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In November 2006, the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania struck 
down the Law on Citizenship which allowed dual citizenship for ethnic Lithuanian 
emigrants, but not for representatives of ethnic minorities who have emigrated to their kin-
states, as a case of ethnic discrimination. However, instead of expanding the availability of 
dual citizenship to ethnic minority migrants, the Constitutional Court ruled that widespread 
dual citizenship is unConstitutional and undesirable. Such a ruling went not only against 
the preferences of the Lithuanian general public, minorities, and politicians, but also 
against the predictions of mainstream citizenship studies which presume that an emigration 
country would seek to expand rather than curtail dual citizenship for its diaspora, and that 
European integration is supposed to make postcommunist countries more inclusive. This 
empirical puzzle prompted an inquiry into the approach dominating the field of citizenship 
studies – the twin liberalization/ convergence theses. The convergence thesis suggests that 
citizenship regulation is becoming similar accross different countries, especially in Europe, 
and the liberalization thesis suggests that this convergence is moving in the direction of 
greater accessibility of citizenship, including expanded opportunities for dual citizenship, 
expansion of rights for migrants, and a decline of the importance of identitarian criteria for 
ascription of citizenship. I challenge this thesis by noting how the decoupling of rights from 
citizenship unintentionally re-emphasizes its identitarian dimension.  
I analyze public discourse, parliamentary proceedings, and Constitutional Court 
rulings, and conclude that Lithuania‘s unexpected restrictive turn is a result of the 
combination of contradictory influence of the international norms and the enduring 
concerns with stateness – the requirement for a state to have a clearly established territory 
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and citizenry. On the basis of the case findings, I conceptualize citizenship as a boundary 
maintenance mechanism in reaction to the combination of concerns with stateness and the 
international norms which both delegitimize and reinforce the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship, and set out to test whether it has comparative purchase outside of the 
postcommunist region.  
An overview of dual citizenship regulations and discourse in different regions 
supports my argument that, even if there is a nominal upward trend in availability of dual 
citizenship, its identitarian dimension overshadows the instrumental dimension and is 
intermeshed with the use of citizenship to maintain the boundary of stateness. Although 
studies of democratic transition have relegated stateness issues to the postcommunist 
world, I demonstrate that it is relevant not only for a postcolonial country that has 
experienced foreign domination, but also for established Western states due to the pressures 
of globalization and migration. 
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   “The politics of citizenship today is first and foremost a politics of nationhood.” 
     (R.Brubaker, Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany, 1992: 180.) 
 
The Puzzle 
In October 2006 the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania investigated 
a question raised by a group of members of the Parliament of Lithuania on whether the 
Law on Citizenship was unConstitutional in that it discriminated based on ethnicity and 
descent. This question was combined into one case together with a district court inquiry 
regarding an Israeli citizen who wanted to regain her Lithuanian citizenship, which she 
possessed before World War II, in order to achieve restitution of her property. She had 
been refused citizenship on the basis of the law that allowed ethnic Lithuanians to retain 
Lithuanian citizenship if they emigrated, but forbade preservation of Lithuanian citizenship 
for people of other ethnicities who repatriated to their ethnic homelands. The Israeli citizen 
brought the case to court and claimed that any attempt to establish repatriation to an ethnic 
homeland requires inquiries into a person’s ethnicity and thus is an instance of 
discrimination prohibited by the Constitution of Lithuania. 
At first sight, this would seem to be a fairly straightforward case of ethnic 
citizenship policy traditionally associated with Central and Eastern European countries. 
Yet the Constitutional Court produced an unexpected ruling on November 13, 2006, 
declaring not only that the preference given to Lithuanians was discriminatory, but also 
that the widespread availability of dual citizenship was unConstitutional. This outcome 
upset the plaintiffs, the Lithuanian public and politicians, and the mainstream theories on 
dual citizenship. At that time Lithuania was the country of largest net emigration (in 
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percentages of population) in the EU, and scholars would assume that, as a sending country, 
it should favor dual citizenship as a means of maintaining ties with its expatriates, rather 
than forbid it. The mainstream hypothesis pertaining to emigration countries holds that the 
sending state takes on the active pursuit of transantionalism, exclusively focusing on co-
ethnics abroad. The state seizes the policy of dual citizenship as a means to control border-
crossing social formations and to further remittances and investment by emigrants in the 
country of origin (Faist 2007; Fitzgerald 2009; Schmitter Heisler 1985; Smith 2003b; 
Varadarajan 2010). Furthermore, as Faist (2007: 5-6) points out, once instituted, dual 
citizenship is unlikely to be reversed. Finally, even the scholars who are cautious not to 
overemphasize the purported trend towards greater inclusiveness of citizenship regulation 
tend to associate liberalization with elites and restrictiveness with popular opinion (Howard 
2009), whereas in the Lithuanian case the restrictive move was undertaken by elites in the 
face of widespread public disapproval. In sum, the case of Lithuanian dual citizenship 
contradicts all expectations of the mainstream approaches to emigrant-sending country 
behavior. 
We are thus presented with a genuine puzzle: why does Lithuania, a quintessential 
emigration country, fly in the face of all the mainstream predictions? The ruling appears 
even more counterintuitive if one looks for an explanation in its temporal and geopolitical 
context. Temporally speaking, this was the time of unprecedented emigration high on the 
national political agenda, which would lead us to expect that the aforementioned 
predictions about the behavior of emigration countries should be manifest in Lithuania. 
Membership in the NATO and the EU, which were also the recipients of the absolute 
majority of emigrants in question, for a time could be considered to have rendered 
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traditional concerns with conflicting loyalties of dual citizens geopolitically obsolete. 
Furthermore, European integration makes it possible to utilize certain political and social 
rights without having citizenship of the locale where a person finds himself or herself, thus 
questioning the practical importance of citizenship. Taking EU membership into account, 
it becomes unclear why the debates on Lithuanian dual citizenship are so contentious. 
When juxtaposed with significant outmigration of the population and overwhelming public 
support for providing dual citizenship to ethnic Lithuanians, the restrictive dual citizenship 
regime that has resulted from the Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling requires more 
explanatory power than one could afford a casuistic reading of the text of the Constitution. 
This thesis investigates the paradoxical case of Lithuanian dual citizenship in an attempt to 
refine the mainstream citizenship studies assumptions which this case challenges. I propose 
that Lithuania’s unexpected restrictiveness is a result of the interaction between the 
hegemony of international norms of nondiscrimination, the strengthening of the 
identitarian dimension of citizenship as an unintended consequence of European 
integration, and concerns with stateness. 
Theoretical Background 
The focal point of my dissertation is the question of declining exclusivity of 
political membership in a nation-state that has come to occupy a prominent place in social 
scientific inquiry in the past couple decades. There are three interrelated strands of 
literature that can be interrogated using the Lithuanian case of citizenship. The move 
towards greater restrictiveness of the Lithuanian dual citizenship regime can be juxtaposed 
with the mainstream citizenship studies’ claim that citizenship regulation is becoming 
increasingly liberal across the world. A second strand of literature, which partly overlaps 
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with the first one, focuses on European integration and treats the EU as, first, the laboratory 
for liberal convergence, and, second, as a positive influence that moderates ethnonationalist 
proclivities of the postcommunist Central and Eastern European states. The third body of 
literature that is challenged by the Lithuanian case concerns dual citizenship seen as an 
indicator of liberalization and how an emigration country relates to dual citizenship. These 
strands are disentangled in detail in the first chapter of this dissertation, but here it is 
important to position my research in relation to the existing body of knowledge by briefly 
addressing this constellation of literature. 
Citizenship, Nationhood, Migration, and the Liberal/Convergence Thesis 
Citizenship is a multifaceted concept that can be studied in numerous ways, from 
normative political approaches of what it entails and how it should be practiced to legalistic 
analysis of rules and regulations. In my dissertation, I use the concept of citizenship to 
designate a legal status composed of two mutually ambivalent clusters of elements: rights 
and duties of an individual, and identity, membership, and participation in a political 
community (Kivisto and Faist 2007), i.e. a combination of an instrumental and an 
identitarian dimensions. One of the central tenets on which my approach is built lies in the 
understanding of citizenship as the interface between the individual, the state, and the 
international levels, expressed through the nexus between citizenship, nationhood and 
migration. This nexus, and the states’ efforts to cope with the volume, salience, and 
changing patterns of migration that are part and parcel of globalization, is becoming 
increasingly relevant across world regions. I argue that taking into account migration issues 
is indispensable when studying citizenship regulation in any given country, and that dual 
citizenship is especially propitious for the study of the nexus between citizenship and 
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migration. The very fact of migration, whose current volume amounts to 3 percent of the 
world’s population (Segal et al. 2010), is not new, but its political salience has been 
sharpened by the synergy between xenophobic popular opinion and politicians willing to 
manipulate it for electoral gains, facilitated by the scare of terrorism and the perceived 
failure of immigrant integration in receiving countries. Paradoxically, citizenship studies 
have consistently pointed out that citizenship regulation is becoming increasingly liberal 
across the world, a hypothesis that is connected with the question of the role of international 
norms diffusion and its potential to mitigate discrimination and inequality.  
In an influential study that revitalized scholarly interest in citizenship, Brubaker 
(1992a) posited that states can be characterized by distinct citizenship regimes underpinned 
by distinct conceptions of nationhood. He identified a civic and an ethnic citizenship 
regime, distinguished by a different emphasis on the relationship between a state and an 
ethnic group that forms the basis of its population, but emphasized the fundamental 
imbrications between citizenship as membership in the state, on the one hand, and national 
identity, on the other. This nexus between citizenship status and national identity has been 
increasingly challenged by claims that, in the globalized world, characterized by increasing 
flows of migration, descent-based conceptions of citizenship are delegimitized and are 
giving way to civic orientations that do not rely on the correlation between the dominant 
ethnic group and the political community in apportioning political membership (Kaufmann 
2000).  
In essence, the liberalization/convergence thesis is built on either postnationalist or 
multiculturalist lines of reasoning that address the question of declining exclusivity of 
political membership in a nation-state. Both of these camps are characterized by a 
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combination of normative and empirical scholarship in that they both proclaim and herald 
a shift towards a decline of the centrality of nationhood (contra Brubaker 1992a) and an 
increase of inclusiveness on the part of the state. Multiculturalists address the increasing 
ethnic and cultural diversity within states and associate it with minority claim making and 
a lessening of the homogenizing impulse inherent in nation states in general and in 
citizenship in particular (Abu-Laban 2002; Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008; 
Koopmans and Statham 1999; Kymlicka 2007). Postnationalists focus on the decoupling 
of rights and citizenship and claim that the nation-state is losing its relevance, giving way 
to increasing availability of rights based on residence rather than citizenship enabled by the 
hegemonic international human rights regime (Soysal 1994; Jacobson 1996; Shafir and 
Brysk 2006). The European Union, as an ‘ever closer union’, is viewed as the incubator of 
postnationalism par excellence, a factual negation of exclusivity of loyalties (Hansen and 
Weil 2002; Soysal 1994). In Chapter 1, I address the developments in European Union in 
greater detail as they pertain to the twin hypotheses of liberalization and convergence, and 
in Chapter 5 I revisit the EU in light of the findings distilled from the empirical data 
analysis of the Lithuanian case. Looking at the conditions of possibility of access to 
residency and then citizenship in the EU countries, I develop the argument that, rather than 
heralding the advent of postnationalism, the decoupling of people, rights and territory 
taking place due to European integration has inadvertently strengthened the identitarian 
dimension of citizenship, as evidenced in the increasingly stringent requirements for 
migrant integration. Even if the simplified assumption of the derivation of citizenship 
policies from the ethnic or civic nationhood conceptions has been widely discredited, the 
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actual complexities of the relationship between national identity and citizenship merit our 
scholarly attention (Bauböck 2006). 
Dual Citizenship and Postnationalism 
In the past decade the celebration of the decline of the nation-state has been checked 
by an acknowledgment of a countervailing trend towards a more restrictive backlash that 
is mostly ascribed to securitization in the post-9/11 context (Bauböck 2006; Faist and 
Kivisto 2007). Nevertheless, the prevalent theories posit a convergence towards greater 
liberalization of citizenship legislation, and the rules regarding dual citizenship are 
considered to be one of the key indicators attesting to such liberalization. Even where there 
are indications of securitization-induced restrictiveness towards immigrants, the expanding 
possibilities for co-ethnic emigrants to gain dual citizenship are rarely questioned by most 
theorists (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch 2006; Faist 2007; Faist and 
Kivisto 2007; Howard 2009), making Lithuania a deviant case and thus especially 
interesting to investigate. 
More than half of the countries in the world today tolerate some form of dual 
citizenship due to the combination of an uncoordinated variety of state citizenship policies 
(ius soli, ius sanguinis, and combinations thereof), large scale migration, a decrease in the 
likelihood of putting competing loyalties to the test, and the expansion of human rights, 
especially the imperative of gender equality (Blatter, Erdmann and Schwanke 2009; 
Brøndsted Sejersen 2008; Koslowski 2000; Howard 2005; Renshow 2005; Kivisto and 
Faist 2007). However, a lack of hard quantitative data on the numbers of dual citizens limits 
a major part of literature to discussions of potential benefits and dangers of dual citizenship 
and its un/desirability (Bar-Yaacov 1961; Hammar 1989; Hansen and Weil 2002; Martin 
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and Heilbronner 2003; Renshow 2005). The proliferation of literature on dual citizenship 
in the past decade has not produced significant changes in the main hypotheses it offers to 
social scientists. The prevalent theories assume that increasing availability of dual 
citizenship is due to immigrant-receiving countries’ attempts to facilitate immigrant 
naturalization and incorporation, and to emigrant-sending countries’ pursuit of remittances 
and political control of its co-ethnics abroad, and do not foresee a backlash against dual 
citizenship once it has been instituted (Faist 2007: 5-6). In the theoretical framework 
chapter I expand on these assumptions, and in the empirical chapters I explicate how the 
Lithuanian case challenges them, questioning whether dual citizenship is necessarily 
becoming more available, and whether it is better understood as a harbinger of 
postnationalism, or, conversely, as a reaffirmation of the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship.  
Dual (or multiple) citizenship, understood as membership in more than one state, 
multiplies both the instrumental and the identitarian elements of citizenship and the 
problems of their reconciliation, thus exposing the cracks in the edifice of exclusionary 
state membership. However, inquiry into the relationship between the phenomenon of dual 
citizenship and the “analytical and normative nationalism” (Bosniak 2006: 5) that underlies 
citizenship studies needs to be informed by empirical investigation. My project addresses 
the question whether dual citizenship could be an indicator of postnationalism (Soysal 
1994), multinationalisation (Bosniak 2006), or denationalization (Sassen 2002), by 
exploring whether it can be taken to signify the lessening of the emphasis on national 
identity in the discourse and practices of the nation-state. Posing the question in such terms 
also serves as a way to overcome the frequent binary compartmentalization of dual 
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citizenship as a tool of immigrant incorporation and as an instrument of maintaining 
connections with emigrants, and to bridge the divide between clusters of citizenship studies 
situated within- or outside- nation-state boundaries (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 
2008). Dual citizenship, as a hybrid phenomenon straddling the divide between outside- 
and in-nation-state perspectives, is an especially conducive lens for advancing the 
understanding of the contradictory trends of greater liberalization and increased 
restrictiveness, as well as the dynamics of what Joppke (2005) calls “de- and re-
ethnicization” of citizenship. Focusing on the changes in citizenship regulation offers 
additional analytical purchase by departing from the static bias inherent in such 
dichotomizing categories as civic/ethnic and sending/receiving countries. Close 
examination of the discourse on dual citizenship enables us to explore whether the ensuing 
changes in citizenship regulation are indeed characterized by greater inclusiveness both 
formally and substantively, going beyond quantitative indicators or metanormative 
argumentation, as well as beyond acknowledging the determining role of path dependency 
in shaping each country’s approach to dual citizenship (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple 2004; 
Faist 2007). My argument is that, in the context of purported postnational decoupling of 
rights and citizenship, dual citizenship tips the balance of scale from the instrumental to 
the identitarian dimension of citizenship in countries across the board.  
Faist (2007) claims that dual citizenship debates in European countries indicate a 
shift from preoccupation with nationhood to concern with societal integration. My project 
revisits such notions and proposes to explore the discourse on dual citizenship to 
demonstrate the inseparability of societal integration from the notion of nationhood. The 
hypothesis that posits a convergence towards greater liberalization of citizenship is only 
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partly addressed by studies that focus on legal developments; the context and motives 
surrounding the regulations are crucial for establishing whether citizenship actually is more 
liberal and characterized by greater inclusiveness. I suggest that if the state connects dual 
citizenship with an explicit goal of facilitating immigrant assimilation, as evident in the 
recent shift towards an emphasis on more substantive integration requirements for 
naturalizing immigrants, it should be seen as a reaffirmation, rather than a negation, of the 
fundamental role of national identity in relation to citizenship. 
European Integration and Central and Eastern Europe. The dynamics of the 
relationship between migration, citizenship and nationhood are especially interesting at the 
intersection of the European Union and the post-communist world. European integration 
has led many scholars to speculate on the changes in the exclusive primacy of political 
membership in the nation-state. On the other hand, national sovereignty and national 
identity have been at the center of politics in post-communist countries. When these two 
modes of political membership meet, the inherent tensions and vicissitudes are brought to 
the forefront. The curious case of dual citizenship in Lithuania provides an especially rich 
investigative field for addressing this intersection. of two fields of political membership 
that represent the competing paradigms – the European Union, seen as the pinnacle of 
observable postnationalist trends, on the one hand, and the postcommunist Central and 
Eastern Europe, the archetypical locus of ethnic citizenship tendencies, on the other 
(Brubaker 1992b, Kymlicka 2007).  
Most scholarship on citizenship issues in Central and Eastern European states has 
been focused on their relationship with historical kin-minorities in neighboring countries, 
mostly concentrating on the case of Hungary (Batory 2010; Csergő and Goldgeier 2005; 
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Kovács 2006; McGarry and Keating 2006; Tóth 2003; Udrea 2014; Waterbury 2014), 
whereas the case of Lithuania presents an opportunity to incorporate the novel aspects of 
increased migration tied to belonging to the common EU space into citizenship studies of 
this region. The patterns of migration across the world are changing in ways that challenge 
both scholarship and policy addressing the nexus between migration and citizenship: 
migration is becoming increasingly circular, and a growing number of states that were 
considered sending states are also becoming countries of immigration, undermining the 
distinctions on which much of the thinking about the issues of migrant citizenship has been 
predicated. A study of the discourse on dual citizenship and its regulation in Lithuania, a 
country representing these trends and contradicting the mainstream theories, allows us to 
strive for a more nuanced understanding of contemporary changes in the nexus between 
migration patterns, citizenship regulations, and political community.  
By focusing on the intersection between the EU and the postcommunist region, a 
closer look at the Lithuanian discourse on citizenship allows us to address the well-known 
hypothesis of EU-membership conditionality that attributes to the pursuit for EU 
membership the power of nudging the acceding countries away from an ethnic conception 
of citizenship and towards a more territorially based inclusiveness (Cirtautas and 
Schimmelfennig 2010; Csergő and Goldgeier 2005; Kelley 2006; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Williams 2002). The bulk of research on the role of international norms 
in domestic change fails to analytically disentangle “genuine” normative socialization on 
the one hand, and strategic reasoning and action that breeds “Constitutional cheerleading” 
and Janus-faced structures and discourses on the other (Jacoby 1999). Analysis of the 
contentious discourse on dual citizenship provides an opportunity to avoid oversimplifying 
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the opposition between an ‘ethnic’ orientation of Central and Eastern European countries 
on the one hand, and a ‘liberalizing’ Western Europe, on the other, exploring instead the 
superimposition of international and domestic ideational spheres, an approach that leads to 
more fruitful research on norms diffusion (Checkel 1999; see e.g. Schwellnus 2005 for an 
account of the complementarity of EU conditionality and socialization in explaining 
Europeanization of the norms of nondiscrimination and minority protection in Central and 
Eastern Europe). Since the main strategic functions of political discourse are coercion/ 
resistance, legitimization/ delegitimization, and representation/ misrepresentation (Chilton 
and Schäffner 2011: 311-312), it provides a direct line to the exploration of the roles 
various ideas perform. Closer analysis of the ways in which European integration and 
international norms are deployed in the discourse on citizenship serves as one of the crucial 
elements in furthering an explanation of the curious case of Lithuanian dual citizenship. 
Each of these arguments is developed in more detail in Chapter 1. As an inquiry 
into the changes in citizenship regulation and its relationship with the issues of nationhood, 
my study is directly informed by the debates between theorists who both celebrate and 
advocate the decline of importance of citizenship as exclusive political membership in the 
nation-state (Benhabib 2004, Bosniak 2006) and those who defend the normative value of 
the connection between citizenship and national identity (Miller 1997). However, I refrain 
from passing judgment on the case under investigation, choosing rather to highlight the 
deep-cutting contradictions that are informative of the fundamental aspects of the discourse 
of citizenship. 
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Contribution to the Literature 
The main contributions of my research are twofold: explicating the increasing 
importance of the identitarian dimension of citizenship mentioned in the previous 
subsection and analyzed in more detail in Chapter 1, and proposing to concentrate on the 
interaction between international norms of nondiscrimination, the identitarian dimension 
of citizenship and concerns with stateness when analyzing citizenship regulation, which I 
briefly discuss in this subsection and flesh out throughout the paper as part of the theory-
building endeavour. 
The postcommunist region has traditionaly been approached through the lens of 
area studies or comparative analysis of democratic transition and consolidation, usually in 
juxtaposition to Latin America. In my quest to understand what factors could make 
Lithuania deviate from a pattern predicted by the prevalent approaches of citizenship 
studies, a natural place to turn to was its status as a postcommunist country. The classic 
work by Linz and Stepan (1996) on democratic consolidation suggested the variable of 
stateness as a key to the difficulty of postcommunist transition and democratic 
consolidation. They conceptualized stateness as an agreement on what the boundaries of 
the polity should be, both in terms of territory and in terms of its demos (Linz and Stepan 
1996: 16). They contended that the better the congruence between the state and the nation, 
the greater national homogeneity, the easier the democratization. Unsurprisingly, 
establishing stateness was perceived as problematic in an area of the world characterized 
by a patchwork of changed borders and stranded minorities. In that sense, the concerns 
with stateness dovetail closely with the issue of state identity. It is one of those concepts 
that should be understood and captured on a large societal scale, so it did not receive much 
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attention beyond this field of study. Later attempts to further specify stateness relied on 
operationalization of the key features of a Weberian state, such as administrative capacity, 
effective security, domestic control and legitimacy (Melville, Stukal and Mironyuk, 2013, 
cf. Møller, Jørgen, and Svend-Erik Skaaning. 2011). Meanwhile, the identitarian 
dimension becomes relegated to a secondary role, whereas my goal is to bring it back to 
the forefront. 
Linz and Stepan (1996) employed stateness in the analysis of democratization and 
political regimes, approaching it as precondition for successful democratic consolidation 
(see also Stepan, Linz and Yadav 2011), so it became inextricably intertwined with that 
field of study. One of the consequences of such a symbiotic relationship has been a 
relatively confined conception of stateness – either a country has stateness problems and 
consequently struggles in its democratic transition and consolidation, or the stateness is 
successfully established, the country consolidates its democracy, and its stateness does not 
get questioned any more. Linz and Stepan (1996) portrayed Western European and Latin 
American countries’ stateness as not problematic, since they had taken care of their nation-
building earlier. These authors are not alone in this approach, for example, Wilmer (2004) 
cites a conversation with a member of Milosevic’s party during the Bosnian war who 
claimed that they were only doing what the Western states had done earlier in order to 
establish nation-states, giving the specific example of France.  
However, I propose approaching the notion of stateness from a less static angle by 
accepting that stateness is never established irreversibly. The postcommunist states’ 
politics are fundamentally affected by their awareness of their history of periodic 
dominance by foreign powers via Russian, Austrian or Ottoman imperialism. This is 
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certainly true for a country like Lithuania, which had been at war with Russia for centuries 
and got occupied by it three times in the past three hundred years. Events in Georgia in 
2008 and Ukraine in 2014 testify to an existing continuous threat to the statehood of 
Russia’s “near abroad” countries. Following this logic, due to awareness of the 
vulnerability of one’s state, stateness requires continuous maintenance. Citizenship 
regulation becomes a tool of excluding the Russian minority connected with the Russian 
threat (or any other neighbouring country that is perceived as a threat). 
In this dissertation, I propose that the imperative of continuous stateness 
maintenance extends beyond the postcommunist region. Although postcommunist 
countries may experience the threat more acutely and directly, the difference from other 
countries is more of degree and less of quality. The next concentric circle to which the 
concerns with stateness are relevant would be postcolonial countries. The feature that they 
share with postcommunist states is the fact that they have experienced foreign domination 
which they resent, and often have formed their identity in opposition to the aggressor. In 
maritime postcolonial countries the geographical proximity of the threat may not be as 
immediate as in Eastern Europe, but the threat is nevertheless continuously experienced, 
first of all through the need to assert themselves culturally and materially. In this context, 
the attribution and symbolic content of citizenship becomes important as a form of 
affirmative action, a way to redefine the colonial “us” vs. “them” in a normative mirror 
image. 
The concentric circles through which I map my conceptual travel do not stop with 
countries that have concerns with stateness due to their experience of foreign domination. 
I contend that pressures of migration and globalization call into question the nation-ness 
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and stateness of virtually all the nation-states, including those that scholars of political 
regimes and transitions deemed to be fully established and unproblematic. With the 
increasing migration-related pressures, even the most established Western European and 
settler countries are not able to physically ensure the unassailability of their defined 
territory or the demos and have to contend with the symbolic boundaries of their nation-
states. My suggestion is that, in this vein, one of the key constitutive elements of stateness, 
citizenship regulation, becomes the focal point of the continuous stateness boundary 
maintenance. Thus I extend my concentric circles of the applicability of the notion of 
citizenship as a stateness boundary maintenance regime across several types of states.  
The hunch to focus on stateness came from the initial inquiry into the empirical 
data on the paradoxical case of Lithuanian dual citizenship, making this thesis truly a theory 
building exercise. I map out my steps in writing by tracing the role of stateness concerns 
in the development of Lithuanian citizenship regulation and in the public and politico-legal 
discourse on citizenship, demonstrating the pervasiveness of concerns with stateness. 
Afterwards, I test whether the notion of citizenship as a stateness maintenance regime 
indeed has comparative purchase across regions by reviewing citizenship regulation and 
discourse in different parts of the world. In the end, we can say that citizenship indeed is 
employed as a stateness boundary maintenance regime under various combinations of the 
conditions of possibility distinguished in my theoretical framework, which is developed in 
more detail in Chapter 1. 
A Note on Methodology 
From the methodological point of view, this dissertation is an instance of using a 
deviant case for theory-building, or, to be more exact, for theory-refining purposes. The 
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Lithuanian case of dual citizenship challenges the premises of the mainstream citizenship 
studies regarding citizenship and the behaviour of emigration countries, and my goal is to 
explore how this case can help us refine and qualify those mainstream theories. 
Case study. Case studies have a mixed reputation as a mode of scientific inquiry. 
Critics treat them as only suitable for exploratory research and plagued by a lack of 
generalizability, bias in case and method selection, lack of rigour, representativeness, 
discipline and formalization in research designs, inappropriate degrees of freedom, 
underspecified methodology, subjectivity from both the researchers’ and the informants’ 
perspectives, nonreplicability, and overdetermination (Gerring 2007; Hamel, Dufour, and 
Fortin 1993; Yin 2012). Proponents of case study research emphasize its utility in 
answering questions of how and why something happens and argue that it is in fact possible 
to be rigorous and explicit in case study methods and to produce analytical (not statistical) 
generalizable insights (Yin 2012: 5, 18, passim). They also point out the superiority of case 
studies when it comes to understanding the cognitive factors related to the actors in the 
case, such as norms and ideas, and to identifying the processes through which the cognitive 
framework takes place (Blatter and Haverland 2012: 6). Case studies are considered to be 
especially well positioned to ensure conceptual validity, creation of new theories, 
examination of causal mechanisms and causal complexity (George and Bennett 2005). The 
reprimand that case studies have many more potential explanatory variables than data 
points can be addressed by using multiple sources of evidence for triangulation (Yin 2009). 
One of the main benefits of conducting case studies is that they lend themselves to 
modifications of the boundaries of inquiry, research questions and theoretical frameworks 
in the process of conducting the study (Stake 1995: 9, Yin 2012: 6). This characteristic 
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makes case studies especially conducive to theory-building exercises, and therefore 
especially suited for the purposes of this thesis. As Stake (1995: 1) notes, we are interested 
in cases “for both their uniqueness and commonality”, which he denotes as an intrinsic vs. 
an instrumental case study, pointing out that case studies do not lend themselves to the 
imperatives of representative sampling and are in a sense pre-selected (which is what 
happens when one’s study begins with a real-world puzzle, like this dissertation). 
Descriptive case studies have their place in social science as building blocks of the body 
of knowledge, but the more immediately relevant type of case studies are those that are 
more theory-oriented. More specifically, a case study can be interpretative and use existing 
theoretical frameworks to explain a particular case, assessing how satisfactory the existing 
theories are and offering ways to refine them, or seek to generate new or refine existing 
hypotheses (Vennesson 2008: 227-228). Yin (2003: 40-42) distinguishes several types of 
within-case studies: a critical case which tests a well-established theory; an extreme/unique 
case which represents a phenomenon too rare to allow for any cross-case research; a 
representative/typical case that aims to inform about the commonplace as it pertains to the 
phenomenon under study; a revelatory case where one can analyze a previously 
inaccessible phenomenon, and a longitudinal case whose primary objective is to specify 
the pattern of changes over time. This thesis falls broadly within the first type of case 
studies, which can also be called analysis of a deviant case. Deviant cases are an especially 
beneficial research strategy, since they are best positioned to highlight issues in the 
theoretical frameworks that can be overlooked when studying “typical cases” (Stake 1995: 
3-4). Study of deviant cases can make significant contributions to the development of 
theories (George and Bennett 2005; Orum, Feagin and Sjoberg 1991). Case studies are 
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capable of providing analytical generalizations through a two-step process: first, 
demonstrating how the findings of a particular case study inform the theoretical framework, 
and, second, applying these insights to other situations where similar theoretical 
propositions may be relevant (Yin 2012: 18). The ultimate justification of the use of this 
case study in this dissertation is the use of its findings to revisit and refine the mainstream 
theoretical premises regarding dual citizenship. 
In essence, a case study is a more territorially than temporally bounded form of 
cross-level inference (Gerring 2007), lending itself to research tools that trace 
developments over time. In my in-depth within-case analysis, I conduct process tracing of 
the development of the events that challenge the mainstream theories in order to tease out 
the potential building blocks that could help refine those mainstream theories. Process 
tracing is especially suited for theory-refining purposes, as it has both an inductive and a 
deductive element, and is becoming increasingly popular as a way to research the 
complexity of social causal mechanisms (Beach and Pedersen 2013; Bennett 2008; George 
and Bennet 2005). George and Bennet (2005: 224) go as far as to claim that process tracing 
is the only alternative to covariation when it comes to causal inference from observations. 
Unlike the variable-based approach to causality exhibited by quantitativists, process 
tracing looks at it in terms of the interaction of necessary and sufficient conditions that 
make the outcome under study possible, leading to “possibilistic generalizations” (Blatter 
and Haverland 2012). In fact, the use of process tracing as a supplement to cross-case large-
N research is problematic, because it is possible that different mechanisms operate in 
different cases (Goertz and Mahoney 2012). This line of argumentation is based on the 
point that one should not judge within-case qualitative research using probabilistic criteria, 
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but rather appreciate the value of study of single cases as a tool for refining theoretical 
principles. In the study of deviant cases, process tracing proceeds rather inductively, but 
the eliminative character of this induction and the possibility to test the derived theoretical 
insights with data from different points in the process enables falsification efforts (Bennett 
2008).  
Therefore, I choose this approach as the most suitable way of addressing my main 
research questions: Why does Lithuania contradict the predictions of mainstream theories 
on citizenship? Which elements predicted by the mainstream theories are there and which 
are missing? What is Lithuania a case of? Are there discernable trends in the development 
of Lithuanian citizenship regulation? What are the main topics that figure in deliberations 
on dual citizenship? What is the role of international norms in the regulation of Lithuanian 
citizenship? How are they employed and by which actors? What is the relationship between 
citizenship and identity in Lithuanian discourse on dual citizenship? What insights can the 
Lithuanian case offer in terms of citizenship theories?  
After refining my theoretical propositions based on the Lithuanian case data 
analysis, I turn to a comparison with a shadow case – South Korea – to assess how well 
those insights travel, but process tracing of the case of Lithuania forms the basis of this 
research project. The “fingerprints” of the identitarian and instrumental dimensions of 
citizenship and the influence of European integration that I am looking for in tracing the 
process of the development of Lithuanian discourse on citizenship include references to 
ethnic vs. civic identity in the politico-legal texts and identitarian claim making in the 
public discourse, invocation of international norms, the EU and “the West” by the judges, 
politicians and the public, and arguments about the instrumental benefits and pitfalls of 
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dual citizenship from an individual, a societal and a state perspective expressed in the 
public discourse. As this is a theory-building exercise, I am also looking for the elements 
that figure prominently in the politico-legal public discourse and yet are unaccounted for 
by the mainstream citizenship theories, which I eventually conceptualize as stateness. 
Sources. The bulk of the data comes from archival research: the texts of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and laws on citizenship; the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court of Lithuania pertaining to citizenship and protocols of public 
deliberations on those rulings; records of the working group which prepared the text of the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania in 1990-1992; stenographs of parliamentary 
sessions in which the laws on citizenship were debated; public statements made by 
politicians, articles in Lithuanian media and public comments on those articles. My initial 
objective to balance archival research with ethnographic method of field interviews had to 
be curtailed due to the fact that most players of the case of Lithuanian dual citizenship were 
very aware of each other and the political sensitivity of the matter and either refused to 
give interviews or talked evasively, avoiding key questions and offering carefully qualified 
generic statements. Most regrettably, the Constitutional Court judges treat the rule that 
prohibits them from revealing the content of deliberations behind closed doors as 
effectively barring them from expressing personal opinions on the case and the discursive 
argumentation pertaining to the rulings. Therefore, insights based on interviews inform the 
interpretation of the material, but cannot be intensively quoted and properly attributed. 
Stone Sweet (2000) suggests that the unavailability of insight into the judges’ deliberations 
preempts ideational analysis of judicial review in favor of strategic-interest based 
approaches. However, I adopt a broader view of what is relevant in this case, focusing on 
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the interactions between the legal and the political planes as expressed in publicly available 
discourse, which facilitates the investigation of the role ideas play and the ways in which 
they are deployed in the paradoxical case of Lithuanian dual citizenship.  
The main tools employed in this analysis are discourse analysis of the arguments 
articulated in political debates, legal reasoning and public reactions to the regulation of 
citizenship, and content analysis of the rulings of the Constitutional Court of Lithuania. 
The political discourse is an especially propitious place to look for boundary production 
and inscription, as it provides the framework for social meaning (Larsen 1997). I analyze 
the public discourse on dual citizenship in Lithuania in order to address the question of 
whether dual citizenship can be taken to signify a decline, or, conversely, a reiteration of 
the national. Analysis of citizenship as legal status needs to be supplemented by a thorough 
understanding of the context that shapes the relevant legislation; after all, formalizing a 
rule is hardly the first or the last step in a contentious political process. Discourse analysis 
operates on the assumption that political language is not restricted to politico-legal 
documents and thus justifies the inclusion of media and public discussions into the 
analyzed material and a broader interpretation of the data (Larsen 1997). By treating 
individual utterances as societal products based on the assumption that, if that were not the 
case, the individual would not be able to communicate, discourse analysis makes it possible 
to partially overcome the limitation of not having direct access to the information about 
Constitutional Court judges’ decision-making processes. To supplement discourse 
analysis, I also conduct content analysis, which helps to quantify the patterns of 
increasing/decreasing usage of certain terms in the development of citizenship regulation. 
Close analysis of the politico-legal texts and public discourse reveals the centrality of 
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‘stateness’ concerns in citizenship regulation, the ingredient that was missing in the 
mainstream accounts which the Lithuanian case challenged. 
Overview of the chapters 
This thesis consists of five chapters bookended by the Introduction and 
Conclusions. Chapter 1 presents the theoretical framework that my study sets out to 
challenge and qualify. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 present the empirical evidence of the case study, 
while Chapter 5 revisits and refines the theoretical framework and discusses the 
comparative implications of this study. Let us overview each chapter in more detail. 
In the first chapter of the dissertation I review the literature that could be employed 
to explain the puzzle found in the Lithuanian case and point out the tensions that require 
closer examination. I begin by specifying the concept of citizenship and its contents as it 
pertains to this study, namely, the conceptualization of citizenship as composed of two 
mutually ambivalent clusters of elements: rights and duties of an individual on the one 
hand, and identity, membership, and participation in a political community on the other 
hand (Kivisto and Faist 2007). In other words, I proceed under the assumption that 
citizenship consists of the instrumental and the ideational dimensions. I discuss the 
liberalization/convergence hypotheses in citizenship studies and formulate the challenges 
to these hypotheses. The main focus of this study is on dual citizenship which can be used 
as a lens of inquiry into the substantive questions of citizenship studies, and particularly as 
a tool for in-depth testing of the liberalization/convergence hypotheses, due to the inherent 
ways in which dual citizenship highlights the tensions between the instrumental and 
ideational dimensions of citizenship. I discuss the concept of dual citizenship, its historical 
development, current debates in the world and their interpretations in light of the 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
24 
 
liberalization/convergence hypotheses. In this chapter, I unpack the theories pertaining to 
dual citizenship regulation and formulate propositions which take into account the 
instrumental and ideational dimensions and enable us to evaluate whether certain 
developments in dual citizenship regulation could be interpreted as an indicator of 
liberalization and/or of convergence, and if yes, then in what direction. I tackle some of the 
central premises of citizenship studies; namely, the hypothesis that various countries are 
converging towards a more liberal regulation of citizenship, which views dual citizenship 
as one of the indicators of such liberalization and the European integration as the most 
advanced locus of such developments; and the assumption that dual citizenship is a 
harbinger of postnationalism and is increasingly favored by immigrant-receiving countries 
as a tool for immigrant incorporation, and by emigrant-sending countries as a tool for 
encouraging remittances and extending control over co-ethnics abroad. I address the idea 
that the European Union is, in a sense, an experimental laboratory where one can observe 
the liberalization/convergence of citizenship regulation and the development of 
postnationalism, and analyze the paradox wherein European integration both enables and 
subverts postnational developments in the concept and practices of citizenship. I also 
address the implications of European conditionality for citizenship regulation and 
discourse in postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe. I finish the first chapter by 
highlighting the tensions and gaps in the mainstream theoretical framework that could 
attempt to explain the Lithuanian case of citizenship regulation, leading to the need to delve 
into the empirical evidence in an effort to locate the “missing ingredient” of stateness that 
could bridge the aforementioned gaps. 
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In the second, third and fourth chapters, I turn to the empirical case of dual 
citizenship in Lithuania which challenges the mainstream assumptions and claims 
pertaining to citizenship regulation and provides a rich collection of material for the 
interrogation and refinement of the mainstream theories of citizenship. Although on the 
surface the critical junction of Lithuanian dual citizenship regulation appears to affirm the 
importance of international norms of nondiscrimination, if we want to be able to specify 
the effect, or lack thereof, of such norms channeled via European integration on citizenship 
regulation, it is not enough to look at the outcome that appears to confirm the effect and 
accept that as sufficient proof (George and Bennett 2005). Rather, a detailed process tracing 
of the development of Lithuanian citizenship discourse and its critical juncture allows us 
to distill the main conditions of possibility of such an outlier case.  
In Chapter 2, I set the stage by overviewing the historical background and 
demographic facts of the Lithuanian case, focusing on its status as an ethnonationalist 
postcolonial emigration country, thus establishing its relevance as a deviant case. I trace 
the development of citizenship regulations, especially those pertaining to dual citizenship, 
from the inception of the modern Lithuanian state to the early 2000s. In addition to 
addressing the role of international norms and identitarian vs. instrumental dimensions 
discussed in Chapter 1, the discussion of the arguments and comments made by policy 
makers during the course of citizenship-policy-making (such as those found in the records 
of the working group who prepared the text of the Lithuanian Constitution) helps tease out 
the preliminary directions of inductive theory building by not only testifying to a strong 
ethnonationalist foundation laid into the conception of the Lithuanian state, but also 
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alerting us to the prominence of stateness concerns in citizenship regulation and an 
ambiguous relationship of Constitution crafters with international norms. 
Chapter 3 focuses on the critical juncture in the development of Lithuanian 
citizenship regulation – the November 2006 Constitutional Court ruling which struck down 
both the pre-existing preference for ethnic Lithuanians and the widespread availability of 
dual citizenship, exposing a different configuration of the nexus between international 
norms of nondiscrimination and availability of dual citizenship than the trend towards 
liberalization predicted by the mainstream citizenship theories. I analyze the reasoning 
provided by the court in the text of its ruling and the reactions to the arguments of the 
Constitutional Court by the politicians and the public, recorded in the media 
pronouncements and legislative proposals on how to remedy the situation. Discourse 
analysis reveals the prevalence of the identitarian dimension in the discourse on citizenship 
over the instrumental concerns with dual citizenship, and traces the tense engagement with 
international norms of nondiscrimination, echoing the arguments laid out in Chapter 1. 
Furthermore, the arguments deployed in the citizenship discourse at the critical juncture 
help flesh out the importance of the concerns with stateness which we were alerted to by 
the data discussed in the previous chapter. This chapter sets the stage for the search for an 
explanation for the state’s inability to act on the assertion of the primacy of the identitarian 
dimension of citizenship and overwhelming support for the restoration of the 
ethnonationalist dual citizenship regime. 
Chapter 4 brings the discursive data into focus, discussing the major alternative 
explanations of the behaviour of the Constitutional Court. One of the alternative 
explanations suggests that the key to such a counterintuitive outcome lies in the effect of 
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international norms that push towards greater liberalization of citizenship regulation. 
Another alternative explanation claims that restrictiveness comes from the more 
instrumentalist dimension, suggesting that both the Court and the politicians were reluctant 
to open the door for the issue of restitution of Jewish property. Process tracing using the 
data gleaned through content analysis of legal documents shows that it is in fact the 
interaction of hegemonic norms with the fundamental stateness concerns that produces a 
paradoxical outcome. My work contributes to the advancement of ideational research by 
addressing the hypothesis of EU conditionality, which predicts a positive liberalizing 
influence on aspiring candidates for membership in the European Union. The research on 
international norms diffusion often fails to analytically disentangle genuine socialization 
and strategic reasoning, whereas the process tracing of the case of dual citizenship in 
Lithuania enables me to detect their differing expressions in the contentious citizenship 
discourse, especially how international norms are filtered in the judicial review. Content 
analysis of Constitutional Court rulings detects a slight shift from more ethnic to more civic 
argumentation over time, which would seem to lend partial support to the effect of norms, 
but since these two dimensions are not correlated in the Court’s utterances, such a 
conclusion needs to be taken with caution. The main finding of the discourse analysis and 
content analysis of the Constitutional Court’s rulings is the crucial and continuous 
reassertion of the primacy of stateness. 
Chapter 5 discusses the comparative implications of the insights produced by the 
in-depth case study. I revisit the theoretical framework for explaining developments in 
citizenship regulations discussed in Chapter 1 by incorporating the insights distilled during 
the process tracing of the case study of Lithuania, concentrating on the analytical categories 
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of the role of international norms, the increasingly identitarian character of citizenship, and 
the importance of concerns with stateness. A discussion of relevant developments in other 
countries and a more in-depth comparison between Lithuanian and South Korean cases 
serves as an additional test of the utility of the refined theoretical framework.  
In the conclusion I draw together the strands of arguments explicated in this 
dissertation that address the contemporary constellations of national identity vs. 
postnationalism in migrant citizenship regulation, summarizing the insights relevant to 
several clusters of social scientific research, such as European studies; postcommunist 
studies; studies in citizenship, migration, and nationalism; Constitutionalism; and 
ideational inquiry. I conclude that the understanding of citizenship as a continuous 
boundary maintenance regime engaged with external and internal existing or perceived 
challenges provides a more dynamic conceptualization than the dominant approach to 
citizenship regulation as a path-dependent phenomenon. Rather than adopting a path-
dependent approach and focusing on ways in which current developments are shaped and 
limited by previous decisions and domestic political concerns foreclosing some paths and 
reemphasizing others, our understanding can be enhanced by shifting the focus onto the 
ways in which they are shaped by interactions with and reactions to the perceived others 
and otherness at the interface of the domestic and the international. Ultimately, citizenship 
is more about interaction than about path dependence, and is never really postnational. 
 
  
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
29 
 
Chapter 1. Theoretical Framework. Dual Citizenship and the Liberalization 
and Convergence Theses in Citizenship Studies 
 
In this chapter, I present the theoretical framework of my thesis. I discuss the 
concept of citizenship and the main approaches to the study of this phenomenon, focusing 
on the dominant trends in citizenship studies. I locate myself in this field of study and 
sketch out the theoretical argument advanced by the Lithuanian case of dual citizenship – 
namely, that citizenship regulation is affected by the conditions of possibility that include 
a simultaneous delegitimization and reiteration of the identitarian dimension of citizenship 
and a concern with stateness. Let me briefly overview the four main building blocks of my 
argument: the liberalization/convergence thesis, the unintended re-emphasis on the 
identitarian dimension of citizenship that is a result of the decoupling of rights and 
belonging, the purported influence of EU on Central and Eastern European postcommunist 
countries, and the relevance of stateness for the issues related to citizenship. 
Citizenship can be conceptualized as consisting of rights and duties of an 
individual, or an instrumental dimensions, and membership in a political community, or an 
identitarian dimension. Most of the scholarship on citizenship has focused on the questions 
of rights. The postnationalist argument, on which the liberal convergence thesis that has 
dominated scholarship since the 1990s relies, posits that states are increasingly liberalizing 
access to citizenship and shifting the dependence of rights onto territorial residency rather 
than on belonging to the national community.  
European integration has been perceived as the pinnacle of such postnationalist 
developments and as a liberalizing influence that lessens the ethnonationalist orientations 
of postcommunist Central and Eastern European states. I argue that both these premises 
should be reconsidered. First, when rights are increasingly decoupled from citizenship, the 
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identitarian dimension of citizenship gets unexpectedly reinforced, which stands in tension 
with the hegemony of international norms of non-discrimination, thus rendering the EU a 
much less straightforwardly liberal environment. Second, the postcommunist countries can 
be perceived as postcolonial states that have experienced foreign domination and thus are 
concerned with their stateness, whereas statehood has been taken for granted in the case of 
the Western states that have served as the basis for the development of most scholarship 
on citizenship. Due to such postcolonial anxieties, the international norms can be used 
subversively in CEE countries, not necessarily in favour of greater liberalization, but for 
restrictive purposes. Furthermore, increasing migration and the resulting actualization of 
citizenship acquisition actually exert pressure on the heretofore unquestioned stateness of 
Western countries. 
When a country is concerned with stateness, citizenship becomes a continuous 
statehood and nationhood boundary maintenance regime. Dual citizenship is an especially 
useful tool for the analysis of this boundary maintenance. Dual citizenship has mostly been 
seen as an indicator of postnationalism due to the focus on immigrant-receiving countries 
and the instrumental dimension of citizenship, whereas dual citizenship for emigrants has 
been understood from the perspective of nationhood, but has remained on the margins of 
citizenship theory. However, if we focus on the contents of the discourse on dual 
citizenship, the ultimate concern with this maintenance of the boundaries of statehood and 
nationhood is evident in both countries of emigration and immigration, reinforcing the 
argument that citizenship has become more and more about identity. In the following 
sections, I expand on each of these points in greater detail. 
Citizenship studies: trends and challenges. 
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The concept of citizenship has been analyzed since Ancient Greece, but its meaning 
is still multifaceted and contested. Most scholars see citizenship as a complex phenomenon 
composed of several dimensions. The enumerations of these dimensions vary; however, 
there is a certain overlap among the main constitutive elements of the concept of 
citizenship. Most authors distinguish citizenship as active participation vs. citizenship as a 
set of rights and duties vs. citizenship as identity and belonging (Bauböck 1994; Heater 
1999; Heater 2004; Kivisto and Faist 2007). For the purposes of this thesis, the analysis of 
citizenship as active participation in the life of a polity is bracketed and the main focus falls 
on the interlocking rights-duties and identity-belonging dimensions of citizenship, which 
can also be conceptualized as the instrumental vs. the identitarian dimensions. Citizenship 
studies in the past two decades have increasingly focused on the former and pronounced 
the latter to be decreasing in importance, an approach that can be summarized as the 
liberalization/convergence thesis, which is challenged in this paper. 
1.1.1. Liberalization/convergence thesis.  
One of the main characteristics of social scientific inquiry in the past several 
decades has been a focus on the question of a relative decline of the exclusivity of political 
membership in a nation-state. Its most concise expression in the field of citizenship studies 
can be found in the so-called twin theses of liberalization and convergence. The 
convergence thesis states that the changes in citizenship regulation across countries are 
bringing the legislation closer to a common denominator, and the liberalization thesis 
specifies the direction of this convergence towards greater inclusion (Aleinikoff and 
Klusmeyer 2001; Bauböck 2006; Howard 2009). By examining each of these arguments in 
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turn, we can extract the potentially testable elements of the liberalization/ convergence 
thesis.  
The hypothesis of convergence centers around the claim that citizenship regulations 
are becoming increasingly similar across countries (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 2002; 
Hansen and Weil 2001). The notion of convergence has been mostly developed in relation 
to Europe, although some studies point towards certain trends that are bringing European 
regulations closer to those characteristic of traditional immigration states, such as USA or 
Australia (Joppke 2010). 
Different authors provide different explanations as to which factors mostly 
contribute to the convergence of policies and legislation. On the one hand, we encounter 
the arguments that similar historical developments have put various countries into similar 
positions and thus lead to similar solutions despite their initial differing conceptions of 
nationhood. They key development that is pointed out as leading to such convergence is 
the presence of a large number of foreigners resulting from migration (Faist and Ette 2007). 
As we can see, the main argument for the convergence thesis rests squarely on the 
perspective of immigrant-receiving countries. An increase in the number of countries that 
simultaneously experience immigration and emigration pressures, such as those 
participating in the Eastern enlargement of the European Union, provides an opportunity 
to inquire into the extent of the applicability of the convergence thesis beyond the core 
immigration countries.  
On the other hand, we have those who emphasize the normative aspect of the 
developments of citizenship regulations. This strand of argumentation also relies heavily 
on the analysis of the experience of the EU countries. The normative influence of the 
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European institutions is not limited to the vertical imposition evident in the conditionality 
of accession for new members; it is crucial to recognize the dynamics of horizontal learning 
between countries (see Bauböck et al. 2006; Maatsch 2011; Vink 2005). In this 
dissertation, I trace both the role of the diffusion of ideas and the role of historical 
developments via discourse analysis of discussions and deliberations pertaining to dual 
citizenship in Lithuania. 
The proponents of the convergence hypothesis, even when they acknowledge 
certain restrictive tendencies, claim that citizenship, at least among the ‘developed’ 
countries, is “converging on a liberal model of inclusive citizenship with diminished rights 
implications and increasingly universalistic identities” (Joppke 2010: vii; see also Castles 
2005; Kivisto and Faist 2007). This can be identified as the “liberalization” component of 
the convergence/liberalization thesis. In short, this thesis entails three constitutive claims 
– that citizenship is becoming more inclusive and liberal, that rights are increasingly 
disassociated from the status of a citizen, and that the identities associated with citizenship 
are moving in the direction of universalism. In order to establish what “fingerprints” to 
look for in the discourse on Lithuanian citizenship, first it is necessary to unpack the 
foundations of the liberalization/convergence thesis.  
1.1.2. Citizenship and national identity. 
In an influential study that revitalized scholarly interest in citizenship, Brubaker 
(1992a) posited that states can be characterized by distinct citizenship regimes underpinned 
by distinct conceptions of nationhood. He identified a civic (ius soli) and an ethnic (ius 
sanguinis) citizenship regime, distinguished by a different emphasis on the relationship 
between a state and a descent group that forms the basis of its population, but, for our 
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purposes, his most important contribution lies in emphasizing the fundamental 
imbrications between citizenship as membership in the state, on the one hand, and national 
identity, on the other.  
Brubaker’s thesis has been widely referenced in virtue of being one of the 
foundational arguments of citizenship studies, but it has received widespread criticism in 
light of the developments in citizenship regulation in the past couple decades (see e.g. 
Joppke 1999; Weil 2001). Criticism focuses on the changes in citizenship legislation in the 
countries that Brubaker studied, pointing out that in Germany, which was said to present 
as an archetype of ethnically conceived nationhood, the 1999 changes in the citizenship 
law significantly expanded the rights to citizenship for migrants of non-German ethnicity, 
and that France, which was presented as an archetype of civic citizenship, took a restrictive 
turn in the 1990s (Hansen and Weil 2001). Such changes purportedly indicate the limited 
validity of Brubaker’s claim of the fundamental importance of the conceptions of 
nationhood, citing mass migration and developments in human rights norms as the main 
factors undermining the continuing relevance of national identity traditions. The nexus 
between citizenship status and national identity has been increasingly challenged by claims 
that in the globalized world, characterized by increasing flows of migration, descent-based 
conceptions of citizenship are delegimitized and are giving way to civic orientations that 
do not rely on the correlation between the dominant ethnic group and the political 
community in apportioning political membership (Kaufmann 2000). The next section 
discusses the main ways of conceptualizing these changes in the nexus between a state and 
a nation. 
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1.1.3. Erosion of the nexus between a state and a nation? 
Two main approaches that aim at conceptualizing the disintegration of the 
relationship between state and nation can be labeled ‘postnationalism’ and 
‘multiculturalism’. Both of them combine normative and empirical scholarship, heralding 
a shift toward greater inclusiveness on the part of the state, but differ in the ways this shift 
is envisioned.  
1.1.3.1. Postnationalism. Some authors (e.g. Cohen 2009: 172) claim that the 
founding postnationalist argument can be traced to Habermas (1990) and his deliberative 
democracy stripped of ethnonational connotations. Others have connected postnationalism 
with the notion of transnational citizenship, focusing on the experiences of migrants that 
operate in more than one national milieu (Basch, Glick Schiller and Szanton Blanc 1994; 
Liebert 2005). However, the key text in citizenship studies that established a more 
empirically-grounded and state-oriented argument that we live in the age of 
postnationalism belongs to Soysal (1994). She built on an incipient awareness among the 
students of citizenship of the increasing divorce between rights and belonging. Calls for 
such dissociation were prompted in the 1980s by the necessity to accommodate increasing 
numbers of migrants who for various reasons did not or could not pursue host country 
citizenship (Silverman 1991). Hamar (1990) even popularized a term “denizenship” to 
designate those who lack official citizenship status but are effectively granted many of its 
rights.  
One of the main developments that is presented as an indicator of postnationalist 
developments is the aforementioned trend among numerous countries towards increasing 
liberalization of citizenship regulation and the lessening of the logic of exclusivity in its 
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attribution, discussed here as the twin convergence and liberalization theses (Bauböck 
2006; Howard 2009). The decline of the relevance of the membership in a nation-state is 
grounded in a combination of the increasing availability of dual citizenship, recognition of 
international norms and various rights for noncitizens (Sassen 1996; Sassen 2008: 278). 
Such rights are usually defined in non-discriminatory terms and are thus at least nominally 
divorced from culturally specific characteristics of their subjects, even if the actual 
implementation may vary (Koopmans 2012). Causal explanations for the increasing 
availability of rights for noncitizens vary from domestic (such as partisanship, political 
mobilization of immigrants, and delegitimization of xenophobia) to international factors 
(Guiraudon 1998). As Shafir and Brysk (2006: 275) note, the international conception of 
human rights has taken over citizenship as the main reference point for legal rights. Such 
postnational developments stand in stark contrast to the fundamental importance of state 
membership as “a right to have rights”, as identified by Hannah Arendt (1973: 296) after 
the World War II and the Holocaust. Postnationalism sees the decoupling of rights and 
citizenship status as the main indicator of the decline of relevance of the nation-state and 
kindles the imaginings of the possible political formations whose coming into being we are 
witnessing, epitomized in the European Union integration (Jacobson 1996; Soysal 1994).  
It is important to point out that a substantial part of the postnationalism arguments 
focuses on the rights that are afforded to migrants based on their residence, rather than on 
the legal status of citizenship. On the one hand, the expansion of denizenship (Hammar 
1989) makes a strong argument for the importance of the role of international norms of 
human rights in the decoupling of rights and citizenship status. On the other hand, by 
placing the focus squarely on the rights that are less closely knit with the legal citizenship 
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status, the postnationalist approach overlooks the importance of the concomitant changes 
in the content of the status of citizenship. The contribution of this dissertation is to bring 
into sharper focus this other side of the rights/status nexus by exploring what happens to 
citizenship once it is decoupled from rights. My argument is that these developments lead 
to the strengthening of the identitarian aspect of citizenship, expressed in both its discursive 
contents (analyzed in Chapters 2, 3, 4) and in the developments pertaining to the 
requirements that an aspiring citizen is expected to fulfill (Chapter 5).  
Soysal (1994: 3) equates postnational citizenship with conferring “upon every 
person the right and duty of participation in the authority structures and public life of a 
polity, regardless of their historical or cultural ties to that community.” Such a definition 
directly implies a relative decline of ethnically biased ascription of membership in the body 
politic, which finds an even more direct expression in multiculturalist theories.  
1.1.3.2. Multiculturalism. The concept of multiculturalism can be approached as 
(1) a de facto statement of increasing diversity in societies, especially as it pertains to 
immigration; as (2) a normative invocation of a positive response to such diversity; and (3) 
specific policies aimed at acknowledging and accommodating or even promoting diversity, 
such as special provisions for minority rights and curtailment of political expressions of a 
dominant culture (Crowder 2013; Holtug, Lippert-Rassmusen and Lægard, 2009). 
Multiculturalists focus on the increasing ethnic and cultural diversity within states and 
associate it with a lessening of the homogenizing impulse inherent in nation-states in 
general and in citizenship regulation in particular (Kivisto 2002). For the purposes of this 
paper, we can bracket the first two dimensions of multiculturalism and the related debates 
about positive and negative implications of potential reification of cultural groups at the 
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expense of individual freedom, segregation, etc., and focus on the third element – 
multicultural policies. 
Some of the specific expressions of multicultural policies include passing extensive 
anti-discrimination measures, recognition of more than one state language (Coulombe 
2000), providing a more diverse representation of national history in education curricula 
instead of presenting the perspective of the dominant cultural group as a unified front of a 
national stance (Carstensen-Egwuom and Holly, 2011), accommodation of different 
religious practices, such as allowing ritual slaughter of animals or wearing traditional 
headgear, institutional channels for taking into account minority positions, ‘sensitivity 
training’ for public officials, and providing state funds for minority cultural activities 
(Vertovec 1998). When it comes to citizenship regulation, the main multiculturalist 
concern is to disassociate citizenship from the elements of the dominant culture and enable 
all members of the polity to participate in the body politic (Kymlicka 1996). This requires 
a national identity centered around political institutions rather than ethno-cultural elements, 
and an acceptance of minority claims as no less legitimate than those of a titular nation 
(Parekh 2000: 231-234). Multicultural citizenship policies are grounded in a combination 
of cultural pluralism and a civic-territorial approach to an individual’s belonging to the 
state (see Koopmans et al. 2005 for the classification of citizenship regimes on the cultural 
pluralism-monism and ethnic-civic dimensions). According to multiculturalists, those 
citizenship policies that claim to be ‘colorblind’ are frequently tacitly assimilationist, 
whereas preferable policy would be one which consciously and actively seeks to provide 
the necessary conditions for different cultures to flourish (Kymlicka 1996). 
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Multiculturalism requires the state to aid immigrant integration without assimilation 
(Bloemraad 2007; Bloemraad, Korteweg and Yurdakul 2008). 
While post-nationalists proclaim the declining relevance of citizenship due to the 
availability of rights for non-citizens, in contrast, citizenship becomes crucial for 
multiculturalists as the main characteristic that is common to all the different members of 
the state and the key conduit through which members of different cultural groups can 
operate. In order to fulfil this function, access to citizenship cannot be dependent on the 
cultural identity of those who seek to gain it. Thus, while multiculturalism places greater 
emphasis on the legal status of citizenship as a necessity for political incorporation, we 
come full circle to the initial statement that both postnationalism and multiculturalism rely 
on the premise that belonging to the titular nation is becoming less relevant for migrant 
incorporation and participation in the body politic. 
Although multicultural policies appeared as a reaction to immigration, multicultural 
theory has been built by referencing not only migrants, but also autochtonous national 
minorities (Kymlicka 1996; Kymlicka 2007a). This duality of the targets of 
multiculturalism is especially relevant for this thesis, providing an integrative background 
for my inquiry into the role of international norms of nondiscrimination in the development 
of the citizenship policies and public discourse in Lithuania where mostly Slavic 
immigrants and national minorities inadvertently overlap. In fact, Kymlicka (2007b) claims 
that much of the international norms regarding minorities have been developed and 
instituted precisely in relation to postcommunist countries. The notion of the impact of 
such norms on CEE countries through the pressures and conditionality of membership in 
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the European Union and other Western organizations is briefly overviewed below and 
analyzed in more detail in Chapter 4. 
1.1.4. European Union as the laboratory of postnationalism 
The main arguments in favour of the decline of the relevance of the nation-state 
and for the liberalization/convergence thesis have been drawn from the experience of 
European integration. The creation of supranational institutional framework that started as 
a European Coal and Steel Community after World War II and became the European Union 
in 1993 is intimately related to the attempts to prevent international hostilities which had 
been a hallmark of life in Europe for hundreds of years and culminated in genocide. Such 
background set the stage for the hegemony of anti-discriminatory norms and inter-cultural 
tolerance as some of the key aspirations of European integration. The 1957 Treaty of Rome 
which established the European Economic Community proclaimed in its preamble the 
determination to “lay the foundations of an ever-closer union among the people of Europe”.  
According to theorists of postnationalism, the integration of Europe into an ‘ever-
closer union’ has spearheaded transnational developments in the increasingly globalizing 
world (Soysal 1994). Hopeful post-nationalists see the EU as an incubator of progressive 
trends and give them evocative labels, like a “demystification of state sovereignty” 
(Keating 2006: 24), “a new medievalism” (Koslowski 2000: 155), or simply see it as a 
factual negation of exclusivity of loyalties (Hansen and Weil 2002: 7). For the purposes of 
this paper, we need to concentrate on three main aspects in which European integration 
speaks to the arguments behind the liberalization/convergence hypothesis: the 
characteristics of the common European space as it pertains to free movement of an 
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individual, the policy convergence vector, and the relationship between the EU and 
ethnonational communities. 
1.1.4.1. Common market and freedom of movement. The principal development in 
the EU has been the market integration, epitomized in the four freedoms – free movement 
of goods, capital, services and people. These freedoms have reconstructed the way a state, 
a cultural community and an economy relate to each other, and have removed territoriality 
of a nation-state as the prerequisite and boundary mechanism for such interactions 
(McGarry et al. 2006). Within the framework of this thesis, the most relevant freedom is 
the free movement of people. The most visible aspect of the freedom of movement is the 
Schengen area – the possibility to move between countries with merely a signpost 
signifying that you have crossed a national border; however, the key implications of the 
principle of free movement of persons go beyond tourism. If a person is a citizen of any of 
the member states (with certain delays in regard to new members), s/he can move freely, 
find work and establish domicile anywhere in the EU and is granted numerous social, and 
even political, rights (e.g. voting in local and European Parliament elections).  
Free movement of persons is often proclaimed to be among the most important 
foundational features of the EU, but it faces a backlash from countries like the United 
Kingdom due to an increase of Eastern European immigrants. The established freedom of 
movement precludes national governments from instituting effective limits on intra-EU 
migration beyond transitional periods imposed on new member states that last no more 
than 7 years. Every year there are more and more people who are citizens of one European 
country, but live and work in another, pay taxes there and receive public services, and are 
even able to vote in local and European Parliament elections in the place of their domicile. 
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Possible overlap of government functions is resolved among states in ways that enable 
people to receive social security payments wherever they go, etc. Through such 
developments, European integration has posed the most veritable challenge to the trinity 
of state functions, territory, and the people. These correlatives of the free movement of 
persons serve as the springboard for postnationalist arguments about the increasing 
availability of various rights previously associated with citizenship for people who are not 
citizens of the country in which they currently reside. This argument speaks to the 
liberalization dimension of the liberalization/ convergence hypothesis. 
1.1.4.2. Policy convergence. Another feature of the European Union that is directly 
related to the liberalization/convergence thesis is policy convergence. The EU has a unique 
governance structure, and one of its key characteristics is a division of competences among 
different levels of government. Some policy areas, like customs, competition, trade, and 
Eurozone monetary policy, are under exclusive EU competence, where decisions are made 
and enforced by its supranational institutions like the European Commission and the Court 
of Justice of the European Union. In contrast, other areas, like education or taxation, are 
firmly under the responsibility of the member states. A large part of policy areas ranging 
from agriculture and consumer protection to external relations and research and 
development are considered to be shared competences, becoming a continuously evolving 
amalgam of supranational and national regulations. From these common policies comes 
one of the fundamental features of the EU – acquis communautaire – the accumulated body 
of law, regulations, directives, etc., that each member state must fully accept and 
implement unless it negotiates a specific opt-out. However, there is a certain tendency 
towards harmonization of regulation (based on the principle of mutual recognition rather 
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than uniformity) even in the areas where the member states are not compelled to do so. 
Such an inclination makes sense in the context of the common market, but the creation of 
the common European space has a spillover effect on other policy areas beyond economic 
integration. The creation of the Schengen area and the principle of the free movement of 
persons have created such a spillover effect in the need for coordination of asylum, 
migration, and policing issues, and for stronger control of external borders of the EU. 
Citizenship attribution falls under strictly national competences, but migration 
issues are a part of a shared competence policy field known as the Area for freedom, 
security and justice (dubbed by less benevolent commentators as “fortress Europe”, where 
the effort to ensure the freedom, security and justice for the European citizens goes hand 
in hand with striving to keep out unwanted migrants). Considering that migration control 
is another side of the coin of citizenship policies, this combination of different competence 
regimes allows us to approach the notion of convergence as a question rather than as a 
premise, although the need to coordinate asylum and migration policies has been cited as 
the main argument in favour of the convergence element in the liberalization/convergence 
thesis (Faist and Ette 2007). In Chapter 5 I discuss the indicators of convergence in 
citizenship regulation in the EU in more detail. 
1.1.4.3. Decoupling people and territory. The previous two sections indicated how 
European integration has been used as a foundation for the liberalization/convergence 
thesis due to the decoupling of rights and citizenship related to the freedom of movement 
and the functional fusion of the common European space. Yet these developments have 
not been matched by a fusion of identity. My claim is that, on the contrary, divergence of 
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state membership and various rights and duties has inadvertently emphasized the 
identitarian aspect of the former.  
European Union provides a space that allows the nation to be reconceptualized as 
a non-spatial cultural community (Keating 2006: 28) and thus decouples the state and ‘the 
people’, adding another layer to the decoupling of certain packages of rights and duties 
from citizenship (Faist 2000: 333). Here we encounter the fundamental tension between 
territoriality of the state on the one hand and the collective identity that does not have to be 
territorially circumscribed (but does not negate the existence of a territorial base (Keating 
2006: 30)). Such collective political identity is ultimately tied to the nation-state as the 
epitome of political organization, although its longings are misdirected. The state is an 
instrument of inclusion and not a guarantor of belonging (Badiou 2006: 107), whereas this 
“sense of belonging”, as separate from legal status, rights, and duties (Faist 2000), is 
precisely what is at stake in many current debates on citizenship. If we recognize that the 
viability of political identity is based on the strength of association between actors (Agnew 
2003: 224), European integration has not yet overcome pre-political ascriptive criteria for 
citizenship (Schmidtke 1998: 61). The warning that familiarity may breed contempt, and 
that “extra knowledge of other peoples, through widespread and frequent travel or foreign 
domicile, may lead to a hardening rather than a softening of the very nationalistic or ethnic 
dislikes” (Heater 1999: 150), seems to be playing itself out in the ‘ever closer union’ as 
well as on the more global scale, when identitarian clashes are coupled with social tensions 
(Rosenfeld 2010: 234). If the European Union is “the framework for multiple demoi, 
themselves constitutive, along with the state, of a larger political community” (Keating 
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2006: 33), ethnonationalism would seem to be the premier candidate for a basis of such 
demoi. 
In the years following the terrorist attacks of 2000s, there has been a growth in 
literature that recognizes the relevance of identitarian concerns for migration, mostly 
viewed through the lens of security. My dissertation extends the understanding of the scope 
of this relevance by bridging the gap between the literature that analyzes migration 
concerns of the Western countries and the literature that focuses on the situation of 
autochtonous and kin-state national minorities in the postcommunist world, demonstrating 
the intermeshing of migration as the issue du jour on the political agenda in post-
communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe with long-standing issues concerning 
the security and national identity of what some may consider a postcolonial relationship 
with some of the neighboring countries.  
My thesis is that the conundrum of Lithuanian dual citizenship is a product of the 
paradox of the long-sought-after membership in the EU which delegitimizes ethnicity as a 
criterion for citizenship and at the same time effectively reinforces identitarian impulses in 
the citizenship discourse via the decoupling of people, rights, and territory brought about 
by the institutionalization of the common European space (see McGarry and Keating 
2006). Dual citizenship is especially conducive to testing this proposition, as evidenced by 
the contrast between the mainstream conception of dual citizenship as “a deliberate strategy 
to protect various rights in multiple states” (Faist 2000: 278) on the one hand, and 
Lithuanian migrants’ demands for dual citizenship in a situation where those rights are 
already protected courtesy of the common European space. In the next subsection, I dissect 
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the phenomenon of dual citizenship and highlight its relevance in testing the 
liberalization/convergence thesis. 
1.1.5. Dual citizenship as the litmus test of postnationalism 
Dual citizenship can serve as a litmus test of the liberalization/ convergence thesis 
for two reasons. First, the expansion of availability of dual citizenship in a country is 
considered to be one of the key indicators of liberalization, and such expansion across 
several countries could be considered an indicator of convergence, therefore, accounting 
for the changes in formal regulations pertaining to dual citizenship is important for my 
research and is further discussed in Chapter 5. However, as I mentioned earlier, it is crucial 
to explore not only formal rules, but also the substantive content attributed to citizenship. 
Therefore, dual citizenship is especially conducive for inquiry into liberalization, since 
membership in more than one state multiplies the mutually ambivalent dimensions of 
citizenship as rights vs. identity, consequently exposing the ambiguities in the nation-state-
citizenship nexus. In this section I explore the development of the constellations of these 
ambiguities.  
1.1.5.1. From prohibition to tolerance of dual citizenship. It is no accident that after 
one major study devoted exclusively to dual nationality (Bar-Yaacov 1961) was published, 
it took several decades before literature focused on dual/multiple citizenship began 
proliferating (Hansen and Weil 2002, etc.). Although dual citizenship has existed since 
antiquity because of mobility of individuals (Heater 2004), the modern states have viewed 
it as an anomaly to be avoided and minimized, a position entrenched in numerous 
international conventions and treaties during the most of the 19th and 20th centuries 
(Koslowski 2001).  
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The Hague Convention of 1930 instituted certain guidelines for dealing with cases 
of dual citizenship, namely, the principle that a citizen cannot ask one state for diplomatic 
protection from another if s/he is a citizen of both of them, and the principle of ‘effective 
nationality’, which gives precedence to the place of primary residence (Heater 1999: 119). 
The 1954 Convention Relating to the Statelessness of Persons acknowledged that every 
person is entitled to a nationality, but only to one (Koslowski 2001: 207). Here we already 
see the language of individual rights taking over what heretofore had been viewed from the 
standpoint of states. The European Convention on Reduction of Cases of Multiple 
Nationality and Military Obligations in Cases of Multiple Nationality, concluded by the 
Council of Europe in 1963, was the pinnacle of the attempts to limit the instances of dual 
citizenship (Brubaker 1989: 173). Yet, enforcement of the convention was impeded from 
the start by the lack of exchange of information between states on changes in citizenship 
status of an individual (Hammar 1989: 83). Eventually the disposition changed, 
increasingly viewing the prohibition of dual citizenship as simply wrong, both because of 
the realities being quite otherwise, and because of the dissemination of progressive ideas 
(Checkel 2001: 55-56). The 1997 European Convention on Nationality refrains from 
expressing negative judgment on the desirability of the phenomenon of multiple nationality 
(Council of Europe 1997), and amendments to the previous Convention even call for its 
application in the name of spouse equality (Council of Europe 1994). Such developments 
towards greater tolerance of dual citizenship are considered to be one of the indicators of 
the trend towards liberalization. 
Still, dual citizenship is celebrated by only a handful of enthusiastic thinkers (e.g. 
Spiro 2002) and merely “tolerated”, if that, by nation-states. In a world where every citizen 
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belongs to a particular state, the issue of conflicting loyalties, rights and duties is raised in 
both ideological and pragmatic terms, concerning not only the military service and 
diplomatic protection, but also questions of application of conflicting laws in areas of 
taxation, property, inheritance, family, and the like, as well as questions of violation of the 
principle of equality in the sense of having more than one vote and not necessarily being 
subject to the consequences of one’s voting decisions, to reverse Benhabib’s (2004: 217) 
statement that “those who are subject to the law should also be its authors”. 
Despite all ambiguities, today more than a half of the sovereign states of the world 
accept some sort of dual citizenship (Faist and Kivisto 2007; Renshow 2005), with scholars 
increasingly calling for its management rather than prevention (Aleinikoff and Klusmeyer 
2002). The main reason behind the proliferation of dual citizenship is an uncoordinated 
variety of state citizenship policies (ius soli, ius sanguinis, and combinations thereof) 
combined with large scale migration and the expansion of human rights, particularly those 
related to gender equality, demolishing the traditional primacy of a husband’s citizenship 
over that of the wife’s. A child born in a country that applies the principle of ius soli to 
foreign nationals of countries which apply the principle of ius sanguinis could have a triple 
citizenship. Although many countries have special provisions for such a child to choose his 
or her citizenship at majority, not all possible situations are covered.  
In the face of the advancement of volunteer military service instead of conscription, 
increasing world interdependence, and the development of NATO and the EU in particular, 
the “probability of multiple loyalties being put to the test in war has decreased” (Koslowski 
2000: 141). The common space of the EU seems to negate any reservations about 
compatibility of multiple citizenships or the “physical impossibility of performing 
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simultaneously the rights and duties of citizenship in different geographical locations” 
(Bar-Yaacov 1961: 265). Scholars point out that, as a practical matter, the imperative for 
countries to ensure the exclusive loyalty of their citizens has been weakening. However, 
the recent heightening of security concerns related to the scare of terrorism allows us to 
question this assumption. While the aversion to statelessness appears to have rendered the 
stripping of a citizenship of an individual by a state increasingly obsolete, the situation is 
fundamentally different when it comes to a dual citizen. In fact, the practices and 
regulations of dual citizenship bring into sharp focus the precariousness and conditionality 
of the link between a person and a state, opening the possibility of a top-down severance 
of this link based on the estimation of loyalty and fidelity (see e.g. Guild 2009). The 
discussion of the case of Lithuania in the subsequent chapters demonstrates the unceasing 
relevance of the questions of threas to state interests even when terrorism is not in the 
picture. 
1.1.5.2. Interrogating dual citizenship. Notwithstanding the attempts to dismiss the 
relevance of the questions of loyalty of dual citizens, public discussions on dual citizenship 
tend to focus on the questions of identifying with the political community of the state. 
Borrowing from an anecdotal exchange between the prime minister of India and the head 
of the Indian-American community (cited in Avila 2002), those who see citizenship 
primarily from the perspective of the state tend to frame it as a thesis “no one can serve 
two masters”, whereas those who see it from the perspective of an individual claim that 
“one loves both one’s father and one’s mother”.1 As Ong (1999: 2) puts it, “the multiple 
passport holder is an apt contemporary figure; he or she embodies the split between state-
                                                 
1 Both phrases have been explicitly invoked by participants of the debate on Lithuanian citizenship. 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
50 
 
imposed identity and personal identity caused by political upheavals, migration, and 
changing global markets”.  
It is widely presumed that the pressure on states to accommodate the reality of 
increased migration and recognize “multiple forms of belonging” (Carens 2000: 161) has 
led to the widening of de facto and even de jure possibilities of dual citizenship. Scholars 
generally assume that receiving countries relax the prohibitions of dual nationality in hopes 
to facilitate integration of immigrants, and emigration countries favor dual citizenship as a 
means of maintaining the ties with their co-nationals (see e.g. Kofman and Youngs 2003; 
Koslowski 2000). More specifically, emigration countries are expected to (1) institute dual 
citizenship as a reaction to previous actions by immigrant-receiving countries, (2) apply it 
asymmetrically – only to their conational emigrants and not to immigrants, (3) use dual 
citizenship in efforts to influence border-crossing social formations, and (4) not revoke or 
restrict dual citizenship once it has been instituted (Faist 2007: 5-6). The case of Lithuania, 
which is undoubtedly an emigration country, is interesting and worth investigating 
precisely because it does not neatly confirm any of these presumptions, questioning 
previously allowed dual citizenship and having immigrants also figure in debates which 
are nationally initiated and framed, and the role of the state is especially convoluted in that 
it is far from a unitary actor in this situation.  
The contradictions exposed by the seemingly outlier case of Lithuania allow us to 
delve into the fundamental aspects of the relationship between the phenomenon of dual 
citizenship and the “analytical and normative nationalism” (Bosniak 2006: 5) that underlies 
citizenship studies and needs to be informed by empirical investigation. The question is 
whether dual citizenship could be an indicator of liberalization of citizenship regulation, 
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and it can be answered by exploring whether deploying dual citizenship can be taken to 
signify the lessening of the emphasis on national identity in the discourse and practices of 
the nation-state. Posing the question in such terms also serves as a way to overcome the 
frequent binary compartmentalization of dual citizenship as a tool of immigrant 
incorporation and as an instrument of maintaining connections with emigrants, and to 
bridge the divide between clusters of citizenship studies situated within- or outside- nation-
state boundaries (Bloemraad, Korteweg, and Yurdakul 2008). Bauböck (2010) suggests 
that we should overcome that divide by studying citizenship constellations – the ways in 
which countries react to each other’s actions in citizenship regulation. I suggest another 
possibility – inquiring how both the identitarian and the interest-based dimensions of the 
discourse on dual citizenship are relevant to both sides of this somewhat schematic divide 
between immigration and emigration countries, and explore their expressions in the 
Lithuanian case (Chapters 2, 3, 4) and in the broader comparative context (Chapter 5). 
My position questions Faist’s (2007) claim that dual citizenship debates in 
European countries indicate a shift from preoccupation with nationhood to concern with 
societal integration. Revisiting such notions and exploring the discourse on dual citizenship 
should demonstrate the inseparability of societal integration from the notion of nationhood. 
The thesis that posits a convergence towards greater liberalization of citizenship is only 
partly addressed by studies that focus on legal developments; the content of regulations 
and the motives that underline them are crucial for establishing whether citizenship 
regulation actually is more liberal and characterized by greater inclusiveness.  
When it comes to emigration countries, their preferential treatment of co-ethnic 
emigrants in citizenship regulation is an accepted postulate of citizenship studies, thus dual 
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citizenship for emigrants is not truly an indicator of liberalization, only equal access for 
both emigrants and immigrants would fulfill that condition. However, the availability of 
dual citizenship for immigrants has been axiomatically treated as one of the key indicators 
of liberalization. Instead, I suggest that, if the state connects dual citizenship with an 
explicit goal of facilitating immigrant assimilation, as evident in the recent shift towards 
an emphasis on more substantive integration requirements for naturalizing immigrants, it 
should be seen as a reaffirmation, rather than a negation, of the fundamental role of national 
identity in relation to citizenship. I believe that discursive data is crucial in this inquiry: if 
one familiarizes oneself with the arguments pertaining to dual citizenship in the debates 
surrounding the 1999 citizenship reforms in Germany, one would be hard pressed to see it 
as an unambiguous indicator of liberalization and inclusivity, even further undermined by 
the subsequent introduction of naturalization tests in 2006. Therefore, a large part of my 
empirical research centers around public discourse analysis. 
The proliferation of literature on dual citizenship in the past decade has not 
produced significant changes in the mainstream hypotheses it offers to political scientists, 
namely, the claims that immigrant-receiving countries relax the prohibitions of dual 
citizenship in hopes of facilitating integration, and that emigrant-sending countries favor 
dual citizenship as a means of maintaining ties with their expatriates. More than half of the 
countries today tolerate some form of dual citizenship due to the aforementioned 
combination of an uncoordinated variety of state citizenship policies, large scale migration, 
a decrease in the likelihood of putting competing loyalties to the test, and the expansion of 
human rights (Howard 2005; Koslowski 2000; Kivisto and Faist 2007; Renshow 2005). 
However, a lack of hard quantitative data on the numbers of dual citizens limits a major 
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part of literature to discussions of potential benefits and dangers of dual citizenship and its 
un/desirability (Bar-Yaacov 1961; Hammar 1989; Hansen and Weil 2002; Martin and 
Heilbronner 2003; Renshow 2005). My study demonstrates the utility of using dual 
citizenship as a lens in conducting empirical inquiry into the substance of citizenship 
regulation beyond quantitative indicators or metanormative argumentation. If we want to 
be able to advance the understanding of the content and significance of dual citizenship, 
we need to be able to go beyond acknowledging the determining role of path dependency 
in shaping each country’s approach to dual citizenship (Faist, Gerdes, and Rieple 2004; 
Faist 2007). Howard (2005; 2009) attempts to formulate comparatively applicable 
categories in relation to the broader issue of liberalization vs. restrictiveness of citizenship 
regimes, and claims that the availability of dual citizenship for immigrants rather than 
emigrants should be conceived as an ultimate indicator of inclusivity of citizenship policy 
(Howard 2009: 24-26). However, I argue that this dichotomization obscures the underlying 
common denominators characteristic of countries’ concern with dual citizenship. If we 
look closely at the discourse on dual citizenship for either emigrants or immigrants, we will 
find that both of them espouse similar lines of argument, boiling down to questions of 
identity, loyalty, and assimilation, thus bringing us back to the initially discredited claim 
of the close relationship between the regulation of citizenship and the identitarian 
conception of the political community. In this respect, it is especially beneficial to conduct 
a case study of a country in which both the questions of dual citizenship for emigrants and 
for immigrants figure in debates on citizenship regulation. Furthermore, the benefits of 
studying a new member of the EU lie in the possibility of questioning the stereotypical 
divide between an ‘ethnic’ and restrictive ‘East’ and a ‘civic’ and liberal ‘West’. 
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If any practical considerations pertaining to contradictions of dual citizenship can 
be resolved with the help of bilateral or multilateral treaties (Hammar 1989: 87), then the 
questions which remain the most acute are the questions of political identity. However, in 
this study I argue that practical considerations should not be dismissed, but, rather, 
reformulated from the perspective of the state. The subsequent chapters present a case 
study of a critical juncture in the regulation of dual citizenship, exploring the arguments 
presented in the discourse on citizenship that serve to expose the underlying discursive 
patterns, allowing us to provide a more nuanced answer to the question whether and in 
what ways dual citizenship is indeed an indicator of liberalization and/or convergence of 
citizenship regulations. 
1.1.6. Challenging the liberalization/convergence hypothesis: some research notes. 
Taking into account the combined claims of postnationalists and multiculturalists, 
we are facing the question whether the convergence and liberalization thesis applies not 
only to the formal, but also to the substantive aspects of citizenship regulation. The 
question that needs to be addressed, rather than assumed, is whether the decoupling of 
people, territory and rights, associated with postnationalist developments, indeed leads to 
citizenship characterized by greater inclusiveness. The empirical indicators that allow us 
to test these claims have been variously formulated, but, for the purpose of work that is 
focused on the legal status of citizenship, the appropriate indicators can be found in the 
conditions of access to citizenship in terms of the requirements for naturalization and 
availability of dual citizenship.  
The question of applying the principle of ius soli for second and third generation 
migrants, the conditions of naturalization for first generation migrants, and the rules 
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concerning dual citizenship for immigrants and for emigrants have all been employed in 
the attempts to determine whether the hypotheses of liberalization/ convergence can indeed 
be substantiated (Howard 2009; Koopmans, Michalowski and Waibel 2012). Most of the 
arguments supporting the liberalization hypotheses have concentrated on the expansion of 
the ius soli principle for generations born on the soil of the country to immigrant parents. 
On the other hand, if one looks at the contents of the conditions of naturalization for the 
first generation migrants, one may be more likely to reject the liberalization hypothesis. 
Dual citizenship is an especially interesting lens for exploring the relative inclusivity vs. 
restrictiveness due to the fact that it straddles the national boundary, but it should not be 
equated with inclusiveness – rather, one should look not only at the nominal availability of 
multiple citizenships, but also at the contents attributed to dual citizenship in the public and 
the arguments employed in its defence vs. criticism, which is what I proceed to do below 
in Chapters 2 and 3. 
So far, empirical data have not been able to provide enough conclusiveness 
regarding citizenship regulation. The major study of European countries’ citizenship 
legislation warns against an optimistic assumption of an overall trend of growing 
acceptance of dual citizenship; in fact, it points out the shifting bidirectional patterns that 
are closely related to contemporary political changes (Bauböck et al. 2006b: 16). In the 
past decade the celebration of the decline of the nation-state has given way to an 
acknowledgment of a countervailing trend towards a more restrictive backlash that is 
mostly ascribed to securitization in the post-9/11 context (Bauböck 2006; Faist and Kivisto 
2007). Nevertheless, the prevalent hypothesis that posits a convergence towards greater 
liberalization of citizenship legislation survives, and the rules regarding dual citizenship 
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are considered to be one of the key indicators attesting to such liberalization. Significantly, 
even where there are indications of securitization-induced restrictiveness towards 
immigrants, the expanding possibilities for co-ethnic emigrants to gain dual citizenship are 
rarely questioned by most theorists (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch 2006; 
Faist 2007; Faist and Kivisto 2007; Howard 2009). My empirical investigation challenges 
these assumptions. Dual citizenship, as a hybrid phenomenon straddling the divide between 
outside- and in-nation-state perspectives, is an especially conducive lens for advancing the 
understanding of the contradictory trends of greater liberalization and increased 
restrictiveness, as well as the dynamics of what Joppke (2005) calls “de- and re-
ethnicization” of citizenship.  
In sum, it is possible to point out two developments that undermine both the 
postnationalist and the multicultural outlook: first, the tightening of controls of access to 
residency (both the attempts to control immigration in the first place and to limit the 
possibilities of existing immigrants to cross over from vulnerable positions as irregular or 
temporary migrants to a more secure long-term or permanent residency status), and, 
second, the “thickening” of requirements for access to citizenship. In Chapter 5 I explore 
the fact that many countries are turning towards stricter, “thicker” integration requirements, 
as evident in the proliferation of naturalization tests and language competency 
requirements, which reaffirm the prevalence of integration as assimilation (Bauböck et al. 
2006b; Joppke and Morawska 2003; Koopmans 2012; etc.), and explore whether there is a 
trend towards convergence, even if it is not liberalizing. These counter-liberalizing 
tendencies have to do with both the securitization and identitarian concerns, both of which 
are manifest in the Lithuanian discourse on citizenship analyzed in the subsequent chapters.  
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Another limitation of the postnationalist approach lies in its focus on European 
integration as spearheading these developments of converging towards liberalization 
(discussed above in section 1.1.4). First, the uniqueness of the EU as a political construct 
limits the generalizability of the postnationalist arguments, second, it may result in an 
overly optimistic and one-sided view of its influence upon domestic policies, and, third, it 
brackets the issue of ‘fortress Europe’ that is inseparable from any trans-European 
developments in the sphere of migration. Even if we could agree that there are indicators 
supporting the convergence hypothesis in the EU, in subsequent chapters I explore how the 
EU can be employed as a factor both towards liberalization and towards greater restrictions. 
The attempts in citizenship studies to find a solution to the seeming impasse 
between the claims of liberalization and restrictiveness have looked at the more short-term 
factors, namely, the constellation of political forces, emphasizing the role of political 
parties of the left and of the right and the relative politicization of the questions of 
citizenship and migration (Freeman 1995; Howard 2009; Joppke 1998). With this paper, I 
advocate a multiple-source perspective and strive to look at two dimensions in an attempt 
to evaluate the relative restrictiveness vs. liberalization: a broader historical perspective on 
the development of citizenship regulation in order to take into account path dependency 
and the historical-political context of a political unit (see Chapter 2), and a qualitative 
dissecting of the public politico-legal discourse in order to distill the meaning ascribed to 
citizenship and its key criteria (see Chapters 2, 3, 4, 5). Before proceeding to the analysis 
of the Lithuanian case, let us set the stage by discussing the immediate context of Central 
and Eastern Europe. 
1.2. The curious case of citizenship regulation in Central and Eastern Europe 
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The emphasis on citizenship as identity seems to be affirmed by a glance at the new 
Europe. The studies of dual citizenship in relation to Central and Eastern Europe have been 
mostly focused on the situation of historical minorities and diasporas in the face of post-
imperial disparities between the boundaries of the state and the nation. This dissonance 
between nation and state has been accompanied by flows of ethnic migration (Jennissen 
2011). Although various historic emigration countries, such as Germany, Portugal, Italy, 
Spain, and Greece, have for a long time allowed preferential access to citizenship based on 
kinship criteria (Bauböck 2006b; Kovács 2005), Central and Eastern Europe has been 
considered the archetype of völkisch tendencies (Berend 1996). Poland and Germany, 
Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina, Romania and Moldova, Bulgaria and Turkey share quite 
a few citizens. In addition, considerable numbers of displaced persons who became citizens 
of Western democracies in the aftermath of the Second World War have demanded 
recognition and institutionalization of their relationship with the homeland in most of the 
post-communist countries and have been given ear in attempts to right the historical 
wrongs. Hungary has received the most scholarly attention due to the sheer size of its 
historic losses of territory and numbers of Hungarians in neighboring countries, as well as 
persistent attempts to establish legal ties with kin minorities, including a failed referendum 
on dual citizenship in 2004 (e.g. Batory 2010; Csergő and Goldgeier 2004; Csergő and 
Goldgeier 2005; Fowler 2002; Iordachi 2004; Kántor 2006; Kemp 2006; Kovács 2005; 
Waterbury 2006). Among Baltic states, Lithuania has gotten the least attention compared 
to Estonia and Latvia that have had to deal with much larger ethnic Russian minorities. 
My analysis of the Lithuanian case demonstrates that in the wake of European 
integration the dual citizenship discourse in Central and Eastern European countries 
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appears to be shifting towards greater multidimensionality, both in terms of a growing 
awareness of actual and potential immigration of third country nationals (Bauböck 1994), 
which has so far taken the backseat to concerns about ethnic kin (Bauböck 2006b), and in 
terms of the EU-law view of ethnicity as an unacceptably discriminatory criterion for 
citizenship (McGarry et al. 2006). These developments co-exist with ever-present 
historically informed contexts in postcommunist countries. I would like to address the latter 
two elements here in a bit more detail. 
1.2.1. Normative influence of EU conditionality. 
One of the key characteristics of the European Union is a certain conditionality that 
it applies to potential members and even to those countries which have no prospect of 
becoming members, but receive foreign aid or some other assistance from the EU. Different 
enlargements in EU history brought with them unique sets of circumstances. The end of 
the Cold War opened up membership possibilities to countries that hitherto had been far 
removed from the EU norms in their characteristics, and the postcommunist countries 
quickly proclaimed their desire to “return” to Europe. In order to manage the mutual 
expectations, the European Council – a meeting of the heads of EU member states – 
formulated the so-called Copenhagen criteria in a summit in 1993. A state that wishes to 
join the EU must accept the acquis communautaire, be economically viable and politically 
democratic, which includes respect for human rights and protection of minorities. 
Candidates for EU membership had to “Europeanize” many policy sectors, but for the 
purposes of this paper it is sufficient to focus on the imperative of non-discrimination 
which became an important part of the normative pressures exerted by the Western 
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European institutions on the postcommunist countries before the latter even applied for 
membership. 
The process of accession to the EU and especially the Copenhagen criterion 
concerning the rights of minorities have been viewed as a positive and moderating 
influence on potential explosiveness of ethnonationalism2 in the post-communist world, 
nudging them towards a more territorially and less ethnically based inclusiveness (e.g. 
Csergő and Goldgeier 2005; Henderson 1999; Maresceau 1997; Schimmelfennig and 
Sedelmeier 2005; Weidenfeld 1995; cf. Hughes et al. 2004; Jutila 2009). Yet this emphasis 
on territoriality as a criterion of inclusion coexists with the increased possibility to de-
territorialize a range of functional and symbolic aspects of citizenship brought about by 
aforementioned freedom of movement within the European Union (McGarry et al. 2006). 
The overwhelming ethnic orientation of the public and the politicians in the Lithuanian 
case that was discussed in the previous chapter helps to bring attention to the opportunities 
provided by the European integration for the “amalgamation of the identity and the ethno-
cultural aspects of citizenship” (Schierup et al. 2006: 257). One of the questions that 
Chapter 5 addresses is the potential negating the recycling of the stereotypical dichotomy 
between the “civic West” and the “ethnonationalist East” (see Johns 2003 and Jutila 2009 
on what they call double standards on minority rights). In fact, Maatsch (2011) 
demonstrates that countries like Poland and Hungary explicitly learned from countries like 
Germany and made their citizenship regulation more restrictive in their movement towards 
convergence. One could venture to question whether there is substantial difference between 
ius sanguinis and ethnonationalism, or whether the civic-ethnic categorization of countries 
                                                 
2 I use the term “ethnonationalism” following Connor (1994) in that it emphasizes the aspect of descent. 
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still has any validity. The analysis in Chapter 5 overviews the validity of such distinctions 
among the EU countries, while Chapters 2, 3 and 4 touch upon the evidence of EU 
normative influence on Lithuanian citizenship regulation more specifically. 
Although the developments in the post-communist Europe in the past decade have 
been strongly shaped by the aspiration to EU membership, shifts and concerns brought by 
actual membership is a brand new environment for this region, in the wake of which the 
westbound migration caused by economic disparities between the ‘old’ and the ‘new’ 
Europe (Wallace 2001) seems to be the most salient issue, bringing with it the pressing 
questions of disaggregated membership and the relationship between legal status and 
national identity. While the phenomenon of “trans-sovereign” or “virtual” nationalism 
(Csergő and Goldgeier, 2005) in Central and Eastern European countries has been mostly 
analyzed with an eye on historic minorities and the legacy of the 20th century wars, I 
advocate the utility of incorporating the dimension of contemporary migration into such 
inquiries. The case of Lithuania, which does not easily square with most predictions aimed 
at emigration countries, helps highlight the tensions between transnationalism and 
nationalism unraveled by migration and the EU integration, and provides an additional 
insight into the broader implications of the EU – postcommunist nexus.  
However, it would be myopic to look at citizenship regulation in postcommunist 
Central and Eastern Europe only through the lens of traditional ethnonationalism or 
disturbances of migration. I propose that we cannot understand the position of these 
countries without taking into account their self-conception as postcolonial countries in the 
sense that, for centuries, they had been under foreign domination exerted by Russia and 
then the Soviet Union, which is especially relevant for the Baltic states (in fact, there are 
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instances of explicit referral to the Soviet occupation as colonization, for example, in 
Estonia (Reinikainen 2012)). In the next section I spell out the implications of this 
experience. 
1.2.2. Stateness concerns. 
A large part of scholarship on the postcommunist region is confined to either area 
studies or transitology. In the introduction I proposed to reappropriate a concept from the 
field of study of democratic transitions and consolidation – the notion of stateness. As 
stateness refers to the security of the boundaries of state and nation, citizenship regulation 
is its key tool. I suggest that stateness should not be perceived as belonging in only one 
part of the process of political development which can be achieved in a finite manner. 
Rather, I argue that countries have a constant concern regarding their stateness and actively 
engage in its maintenance. The most immediate concern stems from the perception of 
foreign threat.  
In this context, I suggest that it would be fruitful to interpret the postcommunist 
experience as a variant of postcolonialism in order to pave the way for broader application 
of the insights generated by the Lithuanian case. Applying the postcolonial label to the 
issues encountered in Eastern Europe is not a common way of approaching the study of 
this region in general and of its political vicissitudes in particular. There are very few 
references to Eastern Europe in postcolonial literature, or, conversely, references to 
postcolonialism in postcommunist studies, and what there is usually belongs to the sphere 
of arts and humanities (Korek 2007; Mazierska, Kristensen and Näripea 2014; Segel 2008). 
Therefore, I have to build some ground for my analytical endeavours. 
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I use the term of colonialism in order to highlight the experience of foreign 
domination and the conception of the self in opposition to that oppressive foreign other, 
and bracket the very complex and extensive postcolonialism literature which is mostly 
focused on countries in the developing world and hardly touches upon what used to be 
called “the Second World”. Part of the divide stems from the agreement among the colonial 
powers to only consider “saltwater” colonialism as true colonialism in order to protect 
themselves from charges at home (Kymlicka 2007b), and part of it could be due to a 
paradoxical Euro-centrism of postcolonial inquiries in that they have predominantly 
focused on the aftermath of Western European empires, especially on Anglophone 
postcolonial countries and their diasporas (Keown, Murphy and Procter 2009). However, 
it is possible to distill certain overarching characteristics of postcoloniality. As Childs and 
Williams (1997) note in their survey of postcolonial theorizing, postcolonial nationalists 
are engaged through anti-colonial practices in a pursuit of mythical indigeneity interrupted 
by colonizers. In a similar vein, the nationalist impulse in Eastern Europe was very clearly 
directed agaist what was perceived as foreign domination (Holmes 1999). Such parallels 
allow me to argue that the logic of anti-colonialism applies to the situation of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
If we challenge the “saltwater” distinction, the behaviour of the Russian empire in 
the past several centuries can be considered classical colonialism. That is especially true 
for its activities in Asia, but the European part of the Russian empire also experienced 
forced russification, closure of native-language educational institutions and prevention of 
carreer advancement, etc. Therefore, it makes sense to presume that the more traditional 
postcolonial countries and postcommunist countries share some of the crucial elements of 
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what constitutes a postcolonial situation. If we accept that nationalism of oppressed 
nations, characterized by its reactionary relationship to the fact that under a colonial 
situation the ruling strata are aligned with the oppressor rather than with the local 
population (Hroch 1985), is a common feature in both the Second and the Third world, we 
can conceive of postcommunist countries as part of a larger phenomenon of states that have 
defined themselves against their oppressors. 
Brubaker (2000) suggests that we need to think about the postcommunist area as 
post-multinational, not only due to the break-up of the USSR and Yugoslavia, but also 
looking at a longer historical perspective and the experiences of Central and Eastern Europe 
under the Russian, Austrian-Hungarian and Ottoman empires. There is also a considerable 
strand of literature that considers the Soviet Union to have been an empire (Kiss 1998). 
Thus the label of postcolonialism is even more appropriate for understanding the approach 
of these countries to the relationship with other ethnicities that are viewed as leftovers of 
imperialism. Due to sometimes arbitrary carving of borders, many countries in Europe and 
beyond are left with what Brubaker (2000: 2) calls “accidental diasporas” that appear due 
to the movement of borders over people, in contrast to the traditional diasporas that appear 
due to the movement of people across borders due to economic or humanitarian reasons. 
Another dimension in which we can find comparability between postcommunist 
and postcolonial countries is that the status of periphery or semi-periphery is common to 
both of them. A part of this condition is expressed in the fact that they experience more 
emigration than immigration, and a lot of migrants can be characterized as “neonomads” 
(Forment 1996: 315) in that the migration is often circular. Although it is important to 
acknowledge the difference in destinations – while migrants from former colonies tend to 
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migrate to former metropolis, the Eastern European migrants go to the West, not to Russia, 
– the underlying character of migration has enough similarities to be comparable. 
A tentative move in the direction of putting postcommunist and postcolonial studies 
in touch with each other is the collection of essays edited by Lowell W. Barrington (2006) 
which provides an array of analyses of nationalism and nation-building in postcolonial and 
postcommunist states, although it still does not engage in much systematic comparison 
among cases. The authors identify two main concerns of nationalists – the boundaries of 
national membership and of national territory – and based on them distinguish two broad 
families of nationalism: state-seeking nationalism that morphs into sovereignty-protecting 
nationalism after independence, and identity-creating nationalism that further develops as 
civic-identity creating, ethnic-identity creating, co-national protecting and diasporic types 
of nationalism (Barrington 2006; Suny 2006). The authors emphasize that the most 
important lesson of this endeavour is the appreciation for continued relevance of nationalist 
orientation in postcolonial states and the need to appreciate their past experiences in the 
efforts to understand the current constellations of nationalism. However, for my purposes 
the crucial element is the acknowledgement of continuous fundamental concern with the 
boundaries of the nation and the territorial state. 
I propose to take this bridge between regions a step further and to apply it to the 
analysis of citizenship, building on the appreciation of the fundamental mutual 
imbrications of citizenship and national identity. More specifically, I believe that the 
concept of postcolonialism helps us to locate the second missing ingredient which allows 
us to overcome the inadequacy of the civic-ethnic dichotomy when trying to understand 
the developments in national identity and citizenship – the self-image of a “nation of 
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‘innocent sufferers’” (Clark 2006) and the subsequent notion employed by postcolonial 
state/nation-builders that colonial experience of foreign domination entitles the nation in 
question to something akin to “affirmative action” (Kuzio 2006; Suny 2006). This nuance 
calls into question the tendency to condemn the reliance of nationalism on the notion of 
enemies of, and threats to, the state and the nation, and thus challenges the normative 
disbalance between the labels of a civic and an ethnic nation-state.  
The concept of stateness (Linz and Stepan 1996), is, to my mind, very suitable for 
capturing the concern with the continuous maintenance of the identitarian and territorial 
boundaries of the nation-state, as it emphasizes a monopoly over territory and an agreement 
about the demos as fundamental elements relevant to the regions that fall under 
postcolonial/postcommunist/transitional labels, and is distinct from the concepts of state 
capacity or rule of law (see Møller and Skaaning 2011). The tense relationship between 
stateness and democracy highlighted by Linz and Stepan (1996) points us in the right 
direction when trying to explain the paradoxical case of Lithuanian dual citizenship. They 
conceptualized stateness as a condition of a country possessing two main elements: clearly 
demarcated territorial boundaries of a polity and an agreement on who has a right to 
citizenship in a state (Linz and Stepan 1996: 16). They pointed out that many countries in 
Western Europe developed as states and as nations at a roughly similar time and therefore 
their demoi were sufficiently clear when these countries became democracies. In a 
somewhat teleological conception of the democratic transition process, postcommunist 
countries were expected to strive for a similar goal and to resolve the definition of their 
citizenry in a nondiscriminatory manner. Their inability to achieve such standards has been 
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one of the main reasons for continuous juxtaposition of ethnonationalist Central and 
Eastern Europe vs. the more civic West.  
However, I propose that stateness cannot be treated as a static or finite phenomenon 
either in the postcommunist area or beyond. In fact, in the age of globalization and its 
challenges to the nation-state, we could claim that stateness is under constant pressure. 
Migration is central to these pressures both by making the territorial boundary definition 
more difficult and by multiplying the challenges to the acceptable ascription of the 
membership in the demos. Therefore, even the stateness of those Western countries that 
seemed to have solved the questions of territorial and demos boundaries long time ago is 
being challenged. Meanwhile, when it comes to the stateness of postcommunist countries, 
the challenge of globalization is compounded by the perceived threat of Russian 
imperialism. Thus stateness is under constant challenge and needs to be constantly 
maintained in all countries, but especially in the postcommunist Central and Eastern 
Europe. My contribution to this field of inquiry can be formulated as the proposition that 
citizenship regulation is the boundary maintenance regime that is continuously employed 
in response to the challenges to the demographic elements of stateness, and that dual 
citizenship is the solution that gets applied to the most intractable locations of such 
challenges. 
As this is a theory-building exercise, I flesh out my analysis of the Lithuanian case, 
and later through an overview of citizenship regulation and discourse in other regions of 
the world, in an incremental manner, so by the end of the paper the reader would have 
formed a rich understanding of what is involved in the stateness boundary maintenance in 
a situation where the identitarian aspect of citizenship is at the same time delegitimized by 
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international norms and reinforced by the divorce of some rights from citizenship. Central 
and Eastern Europe is especially conducive for such analysis due to being caught between 
the normative pressure of the EU and the threat of Russia, however, it is important to 
conceptualize the factors operative in the Lithuanian case in such a way as to ensure their 
broader applicability. I contend that a concern with stateness and the first ingredient 
distilled in the critique of the liberalization/convergence thesis – the unflagging or even 
increasing importance of the identitarian dimension of citizenship, – can be identified as 
the conditions of possibility of ambiguous and/or subversive use of external factors like 
international norms and security concerns when it comes to citizenship regulation3. I 
proceed to summarize the main elements of the theoretical framework presented in this 
chapter before I turn to the empirical analysis of the case of Lithuanian dual citizenship. 
1.3. Concluding remarks 
This chapter proposed a theoretical framework composed of four key elements. 
First, I analyzed the liberalization/ convergence thesis which has dominated citizenship 
studies for the past several decades and which claims that citizenship regulation is 
becoming more similar across countries and that the vector of this trend is towards greater 
liberalization characterized as greater access to citizenship and a lessening of the 
importance of identitarian criteria in citizenship attribution. The postnationalist arguments 
underpinning the liberalization/ convergence thesis center on the increasing decoupling of 
rights from citizenship, and treat the European Union as the laboratory of such 
developments. I pointed out that the paradoxical unintended effect of such decoupling has 
                                                 
3 For a study built on a premise of the interaction between international linkages and stateness in eastern 
neighbours of the EU, although differently conceptualized, see Sasse 2013. 
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been to reinforce the identitarian dimension of citizenship. Therefore, the effect that 
European integration is expected to have on postcommunist countries can not only be 
characterized by the hegemony of the norms of non-discrimination, but also by increased 
opportunities to reassert ethnonational identities within and across territorial borders. I also 
extended the argument of the reassertion of the identitarian dimension of citizenship to the 
phenomenon of dual citizenship and claimed that this chatracteristic is not only endemic to 
dual citizenship for emigrants, but can be applied to immigration countries’ behaviour as 
well.  
I argue that we can only understand the Lithuanian dual citizenship case if we take 
into account this ambiguity combined with the concerns with the threats to stateness arising 
from globalization, migration and postcolonial resentment of the threat of Russian 
imperialism. In the subsequent empirical chapters, I explore how these elements form the 
conditions of possibility of paradoxical developments in citizenship regulation that go 
against the predictions of mainstream citizenship theories and expectations of both 
politicians and the public, and in the comparative Chapter 5 I explore the wider 
applicability of the notion of citizenship regulation as a boundary maintenance regime. 
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Chapter 2. Citizenship regulation in an ethnonationalist postcolonial 
emigration state 
 
The case that I explore centers around an outcome of an inquiry into the relationship 
between citizenship and ethnicity in Lithuania, which started as a legal process, but 
exploded into one of the most controversial and hotly debated topics of the public discourse 
since the country joined the European Union. In order to understand this critical juncture 
in Lithuanian citizenship politics and pinpoint the emerging patterns that are characteristic 
of the wider constellation of citizenship discourse in the era of mass migration and human 
rights expansion, it is vital to explore the development and the context of Lithuanian 
citizenship regulation. Lithuania has often been neglected in studies of citizenship (Krūma 
2007 and Ziemele 2005 being a rare exception) in favor of more obviously controversial 
cases of Latvia and Estonia (e.g. Lukić et al. 2006; Schimmelfennig et al. 2005; Thompson 
1999; Zielonka and Pravda 2001), thus an inquiry into this case can be a fruitful addition 
to the study of citizenship issues in the postcommunist world. This chapter presents the 
background and development of Lithuanian citizenship regulation until the critical juncture 
represented by the 2006 dual citizenship case. I begin by briefly summarizing the case in 
order to highlight the ways in which it relates to the context of Lithuanian citizenship. Then 
I discuss the historical and demographic background of Lithuanian citizenship regulation, 
establishing the status of Lithuania as a postcolonial ethnonationalist state and an 
emigration country. The third part of this chapter traces the process of the development of 
Lithuanian citizenship regulation since the inception of the independent state of the 
Republic of Lithuania. I conclude this chapter by summarizing the main insights gleaned 
from the historical context and the evolution of citizenship regulation that can help put the 
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2006 Constitutional Court ruling in perspective before moving on to the discussion of the 
case under scrutiny in the subsequent chapter. 
2.1. The paradoxical nature of the case of Lithuanian dual citizenship 
In November 2006, the Constitutional Court ruled on a case regarding 
discriminatory nature of the rules regarding availability of dual citizenship (presented in 
greater detail in Chapter 3). The case was based on the combined inquiries of a group of 
members of the parliament belonging to liberal parties and ethnic minorities, and of a 
district court facing a case of an Israeli citizen who wanted to regain her Lithuanian 
citizenship, which she possessed before World War II, in order to achieve restitution of her 
property, but was refused on the basis of the law which allowed ethnic Lithuanians to retain 
Lithuanian citizenship if they emigrated, but forbade preservation of Lithuanian citizenship 
for people of other ethnicities who repatriated to their ethnic homelands.  
The Constitutional Court ruled that indeed the repatriation clause is a case of ethnic 
discrimination. However, instead of expanding the availability of dual citizenship to 
include people of other ethnicities, the Court forbade dual citizenship for everyone, 
including ethnic Lithuanians. As we have established in the previous chapter, this kind of 
an outcome is unexpected for an emigrant-sending state. The mainstream hypothesis 
pertaining to emigration countries holds that the state takes on the active pursuit of 
transantionalism, exclusively focusing on co-ethnics abroad (Faist 2007). The state seizes 
the policy of dual citizenship as a means to control border-crossing social formations, as 
well as to further remittances and investment by emigrants in the country of origin. 
Furthermore, in line with the dominant liberalization/convergence approach, once 
instituted, dual citizenship is unlikely to be reversed. 
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The ruling appears even more counterintuitive if one looks for an explanation in its 
temporal and geopolitical externalities (increased security due to membership in the NATO 
and the EU and unprecedented emigration rates to countries belonging to aforemenetioned 
organizations). Considering overwhelming public support for providing dual citizenship to 
ethnic Lithuanians (55-88 percent according to various polls, depending on the formulation 
of the question4), echoed in parliamentary debates and the media, understanding the 
restrictive turn in the Lithuanian dual citizenship regime and its endurance for almost a 
decade requires deeper analysis.  
As scholars have approached dual citizenship as a path-dependent phenomenon 
(e.g. Faist, Gerdes and Rieple 2004), it is necessary to trace that path, keeping in mind the 
theoretical framework discussed in the preceding chapter. Namely, we have to ask whether 
there is evidence of liberalization/convergence in the evolution of Lithuanian citizenship 
regulation, what role is played by postcolonial experiences and by the imperatives of 
European integration, and what is the relationship between nationhood and statehood in the 
official conception of Lithuanian citizenship. The picture painted in this chapter should 
serve as a foundation for appreciating the degree to which the November 2006 




                                                 
4 Results of various representative surveys conducted by public opinion research organizations and reported 
in the media. “Almost 60%” was reported in BNS (2007). 88.1% support was reported in Lrytas.lt (2007). 
60.7% support reported in DELFI.lt. (2007). 72.3% support was reported in DELFI.lt, „Spinter tyrimai“ 
(2009). 55% support was reported in BNS (2013). Due to the differences in the exact formulation of survey 
questions it is not possible to draw systematic comparisons, but the general tendency of the support of the 
majority of the population for dual citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians is indisputable.  
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2.2. History and demographics. 
2.2.1. A brief history of Lithuanian nationhood and statehood. 
The first mention of Lithuania in historical records happened in 1009 as a place 
where a missionary was killed – a context which represents the reputation of Lithuania as 
the last pagan state in Europe (parts of it officially baptized in 1387, the last part only in 
1413), a state with a distinct sense of identity, heightened by the continuous struggle 
against the encroachment of its neighbours – Russia, Poland, Prussia, and even Sweden in 
the 17th century. Although Lithuania used to be a formidable state several hundred years 
ago, first as a largest duchy in Europe in the 14th-16th centuries, and then as a part of a joint 
state with Poland (union through royal marriage) from 1569 until 1795 when it was 
annexed by the Russian empire, the timeframe that is the most relevant to our subject starts 
with the 19th century, as that is the first time we can meaningfully talk about such questions 
like migration and nationhood. However, the centuries of history shared with the 
neighbouring countries (Germany in its many forms, Poland, and Russia) should be kept 
in mind as the backdrop to the ways in which Lithuanian nationhood and statehood, and 
consequently citizenship, has been conceptualized in more modern times.  
During the times of the union with Poland, Polish culture was dominant among 
nobility, whereas Lithuanian language and culture were considered backwards and only 
appropriate for peasants, and anyone among the nobility and clergy who aspired to not be 
considered backwards was expected to shun Lithuanian language and use Polish instead. 
With the advent of the Russian empire, both Polish and Lithuanian nobility staged several 
rebellions, prompting a crackdown from Russia which culminated in a campaign of 
assimilation. After the 1831 rebellion the Lithuanian university was closed, and after the 
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1863 rebellion Lithuanian language press and even primary education was banned. Instead 
of succumbing to the assimilation efforts, Lithuanians developed a network of secret 
primary schools and book smugglers, and with the unrest in the early 1900s the bans were 
acknowledged as futile and were lifted. For Lithuanians, the resistance to assimilation was 
confounded by the fact that the Polish nobility argued that resistance to Russia should equal 
alignment with Polish language and culture, and the fact that higher education could only 
be pursued in a foreign language. However, by the end of the 19th century, Lithuania was 
subject to a broad nationalist movement, which eventually put forth demands for 
independence, taking advantage of the weakened state of Germany and Russia due to the 
First World War, leading to the declaration of independence in 1918. The experiences 
under the Polish cultural hegemony and Russian forced assimilation and the reactions to 
them allow us to interpret Lithuania as a postcolonial case. 
The newly independent Lithuanian state had to fight Russian efforts to subvert its 
government and establish a socialist regime (the fear of a repetition of such attempts was 
one of the factors that led to a coup in 1926 which turned Lithuania from a parliamentary 
democracy into a nationalist authoritarian state), and deal with territorial disputes with 
Germany and Poland (both of which engaged in their own assimilationist efforts in the 
occupied Lithuanian territories) which were resolved only briefly before the Second World 
War. In fact, during the majority of the existence of the interwar republic, the southeast of 
Lithuania, including its capital Vilnius, was occupied by Poland which claimed that it was 
actually Polish lands and recorded most of the inhabitants as Poles, even changing their 
surnames to sound more Polish (including that of the family of the author of this thesis). 
Lithuania established a temporary capital in its second largest city Kaunas and never 
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recognized the occupied territories as Polish. Ironically, Soviet Union used the provision 
of help in getting the occupied territories back from Poland in 1939 as a way to strongarm 
Lithuania into a one-sided military treaty which paved the way for subsequent occupation 
enabled by the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact. The legacy of the Polish cultural hegemony 
efforts in both the times of the joint republic in the 16th-18th centuries, during the 19th 
century resistance against the Russian empire and its assimilationist campaign, and during 
the more current occupation in the interwar period, is that a large portion of the inhabitants 
of that region, originally a mix of Poles, Lithuanians and Belorussians, identify themselves 
as Polish and speak in a language that is a mix of Polish, Lithuanian, Russian and 
Belorussian. 
Soviet Union occupied Lithuania in 1940, was replaced by German occupation in 
1941-1945, and then again reclaimed Lithuania as a part of the USSR in 1945. The armed 
guerilla resistance to Soviet occupation in Lithuania was eradicated by 1953. A large 
portion of the more educated population who could have led resistance efforts were either 
exiled to Siberia, where many died from cold, exhaustion and starvation (the first wave of 
exiles took place within months of annexation, in June of 1941, right before the German 
occupation, which helps to understand why initially Lithuanians welcomed Germans as 
liberators and only became disillusioned in the wake of the Holocaust), or escaped to the 
West with the advent of the Red Army in 1945 and eventually moved from the displaced 
persons camps in Germany on to the Anglosaxon immigration countries, mostly the USA. 
A small number of dissidents, mostly clergy members, remained active, usually facing 
imprisonment and torture. The resistance movement gained traction only in the late 1980s, 
enabled by the liberalization brought on by the developments in the Soviet Union. Mass 
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nationalist demonstrations took place in 1988-1989, and the first actually free elections in 
1989 yielded an absolute majority of nationalists in the parliament, who did not delay in 
declaring a restoration of independence on March 11th, 1990.  
The first several years after the declaration of independence were marked by large 
scale economic turmoil due to the triple transition. Many decisions that were taken by the 
government were oriented more towards establishing statehood than towards any concern 
for economic efficiency, paying particular attention to ways of preventing the possibility 
for former foreign aggressors, namely, Russia and to a certain extent Poland, to gain any 
ground in Lithuania. For example, laws on land ownership were explicitly formulated in 
such a way that only Lithuanian citizens or citizens of pre-1989 OECD countries would be 
allowed to purchase land, thus explicitly excluding both Russia and Poland (Darden 2009: 
131). The approach towards ethnic minorities in Lithuania is substantially informed by the 
politico-historical approach to their kin-states, but there are certain peculiarities to each of 
them. Let us briefly overview the key elements of ethnic relations in Lithuania. 
2.2.2. Ethnic relations in the newly independent Lithuania. 
A lot of the Lithuanian migration is directly related to the ebbs and flows of its 
historical relations with Russia in its many incarnations, and a lot of the attitude towards 
people of other ethnicities is derived from the historical struggles with the neighbouring 
nations whence these minorities originate. Some of these struggles are further in the past, 
but some are not that far removed from today. More specifically, in the circumstances 
mirroring the establishment of the first independent Lithuanian republic, the newly 
independent state had to address challenges related to Russia and Poland.  
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2.2.2.1. Russian. On January 13th, 1991, Soviet Union (which at that point equaled 
Russia) launched an attempt to subdue Lithuanian independence by capturing the TV and 
radio broadcasting stations, killing 14 and injuring 702 unarmed protesters who attempted 
to defend “strategic objects” by acting as human shields. The personnel installed in the 
captured stations broadcasted as if Lithuania was back in the USSR, however, no one took 
them seriously and after the 1991 August coup in Moscow they retreated. Direct Russian 
threat to Lithuania symbolically ended by the retreat of Red Army forces in 1993, but a 
large part of the public and politicians still perceive Russia as a threat, exacerbated most 
recently by the 2013-2015 events in Ukraine.  
The Russian minority in Lithuania (see Table 2.1 for ethnic composition of the 
population of Lithuania) is much smaller than in the other Baltic countries5 due to the 
differences in the duration of the annexation by the Russian empire and the relative weight 
of industry attracting Russian colonizers. Therefore, it is not perceived as a significant 
threat on its own, only as a potential Trojan horse for Russia’s political schemes. It is 
widely believed that those who are overwhelmingly loyal to Russia, such as former officers 
of the Red Army, have already repatriated to Russia immediately after the restoration of 
Lithuanian independence, and that those who remain actually appreciate what Lithuania 
with its membership in the EU has to offer and thus are not eager to return to Russian 
dominion. However, Russia’s ability to capture the discourse of a kin-state after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union (King and Melvin 1998) has kept a part of the public and 
politicians alert to the possibility that the Russian government may use the Russian 
minority as a Trojan horse in an attempt to jeopardize Lithuanian independence. 
                                                 
5 Russians comprise 26% of the population of Latvia (as reported by the Central Statistical Bureau of 
Latvia (2014: 13)) and 25.2% of the Estonian population (as reported by the Statistics Estonia (2014: 8)). 
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2.2.2.2. Polish. The Polish situation in the wake of the restoration of independence 
was less clear-cut.6 The population of the southeastern part of Lithuania which had 
underwent Polish occupation and assimilation efforts in 1920-1939 identified themselves 
as Polish and raised demands for regional autonomy or even secession from Lithuania and 
unification with Poland. The Polish state did not instigate or provide support for such 
claims, in fact, the Polish movement in Lithuania was supported by the Soviet Union as a 
means of weakening the Lithuanian claims to statehood. However, a hardline stance of the 
government against any concessions beyond schooling in the ethnic minority language, 
and a lack of support for rattachist aspirations from the Polish state in 1990s, prevented 
tangible political achievements on behalf of the autonomist movement. Still, the dominant 
attitude in the Lithuanian public discourse is that those who consider themselves Polish are 
not loyal to the Lithuanian state and are therefore perceived with suspicion.  
The attitude towards Poles is exacerbated by the fact that the local government in 
this region is overwhelmingly dominated by the Polish Alliance, the successor party of the 
                                                 
6 A recommended English-language detailed account of the situation of the Polish minority in Lithuania 
during Soviet times and after restoration of independence can be found in Snyder (1998: 188-194). 
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autonomist movement, which is adamant about the dominance of Polish language and 
culture in the public life of this region. A recurring complaint from the locals who identify 
as Poles is that Lithuanian government does not allow them to post street signs in both 
languages, as recommended by the European Council. However, the signs that they 
actually try to post are written in the mix of Polish, Lithuanian, Russian and Belorussian, 
prompting the complaints from the Lithuanian population and the rebuttals from the 
Lithuanian government that it is not actually in Polish and thus should not be seriously 
considered.  
Another common complaint raised by the Poles is that they cannot have their names 
in their official documents due to the fact that the use of non-Lithuanian letters (such as the 
letters X, W, Ł, or anything from the Cyrillic alphabet) is prohibited in official Lithuanian 
documents (thus preventing the author of this thesis from being able to take her husband’s 
name). The support for such demands by the Polish state in the past decade, and the 
strengthening of Lithuanian Poles’ relationship with their kin-state thanks to the 
establishment of the Polish card in 2007, has relatively soured the Polish-Lithuanian 
interstate relations which were considered to be exceptionally good in the initial period 
after the collapse of the Soviet Union. The plaintiffs periodically bring these complaints 
against the Lithuanian government, who is still standing its ground on these issues, into 
court, from the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania to the European Court of 
Human Rights. This tug-of-war has resulted in a poisoned atmosphere in regards to the 
Polish ethnic minority. We could go so far as to claim that, in terms of ethnic minorities, 
the Poles are perceived as an even larger threat than Russians, even if the same cannot be 
said for the corresponding countries. 
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2.2.2.3. German. Another historical antagonist, Germany, is historically perceived 
as a direct heir of the Prussian empire which had assimilated the southwestern part of 
Lithuania and its ethnic kin, the Baltic tribe by the name of Prussians. In the more recent 
history, Germany is remembered not only for the general atrocities of the Second World 
War, but also for annexing the seaside region of Klaipėda, currently the third largest city 
in Lithuania, shortly before the war started, and claiming it to be German, when in actuality 
it was part of the Lithuanian lands forcibly assimilated by the Prussian empire. The current 
German state is not perceived as a threat due to its central position in the European Union, 
but the potential threat of ethnic Germans laying claims on the Lithuanian seaside is still 
acknowledged. There are hardly any Germans in Lithuania today, but the memory of 
German dominance in the seaside region is reawakened by annual German tourist 
pilgrimages to these supposedly German lands, periodically bursting into the Lithuanian 
public discourse as a cautionary tale against allowing foreigners access to real estate, 
especially in desirable areas like resorts.  
2.2.2.4. Jewish. This perception of the threat of real estate ownership is especially 
relevant when it comes to the Jewish community in Lithuania. Before the World War II 
8% of the population of Lithuania were Jews (Vaitiekus 1992: 9), mostly concentrated in 
the cities due to the norms which prevented Jews from land ownership and agricultural 
pursuits. In fact, ethnic Lithuanians comprised the absolute majority of the rural population 
and sometimes a minority of the urban population. This functional and subsequently spatial 
segregation fed into an undercurrent of anti-Semitism that could be found in all Eastern 
European countries and that carries partial blame for the severity of the Jewish genocide in 
the lands occupied by Germany. Jews comprised as much as 30% of the inhabitants of 
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Vilnius, whereas today there are only several thousand Jewish people left (Eberhardt 
[1996] 2003). During the Holocaust Lithuania lost the largest percentage of Jews, and their 
presence was effectively marginalized in the public space and collective memory, further 
compounded by emigration to Israel whenever possible during the Soviet times. 
To this day, the discussion of how much responsibility for the extermination of the 
Lithuanian Jewish population lies with the Germans, and how much with locals, keeps 
resurfacing every time a person who collaborated with the Germans on Holocaust is 
brought to trial. The public officials maintain the position of appeasement, for example, in 
a 1995 visit to Israel the President of Lithuania offered a public apology in the Kneset for 
the participation of Lithuanians in the genocide. However, a part of the public reacts to 
such pronouncements with resentment, claiming that the Soviets performed genocide on 
Lithuanians and yet they do not get acknowledged as equally evil by the world community 
in general and by Israel in particular (Stungurys 2007). This attitude is shored up by the 
fact that the first instances of mass murder of the Jews by Germans in Lithuania took place 
within a fortnight from the first wave of exile of Lithuanians to Siberia by the Soviets. 
Soviet propaganda paid a lot of attention to bashing fascism and employed Holocaust as 
an additional tool to discredit Lithuanian nationalists who had initially accepted Germans 
as liberators and established an interim government (before the German occupation 
officials disbanded such efforts within a couple months), which coincided with the first 
wave of mass extermination efforts in 1941. The fact that many Jews supported Soviet 
Union and that those who escaped from the ghettoes joined Soviet guerilla efforts alienated 
them from the majority of the Lithuanian population who perceived both Soviet Union and 
eventually Germany as equally evil. After the restoration of independence the predominant 
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position in the public discourse was that Jewish suffering has been sufficiently 
acknowledged and now it is time to acknowledge Soviet atrocities.7 In the face of 
resentment produced by the multiplied attempts of foreign domination, many Lithuanians 
ultimately painted the Jewish community with the same brush as other ethnic minorities – 
as allies of enemies and therefore hostile. Earnest efforts by various governmental and 
nongovernmental organizations to educate the public about Holocaust and those 
Lithuanians who collaborated with the Nazis have somewhat muted the anti-Semitism in 
the public discourse, but it is far from gone. 
Although Lithuanian – Israeli interstate relations are termed “very good” by 
officials, the relationship between Lithuania and the world Jewish community is a fragile 
shell, since it concentrates on restitution of property, most of which is in the heart of 
Lithuanian historical districts, defined as the so-called Old Town areas which used to be 
the town in the days when Jewish people comprised a significant part of the urban 
population. These areas which used to house Jewish shops and homes until the advent of 
the Second World War and were used as locations for ghettos during the German 
occupation have been reimagined as the heartlands of Lithuanian historical heritage. The 
mass media is teeming with commentaries from Lithuanians who see the “old towns” as 
belonging to them and are angered by the efforts of the world Jewish community to claim 
Jewish property. The issues related to the restitution of property are especially relevant for 
my research, since in Lithuania, as in numerous other postcommunist countries, restitution 
of property is connected to citizenship status, which is a source of friction above all with 
the world Jewish community who attempt to claim the property of heirless Lithuanian 
                                                 
7 Discussion of the Lithuanian attitudes towards Holocaust and the Jews based on Bubnys (n.d.) and 
Tatarūnas (2009). 
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Jews, as well as the communal property (Barkan 2000; Eizenstat 1997; Geleževičius 2003). 
In fact, the issues related to Jewish property restitution served as one of the factors that 
prompted the critical juncture in Lithuanian dual citizenship regulation that is discussed in 
the subsequent chapter.  
While the questions of restitution are relevant for people of all ethnicities, they are 
especially problematic when it comes to Jewish property due to the historical events in the 
context of Second World War and the interchanging occupations by USSR, then Germany, 
and then again USSR. The Soviet annexation of Lithuania in 1940 brought about 
nationalization policies, expropriating first and foremost the middle and upper class 
Lithuanians and sending many of them into exile, taking their factories and shops into the 
possession of the state and giving their homes to either public institutions or dwellings for 
the supporters of the Soviet regime. Since many Jews were supporters of Soviet Union, 
they were not treated quite the same way. On the other hand, during German occupation 
the expropriation of property focused exclusively on the Jews, allowing some of the local 
Lithuanian collaborators to take advantage of this as well. The property that was 
nationalized by the Soviets was basically within several months either reclaimed by its 
original owners or taken over by someone else if the original owners had been exiled, thus 
setting the precedent for changes in property ownership without the use of standard market 
procedures. With the retreat of the German army, the escape of some Lithuanians to the 
West in anticipation of the return of the Soviet occupation, and the loss of the casualties of 
the Second World War, there appeared more opportunities for some people to take over 
others’ property. Finally, when the Soviet rule was reestablished, the nationalization 
processes resumed. During the span of several years, some property changed hands more 
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than once, confounding the possibility to determine proper ownership when it comes to 
restitution. Furthermore, since large scale private property did not exist in the Soviet Union, 
any larger estate was either used as a building for some public institution or divided into 
smaller apartments, providing additional confusion about the type of ownership.  
When, as a part of the package of Westernization, Lithuania embarked on the road 
of denationalization of property, government officials encountered numerous situations 
where the possibility to determine who should be given the right of ownership of a piece 
of real estate was not quite straightforward. For example, most people were given the right 
of ownership of the apartment in which they lived in during the Soviet times. But if a 
building used to belong to one family before the Second World War and was converted 
into apartments by the Soviets in 1940s, who is to be given the right of ownership – the 
person whose ancestors owned the building in 1930s or the families living there for 
decades, for whom these apartments are the only home they ever knew? Incidentally, due 
to the predominance of Jews in interwar Lithuanian towns, many of such cases were of a 
former Jewish home now occupied by several Lithuanian, Polish or Russian families. The 
overlapping claims of ownership were especially pronounced in the case of Jewish 
property, and the fact that in many cases there were no heirs of the original owners, and 
instead it was the Jewish community trying to reclaim the property, weakened the weight 
of the Jewish demands for restitution in the eyes of the Lithuanian public.  
Another ethnic group whose claim to property is perceived as not quite 
straightforward is the Poles who want to claim property from the period when the 
southeastern part of Lithuania was occupied by Poland. They can either be perceived as 
not really Polish and only “brainwashed” by Poland and therefore untrustworthy, or they 
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are really Polish and then they do not belong in this region and are therefore not worthy of 
having claims to property here. The discourse of property restitution is underscored by the 
conception of who can actually lay claim to Lithuanian real estate, and oftentimes 
representatives of ethnic minorities are not considered to have the same level of moral 
claims as ethnic Lithuanians due to their relationship with some state that has been a threat 
to Lithuania at some point in history. 
The decision to limit property restitution to Lithuanian citizens and the 
establishment of the ethnic repatriation clause in dual citizenship regulation have to be 
understood in tandem as attempts to address the potential threat of giving extra resources 
to the ethnic minorities which may be not quite loyal to Lithuania or outright foreigners 
who cannot even be expected to have any loyalty to Lithuania. Such a perception of 
ethnic/national “others” as threats dovetails into the underlying conception of Lithuania as 
an ethnonationalist state which I discuss in the following section.  
2.2.3. Lithuania as an ethnonationalist state. 
The conception of Lithuania as an ethnic homeland of Lithuanians, together with 
the pronounced sense of historicity of both the achievements and the aspirations of the 
nation which need to be secured, and of the historical wrongs it has suffered from the big 
neighbors (read: Russia, Poland, and Germany) which needed to be righted and prevented 
from happening in the future, was laid into the foundation of the newly independent 
Lithuanian state. The evidence of such orientation is abundant in the explosion of public 
discussions in the 1988-1990 mass media and could fill volumes, but for the purposes of 
this thesis it is sufficient to concentrate on its expression in the development of the 
Constitution of Lithuania, the conceptual document on which the regulation of Lithuanian 
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citizenship has been built and which serves as the main reference point in the Constitutional 
Court’s deliberations. In the previous chapter I discussed the presumption that Central and 
Eastern European postcommunist states are archetypically ethnonationalist, but their desire 
to belong to the Western political constellations like the EU and NATO serves as a 
moderating influence by prompting their compliance with international norms of 
nondiscrimination and moving the policies of these countries in a more civic direction. As 
I trace the process of creating the Constitution of the newly independent Lithuanian state, 
I look for textual evidence of both ethnonationalist orientation and acknowledgement of 
international norms, paying special attention to whether the latter actually moderate the 
former.  
The Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was drafted during the 1990-1992 
period and adopted in October 1992 (until then Lithuania had an interim Constitutional law 
mostly based on the 1938 Constitution, but purged of its authoritarian elements). The first 
attempts were directly coordinated by the head of the state, but in November 1990 a 
working group for the preparation of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania was 
established. The protocols of the meetings of this working group which was tasked with 
the preparation of the draft of the Constitution provide many clues to tug-of-war between 
ethnonationalist and civic aspirations.8 The records of the proceedings contain numerous 
references to “the commitment to guarantee the historical survival of the Lithuanian nation 
                                                 
8 The documents of the drafting of the Constitution were accessed at the archives of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Lithuania in August and September of 2009 thanks to The Johns Hopkins University Leonard 
and Helen R. Stulman Jewish Studies Award for Pre-dissertation Research. The Paliament archives are in 
the process of construction, so the records have not yet been assigned case volume numbers, only laid out 
in a chronological order through several tentative volumes. 
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and the development of its national culture” (November 1990) and “the importance of the 
ecological existence and continuity of the nation” (January 1992).  
2.2.3.1. The conception of statehood and nationhood in the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania. One of the main bones of contention in the drafting of the 
Constitution was the concept of the nation. The common Lithuanian word ‘tauta’ primarily 
refers to the nation in the ethnic sense. The documents of the proceedings of drafting the 
Constitution reveal an awareness of its authors of why this word can be problematic. 
However, the problems were considered to be in the eye of the beholder, i.e. of the Western 
countries which feared that the quest for independence from the Soviet Union would lead 
to ethnonationalist violence, and not in the actual attitudes of the Lithuanians. Some 
drafters feared that explicitly defining the nation in an ethnic manner would hurt their cause 
by dissuading people of other ethnicities from supporting the goal of Lithuanian 
independence or be discordant with the international legal norms, some claimed that a 
nation is an organic entity that cannot be defined by law, and only one member of the 
commission explicitly called for a non-ethnocentric vision of the nation for the 21st century.  
The initial outline of the Constitution produced in November of 1990 included a 
quite candid discussion of the implications of choosing one or another term. The working 
group wrote that it is difficult to decide how to name the sovereign subject – the people, 
the nation or the citizens of Lithuania. They suggested that using the term “Nation” 
(‘Tauta’) would require long explanations to the opponents regarding its true meaning. On 
the other hand, they acknowledged that the term “the people” was “totally suitable”, but it 
had been deeply devalued due to demagogical overuse by the Soviet propaganda. The 
implications of the term “citizens” were not discussed in that particular outline. 
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Ultimately, the alternative proposals – to replace the word “nation” with words such 
as “people” or “citizens” – were rejected. The drafts that were discussed in 1990-1991 used 
the term “the nation of Lithuania”. The protocols of the commission (January-February 
1992) indicate an anxiety over whether a definition of a nation should be provided in the 
Constitution, or if it would become a polarizing issue. The draft of the Constitution that 
was circulated in January-March 1991 included a paragraph that defined the “nation of 
Lithuania” as consisting of “ethnic Lithuanians and people of other ethnicities who have 
traditionally been living in the [other versions: ethnographic] territory of Lithuania and 
consider themselves permanent residents of Lithuania [other versions: “consider 
themselves a part of this nation”], as well as other citizens of Lithuania”. In a sense, such 
a definition establishes a certain hierarchy of various groups of the inhabitants of Lithuania, 
where ethnic Lithuanians are conceived as the core group, followed by autochtonous 
national minorities, and then listing the residual category of “other citizens of Lithuania”, 
whereby the former colonizers from the USSR were excluded if they chose to keep their 
Soviet citizenship rather than take on a new Lithuanian one. In March 1992 the working 
group (as well as the left-wing opposition) proposed to define the “nation of Lithuania” as 
consisting of citizens of Lithuania. Such evidence was taken into account by the 
Constitutional Court in its November 2006 ruling, reasoning that the authors of the 
Constitution did not intend for a privileged position of ethnic Lithuanians.  
One of the main variants of preamble was circulated in November 1991. It proposed 
to proclaim the Constitution based on “the history of the statehood of Lithuania and 
democratic traditions and Constitutional institutional continuity of the Republic of 
Lithuania, the ideals of humanism, democracy and social justice” and “universally 
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acknowledged principles of international law”. The preamble of the draft also stated the 
intention to “guarantee free development of Lithuania and its people, the conditions for the 
historical persistence of the [ethnic] Lithuanian nation and development of national culture 
in the land of parents and ancestors” and to “develop friendly relations with other nations”. 
It also emphasized the territorial integrity of the state of Lithuania, its “allegiance to the 
legal values universally acknowledged by the world community“, and self-identification 
as a member of said community. 
There were other suggestions for preambles that were more explicitly 
ethnonationalist. A 1991 draft proposed by Aloyzas Astravas, an American-Lithuanian 
from Boston, is very close to the preamble of the 1922 Constitution of Lithuania and can 
serve as a rather representative example of the orientations among the Lithuanian diaspora: 
In the name of God Almighty, the Nation of Lithuania, having 
suffered oppression and genocide, rejuvenated by the majestic past of 
the old Lithuania, gratefully commemorating its children’s efforts and 
noble sacrifices made for liberating the Homeland, is restoring the 
continuity of the sovereignty of the independent State of Lithuania, so 
that it would, implementing the eternal right given to it by the Almighty 
Creator to be free and sovereign in its fartherland, guard with a unified 
will that which belongs to it through the ages, continue the honorable 
traditions of the Nation to live peacefully, and through the efforts of the 
current and future generations continue and cultivate the powers of 
sovereign Lithuania and the continuity of its statehood. 
This Constitution is established for Lithuania through the 
experience given to the nation of Lithuania by its antiquity and past 
stateness, its renaissance and fights for independence, the flourishing of 
independent Lithuania, desperate resistance against decimation of the 
Nation, which has brought about the restoration of the continuation of a 
sovereign State of Lithuania. 
Even though this proposal talks about the “state of Lithuania” and “nation of 
Lithuania” instead of using the more ostensibly ethnic concept of the nation, the imagery 
is saturated with the ethnonationalist conception of what the state of Lithuania is all about. 
In November of 1990, another Lithuanian-American, Algimantas Gureckas, provided not 
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only a proposal of the main principles to be enumerated in the Constitution, but also explicit 
justification for basing it mostly on the interwar Constitutions (1922 and 1938), stating that 
examples of Constitutions of foreign countries can be of little help when it comes to the 
basic principles of Lithuanian statehood. He mostly focused on the historical continuity 
between the newly independent state and the Lithuanian Grand Duchy. 
The preamble of the final text of the Constitution that was presented for public 
discussion in April 1992 and adopted in a referendum in November 1992 used the 
grammatical form of the term “Lithuanian nation” (lietuvių tauta) in the ethnic sense rather 
than the more civic sounding “nation of Lithuania” (Lietuvos tauta), referred to its native 
language and the birthright to live and create in the land of forefathers, and did not provide 
a definition of the nation (an alternative proposal that defined “the nation of Lithuania” as 
“the historical community of the citizens of the state of Lithuania”, which again was 
explicitly aimed against post-war ‘colonial’ immigration, was not adopted), thus leaving 
an opening for either interpretation (see Kalvytė 2008).  
Article 2 of the adopted Constitution reiterates that “The state of Lithuania is 
created by the Nation. The Nation is sovereign.”.9 Article 3 states that “No one may restrict 
or limit the sovereignty of the Nation or make claims to the sovereign powers belonging to 
the entire nation. The Nation and each citizen have the right to resist anyone who 
encroaches on the independence, territorial integrity, and Constitutional order [meaning a 
democratic republic as opposed to an authoritarian (communist or any other) state] of the 
                                                 
9 I follow the capitalization used in the original text. I provide direct translation of the Lithuanian text of the 
Constitution (http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Konstitucija.htm) rather than the official English 
version (http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm), since the English version does not always 
provide a verbatim translation (e.g. the verb tenses differ), and since the Lithuanian version is the one 
quoted in all official documents, in the reasoning of the Constitutional Court, and in the public discourse. 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
91 
 
State of Lithuania by force.”. Article 10 reaffirms the territorial unity of the Lithuanian 
state, and Article 14 designates Lithuanian as the official language of the state. These 
statements are aimed directly against any claims Soviet Union/Russia might make, as well 
as against the pursuits of the Polish minority, and could even be extended towards a vague 
possibility of German claims to the seaside region. The preliminary draft circulated in 
January 1991, which helps to identify the reasoning behind the current Constitution, was 
more wordy on the issue of territorial integrity and expressly forbade internal division of 
the unitary territory of the state for any other purposes than administration. It also 
explicated on the role of Lithuanian language as the official state language, specifying that 
it was to be used in all institutions and organizations, and that an additional language of an 
ethnic minority could be used alongside Lithuanian, but not instead of it. The January 1991 
draft also used the concept of “regional minorities” alongside “ethnic minorities”, hinting 
at the skepticism with which the self-identification of the inhabitants of southeastern 
Lithuania as Poles is perceived. 
2.2.3.2. International norms and influence in the drafting of the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania. International norms of nondiscrimination are also entrenched in the 
Constitution. The second chapter of the Constitution, titled “The Human Being and the 
State”, which includes Articles 18-37, establishes a range of civil and political rights, such 
as the right to privacy and due process, freedom of speech and of association, electoral and 
petition rights, etc., that are directly copied from the Constitutions of Western democratic 
states. In fact, the November 1990 annotated outline of the Constitution explicitly 
proclaimed that it was necessary to “include the rights and freedoms named in the main 
international legal acts, while avoiding mentioning names of international legal acts or their 
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priority over Lithuanian laws in the text of the Constitution”. A 1991 outline of the 
conception of the Constituton labeled these rights as “universally acknowledged 
fundamental human rights and freedoms”. Minutes of the meetings of the Constitutional 
Commission revealed that enumeration of rights is considered unproblematic – the 
sentiment was expressed on January 20, 1992, by D.Morkūnas, and on January 27th, 1992, 
by K.Lapinskas, both stating that the chapter on the rights and freedoms of citizens can go 
straight to the working group, since they are not controversial, but was not rebuffed by 
anyone present. 
The head of the state, Vytautas Landsbergis, who at first acted as the head of the 
working group that drafted the Constitution, used direct consultations with foreign 
laywers/scientists solicited by the World Lithuanian Community, Lowry Wyman, J.D., of 
Harvard University and then the University of Pennsylvania, and her husband Barnabas D. 
Johnson, Esquire. Proposing their help in May 1990, they stated goals like “managing the 
transition from a fundamentally lawless system to a lawful one, including promoting ways 
of avoiding preoccupation with “settling scores” – thereby encouraging participation of all 
citizens within the new society, regardless of their roles within the old”, or “generally 
reforming the legal, administrative, and economic infrastructure to conform with 
international norms”. In a June 1990 memorandum Lowry Wyman provided notes based 
on her discussion with Laurence Tribe of Harvard Law School regarding the preparation 
of the Lithuanian Constitution. She starts her notes by heavily emphasize the importance 
of international norms and nondiscrimination: 
The Lithuanian Constitution should protect everybody. In order 
to be credible internationally, the Lithuanians should produce a fair 
Constitution (imagine reading it through the eyes of an opposition group 
or the outside – the USSR or the West). <…> Very few rights should be 
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limited only to citizens. See Constitutions of Canada, FRG, and Spain. 
There are numerous problems with the draft Czech Constitution; these 
are similar to those of the Lithuanian Provisional Basic Law. There 
should be much stronger and fuller protection of minorities. Query 
whether this should be achieved through greater protection of individual 
rights or the creation of group rights. 
In other memorandums from August 1990, Lowry Wyman and Barnabas D. 
Johnson again mentioned the relevance of “public relations”, “a decent respect for the 
opinions of mankind”, and the Lithuanians’ perception of their help and of Westerners in 
general as having “much to contribute to Lithuania’s quest to constitutional democracy. 
They pointed out that “the international response might have been more favorable if the 
whys and wherefores” of the restoration of independence were proclaimed instead of 
focusing on the proclamation of independence per se. The goal of independence, in their 
view, should have been stated as a desire “to create a Constitutional democracy of free and 
equal citizens, a republic based on majority rule that respects minority and individual 
rights, and all the rest that Lithuania presumably aspires to”.  
In a November 1990 memorandum Barnabas D. Johnson implores the decision-
makers of the Constitutional process to “welcome all current residents of Lithuania to join 
your endeavor to lay aside ancient antagonisms and build a multi-ethnic new Lithuanian 
Republic based on equality of opportunity, the protection of human rights, and all those 
other precious values underlying modern Constitutional democracies”, and warns them that 
the imperatives of globalization should counteract the inclinations towards “righteous 
anger”. As I discussed in the preceding chapter, this inclination towards righteous anger is 
a product of postcolonial experiences. Interestingly, in her presentation at the First 
International Andrey Sakharov Memorial Congress on Peace, Progress, and Human Rights 
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held in May 1990 in Moscow, Lowry Wyman labeled Lithuania as a “former Soviet 
colony”.  
In a December 1990 memorandum to the Lithuanian head of the state, Lowry 
Wyman provides notes from a Heritage Foundation policy analyst Douglas J.Seay, who 
tries to explain that the West, and especially the USA, anxiously perceive the striving for 
independence from the USSR as a potential source of instability due to the threats of 
nuclear proliferation or ethnic conflict, more specifically, persecution of ethnic minorities 
by the newly independent states. While the former did not apply to Lithuania as much, the 
latter was one of the main targets for the tension between domestic imperatives and 
international norms. 
In another December 1990 memorandum, Lowry Wyman pinpoints that the 
concept of the Nation is one two main issues of contention in the preparation of the 
Constitution next to the question of presidential institution. The first of the two issues is 
directly relevant to this thesis. The memorandum extols the benefits of the concept “the 
people of Lithuania” which is “a much broader concept than “the Lithuanian nation,” and 
looks to the future rather than to the past10. “The people of Lithuania” is a concept that is 
capable of embracing people of different ethnic backgrounds who support the Republic of 
Lithuania and its Constitutional order.”. 
The official documents do not contain many verbatim suggestions from these 
consultants, and their frustration with the Soviet-style language and reasoning ingrained in 
the majority of the representatives of the legal profession is repeatedly expressed in their 
                                                 
10 In their constant prompting to look to the future rather than the past, Wyman and Johnson in yet another 
December 1990 memorandum go as far as cautioning the government to beware of the pitfalls of restitution 
in light of the layered confiscations of property during Nazi and Soviet times. 
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letters contained in the archives of the proceedings of the Constitutional Commission. 
Lowry Wyman called a two page outline of the conception of the Constitution produced 
by the working group “the jottings of unfocused thinkers who are drenched in Communist 
law” and “an abysmal product”, warned that “if you send this abroad, Lithuania will 
become the laughing stock of the civilized world”, suggested disbanding this Commission, 
and implored to “create something worthy of the people who have died for Lithuania”, 
saying that “they, and their children, deserve better”. Barnabas D. Johnson also was not 
short of lofty expressions, stating in his letter to the then-head of the Lithuanian state 
Vytautas Landsbergis that “the new Constitution of Lithuania is by far the most important 
and precious gift you and your generation of patriots can ever hope to give to your beloved 
country” and asking to let him and the other consultant rest at night so they could do their 
best when drafting the text. The draft proposed by the American consultants in February 
1991 was markedly different from the one drafted by the Lithuanian working group which 
ultimately served as the basis for the Constitution adopted in 1992. It used notions like “the 
people of Lithuania” instead of referring to the nation in any form, proposed to print the 
text of the Constitution not only in Lithuanian, but also in Russian, Polish and English, and 
explicitly stated that “The people of Lithuania intend by this Constitution to base their 
Republic upon a foundation of Western Constitutional democracy, political wisdom, 
administrative experience, good governance, reason, justice, equity, and law. The people 
therefore intend, and hereby instruct, that the words and phrases of this Constitution be 
interpreted in light of the meaning given to them by the historical usages of the Western 
legal tradition and by the best judicial and scholarly interpretations of other Constitutional 
democracies”. Their proposed text was perceived as “too American” in style, for example, 
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continuously starting pronouncements with “We, the people…”, but the fact that it was 
also circulated as a part of the deliberations during the Constitution drafting process 
supports the idea that the advice from foreign experts was taken seriously by those who 
prepared the Constitution for Lithuania. 
2.2.3.3. Ethnicity in the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. One should also 
take into account Article 45 contained in the third chapter (titled “Society and the State”) 
which states that “Ethnic communities of citizens independently manage the affairs of their 
ethnic culture, education, charity, and mutual assistance. The state provides support to the 
ethnic communities.” The goal of the prevention of potential ethnic conflict and ethnic 
discrimination in postcommunist states was one of the main points of concern for the West, 
and this article can be seen as an attempt to appease such concerns. However, it very clearly 
limits the areas in which ethnic minorities can exercise their autonomy to the cultural 
sphere, foreclosing, for example, potential claims to territorial autonomy. 
For the purposes of this thesis, two articles – Article 29 and Article 32 – in the 
second chapter of the Constitution hold special relevance. Article 29 prohibits 
discrimination, or, more specifically, states that “The rights of the human being may not 
be restricted, nor may he be granted any privileges on the grounds of gender, race, 
nationality/ethnicity [it could be argued which translation is more appropriate for the 
Lithuanian word ‘tautybė’, which is grammatically derived from the ethnic conception of 
the nation ‘tauta’, but is also used to designate nationality of a country, such as 
“American”, for lack of another term in the Lithuanian language], language, origin, social 
status, beliefs, convictions, or views.” This article was employed in the challenge to 
Lithuanian citizenship regulation that is discussed in the next chapter. On the other hand, 
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Article 32 establishes freedom of movement for citizens of Lithuania, but also adds that 
“Everyone who is Lithuanian may settle in Lithuania.”, ultimately establishing the 
privileged relationship between ethnic Lithuanians and the Lithuanian state. Some of the 
drafts of 1991 and 1992 suggested to regulate acquisition of citizenship by giving it to any 
Lithuanian once they settle in Lithuania or to any person of a different ethnicity after they 
have resided in Lithuania for 10 years. Such contradictory inclusion of both express 
interdiction against discrimination or privilege and express acknowledgement of the 
special status of ethnic Lithuanians have served as fodder for many debates related to the 
2006 case of Lithuanian citizenship regulation.  
Overall, the records of the working group who prepared the draft of the Constitution 
in tandem with the current text of said Constitution reveal the picture of a state with 
ethnonationalist orientation that is nevertheless aware of the need to toe the line of 
international norms of nondiscrimination and has some proponents of a more civic 
orientation. It is evident that movements away from ethnonationalism and towards 
nondiscrimination are related both to genuine socialization into Western norms and mere 
attempts to appease the West without necessarily internalizing said norms. International 
norms of nondiscrimination coexist with the privileged relationship between ethnic 
Lithuanians and the Lithuanian state, highlighting the conditions of possibility of 
discursive contention that is discussed in more detail in the subsequent chapter. For now, 
we have established the status of Lithuania as an ethnonationalist postcolonial state, let us 
turn next to establishing its status as an emigration country. 
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2.2.4. Lithuania as an emigrant-sending state. 
2.2.4.1. 19th century. In terms of immigration and emigration countries, Lithuania 
has always been in the latter camp. Large scale emigration started in the last third of 19th 
century due to the combination of deteriorating economic and political conditions in the 
Russian empire, and reached its peak before the First World War. The most modest 
estimates place the number of emigrants who left for the three main destinations – USA, 
UK and Russia – between 1897 and 1914 at approximately 325 000.  
2.2.4.2. Interwar Lithuania and Soviet occupation. After Lithuania became an 
independent republic in 1918, the socioeconomic hardships of state-building and a surplus 
labor force prompted another wave of emigration, mostly to the Americas, which subsided 




Table 2.2. Migration from interwar Lithuania. 





















1923  2 693 1,3 112 33 112  16 1 845 33  542 
1924  3 051 1,4 499 24 195 476 38 861 141  817 
1925  2 869 1,3 689 22 112 377 72 778 85  734 
1926 2 227 502 10 364 4,6 1 353 5 669 969 202 106 1 090 229  746 
1927  18 086 8,0 1 995 11 702 1 040 56 409 1 429 571  884 
1928  8 491 3,7 2 151 1 199 2 165 39 970 751 709  507 
1929  15 999 6,9 6 095 4 536 1 335 146 1 238 967 1 394  288 
1930 2 367 042 6 428 2,7 2 280 836 869 85 791 683 763 4 121 
1931 2 392 983 1 756 0,7 189 41 83 118 460 320 206 305 339 
1932  1 001 0,4 74 66 80 194 291 151 73  72 
1933  1 300 0,5 92 90 45 671 200 130 34  38 
1934  1 521 0,6 130 137 54 646 267 181 59  47 
1935  1 911 0,8 199 165 22 943 256 185 45  96 
1936  1 707 0,7 270 370 70 501 262 138 55  41 
1937  979 0,4 298 40 39 50 155 288 58  51 
1938 2 575 363 811 0,3 185 24 39 101 110 273 4  75 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (www.stat.gov.lt), last accessed on October 1st, 2014. 
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Immediately after the Soviet occupation of Lithuania and the Second World War 
another 60 000 people emigrated to the West. Emigration combined with war casualties 
and forced exile to Siberia deprived Lithuania of a third of its inhabitants. Due to the iron 
curtain there was hardly any movement to or from the West during the 1950s-1980s. The 
influx of people from the other countries of the Soviet Union was not as significant as in 
Latvia and Estonia. 
2.2.4.3. After restoration of independence. Today Lithuania is facing a similar 
demographic challenge, sporting a consistently negative migration saldo and the largest 
emigration in EU in terms of ratio per 1000 inhabitants (see Table 2.3 for migration in the 
recent decades).  
 








rate per 1000 
inhabitants 
Net migration rate 
per 1000 
inhabitants 
2001 3 486 998 27 841 4 694 8,0 1,3 -6,7 
2002 3 454 637 16 719 5 110 4,9 1,5 3,4 
2003 3 431 497 6 283 4 728 7,7 1,4 -6,3 
2004 3 398 929 37 691  5 553 11,2 1,7 -9,5 
2005 3 355 220 57 885  6 789 17,4 2,0  -15,4 
2006 3 289 835 32 390 7 745 9,9 2,4 -7,5 
2007 3 249 983 30 383 8 609 9,4 2,7 -6,7 
2008 3 212 605 25 750 9 297 8,1 2,9 -5,2 
2009 3 183 856 38 500 6 487 12,2 2,1 -10,1 
2010 3 141 976 83 157 5 213 26,9 1,7 -25,2 
2011 3 052 588 53 863 15 685 17,8 5,2 -12,6 
2012 3 003 641 41 100 19 843 13,7 6,6 -7,1 
2013 2 971 905 38 818 22 011 13,1 7,4 -5,7 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (www.stat.gov.lt), last accessed on 
October 1st, 2014. 
 
According to estimates by the Department of Statistics of Lithuania11, since the 
break-up of the Soviet Union about 660 000 inhabitants left the country, mostly headed for 
                                                 
11 Data obtain from the official website of the Department of Statistics of Lithuania http://www.stat.gov.lt, 
2012-01-08. 
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the Western world, increasingly into the more affluent countries of the EU, reflecting the 
general trend in destinations of Central and Eastern European migrants (85% to Western 
Europe and 15% to USA (Morawska 2001)). A smaller, Eastward migration flow, which 
reached its peak in 1992-1993, mostly consisted of non-Lihtuanian people returning to 
Russia or other former Soviet Union countries (Stankuniene 2000; Smith and Shaw 2006: 
15). 
Many of the emigrants who went to the West did not declare that they are leaving, 
partly due to awareness of their status as irregular migrants who overstay their 
tourist/student visas, and partly due to ignorance of bureaucratic procedures. 
Table 2.4. Undeclared emigration from Lithuania, 2001-2009. 
 
Year Undeclared 
emigrants, in thousands 
Undeclared emigrants 
15 years old or older, in 
thousands 
2001-2002 23.2 19.6 
2003 11.7 10.9 
2004 17.3 16.3 
2005 32.5 28.1 
2006 15.2 13 
2007 12.7 12 
2008 6.7 6.4 
2009 12.7 12.4 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (www.stat.gov.lt), last accessed on 
October 1st, 2014. 
 
When Lithuania became a member of the EU in 2004 and Ireland, United Kingdom 
and Sweden did not place any restrictions on the free movement of persons (other EU 
members did place restrictions ranging from 2 to 7 years), undeclared emigration doubled 
(see Table 2.4) and was reigned in only by the 2010 requirement to declare emigration if 
one wanted to avoid having to pay the mandatory governmental health insurance fee (the 
data for 2010 in Table 2.3 should be interpreted with this new law in mind).  
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Table 2.5 breaks down the more current migration flows by citizenship and shows 
that both emigration and immigration flows are dominated by Lithuanians. 
 




2009  2010  2011  2012  2013  
 Em. Im. Em. Im. Em. Im. Em. Im. Em. Im. 
Lithuanian 33 522 4 821 79 315 4 153 51 505 14 012 38 479 17 357 35 492 18 975 
Belorussian 1 055 438 1 180 255 666 254 631 363 796 486 
Russian 675 312 560 248 422 373 422 526 650 774 
Ukraine 895 209 567 145 312 181 450 377 565 413 
USA 127 47 149 32 92 34 92 28 104 18 
Other 
countries 
1 915 645 1 348 370 835 819 967 1 184 1 174 1 337 
Stateless 311 15 38 10 31 12 59 8 37 8 
Total 38 500 6 487 83 157 5 213 53 863 15 685 41 100 19 843 38 818 22 011 
Source: Lithuanian Department of Statistics (www.stat.gov.lt), last accessed on 
October 1st, 2014. 
 
As evidenced by the data presented in Table 2.5, the majority of both emigrants and 
immigrants are Lithuanian, which underlines the centrality of the concern with co-ethnics 
when it comes to Lithuanian migration issues. Furthermore, even some of the migrants who 
hold Belorussian, Russian or American citizenship are of ethnic Lithuanian ancestry. 
Among the rest of the migrants, the majority fall under the rubric of family migration due 
to marriage, but their numbers are sufficiently low to prevent them from prominently 
figuring in the discourse on migration. Keeping in mind the numbers presented in Table 
2.5, when migrants are discussed in this thesis, one should assume they are Lithuanians, 
unless explicitly stated otherwise. 
As of 2013, Lithuania had 2.971 million inhabitants (see Table 2.3). Thus, the new 
emigration (defined as those who leave for longer than six months), which could potentially 
aspire to dual citizenship, amounts to 20 percent of the Lithuanian population. Combined 
with earlier waves of emigration, persons of Lithuanian origin residing abroad comprise 
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about one fourth to one third of the Lithuanian nation (Praninskas 2006). The tensions of 
the relationship between the state of Lithuania and various generations of migrants form 
part of the discourse on dual citizenship, which are addressed in the subsequent chapter. 
For the purposes of the current chapter, we can summarize the main point: Lithuania is 
quintessentially an emigration state with ethnonationalist characteristics, hence its 
citizenship regulation should reflect the expected position of an emigrant-sending state by 
gradually expanding the possibilities for dual citizenship with a preference for co-ethnics. 
In the next section I trace the development of the regulation of Lithuanian citizenship and 
compare its characteristics with the scholarly predictions regarding the behaviour of an 
emigration state. 
2.3. Development of regulation of dual citizenship 
2.3.1. Interwar Lithuanian citizenship. 
The interwar Lithuania had to balance between the realities of emigration and the 
threat of neighboring countries; thus dual citizenship was prohibited in the Constitution of 
1922, with the commentary pointing specifically at dangers of Poland and Russia, both of 
whom had territorial disputes with Lithuania and refreshed centuries-old historical 
grievances. At the same time, in the Constitution of 1928 an exception was allowed for 
those who had emigrated to the Americas.12 As evidenced by the data presented in Table 
2.2, the latter group of migrants comprised the majority of emigrants. This fact should be 
kept in mind as a parallel to the situation as described by the Constitutional Court in the 
                                                 
12 Discussed in Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the 
Provisions of Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of 
Lithuania.” Case No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006. 
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2006 ruling where it lamented the exception becoming the rule when it came to the 
availability of dual citizenship. 
Those who escaped the Soviet occupation during the Second World War held onto 
the passports of the interwar Lithuanian Republic and connected with the network of 
diplomats from various embassies of Lithuania which campaigned for non-recognition of 
the annexation of Lithuania into the Soviet Union. Meanwhile, right after the annexation, 
in September 1940, the occupying powers decreed all citizens of Lithuania to be citizens 
of the Soviet Union, and in 1941 the administration of the Soviet Lithuania even declared 
everyone who had been permanent residents of Lithuania on September 1st, 1939, to be 
citizens of the Lithuanian Soviet Socialist Republic, not giving anyone any choice 
(Sinkevičius 2000). As the iron curtain prevented almost everyone from crossing the 
border, having a USSR citizenship did not play a large role. Lower level citizenship was 
much more important due to the Soviet system of registration which prevented free 
movement of people within the territory of the USSR. Combined with the practice of 
assigning people to workplaces, we cannot meaningfully talk about freedom of movement 
and internal migration, and due to the authoritarian nature of the Soviet state we cannot 
meaningfully talk about the meaning of USSR citizenship beyond its role as a tool of state 
control over individuals. Thus the discussion of citizenship regulation becomes meaningful 
only with the independence restoration movement.  
2.3.2. Citizenship guidelines in the Constitution of the restored Republic of 
Lithuania 
Article 12 of the Constitution adopted in 1992 concerns citizenship and serves as 
the crucial reference point in the deliberations of the Constitutional Court. It states that 
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“The citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania is acquired by birth and on other grounds 
established by law. With the exception of individual cases provided for by the law, no one 
may be a citizen of both the Republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time. The 
procedure for the acquisition and loss of citizenship is established by law.” I discuss the 
more specific development of the laws regulating citizenship later in this chapter. For now 
it is important to establish that Article 12 essentially amounts to a prohibition of dual 
citizenship, mostly targeting the colonizers from the Soviet Union, but leaves an opening 
to determine exceptions which would allow for dual citizenship. On the other hand, it is 
interesting to note that the January 1991 draft of the Constitution had put forth the 
proposition that Lithuanian citizenship could be acquired based on the ius soli principle 
unless otherwise specified by the law. This formulation did not make it into the later draft, 
but still allows us to appreciate the thread of a more civic that ethnic orientation existing 
during the process of the drafting of the Constitution.  
The position of citizenship regulation changed in various drafts of the Constitution. 
For example, the first draft, prepared in May 1990, only stated that the conditions and 
procedure of acquisition and loss of citizenship are determined by law. The annotated 
outline produced by the working group in November 1990 acknowledged that the questions 
of dual citizenship and the possibility to strip someone of their citizenship were problematic 
without specifying what exactly those problems were nor how they could be addressed. 
A look at the January 1991 draft of the Constitution reveals that the initial intention 
was to state the position on dual citizenship in an even stricter way. It expressly stated that 
a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania could lose his/her Lithuanian citizenship if s/he took 
a citizenship of another country, and that the exceptions which would allow for dual 
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citizenship would have to be designated in the Constitution. A retreat from this position 
could partly be explained by the fact that it is extremely difficult to change this part of the 
Constitution. Different chapters of the Constitution have different requirements for 
amendments, and the first chapter on the fundamentals of the state, in which the Article 12 
on citizenship is located (as well as the fourteenth chapter on the rules of Constitutional 
amendments), can only be changed by a referendum with a turnout of more than 50% of 
voters and a majority of them voting in favour, which has only been achieved four times: 
in 1991 to confirm that Lithuania is to be an independent democratic state, twice in 1992 – 
in June to demand the removal of the Red Army and compensation for the harm inflicted 
by the Soviet annexation, and in October to adopt the current Constitution of the Republic 
of Lithuania, and in 2003 to confirm membership in the European Union. The rest of the 
chapters of the Constitution require repeated voting by a qualified majority of the members 
of the Parliament, and only two amendments, both related to the membership in the 
European Union, have been successfully passed by the Parliament. Any other attempts to 
initiate an amendment through a referendum have failed to garner the necessary number of 
either the signatures for the initiation of a referendum, or votes, including the failed 
referendum in June 2014 which strived to cut the required number of signatures from 300 
000 to 150 000. The rather high requirements for the initiation of a referendum were 
installed as one of the safeguards against those with subversive intentions towards 
Lithuanian territorial integrity or Westward geopolitical leanings (such as the 147 040 
citizens who voted against Lithuanian independence in a 1991 plebiscite, 140 077 who 
voted against the removal of Soviet Army from the territory of Lithuania in a 1992 
referendum, or 147 527 who voted against Lithuanian membership in the EU in a 2003 
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referendum) (Vyriausioji rinkimų komisija 2012). The difficulty related to changing the 
Constitution through referenda should be kept in mind when discussing the public 
discourse regarding the November 2006 ruling in the next chapter.  
2.3.3. Citizenship law during the restoration of independence.13 
The initial Lithuanian Citizenship Law was passed in 1989 by the newly elected 
nationalist-dominated parliament before the country even declared the restoration of its 
independence. It was considered to be quite civic in comparison to the other Baltic 
countries which had a much more acute problem of the proportions of the ethnic 
composition of their populace. In contrast to Latvia and Estonia, where the titular nation 
was at risk of becoming an ethnic minority due to the large-scale influx of Russians and 
other ethnicities from the Soviet Union, ethnic Lithuanians amounted to over 3/4 of the 
population of Lithuania (see Table 2.1 above), effectively foreclosing the possibility to 
achieve public legitimation of the radical rhetoric of ethnic preservation.  
The politicians strived to avoid treating the Soviet annexation of Lithuania as 
legitimate in any way, framing the initial Citizenship Law as a tool of transition to the 
restoration of Lithuanian citizenship in continuity with the interwar Republic of Lithuania, 
but they also acknowledged the need to deal pragmatically with the realities of colonial 
migration from the USSR during the 50 year annexation period (Sinkevičius 2000). The 
1989 Citizenship Law designated all those who held Lithuanian citizenship before Soviet 
occupation and their descendants to be Lithuanian citizens if they resided in Lithuania. It 
also provided the so-called “zero option” by allowing any resident of Lithuania who 
immigrated there during the Soviet rule to choose either Lithuanian or USSR citizenship 
                                                 
13 The texts of subsequent laws on citizenship were retrieved from the website of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Lithuania www.lrs.lt.  
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within a two year period. It is important to note that, despite its civic credentials, this law 
was chosen explicitly as an instrument of ethnic policy, meant to serve as a safeguard 
against inter-ethnic tensions and prevent further immigration from Russia (Sinkevičius 
2002: 123-124). A representative survey was carried out in the summer of 1989, asking 
whether people would prefer to have only Lithuanian citizenship, only USSR citizenship, 
or both, and the results showed that it would not have been prudent to impose Lithuanian 
citizenship across the board, but that it was safe to assume that, given a choice, the majority 
of the population would choose to have it. 99.2% of ethnic Lithuanians would choose to 
have only Lithuanian citizenship instead of the USSR citizenship, compared to 42% of the 
representatives of ethnic minorities, and only 8% of ethnic minorities and no ethnic 
Lithuanians would have chosen to have only USSR citizenship (Černiauskas, Lapinskas, 
Namavičius and Stačiokas 1989, as cited in Sinkevičius 2000: 27-28). During the two-year 
transitional period, all residents of Lithuania were allowed to exercise the rights of a citizen 
of Lithuania. Ultimately, 90 % of non-Lithuanians did choose Lithuanian citizenship over 
that of the USSR (Krūma 2007: 91). The provision of the zero-option was a successful 
choice, as it prevented the potential escalation of ethnic cleavages and earned Lithuania a 
reprieve from close scrutiny and criticism by the Council of Europe or any other 
international institution to which Latvia and Estonia were subjected.  
Giving the choice to the people provided a certain litmus test of the loyalty of the 
potential citizens to the independent Lithuanian state, and the period of expressing their 
preferences ended in 1991 when the drafting of the Constitution was underway. If we recall 
the formulations of the definition of the “nation of Lithuania” as consisting of ethnic 
Lithuanians, autochthonous ethnic minorities and other Lithuanian citizens, circulated in 
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January-March 1991, we can see that those colonizers who opted to remain citizens of the 
USSR rather than take on Lithuanian citizenship were effectively designated as being 
outside of the boundaries of Lithuanian nationhood and statehood. A significant part of 
those who retained Soviet citizenship instead of getting that of Lithuania consisted of the 
officers of the Red Army. They were denied the possibility to gain Lithuanian citizenship 
as direct aggressors, and when the Constitutional Court was addressed with a complaint 
regarding such practices, it emphasized in its ruling that these people are essentially 
foreigners and should go through the path of naturalization accordingly.14 The 1989 law 
listed the requirements of 10 year permanent residency, a legal source of income, and 
passing a test on Lithuanian language and the Constitution as requirements for 
naturalization, and forbade naturalizing those who participated in the genocide.  
The 1989 Law on Citizenship also established the notion of “retaining the right to 
citizenship” (Article 22). This right pertained to the persons who were exiled or escaped 
from occupied Lithuania after 1940, as well as their children and grandchildren. Ethnic 
Lithuanians were acknowledged as having a right to gain Lithuanian citizenship if they 
moved to Lithuania and gave an oath to the Republic. The 1989 law did not explicitly 
address the possibility of dual citizenship, but, combined with the residence requirements 
and the prohibition of dual citizenship in the interim, and later the permanent, Constitution, 
we can conclude that dual citizenship was not readily available to the members of 
Lithuanian diaspora. Some retired emigrants came to Lithuania and established residence 
                                                 
14 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 1994. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Seimas of the 
Republic of Lithuania Resolution “On Amending Item 5 of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Procedure for Implementing the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship’, 
adopted on 22 December 1993, with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case No. 7/94. Vilnius, 
13 April 1994.  
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here, taking advantage of the eligibility for Lithuanian citizenship, but it was not a massive 
phenomenon. 
2.3.4. Citizenship regulation during the first decade of independence. 
After the two-year window the transitional period ended, the Parliament adopted a 
new law on citizenship on December 5, 1991, which remained valid for over a decade. The 
zero option was closed, and the law laid out the general rules for citizenship acquisition.  
Contrary to expectations of a typical emigration country behavior, the law stated 
that, as a rule, a Lithuanian citizen could not carry dual citizenship, except in situations 
listed in this law. It added the loss of previous citizenship as a requirement for both 
naturalization and for ethnic Lithuanians gaining Lithuanian citizenship on the grounds of 
“retaining the right to Lithuanian citizenship”. The parents of children who would be 
eligible for two citizenships were told to choose the child’s citizenship. Gaining another 
state’s citizenship was listed as grounds of losing Lithuanian citizenship.  
The 1991 law instituted the notion of repatriation, namely, migration of members 
of ethnic minorities to their kin states. Those descendants of interwar citizens who 
repatriated to their ethnic homelands were denied the possibility of “retaining the right to 
Lithuanian citizenship” available to ethnic Lithuanians. It had to do both with historical 
distrust towards Poland and Russia and with more contemporary concerns with potential 
threats, since ethnicity is seen as a more powerful basis of loyalty if a conflict among both 
countries of citizenship arises (Girnius 2006). In contrast, Article 17 did not explicitly state 
the requirement to first prove the loss of another state’s citizenship or to have residence in 
Lithuania for those who were descendants of interwar Lithuanian citizens, thus some 
members of the post-Second World War diaspora took advantage of the possibility and 
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applied for Lithuanian citizenship. Those undergoing a different chronological sequence 
and taking on a new citizenship after already having Lithuanian citizenship were deemed 
to lose their Lithuanian citizenship, thus foreclosing the possibility of similar advantages 
to the newer post-independence wave of emigrants. Their complaints eventually brought 
about a new version of the law on citizenship that came into effect in 2003. 
 
2.3.5. 2002 citizenship law and the expansion of dual citizenship. 
From its inception, Lithuania could have been considered to have one of the strictest 
dual citizenship regulation regimes in the EU (Bauböck et al. 2007; Howard 2005; Howard 
2009; Liebich 2000). The exception in relation to dual nationality for pre-1990 Lithuanian 
émigrés was framed in terms of righting the historical wrongs and ultimately aimed at 
people who were deprived of Lithuanian citizenship by historical turmoil. This difference 
between post-Second World War displaced persons and the new ‘voluntary’ labor 
emigration is one of the undercurrents of tension in the public debates over dual citizenship, 
exposing the contradictory clusters of identitarian and material-interest-based concerns that 
shape the discourse on citizenship which is discussed in more detail in the subsequent 
chapter. Although the case which prompted the Constitutional Court to declare regulation 
of dual citizenship unconstitutional concerned pre-war citizenship, the main polarization 
of dual citizenship discourse in general referred to the new, post-independence migration. 
On the other hand, the right of the members of the pre-independence Lithuanian diaspora 
to dual citizenship had been an accepted fact in the Lithuanian political discourse due to its 
compensatory role.  
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With a steady build-up of post-independence emigration, more and more people 
found themselves in situations where they needed to take on the host country’s citizenship 
in order to fully realize the opportunities available there, or where their children ended up 
with a different citizenship from their parents due to the requirement to choose one 
citizenship, such as those born in Ireland which practiced ius soli and did not even have a 
provision for renunciation of a child’s citizenship. Representatives of the World Lithuanian 
Community repeatedly addressed the Parliament with requests to enable those Lithuanians 
who have left Lithuania and accepted another country’s citizenship to not lose their 
Lithuanian citizenship. These demands culminated in a declaration by the joint 
Commission of the representatives of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania and USA 
Lithuanian community in June 2001, titled “Resolution regarding the citizenship of the 
Republic of Lithuania for persons of [ethnic] Lithuanian origin who have acquired the 
citizenship of another state”, which recalled similar resolutions from March 10th and 
August 12th, 2000, appealed to the “conception of the integral nation”, emphasizing that 
diaspora is an integral part of the Lithuanian nation, and pointed out that “the loss of 
Lithuanian citizenship complicates the relationship between the person and Lithuania, 
brings no benefit to Lithuania and lowers the number of the citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania”.15 
These demands served as one of the main reasons for the draft of a new law 
prepared by Arminas Lydeka, MP from the liberal party, who pointed out that the Human 
                                                 
15 Lietuvos Respublikos Seimo ir JAV lietuvių bendruomenės atstovų komisija “Rezoliucija dėl Lietuvos 
Respublikos pilietybės lietuvių kilmės asmenims, įgijusiems kitos valstybės pilietybę”. Vilnius, June 8 th, 
2001. // http://www3.lrs.lt/docs3/kad4/W3_VIEWER.ViewTheme-
p_int_tv_id=1732&p_kalb_id=1&p_org=0.htm.  
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rights committee of the Parliament approved the proposal.16 The records of the September 
17, 2002, proceedings of the deliberations in the Parliament regarding the new law reveal 
several political positions. Another liberal MP, Eligijus Masiulis, expressed support for the 
draft of the law on citizenship, emphasizing that there had been many discussions about 
dual citizenship and expressing satisfaction that it has finally moved from public statements 
to practical implementation. He argued that Lithuania does not have so many people “that 
it could take away or cancel the citizenship of those people who leave Lithuania for one 
reason or another and settle in other countries, taking on the citizenship of those countries”. 
He states: 
In my understanding, it is very important for such a small nation 
like Lithuania to have the possibility to keep its citizens’ citizenship 
despite where fate throws them. I think that this law really fits the 
realities and needs of life. The fact that several thousand American 
Lithuanians addressed the Parliament last year already asking for such 
a possibility shows that this law is not just a politicians’ fancy. It is a 
law that matches existing realities, the needs of the citizens of the state 
and the Lithuanians of the world. 
Another MP from the liberal party, Jonas Jučas, echoed his colleague’s ideas, 
expressing satisfaction with the new law for being “significantly more modern” than the 
preceding laws, for fitting “the spirit of times” and “the goals of the state”, specifically 
pointing out the provisions regarding dual citizenship. 
Stanislovas Buškevičius, MP from the nationalist party, expressed satisfaction with 
the inclusion of his proposal to not shorten the naturalization residence requirement from 
10 to 5 years and to set it at 5 years instead of 3 for marriage migrants (the 3 year 
requirement was restricted to the spouses of deportees who got married in exile). On the 
                                                 
16 Records of the proceedings and deliberations in the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania can be found 
through a search function on the Parliament‘s website at http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.forma_l.  
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other hand, he expressed dismay that his colleagues dismissed his proposal to add a 
requirement to know the basic facts about Lithuanian history to the requirements of 
Lithuanian language and the basic Constitution facts for naturalization, claiming that 
knowing history and thus understanding the country is crucial for integration, and 
supporting his argument by giving the example of both Germany and Austria speaking 
German language, or Spain and Mexico speaking Spanish language, but having different 
history. Justinas Karosas, MP from the social democratic party, opposed this suggestion by 
claiming that we should teach Lithuanians themselves some of our history before requiring 
it of others. Even though his position is not overtly nationalist, the language follows the 
ways in which a boundary is drawn between ethnic Lithuanians and others. However, 
Karosas explicitly proclaims support for the spirit of the proposed law which is “a 
liberalizing spirit of an open society” and claims that “the notion of a closed state upheld 
by the priestesses of Lithuanian virginity is incompatible with our integration into the 
European Union and the general tendencies of contemporary democratic society and 
contemporary democratic states”.  
Representatives of the first successful populist party in Lithuania, the social 
liberals, were split in their opinion regarding the new law. Algimantas Valentinas Indriūnas 
emphasized that “we have a lot of diaspora who is until today complaining a lot that they 
cannot be Lithuanian citizens while they are citizens of other countries <…> the removal 
of the barrier that existed until now will clearly have a positive effect and they will be able 
to help their ethnic homeland more than before”. On the other hand, Egidijus Klumbys 
expressed dismay at the devaluation of values and claimed that, once this law is adopted, 
citizenship will lose its worth. He pointed out that many Lithuanians who escaped to the 
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West after the Second World War did not take the citizenship of any other state and were 
still able to settle in some country, have great careers etc., which in his opinion proves that 
having Lithuanian citizenship is not an obstacle to having one’s life together in some 
country, and named the “totally liberal provisions” a reason to vote against this law. There 
was only one vote against and one abstention, indicating an overwhelming consensus 
regarding the changes in the treatment of dual citizenship. The language used by the 
supporters of the law shows both the traditional diaspora-oriented motives of an emigrant-
sending state and the alignment with the worldwide liberalization tendencies.  
Most of the provisions of the law remained the same, still proclaiming that gaining 
citizenship of another state implies losing Lithuanian citizenship. However, this time an 
explicit exception was made for people of ethnic Lithuanian descent, and to those who had 
been citizens of the interwar Lithuanian Republic and their descendants, as long as they 
had not expatriated to their ethnic homelands. Thus, even if the members of Parliament 
lauded the liberalizing tendencies of this law, it still retained its ethnonationalist proclivities 
and contained safeguards against members of nations which have historically been or 
currently are at odds with Lithuania – primarily Russians, Poles, Germans and Jews.  
In the previous chapter, we noted that the scientific discourse on dual citizenship 
has argued for the declining relevance of the potential threat of clashing loyalties due to 
the increasing interdependence of a globalizing world, especially in cases of regional 
integration such as the EU. However, the Lithuanian case may serve as a reminder that it 
would be myopic to underestimate the long-term influence of historical interstate conflict 
and of the colonial experiences of foreign domination on citizenship policies. In that sense, 
the Lithuanian case harkens back to Brubaker’s (1992a) argument and provides support for 
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his claim of the lasting relevance of the historical constellations shaping the national 
identity and citizenship nexus. The historical threat of neighboring countries who have 
repeatedly laid claims to Lithuania by the means of forced occupation is a universally 
accepted part of the Lithuanian public discourse and translates into an undercurrent of 
distrust of the members of corresponding ethnicities (discussed in section 2.2.2), from the 
1920s Constitutional argumentation (mentioned in section 2.3.1) to the 2003 law on 
citizenship. 
The 2002 Law on Citizenship that had further liberalized access to dual citizenship 
for ethnic Lithuanians was criticized from the outset both by national minorities17 and by 
the judiciary18. However, the law was not widely perceived as problematic until the 
impeachment of a populist president Rolandas Paksas who, among other things, was 
accused for granting Lithuanian citizenship to a Russian sponsor as a reward for his support 
(Clark and Verseckaite 2005). The political establishment set out to impeach the president 
who was widely perceived as incompetent and susceptible to Russian influences, and his 
granting of Lithuanian citizenship to a Russian businessman with ties with Russian secret 
police was construed as evidence of breaking the presidential oath of upholding the 
Constitution and the laws of the Republic of Lithuania, and serving the interests of 
Lithuanian state and nation rather than his one’s own personal interests.19 The regulation 
                                                 
17 Leader of Poles in Lithuania Election Action, then a member of the Lithuanian Parliament (now a 
member of the European Parliament) Waldemar Tomaszewski, interview in Renik (2003). 
18 Then Chairman of the Constitutional Court Egidijus Kūris, referring to the ruling of December 30, 2003, 
interview in Maksimaitytė (2007). 
19 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2003. Ruling “On the Compliance of President of the 
Republic of Lithuania Decree No. 40 “On Granting Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania by Way of 
Exception” of 11 April 2003 to the Extent that it Provides that Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania Is 
Granted to Jurij Borisov by Way of Exception with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and 
Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship.” Case No. 40/03. Vilnius, 30 
December 2003.  
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of granting the citizenship of Lithuania by way of exception, which is what Paksas used 
for his supporter, has been repeatedly questioned in the public discourse, especially when 
it is granted to prospective athletes in the wake of international competitions. However, 
what brought the 2003 law to its demise was the regulation of dual citizenship. The next 
chapter provides an in-depth examination of the case that disrupted the development of 
citizenship regulation which until then had appeared to follow the path prescribed by the 
conventional theories on the behaviour of an ethnonationalist emigrant state. 
The data discussed in this chapter have established that Lithuania is an 
ethnonationalist emigrant-sending state with postcolonial sensibilities produced by the 
experiences of foreign domination. Throughout the development of Lithuanian citizenship 
regulation, the distinction between Lithuanians for whom access to Lithuanian citizenship 
was supposed to be unproblematic, and other ethnics who could not be trusted enough to 
be allowed to have dual citizenship, has continued to hold its place in the popular mentality. 
Such a configuration eventually faced its downfall when confronted head on with the 
imbrications of ethnicity and restitution. The next chapter focuses on the critical juncture 
in Lithuanian citizenship regulation – the 2006 case of dual citizenship – and the reactions 
to that ruling in the public discourse in order to expose the role of identitarian vs. 
instrumental dimensions in the conception of citizenship. In the fourth chapter of this thesis 
I analyze the legal documents and the surrounding official discourse produced by the 
decision-makers in this case in order to test the alternative explanations that could be 
offered for the counterintuitive political outcome. In tandem, these three chapters provide 
an exposition of the influences and the reasoning behind, and the implications of, 
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citizenship politics of a nation-state caught between the contradictory forces of 
postcolonialism and globalization. 
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Chapter 3. The critical juncture in Lithuanian citizenship regulation 
 
 
In the previous chapter, we established that the development of Lithuanian 
citizenship regulation until early 2000s would seem to be a fairly straightforward case of 
ethnic citizenship policy traditionally associated with Central and Eastern European 
countries, epitomized by the repatriation clause which targeted members of nation-states 
historically at odds with Lithuania. Yet this citizenship regime was brought down in a 
critical juncture of a 2006 Constitutional Court case which declared not only the preference 
given to Lithuanians discriminatory, but also the widespread practice of dual citizenship 
unConstitutional, cutting off the availability of dual citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians 
instead of expanding it to people of other ethnicities.  
This outcome upset both the plaintiffs of the case, the Lithuanian public and 
politicians, and the mainstream theories on dual citizenship. As evidenced by the migration 
data discussed in the previous chapter, at that time Lithuania was the country of largest net 
emigration in the EU, and scholars would assume that, as a sending country, it should favor 
dual citizenship as a means of maintaining ties with its expatriates, rather than forbid it. 
Furthermore, even the scholars who are cautious not to overemphasize the trend towards 
greater inclusion tend to associate liberalization with elites and restrictiveness with popular 
opinion (Howard 2009), whereas the Lithuanian public wanted permissiveness, but the 
judges decreed restrictiveness. In this chapter I discuss the discursive positions of the elites 
and the public related to the 2006 Constitutional Court ruling in order to highlight to what 
extent the ruling requires explanation (which is offered in Chapter 4). I begin by explaining 
the main features of the Constitutional Court case that was briefly introduced in the 
beginning of the thesis (a more detailed analysis follows in Chapter 4, where each 
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citizenship-related ruling is analyzed more extensively). Then I proceed to discuss the 
public discourse, demonstrating the relative prominence of identitarian vs. instrumental 
dimensions of the conception of dual citizenship. I distinguish the positions presented by 
local Lithuanians and by members of the diaspora. The next part of this chapter focuses on 
the reactions of politicians to this ruling and their heretofore unsuccessful efforts to find a 
legal solution which would allow Lithuania to circumvent the hegemonic norm of 
nondiscrimination and restore the ethnonationalist dual citizenship regime.  
The main source of data for the discussion in this chapter is articles in the 
Lithuanian media and public comments on those articles in internet depositories. Although 
it may seem that the internet is an insufficient source of data due to the limits of its 
audience, its use in the Lithuanian case is justified due to the fact that two thirds of the 
Lithuanian population are regular internet users, and the main activity they engage in is 
precisely internet newspaper reading (European Commission 2013). I have conducted 
sustained monitoring of the appearances of the topic of dual citizenship in the public 
discourse from the year 2006 until 2015 in several internet portals, first and foremost the 
leading internet news portal Delfi.lt, which is read by virtually all Lithuanian internet users 
(e.g. 62.17% of the Lithuanian population in July 2014).20 Overall, I have read over two 
thousand articles, many of them accompanied by hundreds of comments by internet users, 
but only those articles that were directly used in writing the text are included in the 
bibliography. The records of the discourse in the mass media are supplemented by the 
records of parliamentary debates on proposals regarding laws on citizenship, as well as 
public statements and resolutions produced by various governmental agencies, 
                                                 
20 Data shared by a representative of Delfi.lt, Andrius Bagdonavičius, personal communication, September 
15, 2014. 
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nongovernmental organizations, diaspora representatives, politicians and other public 
figures. I approach the discourse as a Claim-Response pattern (Hoey 2001), which 
highlights the contentious and dynamic nature of the dual citizenship debates and helps 
distill the most prominent claims and responses made by various actors, enabling us to 
evaluate the relative hegemony of either rights or identity in the discourse on citizenship. 
In a very schematic manner, we can identify a chain of claims-responses and treat the 
November 2006 ruling as a claim, the immediate public outcry as a response, its 
elaborations as claims, political proposals as a response to these claims and the claims of 
the Constitutional Court, treating legislative proposals as claims in their own right that 
trigger responses from the public and the Constitutional Court, etc. It is possible to identify 
several spikes in the intensity of the dual citizenship debates related to key events after the 
November 2006 ruling, such as the attempts to formulate and pass new versions of the Law 
on Citizenship, or the debates sparked by the issues of granting citizenship by way of 
exception to athletes expected to represent Lithuania in the Olympics. However, instead of 
following the spiral development of citizenship debates chronologically and alternating 
between the public discourse and political proposals, I present the data on the public 
discourse in one section, since the arguments there are repeated during every spike in 
activity and do not substantially change, and confine the legislative proposals to another 
section with more attention to their temporal development. 
3.1. The 2006 Constitutional Court case. 
In September of 2003 a group of MPs, mostly representatives of Polish and Russian 
ethnic minorities and liberal parties, addressed the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania with a question whether the newly adopted Law on Citizenship was 
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unConstitutional in that it discriminated based on ethnicity and descent. This petition was 
combined with a 2004 inquiry from the Vilnius district administrative court. The latter 
inquiry was based on a case concerning Ida Ita Rogovina, an Israeli citizen who had 
repatriated to Palestine in 1940. She wanted to regain her Lithuanian citizenship, which 
she possessed before World War II, in order to achieve restitution of her property. The 
administration that issues citizenship documents had refused to restore her prewar 
Lithuanian citizenship on the basis of the law which allowed ethnic Lithuanians to retain 
Lithuanian citizenship if they emigrated, but forbade preservation of Lithuanian citizenship 
for people of other ethnicities who repatriated to their ethnic homelands. The Israeli citizen 
brought the case to a district court and claimed that any attempt to establish whether the 
person who had Lithuanian citizenship before World War II has repatriated to an ethnic 
homeland or not requires inquiries into a person’s ethnicity and thus is an instance of 
discrimination prohibited by the Article 29 of the Constitution of Lithuania (quoted in 
Petrulienė 2006). The local court tentatively agreed with this assessment of the 
noncompliance of the Law on Citizenship with the Constitution and forwarded the question 
to the Constitutional Court in 2004.21 After the standard process of preparation of the cases, 
the public hearing took place on October 11, 2006, and the ruling was announced a month 
later, on November 13. The protocol of the public hearing (analyzed in more detail in the 
next chapter) shows the judges’ frustration with the lack of definition and consistent 
application of the concept of repatriation, branching off into criticizing other aspects of the 
2002 Law on Citizenship. 
                                                 
21 Interview with the legal representative of the Israeli citizen in her case and in numerous other cases of 
Jewish property restitution, lawyer Faina Kukliansky, September 16th, 2009. 
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In the end, the Constitutional Court ruled that indeed the repatriation clause is 
discriminatory, thus for the first time affirming the applicability of Article 29, which 
prohibits discrimination or privileging, to the area of citizenship legislation (see Chapter 4 
for a more in-depth analysis of the development of the Lithuanian Constitutional doctrine 
on citizenship). However, instead of expanding the availability of dual citizenship to 
include people of other ethnicities, it declared the widespread availability of dual 
citizenship “unjustifiable under the Constitution” due to the Article 12 of the Constitution 
which states that “with the exception of individual cases provided for by law, no one may 
be a citizen of both the Republic of Lithuania and another state at the same time”. The 
formulation of this article was interpreted by equating the phrase “individual cases 
provided for by law” with “exceptionally rare”. With this formulation, the Court provided 
a strong condemnation of the consecutive Laws on Citizenship which had gradually 
expanded availability of dual citizenship to become widespread rather than rare, saying 
that such regulation “not only does not prevent but even encourages such tendency”. The 
seed for this decision was already contained in the petition filed by the group of MPs, who 
complained that using ethnicity as a criterion for dual citizenship leads to the eligibility of 
80% of the population and thus contradicts Article 12. In providing this argument, the goal 
of the petitioners was to remove the ethnicity clause, not to decrease overall availability of 
dual citizenship22, but the Court took this opening and interpreted it in the most restrictive 
way possible: 
 It is to be emphasized that if the legislator really follows 
the provision that it is not necessary to restrict double citizenship, he 
should first of all start the revision of the corresponding provisions of 
                                                 
22 Interview with the former member of Parliament who served as the representative of the group of MPs 
addressing the Constitutional Court in regards to ethnic discrimination in the provisions of the Law on 
Citizenship, Aleksander Poplavski, September 19th, 2009. 
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the Constitution, inter alia of Article 12, and to do that by following the 
procedure which is established in the Constitution itself. In this context 
it is to be noted that Article 12 of the Constitution which establishes the 
basis for the legal regulation of citizenship relations of the Republic of 
Lithuania is in Chapter I titled "The State of Lithuania" of the 
Constitution—an integral act—for the provisions of which a particularly 
big Constitutional protection has been established: under Paragraph 2 of 
Article 148 of the Constitution, the provisions of Chapter I of the 
Constitution may be altered only by referendum. 
 No matter in what way the legal regulation of citizenship 
relations of the Republic of Lithuania might be corrected in the future, 
the provisions of the Constitution  must be heeded, inter alia those which 
entrench the equality of all persons and non-discrimination on the 
grounds of ethnical origin.23 
In addition to addressing the direct inquiries of the petitioners, the Constitutional 
Court offered a critique of the whole 2002 Law on Citizenship, taking an activist stand 
(similarly to its far-reaching 2003 ruling which resulted in an impeachment of the President 
for abusing the power to grant citizenship by way of exception, discussed in more detail in 
the next chapter). The conclusion of the ruling, one of the longest of its kind, contained 23 
points on how the items in the 2002 Law on Citizenship that were in some way affected by 
the repatriation clause and the availability of dual citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians were 
in conflict with the Constitution. 12 of those points of the conclusion denounced specific 
items as being in conflict with Article 29, 9 indicated items in conflict with Article 12, and 
the very definition of repatriation as “departure for one’s ethnical homeland and settlement 
there”, which had been in the Law on Citizenship since 1991, was found to conflict with 
both: in form with Article 12 and in content with Article 29.24  
                                                 
23 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of 
Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case 
No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006. 
24 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of 
Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case 
No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006. 
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In addition to the denouncement of the gradual expansion of availability of dual 
citizenship, the Court criticized the provisions regulating the President’s ability to confer 
Lithuanian citizenship as being too vague and contributing to unwarranted expansion of 
dual citizenship. Altogether, the legal regulations concerning citizenship were termed 
contradictory and in need of essential revamping: 
<..> this legal regulation is very controversial, inconsistent and 
confusing. This law includes a number of provisions which are hardly 
compatible with each other. Some formulas are ambiguous. This law is 
to be corrected in essence.25  
Such a ruling may have been anticipated considering that the seeds had been planted 
with the activist approach evident in the 2003 ruling on the abuse of presidential powers of 
granting citizenship by way of exception26 (discussed in more detail in Chapter 4). 
Furthermore, the 2002 Law on Citizenship was criticized from the outset, both by national 
minorities, for example, the leader of the Polish ethnic party Waldemar Tomaszevski 
(interview in Renik (2003)), and by the judiciary, for example, the Chairman of the 
Constitutional Court himself, Egidijus Kūris (as he reflects in an interview in Maksimaitytė 
(2007)). However, the November 2006 ruling was greeted with explosive disbelief in the 
public discourse. Despite the fact that the Court had previously affirmed the differential 
treatment of the descendants of interwar Lithuanian citizens without expressing any 
negative reaction to the repatriation clause (see Chapter 4 for more in-depth analysis of the 
rulings over time), now it effectively instituted a new explicit Constitutional doctrine aimed 
                                                 
25 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of 
Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case 
No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006. 
26 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2003. Ruling “On the Compliance of President of the 
Republic of Lithuania Decree No. 40 “On Granting Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania by Way of 
Exception” of 11 April 2003 to the Extent that it Provides that Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania Is 
Granted to Jurij Borisov by Way of Exception with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and 
Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship.” Case No. 40/03. Vilnius, 30 
December 2003. 
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against ethnic discrimination27 – in other words, against a privileged position of 
Lithuanians in Lithuania. Now, it took away the possibility to have dual citizenship from 
everyone, disregarding their ethnicity. The controversy sparked by this ruling exposed the 
underlying nationalist assumptions related to the issues of citizenship, statehood and 
national security, and led the public to grapple with these notions and the politicians to 
search for ways to ensure legal linkages between Lithuania and its emigrants. The 
hegemony of the international norm of nondiscrimination was harder to challenge directly 
than the insistence of the Constitutional Court on the imperative of lessening the ranks of 
dual citizens, which was taken as a personal affront by virtually everyone affected by 
emigration, but the two sides of the problem inevitably intermeshed in the discussions. In 
the next section, I try to systematize the responses to the claims put forth by the 
Constitutional Court, which in themselves should be seen as responses to the claims made 
by national minorities. 
3.2. Public discourse on Lithuanian dual citizenship. 
The main actors who made claims and responses in the public discourse on 
Lithuanian citizenship can be grouped into two main categories: those who are emigrants 
and those who are not. These two groups can further be conceptually broken down into 
public figures, whose pronouncements are published and debated in the mass media, and 
the general public represented by the curious category of “internet commentators” who 
post anonymous comments underneath the articles in online news portals. Such anonymous 
commentators are not statistically representative in any sense, including the tendency that 
                                                 
27 Chairman of the Constitutional Court Egidijus Kūris, interview in Kweder (2007). 
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usually only those who hold the most extreme positions tend to seek to be heard. Still, the 
volume, tone and intensity of such commentary can be used as a crude proxy of the 
resonance of the public discourse among the population. My monitoring of Lithuanian 
media included the internet comments, and although they are not accessible once archived 
and thus cannot be analyzed in corpore or in any systematic way, the continuous reading 
of the comments underneath articles from 2006 until 2015 has informed my evaluation of 
the public’s position.  
3.2.1. Reactions to the November 2006 ruling in the public discourse. 
After the media reported on the conclusion of the November 2006 ruling, the 
responses came swiftly and have continued until today. The intensity of activity in the 
public discourse has crested in several spikes related to legislative proposals or well-
publicized cases where the restrictiveness of the ruling had caused problems to specific 
individuals. However, the arguments used in the discourse on dual citizenship have not 
been changing through time since the initial debates, but rather tend to be stuck in a 
feedback loop, therefore, it is possible to talk about the key elements of the schematic 
structure of the discourse by referencing utterances at any point in time during the period 
under scrutiny. 
It is ironic that the December 2003 and November 2006 rulings on the issues of 
citizenship have had the most effect on the image and legitimacy of the Court and of the 
Constitution itself. For many years, the Constitutional Court had been either virtually 
invisible to the public or considered to be virtually unassailable, and its pronouncements 
were accepted at face value (Jankuvienė 2006). However, this ruling caused a large public 
outcry that the Court was continuously overstepping its mandate and going against the will 
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of the people, first by precipitating the impeachment of the popularly elected President and 
then by cutting off the possibility to maintain Lithuanian citizenship for thousands of 
emigrants through the reinforcement of the Constitutional dual citizenship prohibition 
(Laiko ženklai 2008; Šmulkštys 2007). The Constitutional Court has been a target of 
multiple accusations: for engaging in linguistic sophistry, for overstepping its boundaries 
in the system of checks and balances and interfering with the workings of the legislative 
branch, for putting the Constitution above the will of the people, and for disowning the 
Lithuanian nation.  
Between the two main charges leveled by the Constitutional Court, that access to 
dual citizenship had been discriminatory and that it was not rare enough, the main reaction 
was aimed at the latter, calling the Court “arrogant” for proclaiming that there were “too 
many” instances of dual citizenship (Udrys 2006). The need to retain ties to 1/5 or more of 
the population that is currently abroad – and thus potentially aspiring to dual citizenship – 
was overwhelmingly acknowledged by all sides of the debate, but the debate teemed with 
tensions between and within different interest groups. It was further complicated by the 
impossibility to reconcile the imperative of nondiscrimination with the desire to affirm the 
special relationship between the state of Lithuania and ethnic Lithuanian migrants. In fact, 
this impossibility is what forms the feedback loop in which the discourse on dual 
citizenship has gotten stuck: the desire to maintain ties with large numbers of emigrants 
stands in opposition to the ruling that there should be only rare, exceptional instances of 
dual citizenship, and the desire to designate the exceptions on ethnic terms not only is in 
opposition to the discrimination charge, but also exacerbates the requirement of rarity due 
to the fact that the majority of Lithuanian citizens are ethnic Lithuanians. Thus, the 
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aspirations to diaspora citizenship violate both parts of the November 2006 ruling, and yet 
they are not removing their challenge, as the majority of the population uphold the right of 
ethnic Lithuanians to dual citizenship (55-88 percent according to various polls, depending 
on the formulation of the question28). 
Neither the inquiring parliamentarians nor the Israeli citizen whose case 
precipitated the ruling were happy with the ruling, for they had initiated the inquiry with 
the hopes of expansion of dual citizenship to include other ethnicities beyond 
Lithuanians.29 Their hopes would seem well founded, given the combination of the 
mainstream understanding of dual citizenship possibilities as an ever expanding trend, and 
the delegitimation of ethnic discrimination as the hegemonic norm. Therefore, it is not 
surprising that the public backlash against the ruling that blindsided the interested parties 
and defied the predictions of mainstream hypotheses pertaining to emigration countries 
leaves an impression of almost overwhelming disapproval of the Constitional Court in the 
public discourse. In the end the initiator of this case faces a requirement to renounce Israeli 
citizenship if she wants to regain her Lithuanian citizenship, which she is not prepared to 
do, given her domicile in Israel and advanced age.30 The fact that a similar requirement 
now applies to several hundred thousand of Lithuanian emigrants and their families is a 
source of indignation and disbelief among a majority of the Lithuanian public. Although 
                                                 
28 Results of various representative surveys conducted by public opinion research organizations and 
reported in the media. “Almost 60%” was reported in BNS (2007). 88.1% support was reported in Lrytas.lt 
(2007). 60.7% support reported in DELFI.lt. (2007). 72.3% support was reported in DELFI.lt, „Spinter 
tyrimai“ (2009). 55% support was reported in BNS (2013). Due to the differences in the exact formulation 
of survey questions it is not possible to draw systematic comparisons, but the general tendency of the 
support of the majority of the population for dual citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians is indisputable.   
29 Interview with the former member of Parliament, representative of the group of MPs who addressed the 
Constitutional Court concerning ethnic discrimination in the provisions of the Law on Citizenship, 
Aleksander Poplavski, September 19th, 2009. 
30 Interview with the legal representative of the Israeli citizen in her case and in numerous other cases of 
property restitution, lawyer Faina Kukliansky, September 16th, 2009. 
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the case which prompted the Constitutional Court to declare regulation of dual citizenship 
unConstitutional concerned pre-war citizenship, the question of dual citizenship gained the 
aura of political immediacy in relation to the new migration. 
Despite legal complications and warnings that unlimited possibilities for dual 
citizenship would pertain equally to emigrants and immigrants (see Aleknonis 2007), the 
general focus of the public debate revolves around the question of the right to dual 
citizenship for Lithuanian émigrés vs. ethnic minorities. Still, we should note that the future 
relevance of the question of dual citizenship for immigrants is acknowledged by some 
public figures, like Vygaudas Ušackas, a diplomat and public figure, the Lithuanian 
ambassador to the UK at that time (Utyra 2007). 
When the debate turns to foreigners who could gain Lithuanian citizenship through 
the means of Presidential decree, such as the provision allowing to bestow Lithuanian 
citizenship on famous artists, scientists, sportsmen, etc., with the understanding that they 
will promote Lithuania, the hostility comes through even in parliamentarian debates, as 
evidenced by the exchange between a radical MP Egidijus Klumbys, who insisted he does 
not want “negroes” playing on Lithuanian national team, and the Speaker of the Parliament 
Irena Degutienė who reprimanded him for racist speech but did not pursue it further.31 
Although other countries’ choices in limitations of dual citizenship are acknowledged as 
attempts at limiting immigration, the case of Lithuania is usually not interpreted as an 
example of such attempts (see Kubilius 2007b). On the contrary, dual citizenship for 
immigrants is termed a nonexistent issue on Lithuanian political agenda.32  
                                                 
31 “Pilietybė – ir už būsimus nuopelnus”, 2010-11-05 http://www.veidas.lt/pilietybe-%E2%80%93-ir-uz-
busimus-nuopelnus.  
32 Mickevičius, Henrikas. “Dvigubos pilietybės klausimas spręstinas keičiant Pilietybės įstatymą.” Theses 
of a speech delivered at a joint meeting of the Parliamentary and USA Lithuanian Commission, 
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Such is the surface of the official discourse, but if one looks at the vox populi, 
epitomized by internet commentary, the fear of potential cheap labor immigration from the 
East creeps up next to the more historically informed suspicions of aggressive neighbors. 
An archetypal commentator who called himself “Algirdas who took Moscow” (after a 14th 
century Lithuanian Grand Duke) said that “Dual citizenship is not needed, because it will 
be a way for foreigners to get a right to come here in droves and thus create colonies in 
Lithuania”.33  
The connection between such fears and the decision of the Constitutional Court to 
restrict the possibility to have dual citizenship to everyone without ethnic differentiation 
rather than to allow dual citizenship despite ethnic descent is made explicit in several public 
debates.34 The historical context of neighborly dangers is constantly evoked in the 
November 2006 ruling. Overall, it appears that the Constitutional Court operates on a more 
historically and geopolitically informed platform, whereas its critics, the proponents of dual 
citizenship, focus on current émigrés, sidestepping even the sensitive issue of property 
restitution for repatriates, which was the original apple of discord responsible for the 
deathblow to the possibilities of dual citizenship (emphasized in Šindeikis 2007). The 
question of property restitutions gets picked up by smaller parties and populists and 
                                                 
Parliamentary Committee on Human Rights, and Foreign Affairs Ministry, on April 19, 2007. // 
http://www.hrmi.lt/news.php?strid=2000&id=4553. Cf. Pivoras 2007 for an acknowledgement of 
immigration potential in the long-term perspective. 
33 http://www.alfa.lt/straipsnio-komentarai/159396/. 
34 An example of explicit reference to the ruling of November 2006 as a closing of Pandora’s box full of 
Russian collaborators is in Valatka (2007). The commentaries on this article on the webpage abound with 
endorsements of the block on dual citizenship in order to prevent widespread problems related to property 
restitution on the one hand and with refusals to give up citizenship for hundreds of thousands of ethnic 
Lithuanians just to prevent the threat of Russian double agents on the other hand. 
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repeatedly lamented in internet commentaries, although many an opponent of dual 
citizenship does not forgo playing the restitution card.35 
Some opponents see emigrants’ wish for dual citizenship as a purely instrumental 
matter, leading to double rights and no duties (see Valatka 2007). It is condemned as a 
mere quest for a more comfortable life and more convenient travel. Characteristically, 
opposition to dual citizenship for emigrants is more often framed in collectivistic terms of 
the everyday socioeconomic duties to one’s country rather than in terms of the egalitarian 
principle of ‘one person, one vote,’ or in terms of conflicting major duties, such as war, 
which most Lithuanians deem unlikely in the face of Euro-Atlantic integration. The claim 
that Lithuania is created and sustained by people who reside here (hence emigrants cannot 
be considered full-fledged participants in the Lithuanian community) is made by numerous 
commentators and by politicians on either side of the political spectrum.36 
Among the critics of dual citizenship there is pronounced resentment of unfair 
advantage: they already are better off than us, why should they also get the advantage of 
dual citizenship (Stasys 2007)? Emigrant remittances are barely tangential to this 
discourse, although in the context of the post-2008 economic downturn they have been 
increasingly acknowledged in the media.37 Critics of dual citizenship raise material 
questions pertaining to taxation, welfare, pensions, healthcare, etc., but the harmonization 
of social regulations of common European space has been cited to dispel most of such 
doubts. The EU integration is invoked by proponents of dual citizenship to downplay the 
                                                 
35 For example, a member of the European Parliament Aloyzas Sakalas (2007). 
36 Cf. MEP Aloyzas Sakalas, quoted in Sotvarienė (2007), and MEP Vytautas Landsbergis, quoted in 
Valatka (2007). 
37The emigrants’ remittances have been estimated to equal a quarter of earned income of the populace in 
2010 (Gabartas 2011) and half of the retirement pensions paid out in 2011 (ELTA 2012).   
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possible socioeconomic problems which could result from dual citizenship; at the same 
time, it is invoked by opponents of dual citizenship as a satisfactory way of living with just 
one citizenship, as long as it is citizenship of an EU member state (cited in Makaraitytė 
2007) (many discussions referred to the newborn Lithuanians trapped by the ius soli policy 
of Ireland).38 The question of voting rights is also an object in this tug of war, with skeptics, 
on the one hand, claiming that emigrants living abroad are incompetent to decide on 
Lithuanian politics, and proponents, on the other hand, expressing hopes of positive 
contamination with a more developed civic culture. Overall, the opponents of dual 
citizenship rely either on the argument of the unfair advantage or of questionable loyalty 
to the state, while the supporters focus on the predicament of the diaspora. It is in fact 
diaspora that usually reinforces the spike in the perpetual dual citizenship debates by 
reacting to any legislative proposals with the reiteration of the same key arguments. Let us 
summarize the main contributions of the emigrants to the discourse on dual citizenship. 
 
3.2.2. Dual citizenship from the perspective of the emigrants. 
The most prominent and stable participants in the public discourse on dual 
citizenship are the representatives of diaspora. Although the arguments directed against 
dual citizenship are multifaceted and appear reasonably grounded, they are drowned in the 
sea of identitarian claims, spearheaded by emigrants themselves. The media is awash by 
pronouncements by diaspora members who hold that citizenship is a way to keep in touch 
with the homeland, to ensure preservation of Lithuanianness. Pronouncements from public 
figures like the representatives of the World Lithuanian Community, the main organization 
                                                 
38 The next chapter addresses the role of the EU in the Lithuanian citizenship discourse in more detail. 
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of Lithuanian diaspora, are supplemented once again by the internet commentary, and both 
sides emphasize the identitarian dimension of their quest for Lithuanian citizenship.  
In their demands for dual citizenship, the World Lithuanian Community 
representatives appeal to the September 2, 1996, statement by the Parliament of Lithuania 
which confirms that the Lithuanians in Lithuania and abroad form an integral Lithuanian 
nation, joined together by the highest organizational form of national community – an 
independent state. They insist that Lithuanians abroad have a right to democratically decide 
on political matters that affect them, and that without Constitutional political rights a 
person is deprived of the possibility to affect the future of the nation, loses hope and the 
sense of solidarity with his or her compatriots, and eventually distances himself or herself 
from the homeland.39  
At the same time, emigrants emphasize the heightening of their feelings of 
ethnonationalist patriotism produced by the experience of foreignness (cf. Honig 2001) and 
present it as an asset in their commitment to Lithuania. Emigrants appeal to the unity of 
the nation, dramatically comparing loss of Lithuanian citizenship to a mother abandoning 
her children, and complaining that the ruling of the Constitutional Court against privileging 
Lithuanians in Lithuania effectively gives priority to invaders over historic inhabitants 
(cited in Jackevičius 2007). Anonymous emigrants commenting on articles point out that 
they are not after social rights, which are better provided in their countries of residence 
anyways, only after the recognition of their belonging. Even the then President of Lithuania 
Valdas Adamkus expressed an opinion that the question of dual citizenship has been overly 
bureaucratized (formalized) and should instead be more focused on maintaining the links 
                                                 
39 June 27, 2007, a statement by the Lithuanian World Community concerning the long-term strategy of the 
state relations with Lithuanians residing abroad 2008-2020 (http://www.plbe.org). 
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of ethnic Lithuanian emigrants to their homeland.40 This pattern of discourse lends support 
to my argument that the identitarian aspect of citizenship is more pronounced when a 
person’s rights can be guaranteed in some other way.  
The discourse on dual citizenship in Lithuania allows us to broaden the narrow 
assumption that dual nationality is a pragmatic strategy. The discussions on pros and cons 
of dual citizenship have touched upon all components of the notion of citizenship – rights 
and duties, membership and participation – but the central place is occupied by the 
identitarian aspect of the question of who belongs to the Lithuanian political community. 
The debates on dual citizenship predominantly revolve around the axis of an ethnically 
defined Lithuanian political community, thus conforming to the mainstream prediction of 
citizenship studies pertaining to emigration countries. However, the actual political 
outcome of the critical juncture in Lithuanian citizenship regulation contradicts the 
mainstream theories, and even the ones that have been formulated as attempts to refine 
those theories, like Howard’s (2009) suggestions that elites tend to liberalize access to dual 
citizenship, or Joppke’s (1998) argument that liberalization takes place at the hand of the 
judges, despite restrictive public opinion. If an overwhelming majority of both politicians 
and population agrees that emigrants of Lithuanian origin should not lose their Lithuanian 
citizenship, even if they become dual citizens, why is there no easy solution to the juridical 
casuistry that is standing in the way? As we have seen, Lithuanian citizenship discourse is 
inextricably caught between the current migration flows, the shadows of historical 
predicament, and the EU-defined normative and institutional imperatives of non-
                                                 
40 A statement in the April 2007 meeting of the joint committee of Seimas and the Lithuanian World 
Community, quoted in www.alfa.lt. 
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discrimination. In the next section, I review the ways in which politicians have been 
attempting to deal with these challenges. 
3.3. Legislative proposals. 
Having established the overwhelmingly identity-related preferences of the public, 
I turn to an overview of the reaction of politicians who have been searching for ways to 
satisfy both the preferences of their constituents and the constraints imposed by the 
Constitutional Court. Most of them went along one of two tracks: either seeking to 
reformulate the provisions of the Law on Citizenship in a way that would make it possible 
to restore the ethnonationalist dual citizenship attribution regime without triggering a 
reaction from the Constitutional Court, or accepting the Court’s dictum that the situation 
can only be addressed by changing the Constitution. Let us overview the legislative 
proposals that have been laid out since 2006 and identify the main bones of contention in 
the politico-legal discourse on dual citizenship. 
3.3.1. Debates on potential constitutional amendments. 
The 1992 Constitution has been very stable and has hardly been amended, but the 
November 2006 ruling has caused an unprecedented flurry of proposals for constitutional 
amendments (INFOLEX 2009). The proposals to deal with the dual citizenship issue by 
changing the Constitution diverge depending on which article of the Constitution they 
target. Some articles can be changed by the Parliament, yet others require a referendum.  
3.3.1.1. Referendum as a solution and a problem. The corpus of the Constitutional 
Court that passed the 2006 ruling has assumed an activist position on the issue of dual 
citizenship and has repeatedly asserted that any attempt to institute widespread possibilities 
for dual citizenship would contradict the Article 12 of the Constitution which institutes the 
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imperative of the rarity and exceptionality of dual citizenship and thus would have to be 
struck down.41 This article of the Constitution can only be amended via a referendum. 
Therefore, some politicians, first and foremost left-wing populists, have repeatedly 
suggested holding a referendum (Lrytas.lt 2013; Naujosios sąjungos (socialliberalų) 
frakcija 2007; Paulauskas 2014). Their idea was to pose the question to the voters whether 
citizens of the Republic of Lithuania should also be allowed to be citizens of another 
country together with regular elections, either of the Parliament or of the local government.  
The initial suggestion of a referendum was put forth by MP Artūras Paulauskas, 
one of the first populist politicians in Lithuania, on September 18, 2007. He suggested 
rewriting Article 12 by eliminating any reference to restrictiveness or individual cases 
determined by law and to wanted it to say that “A citizen of the Republic of Lithuania may 
also be a citizen of another state”.42  
Although no one expressed outright support for that particular blanket formulation, 
the response to this proposal right away established several political positions regarding 
the referendum. Some MPs supported the general idea and only suggested reformulating 
the question, while others lamented that it would make dual citizenship into a rule rather 
than an exception. The supporters, like a liberal MP Petras Auštrevičius, emphasized the 
importance of coming to a decision for “not only Lithuanian citizens living in this state, 
but also Lithuanian citizens living in other states, and to potential Lithuanian citizens” and 
called for all parties to deliberate on the best formulation of the referendum question.43 
                                                 
41 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of 
Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case 
No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006.  
42 Project presented to the Parliament on September 18, 2007, see the text at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=304070. 
43Parliamentary proceedings, September 18, 2007, 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=304466  
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The opposition to the proposal boils down to a dual argument. The first part is 
whether it is possible to find such a formulation which would ensure that dual citizenship 
explicitly applied to ethnic Lithuanians but would bypass the Constitutional Court’s take 
on the norm of nondiscrimination. The second part is the emphasis on the potential dangers 
of dual citizens from the historically hostile nations, first and foremost Russia, advocating 
a search for other solutions than the suggested referendum with a blanket formulation. The 
then leader of this party and of the right-wing opposition, two-time Lithuanian Prime 
minister Andrius Kubilius, said that this suggested referendum “reflects a Lithuanian 
proverb that the road to hell is paved with good intentions” and worded his opposition very 
strongly: 
I want to once again emphasize the very clear words said by the 
Constitutional Court: “A referendum should be held only if the 
legislator wants to give Lithuanian citizens completely unrestricted right 
to dual citizenship.” That would be a mistake. A mistake which is also 
seen in the initiative submitted by A.Paulauskas, because that is 
precisely how the new version of the second part of Article 12 proposed 
by him is formulated. The result will be that we will have up to 200 
thousand Russian citizens in Lithuania, and Kremlin will rejoice in this 
gift. <…> I suggest to not play with referendum initiatives, to not play 
with the future of the Lithuanian nation and the right of Lithuanian 
citizens to dual citizenship. I suggest to not approve of this really 
completely green initiative.44 
The suggested formulation which does not put any qualifying restrictions on the 
eligibility for dual citizenship has drawn criticism for being easily demonized by anti-
immigration populists, which is a suggestion fascinating in itself, since the question of 
immigration had heretofore appeared to be marginal in Lithuanian discourse. However, the 
                                                 
44Parliamentary proceedings, September 18, 2007, 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=304466  
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overwhelming majority of criticism comes from the fear that ethnic minorities will seek 
dual citizenship with their kin-states (BNS ir lrytas.lt inf. 2014). 
There have been rounds of discussions on the possible referendum in conjunction 
with either parliamentary or presidential elections in 2008, at the end of 2011, in 2013, and 
in 2014, and the arguments have virtually been the same. For example, in 2011, the Human 
Rights Committee of the Parliament of Lithuania stated their support for a referendum if 
its formulation targets Article 12 of the Constitution. Their suggestion on how to avoid 
blanket statements which would open dual citizenship to any Russian was to reframe the 
question in terms of preservation of Lithuanian citizenship rather than in terms of gaining 
a dual citizenship. They called for an installation of voting via internet in an explicit attempt 
to enable the diaspora to participate in this referendum.45 In the new round of discussions 
in 2013, again prompted by a proposal from a group of left wing MPs led by Paulauskas, 
the Committee on Legal Affairs stated that unlimited access to dual citizenship would be a 
threat to Lithuanian national security, with supporting arguments from government 
institutions like the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Lithuania and various 
NGOs, like the World Lithuanian Community and the Lithuanian Human Rights 
Association, and rejected the proposed referendum on the grounds that lack of societal 
support even from the main interest group, the diaspora, suggests that it would be an 
expensive failure.46  
It is indeed crucial to the fate of the referendum proposals that the representatives 
of the diaspora have repeatedly announced that they do not support this idea, both because 
                                                 
45 Press release by the Human Rights Committee of the Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania, 2011-12-
07. http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter/w5_show?p_r=6275&p_d=119106&p_k=1.  
46 Evaluation of the proposal by the Parliamentary Committee on Legal Affairs, December 18, 2013, see 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter3/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=462533  
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the formulation of the question, which will determine the results, is not clear, and because 
referenda in Lithuania usually fail due to not gathering the required minimum amount of 
votes (BNS 2013b; BNS ir lrytas.lt inf. 2011). It remains to be seen whether such a 
referendum will eventually take place, and if it does, whether it will face a fate similar to 
the Hungarian attempt, where the referendum failed despite being geared towards ethnic 
Hungarians, or turn out to be an instance of grandiose mobilization of a majority of the 
electorate, similar to the turnout in the Lithuanian referendum on membership in the EU 
(which was twice that of Hungary) (Nohlan and Stöver 2010: 912, 913). Current debates 
refer to 2016, but it is not clear how the claim-response feedback loop can be broken, as 
the differing positions have remained stable over time, signifying once more the constant 
tension in the discourse of citizenship, which in turn allows us to approach citizenship 
regulation as a continuously relevant stateness boundary maintenance regime. 
3.3.1.2. Proposals to change the Constitution without a referendum. As I explained 
earlier, referenda are difficult to execute in Lithuania. Consequently, some proposals, 
mostly produced by members of the diaspora, concentrated on legislative solutions which 
would deal with the problem on the constitutional level, but would allow the country to 
avoid a referendum (Narušienė 2013). Since only the first and the fourteenth chapters of 
the Constitution require a referendum for amendments, and the Article 12 which entails the 
general prohibition of dual citizenship “except individual cases provided for by law” is in 
the first chapter, the search began to identify an article in some other chapter that could be 
changed in some way which would restore the privileged access of ethnic Lithuanians to 
dual citizenship.  
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Ironically, no one has suggested that the Parliament should use its powers to change 
the Article 29 where the norm of nondiscrimination and non-privileging instituted, 
demonstrating once more the deep delegitimization of discrimination on the institutional-
legal level. Most of the proposals in this cluster concentrated on Article 32 of the 
Constitution, which is in the same chapter as the Article 29 on nondiscrimination. Article 
32 deals with the freedom of movement of Lithuanians: 
A citizen may move and choose his place of residence in 
Lithuania freely and may leave Lithuania freely. 
These rights may not be restricted otherwise than by law and if 
it is necessary for the protection of the security of the State, the health 
of the people as well as for administration of justice. 
A citizen may not be prohibited from returning to Lithuania. 
Everyone who is Lithuanian may settle in Lithuania. 
Most of the article deals with citizen rights and thus is neutral in terms of ethnicity. 
However, the provision for the right to settle in Lithuania is confined to people of 
Lithuanian descent. This fact has been taken up by prominent political figures from the 
diaspora community in their quest to circumvent the nondiscrimination argument. For 
example, a return migrant, political scientist Kęstutis Girnius (2006), lists this right of 
establishing residence as proof that the “founders” of the Constitution intended for 
Lithuanians to have some privileges, next to the preamble and the Article 14 establishing 
Lithuanian as the state language. 
The then chairperson of the Lithuanian World Community, Regina Narušienė 
(2007; 2009), who is a lawyer by profession, repeatedly insisted for several years that it 
would be enough to amend the Article 32 (or Article 18 which says that human rights are 
natural, or, as the official translation of the Constitution says, innate, – the Lithuanian word 
here, “prigimtinės”, is a derivative of the word “birth”). She suggested adding a statement 
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that no Lithuanian person can be divested of Lithuanian citizenship acquired by birth, 
unless s/he renounces it (drawing on examples of Estonia, Czech Republic, Slovakia, 
Poland, and Spain, among others).  
Her suggestion was rebuffed by then Chairman of the Constitutional Court Egidijus 
Kūris for inventing what he called “juridical abracadabras” (quoted in Ignatavičius 2007). 
On the other hand, the subsequent Chairman of the Constitutional Court Juozas Žilys 
appeared much more amenable to this proposal in a 2010 interview.47 It is interesting to 
note how the Court under Kūris‘ leadership appears to at the same embrace the 
international norm of nondiscrimination and denounce the ways to bypass it offered by the 
examples of Constitutions of other countries, but this position is not unmaleable. One could 
say that this is an instance of a certain dynamic relationship between international norms 
and practices and the judges’ socialization into those norms.  
The most sustained rebuff of the proposal to solve the question of dual citizenship 
for Lithuanian migrants was presented by Vytautas Sinkevičius, one of the Constitutional 
Court judges, considered to be the foremost expert on constitutional law questions of 
citizenship in Lithuania. In his 2008 scientific article, Sinkevičius argued that, as long as 
Article 12 is in effect, any other attempts to change the Constitution with the goal of 
expanding the availability of dual citizenship would contradict the spirit of the Constitution 
and thus could not be acceptable. Therefore, it is possible to expect that any attempt to 
change any part of the Constitution in favour of ethnonational dual citizenship without 
touching Article 12 would be met with skepticism from the judges. 
                                                 
47 “Teisininkas: jei leisime dvigubą pilietybę, 70 proc. Lietuvos piliečių bus „dvigubi“.” 2010-02-11. 
http://www.anglija.lt/straipsniai/naujienos/lietuvoje/teisininkas_jei_leisime_dviguba_pilietybe_70_proc_lie
tuvos_pilieciu_bus_dvigubi.html. 
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In conclusion, there are not many prospects of finding a way to reinstall the 
ethnonationalist citizenship regime using the Constitution, referendum or not. Since the 
mandate given by the Constitutional Court was to revamp the Law on Citizenship so it does 
not contradict the constitutional imperatives of nondiscrimination and restrictiveness of 
dual citizenship, and since most politicians are weary of referendum-type blanket 
statements which would open the door for dual citizenship to those whom the repatriation 
clause was targeting, most proposals are focused on finding the optimal formulation of 
what those “individual cases” could entail. In the next subsection, I discuss the main 
proposals put forth by different political factions and the parliamentary debates on the 
drafts of the Law on Citizenship that attempted to accommodate the edicts of the November 
2006 ruling.  
3.3.2. Legislative solutions. 
Legislative proposals that have been put forth in the quest to satisfy emigrant 
aspirations without changing the Constitution can be divided into two categories. The 
majority of proposals seek to produce a definitive list of those “rare and exceptional” cases 
in which dual citizenship would be allowed. Another road that some politicians take is to 
seek alternatives to dual citizenship by creating special quasi-citizenship status available 
to diaspora members. In this section, I review the various legislative proposals in order to 
evaluate the place of identitarian and stateness concerns in the politico-legal discourse on 
citizenship. 
3.3.2.1. Quasi-citizenship alternatives. Some politicians accepted that the 
imperative of nondiscrimination in citizenship regulation cannot be bypassed, and yet 
wanted to find a way to grant privileges to Lithuanian emigrants. To find a solution, the 
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Prime Minister created a working group only a few weeks after the ruling was announced. 
The workgroup, which included Constitutional law specialist and one-time Constitutional 
Court judges Egidijus Jarašiūnas (designated the head of the workgroup) and Juozas Žilys, 
and very prominent social scientists and public figures Raimundas Lopata, Alfredas 
Bumblauskas, Vytautas Ališauskas and Vytautas Radžvilas (BNS 2006), in 2007 proposed 
to create a distinct legal status of a special relationship with Lithuania which would entitle 
one to less than full citizenship rights (Balsas.lt 2007). 
It is peculiar that the head of the workgroup Egidijus Jarašiūnas called this “an 
original Lithuanian solution” (Delfi.lt 2007). In fact, it is likely that the inspiration came 
from some countries which have created a separate legal status for their diaspora members. 
Examples of such legislation can be found in the creation of Turkish “pink cards” in 1995 
(which have become “blue cards” since 2009), “Polish cards” instituted in 2007, or the 
2001 creation of “Hungarian national identity cards”. This quasi-citizenship status grants 
various rights to the carriers of such cards, such as the permission to come to work or study 
in the ethnic homeland without any additional requirements for visas or permits (for more 
on such statuses see Bauböck et al. 2009; Faist 2007). Ultimately, the only difference from 
full citizenship status is the fact that these card holders do not have electoral rights.  
The idea of a special legal status that is granted based on descent but falls short of 
full citizenship should be considered together with the development of the status of 
denizenship discussed in Chapter 1, where the rights that fall short of full citizenship are 
given on the basis of residency. Both of these statuses are symptomatic of the nation-states’ 
reactions to increased migration pressures and of their efforts to maintain the boundaries 
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of stateness epitomized in the full citizenship status, which is not easily handed to either 
immigrants or emigrants.  
Although this quasi-citizenship proposal would grant many of the rights ostensibly 
motivating pursuit of dual citizenship, it was dismissed by diaspora members as 
“humiliating” (Girnius 2006). Such a response lends support to my argument that even if 
citizenship is increasingly disassociated from rights, it is no less desirable for its 
identitarian dimension. The representatives of the Lithuanian emigrant community, like 
Vida Bandis48, Kęstutis Girnius (2006), and Regina Narušienė (2007, 2009, 2013), note 
that the fact that this status would exclude the political rights of the citizenship, namely, 
voting and running for office, is an indication of the fear of the politicians that emigrants 
would vote for someone else and the desire to preclude them from changing the face of the 
political establishment. Unsurprisingly, this proposal was put forth by the left-wing 
government, while the majority of the diaspora tend to vote for the right. Regina Narušienė 
herself was supposed to be a member of the Prime Minister’s working group, but, as is 
evidenced in Maksimavičius’ (2008) report on the activities of the governing board of the 
World Lithuanian Community, she distanced herself from this endeavour, spearheaded the 
official denouncement of these proposals by the World Lithuanian Community, and went 
on to formulate her own proposals discussed above in section 3.3.1.2.. Danguolė 
Navickienė, who replaced Narušienė as the head of the World Lithuanian Community in 
2010, said that this status would be equal to “a mayor giving you a golden key to the city 
which does not open any doors” (Stanišauskas 2012).  
                                                 
48 The representative of World Lithuanian Community Vida Bandis, quoted in “Iš laisvos Lietuvos 
emigravę piliečiai dvigubos pilietybės negaus”, 2010-12-02, 
http://www.anglija.lt/straipsniai/naujienos/lietuviai_pasaulyje/is_laisvos_lietuvos_emigrave_pilieciai_dvig
ubos_pilietybes_negaus.html  
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Ultimately, this proposal of quasi-citizenship was discarded due to such lack of 
support by the main interest group, but the process of its consideration puts two things in 
sharp relief. First of all, it highlights that, even after being offered all the rights that dual 
citizenship is supposed to safeguard, emigrants are not satisfied until they are fully 
acknowledged as belonging to the nation-state on a par with all other citizens, lending 
support to my proposition regarding the supremacy of the identitarian dimension in the 
conception of citizenship. Second, the efforts to find a legal status for ethnic migrants 
demonstrate the continuing interest of the Lithuanian state to maintain the ties with its 
diaspora, thus aligning with the mainstream theories on the behaviour of emigration 
countries, which makes the current dual citizenship regime that contradicts those theories 
especially fascinating and worth investigating. 
3.3.2.2. Negotiating the parameters of dual citizenship. The suggestions on how to 
define the “individual cases” in which dual citizenship could be tolerated can be 
summarized as attempts to recreate the repatriation clause in some guise which would 
prevent ethnic minorities from being able to hold both a citizenship of Lithuania and of 
Russia, Poland or Israel, while opening such possibilities for ethnic Lithuanians.   
The main proponents of the retrenchment of an ethnonational dual citizenship 
regime have been the right-wing opposition lead by the conservative/ Christian Democratic 
party Homeland Union, the party that stemmed from the independence movement and has 
the closest links with diaspora among all Lithuanian political factions. The right-wing 
political leader Andrius Kubilius (2007b) declared that “the main goal of citizenship is to 
preserve the link between citizens and their ethnic Homeland in the storms of 
globalization” (such statements lend support to my argument that citizenship is a boundary 
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maintenance mechanism employable by states under globalization pressures). Kubilius has 
repeatedly emphasized that a referendum that would result in a free-for-all dual citizenship 
would be dangerous for Lithuania and advocated a differentiation which would still 
acknowledge a special status of a Lithuanian person in relation to the Lithuanian state 
(Bardauskas 2014; ELTA 2009; Kubilius 2007a). He proposed to circumvent the wrath of 
the Constitutional Court by listing several special/distinct cases in which dual citizenship 
would be allowed. However, those special categories were definitely based on 
discrimination on the grounds of ethnicity, as the proposal created something akin to 
concentric circles dependent on the person’s descent. The first two circles would consist of 
descendants of inter-war Republic of Lithuania. Ethnic Lithuanians would only be 
prevented from having dual citizenship if they had committed a crime against humanity or 
plotted against the Lithuanian state (a way to exclude Holocaust perpetrators and 
communist regime loyalists). Pre-war citizens of other ethnicities would also have to pass 
an exam on the Constitution and the Lithuanian language and to have legal income and 
domicile in Lithuania. Other applicants would be subject to additional conditions, such as 
a requirement that their second citizenship be with a country belonging to either the EU or 
the NATO (this was a way to exclude Russia). Children born to Lithuanian citizens abroad 
would also be eligible for dual citizenship. 
Kubilius’ proposal was enthusiastically endorsed by the governing board of the 
World Lithuanian Community.49 A version of Kubilius’ proposal was put into law in 2008 
when a right-wing coalition of Christian Democrats and Liberals gained power in the 
government. However, it was vetoed by the President Valdas Adamkus in anticipation of 
                                                 
49 The Board of the World Lithuanian Community addressing the Human Rights Committee of the 
Parliament of the Republic of Lithuania on May 31, 2007 (http://www.plbe.org). 
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a Constitutional Court challenge for violating the prohibition of discrimination or 
privileging on the basis of ethnicity and descent in the Article 29 of the Constitution. The 
President himself is a return migrant and has consistently championed the need to maintain 
links with the diaspora, but was not able to get around the limits circumscribed by the 
Constitutional Court, reluctantly acknowledging that this issue can only be resolved by a 
referendum (BNS 2010c; Digrytė 2008b). This situation testifies to the gridlock in which 
the November 2006 ruling has placed Lithuanian politicians, when the aspiration to an 
ethnonational boundary maintenance regime is foreclosed without diminishing its 
perceived necessity, placing the issue of dual citizenship into a perpetual feedback loop of 
claim-response within the circumscribed conditions of possibility.  
After two years of deliberations and tweaking the 2008 proposal in attempts to find 
a more tenable balance between the Constitutional Court’s restrictions and the perpetual 
need to accommodate Lithuanian emigrants, the Parliament formulated a modified 
proposal of the Law on Citizenship. It retained essentially the same provisions for dual 
citizenship and was again vetoed by the President, this time Dalia Grybauskaitė (in office 
since 2009). In a pattern similar to the previous president, Grybauskaitė continuously 
expresses support for dual citizenship for Lithuanian diaspora, but defers to the lawyers to 
find solutions (BNS 2010a), and vetoes legislative proposals that can be deemed 
discriminatory (in this case due the differential treatment of those whose second citizenship 
would be of a NATO or EU member state). The Law on Citizenship was passed by the 
Parliament on December 2, 2010, discarding the parts vetoed by the President, and now 
limiting dual citizenship availability to those pre-war Lithuanian citizens who left before 
the restoration of independence, similar to the 1991 law provision which had not been 
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challenged by the Constitutional Court in its rulings on citizenship, for children born to 
Lithuanian citizens abroad who gain the citizenship of the host country automatically by 
birth or marriage, and to people who have been granted citizenship by way of exception by 
the President. This was a compromise between the old and the new migrants in that it 
preserved the original exception – dual citizenship for those who left Lithuania due to 
political rather than economic considerations, – but also accommodated the new generation 
born abroad, although the latter are required to choose one citizenship at reaching majority. 
Most politicians are not satisfied with this compromise and continue seeking ways to 
expand the availability of dual citizenship to the more recent economic emigrants, but have 
not yet been able to find a formulation that could bypass Constitutional Court scrutiny. 
The newest round of proposals in November of 2014 came from two sources – the 
President Dalia Grybauskaitė, and the MP Arminas Lydeka who was the principal author 
of the 2002 Law on Citizenship and has been championing ways to work around the limits 
set by the Constitutional Court. 
The President’s proposal was highlighted by a well-publicized case of a 
professional basketball player Žydrūnas Ilgauskas who gained American citizenship and 
automatically lost his Lithuanian citizenship. Contrasting this event with situations when 
the President of Lithuania grants Lithuanian citizenship by way of exception to foreign 
athletes in hopes that they will successfully represent Lithuania in the Olympics, many note 
the paradoxical nature of the situation where an athlete that Lithuania already had is given 
up due to the restrictive interpretation of Article 12 promulgated by the Constitutional 
Court. This time the proposals came from the President’s office and sought to expand dual 
citizenship through the presidential power to grant citizenship by way of exception. The 
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evolving Law on Citizenship always contained the provision that the President can grant 
citizenship to a citizen of another state who has merit in promoting Lithuania and its 
interests, thus creating a certain group of dual citizens. The President proposed to use this 
power in a reverse logic and institute similar consideration of merit applied to those who 
already are, or have been in the past, citizens of Lithuania. She suggested that these people 
could either be allowed to gain citizenship in some other state without losing their original 
Lithuanian citizenship, or have their Lithuanian citizenship restored if they had lost it. 
In the parliamentary debates that took place exactly 8 years after the infamous 
ruling50, the representative of the President, her chief advisor R.Svetikaitė, argued that this 
proposal meets the stringent requirements set by the Constitutional Court, as such instances 
would indeed be rare, and would even address an instance of discrimination when citizens 
of other countries have a better chance of holding dual citizenship based on merit than 
Lithuanian citizens do. The proposal sparked a lively debate. Supporters of the proposal to 
extend the availability of dual citizenship by exception, like MP Arminas Lydeka, lamented 
that what we really need is a referendum, but the President does not have the power to call 
for one, so this little improvement is better than none. In contrast, some MPs, like the social 
democrat E.Jonyla and a left-wing populist Kęstutis Daukšys, argued that the possibility to 
restore Lithuanian citizenship to someone who had previously chosen to give it up would 
be a devaluing of Lithuanian citizenship. The majority of the MPs from the whole political 
spectrum who spoke in this debate, like social democrat Birutė Vėsaitė and conservative 
MP Arimantas Dumčius, questioned the possibility to judge which Lithuanian citizens have 
                                                 
50 Parliamentary debates on November 13, 2014, minutes available at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=487627. 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
151 
 
more merit to Lithuania than others and expressed concern with creating unequal treatment 
of Lithuanian citizens. Populist MP Vytautas Matulevičius proclaimed: 
We are really turning citizenship into a privilege, kowtowing to a part of the 
nation, let’s call it the elite, who earn hundreds of millions of litas, and are not 
essentially solving the problem which is relevant to thousands of Lithuanian 
emigrés. I call upon all to think about this. Not to create privileges, but to finally 
take up creating what our co-national, the diaspora, are waiting from us.51 
 
The next proposal came from the most prolific politician in terms of citizenship 
legislation, the liberal MP Arminas Lydeka. He suggested to remove the requirement for 
children of Lithuanian citizens who gained another country’s citizenship automatically by 
birth to choose only one citizenship when they reach the age of 21. He argued that this 
would meet the restrictions emphasized by the Constitutional Court, since there would be 
no more than several hundred such cases, and appealed to the MPs to not make the children 
choose, figuratively speaking, between their father and mother. The parliamentarians who 
participated in the debate rehashed the usual arguments, emphasizing the need to solve the 
questions of dual citizenship in a more complete manner, debating the issues related to the 
idea of referendum, and lamenting the need to keep chipping away at the law piece by piece 
due to the restrictiveness of the Constitutional Court. Considering that, as a conservative 
MP and a former Constitutional Court judge Stasys Šedbaras argued, these children did not 
choose to have a second citizenship, this individual case of dual citizenship allowance 
appeared relatively benign, thus the voting was in favour of Lydeka’s proposal, which now 
awaits further steps in the legislative process. 
Thus, the pattern of the claim-response dynamic in the Lithuanian politico-legal 
discourse has become a feedback loop where the Parliament crafts a proposal as a response 
                                                 
51 Parliamentary debates on November 13, 2014, minutes available at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/pls/inter2/dokpaieska.showdoc_l?p_id=487627. 
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to the restrictive claims of the Constitutional Court, then the President vetoes the law as a 
less contentious response to the Court’s claims, until the cycle begins anew and the 
Parliament keeps looking for new ways to craft their response so the result would be 
different. So far, neither President has been able to substantiate their declarations of support 
for the availability of Lithuanian citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians abroad due to the way 
the Constitutional Court circumscribed the conditions of possibility. Left-wing MP Povilas 
Gylys (2014) called the situation created by the November 2006 ruling a “juridical trap” 
and reiterated the need to solve the problem of dual citizenship in a more complex manner 
rather than these continuous attempts to patch it up. Why is the Parliament reluctant or 
unable to offer pathways which would avoid the charge of discrimination and yet would 
not make dual citizenship available indiscriminately? My argument is that we need to look 
into concerns with stateness if we want to understand the behaviour of both the judges (see 
Chapter 4) and the politicians. 
3.3.3. The spectre of Russia: stateness concerns.  
Lithuanian politics is fundamentally grounded in its geopolitical realities vis-à-vis 
the EU and Russia. Both the effects of EU conditionality (see Chapter 4) and the fact that 
Russia is a significant factor in the political discourse of postcommunist countries has been 
well established (Rose et al. 2006). Any political action can be interpreted as either pro-
EU or pro-Russia – the choice between the two is considered to be a zero sum game.  
The proposal to allow dual citizenship only with the countries of ‘Euro-Atlantic 
integration’ recognized as such by the Parliament of Lithuania has been precisely an 
attempt to include diaspora in America and other Western democracies, as opposed to only 
the migrants and their families in the EU, and to exclude Russia. Although this proposal 
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was endorsed by Western emigrants themselves, they tread the ground of potential 
accusations of discrimination carefully, for example, the Swiss Lithuanian Community 
suggested regulation of dual citizenship with particular countries via bilateral treaties 
(Šveicarijos Lietuvių Bendruomenės pozicija dvigubos pilietybės ir užsienio lietuvių 
vaidmens Lietuvos gyvenime klausimu 2007).  
Political commentator Gintaras Aleknonis (2007) emphasized that the emigrants 
also lament the unequal position of forced deportees in Siberia that could result from the 
attempts to exclude Russia. On the other hand, the suggestion of a referendum which would 
give blanket allowance for dual citizenship, and thus would enable Lithuanians in Russia 
to freely access dual citizenship, has been met with fear. Earlier in this chapter I quoted the 
reaction of the leader of the right wing opposition and two time Prime Minister Andrius 
Kubilius to the proposed referendum. He emphasized that instituting dual citizenship 
avaialability would be “a present to the Kremlin” (Kubilius 2007a) and expressed fear that 
Russia would pressure the approximately 200 000 Russian speakers that live in Lithuania 
to get both citizenships and we could end up having “hundreds of thousands of Russian 
citizens living here” (BNS 2013c). One way or another, Russia looms large in the 
background of the citizenship discourse. 
More than two thirds of the population do not identify themselves with politicians 
who proclaim to be defenders of national interests (Rose et al. 2006: 321), yet fear of 
Russian influence is a significant theme in Lithuanian politics (Aleknonis 2007). 
Perception of Russia as a threat is not unfounded in Lithuania, especially keeping in mind 
the previous President’s impeachment on alleged ties with Russia (see more in Clark and 
Verseckaite 2005 and below in Chapter 4). The elements of ethnicity and national security 
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intertwine in the hostility of nationalist politicians towards Russia and the tension between 
dual citizenship as a tool to retain ties with emigrants and as a potential gate for Russian 
influence. During the initial phases of state building, such concerns played a significant 
role in shaping the Constitution in general and the regulation of citizenship in particular, 
and they continue to exhort considerable pressure on current discourse. I return to the more 
detailed discussion of the way fear of Russia plays out in the Constitutional doctrine on 
citizenship in the next chapter. 
3.4. Concluding remarks.  
The legal situation regarding dual citizenship continues to display the same 
discursive patterns – the majority of politicians agree that the ultimate goal is to find a way 
back to the constellation which enabled ethnic Lithuanian émigrés to retain their Lithuanian 
citizenship without opening the door to representatives of other ethnicities previously 
excluded by the repatriation clause, but they also recognize that the antidiscriminatory 
ruling of the Constitutional Court has foreclosed any easy avenues. Even the current 
Chairman of the Constitutional Court Juozas Žilys, as mentioned above, has become 
complicit in this quest, suggesting potential Constitutional amendments, such as including 
a provision that people who acquire Lithuanian citizenship by birth can only be stripped of 
it if they themselves request it, but was counteracted by those who fear that such a 
formulation would still include ethnic minorities and thus open up the venues for hundreds 
of thousands potential dual citizens with Russia and Poland.52 However, so far the majority 
of proposals have remained at the level of the Law on Citizenship. 
                                                 
52 “Teisininkas: jei leisime dvigubą pilietybę, 70 proc. Lietuvos piliečių bus „dvigubi“” 2010-02-11. 
http://www.anglija.lt/straipsniai/naujienos/lietuvoje/teisininkas_jei_leisime_dviguba_pilietybe_70_proc_lie
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If we consider Lithuania’s relationship with the two most prominent factors that 
help orient its landscape – the EU and Russa – from the perspective of stateness concerns, 
we begin to discern the unifying thread that can help explain the paradoxical outcome of 
an emigration country with an unintentional emigrant-unfriendly disposition. On the one 
hand, Russia is perceived as a threat to stateness, thus citizenship regulation is geared to 
police and maintain that boundary between Lithuania and Russia more than any other 
country or phenomenon, inevitably leading to what can be perceived as discrimination. On 
the other hand, euroatlantic integration has been seen as a guarantee to safeguard the 
stateness by virtue of distancing Lithuania from Russia; however, the decoupling of people, 
rights and territory due to the common European space and the hegemony of the norms of 
nondiscrimination end up obstructing those efforts of stateness boundary maintenance. 
The most current version of the Law (2010) obeys the ruling by mandating stripping 
of the Lithuanian citizenship of any person who emigrates after the reinstatement of 
independence and gains citizenship of another country, addresses the problem of 
emigrants’ children born in ius soli countries and possible automatic gain of another 
citizenship through marriage by allowing them to retain both citizenships (however, 
children with dual citizenship are mandated to choose one of them within three years of 
reaching maturity), thus highlighting the difference between those who choose another 
citizenship and those who become dual citizens not by their own volition, reinforcing the 
distinction that feeds the question of loyalty and conscious identification, and heavily 
landing on the side of duty and loyalty to the state as opposed to a voluntaristic search for 
                                                 
tuvos_pilieciu_bus_dvigubi.html. Dainius Žalimas  “Dvigubos pilietybės siekių klystkeliai”, 2008-09-17,  
http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/article.php?id=18565147&categoryID=10459539. 
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a better livelihood.53 Some arguments presented for the distinction between those who left 
pre- and post-independence, couched in legal terms, emphasize that those who left 
Lithuania during the Soviet occupation can be characterized as a special case, a condition 
necessary for allowing dual citizenship according to the Article 12 of the Constitution, 
since occupation provided special circumstances, but leaving the country after 
independence cannot be considered a special case, and thus allowing the new emigrants to 
gain dual citizenship would make it available for the majority of the country’s citizens and 
thus counteract the Constitutional mandate that dual citizenship is allowed only in special 
cases.54 The law does include the provision to enable dual citizenship with particular 
countries via bilateral treaties, but so far there are no such treaties signed. However, the 
public discourse is still characterized by a continuous trickling of proposals to expand dual 
citizenship possibilities for ethnic Lithuanian émigrés. 
Ultimately, the discussion on the legal changes that would allow politicians to 
counteract the ruling of the Constitutional Court keeps coming back to the potential 
amendments of the Constitution. On the one hand, then former President of Lithuania 
Valdas Adamkus acknowledged that the Constitution was written at a time when 
citizenship rules had to be stricter, but the current situation required corrections (quoted in 
Dokšaitė 2007). There have been voices who declare that the Constitution is not above the 
will of the people (Praninskas 2006) and that the demos has a right to decide its own 
composition. In fact, some, like a public figure Darius Kuolys, the then head of a prominent 
                                                 
53 “Dvigubą pilietybę įteisinantis įstatymas ekspertų paramos nesulaukė ” 2010-11-17,  
http://www.15min.lt/naujiena/aktualu/lietuva/dviguba-pilietybe-iteisinantis-istatymas-ekspertu-paramos-
nesulauke-56-124762#axzz1oBPzrStZ. Dainius Žalimas  “Dvigubos pilietybės siekių klystkeliai”, 2008-09-
17,  http://www.delfi.lt/news/ringas/lit/article.php?id=18565147&categoryID=10459539. 
54 Head of the President’s working group on the citizenship regulation, professor of international law 
Dainius Žalimas, quoted in “Siūloma įteisinti „lietuvio kortą“”, 2009-02-10.  
 http://www.anglija.lt/straipsniai/naujienos/lietuviai_pasaulyje/siuloma_iteisinti_lietuvio_korta.html.  
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think tank Civil Society Institute and a former Minister of Education and aide to the 
President of Lithuania, say that this decision has already been made in the Constitution by 
proclaiming that the state is created by the nation which is sovereign, therefore, a 
referendum on this question would be a humiliation to the Lithuanian nation (quoted in 
Maksimavičius (n.d.)). Such pronouncements drew criticism from Egidijus Jarašiūnas, 
former Constitutional Court judge and one of the creators of the Lithuanian Constitution 
(albeit representing a minority opinion during the drafting (Žilys 2013)), for conflating the 
civic nation with the cultural ethnie.55 Thus the stalemate continues: the public and 
especially the diaspora are overwhelmingly in favour of dual citizenship with differential 
treatment based on ethnicity, the politicians are looking for ways to restore this type of 
stateness boundary maintenance regime, and the Constitutional Court continues to 
preemptively block any transgressions against the norms of nondiscrimination and 
restrictive access to dual citizenship. Considering that the Court used to espouse a doctrine 
of differential treatment of different groups of citizens and supported the special status of 
the descendants of interwar Lithuanian citizens, the ruling stands out as something that 
needs to be explained. In the next chapter I attempt to offer such an explanation by 
reviewing the proffered explanations of the effects of the EU conditionality vs. the 
prominence of the concerns with stateness. I conduct in-depth analysis of the development 
of the Lithuanian Constitutional doctrine on citizenship over time in order to distill the key 
factors guiding the Constitutional Court’s judgments. 
 
  
                                                 
55 Quoted in the transcript of a discussion on national radio on February 12, 2007 “Kokių pasekmių turės 
KT nutarimas dėl Lietuvos pilietybės?” // http://www.balsas.lt/naujiena/34869.  
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Chapter 4. Norms vs. interests: Analysis of Constitutional Court rulings 
 
In the previous chapters I presented the curious case of the ruling of the 
Constitutional Court on Lithuanian dual citizenship, its demographical and historical 
background and the reaction in the public sphere, highlighting the contrast between the 
ruling of the Constitutional Court that struck down preferential treatment of ethnic 
Lithuanians in the attribution of dual citizenship on the one hand, and the outpouring of 
overwhelming support for ethnically informed policies among the population and 
politicians on the other hand. Together with the mainstream citizenship studies theories 
pertaining to a country of Lithuania’s pedigree that we discussed in Chapter 1, the review 
of the facts on the ground reinforces the notion that such a ruling of the Constitutional 
Court is improbable, counterintuitive, represents a saltation from the previous 
developments, and prompts additional inquiry. 
In this chapter, I delve deeper into the analysis of the legal texts associated with 
this ruling in an effort to extract an explanation of the outcome that not only caught the 
country and its emigrants off-guard, but also contradicts mainstream scientific predictions. 
In relation to the goals of this dissertation, this chapter serves to flesh out the proposal that 
the improbable developments in dual citizenship regulation are due to the conditions of 
possibility brought about by the paradoxical effects of the mutual imbrications of 
international norms and stateness concerns. Since the raison d’être of the norms of 
minority protection lies precisely in counteracting the negative implications of stateness 
concerns that result in securitization of state-minority relations (Galbreath and McEvoy, 
2011), it is very interesting to see the actual product of the interaction of these two powerful 
vectors. The empirical analysis demonstrates that both of these factors need to be taken 
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into account if one is to fully understand the seemingly counterintuitive outcome of the 
Lithuanian case and be able to appreciate its comparative purchase and relevance to the 
larger patterns of international trends in citizenship regulation, which is the subject of the 
next chapter. On a broader scale, this chapter also contributes a building block to the 
analysis of the effectuality of EU conditionality on candidate countries and to the micro-
analysis of judicial review that is considered to be one of the key factors in support of the 
liberalization/convergence hypothesis (Joppke 1998).  
I begin by discussing ideational analysis and then presenting the hypothesized 
ideational factors of the case, namely, the influence of international norms in general and 
European integration conditionality more specifically, and address the peculiarities of 
applying ideational analysis to judicial review. Then, using the process tracing prescription 
of looking for ‘fingerprints’ of the ideas that would demonstrate the relevance of 
international norms of nondiscrimination vs. values associated with stateness, I analyze the 
textual evidence of the norms that are called upon by the Constitutional Court when passing 
judgment on citizenship issues. I triangulate the content analysis of the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court pertaining to citizenship with data gleaned from archival research of 
documents of the working group which prepared the text of the Lithuanian Constitution 
which was discussed in Chapter 2 and from interviews with some of the main actors of this 




4.1. EU conditionality or stateness concerns: ideational approach 
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4.1.1. Ideational analysis: how do we know if norms matter? 
As the Lithuanian case of dual citizenship appears counterintuitive in the context 
of scholarly theories and public preferences, it becomes even more important to disentangle 
the justification and legitimation of the Constitutional Court ruling in order to understand 
it (Cortell and Davis 2000: 71; Hall 2003; Jutila 2009: 630). As Berman (2013: 232) notes, 
ideational context can shape actors’ behavior even if they do not believe in it. In this 
chapter, I conduct ideational research to explore the hypothesis which attributes this ruling 
to the influence of international norms of nondiscrimination.  
4.1.1.1. Ideas as objects of empirical study. In the perennial debates over the value 
of ideas-, institutions-, and interests-based explanations, ideational research at times is 
treated like a stepchild (or at best recognized as a “valuable supplement” (Jacobsen 1995: 
285)). Ideational approaches have been accused of ad-hoc leanings, of using ideas as a 
catch-all residual category, of being too fuzzy, i.e. failing to provide definitions or specify 
the mechanisms at work and merely producing correlational arguments (see discussions in 
Checkel 1999: 85 passim; Cortell and Davis 2000: 68 passim).  
Proponents of ideation research retort that other types of research are just as guilty 
of the same sins, and note that one of the main problem lies in the attempts to operate in 
blanket statements, whereas better results can be achieved by conducting middle-range 
ideational research (Berman 1998: 21, 2001: 241). As Parsons (2003: 2-3) observes, “the 
generality of the political world is an open question <…> The mere possibility of a deeply 
particular, “socially constructed” world makes it illogical to accept generality as a standard 
a priori for theoretical value.” Pace Campbell (2001: 182n5), a case study is especially 
suited for studying the mechanisms of how ideas operate through process tracing (see 
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George and Bennett 2005). Along those lines, I refrain from overarching generalizations, 
and look to the cumulative ideational research for a theoretical toolkit for the Lithuanian 
case at hand.  
Ideas have been defined and categorized variously, but most typologies are based 
on some distinction between cognitive and normative ideas, as well as on the distinction 
between different levels of generality, such as worldviews/philosophies/paradigms, 
programmatic beliefs, and policy ideas (e.g. Berman 1998; Campbell 2001; Schmidt 2008), 
but beyond these general schematics each scholar defines them based on their needs. For 
the purposes of my research, I define norms in an encompassing way as guides for conduct 
and for judgment thereof (for a similar understanding see Cortell and Davis 2000: 69). My 
dissertation deals with the dynamic interaction between and within institutionalized norms 
and their discursive environments, consequently, it could be seen as roughly falling under 
the heading of discursive institutionalism (see Schmidt 2008). As Hay (1996: 255) points 
out, a political response must address the narrative construction of a crisis rather than its 
factual underlying conditions, which underlines my choice to approach the Lithuanian case 
through textual analysis. Schmidt (2008: 303) emphasizes the potential of discursive 
institutionalism, which conceptualizes ideas as the substantive content of the discourse, 
and discourse as the interactive process of conveying ideas, to provide a better account for 
the dynamics, rather than the statics, of ideational institutionalization. In terms of discourse 
analysis, Constitutional Court rulings can be treated as a Claim-Response pattern (see Hoey 
2001 for discourse type classification) where the affirmation or denial of a claim of the 
plaintiff is justified by invoking the substantive content of the discourse as it is 
institutionalized in the Constitution and previous Constitutional Court jurisprudence. 
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Discursive institutionalism is especially suited for the type of non-normative analysis of 
normative ideas that I aspire to, since it allows us to take into account the role and 
interaction of ideas at different levels of generality and different institutional positions, and 
explore the dynamics of their interactions, demonstrating how this interaction can produce 
unintended, at times paradoxical consequences. We have discussed the ideas in the 
Lithuanian public discourse (Ch.3) and the institutionalized constitutional norms (Ch.2), 
and below I discuss the interactions of these ideas in the rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
My research fits in what Kostakopoulou (2005: 234) has called “the normative turn in 
European studies”, but instead of following the path of normatively inclined political 
theory, I strive to stick close to the ground and look for the ways normative ideas actually 
operate in political realities. My analysis is squarely centered on what is, rather than on 
what ought to be, thus placing me in a minority (albeit growing – see Finnemore and 
Sikkink 1998) among the scholars interested in the vicissitudes of the ideational aspects of 
citizenship. 
4.1.1.2. Ideas as parts of a causal mechanism. According to Berman (2001: 233), 
theoretical advancement of ideational research depends on answering the question of how 
certain ideas rise to prominence and occupy the place of old beliefs, how they gain a life 
of their own, and how they influence political behavior. In the context of my research, the 
first question seems relatively easy to answer, seeing how the fall of communism provided 
an ideological opening that was especially conducive for the Western norms to come 
flooding in; this story has been sufficiently repeated and does not warrant a recap. What it 
does warrant, however, is a cautionary note: we will get more returns from looking at the 
interaction of several discursive layers, rather than focusing on the exogenous paradigmatic 
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shock, thus heeding the admonition to explore the superimposition of international and 
domestic norms in the research on norms diffusion (Checkel 1999).  
The question of whether the ideas under investigation have achieved a life of their 
own (Berman 1998: 18) is addressed here by explicating the paradoxical and unintended 
consequences of certain institutionalized norms, whence, so to speak, the Lithuanian state 
ends up cutting the branch it is sitting on by cutting of dual citizenship availability to its 
numerous emigrants. One of the main characteristics of ideational institutionalization is its 
path-dependent effects. Parsons’ (2003) study on European integration reveals how the 
institutionalization of certain ideas progressively preempted alternative ideologies. In a 
sense, the Lithuanian case of dual citizenship faces a similar predicament – the way that 
putting norms into a Constitution binds and conditions the prospects of employing certain 
ideas in the future, but can also reify certain tensions and contradictions. Another 
shortcoming of not only ideational, but any, research that aspires to generalizability is the 
tendency to err on the side of stability, continuity, inertia, and to privilege equilibria (see 
Lieberman 2002). My dissertation goes against this impulse and focuses on the role of 
inter-ideational tensions and frictions as a more fruitful basis for understanding unexpected 
outcomes. 
As far as Berman’s third question is concerned, I am aware of the pitfalls of 
assuming the things that actually need to be established, therefore, it is important to take 
care to specify the carriers and the content of both the ideas and the interests that could 
serve as explanatory variables in the case under investigation. In section 4.1.2 I overview 
the sources of international norms and the mechanism through which they can exert 
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influence on Lithuanian institutions, and in section 4.1.3 I discuss the characteristics of 
judicial review as the vehicle of ideational effects. 
Blyth (2002) offers a useful understanding of the roles ideas play: they (1) reduce 
uncertainty in periods of crisis, (2) enable collective action and coalition building, (3) can 
be wielded as weapons in the struggle over existing institutions and (4) used as blueprints 
for constructing new ones, which then (5) serve as stabilizing rallying points. In a sense, 
this is a conceptualization of the “life cycle” of ideas (Finnemore and Sikkink 1998). To 
the extent that my research taps into the category of “ideas as weapons,” it is haunted by 
Jacobsen’s (1995: 285) question of whether ideas are more than “intellectual rationales for 
material interests.” However, to put the question in such reductionary terms would mean 
to lose sight of the more interesting question, namely, what are the conditions of possibility 
of wielding ideas as weapons, and what results does that yield? Berman (2001: 241) 
reminds us that ideational analysis can contribute to understanding both the motivations 
and preferences of the actors and the opportunities and constraints of their environment. In 
the Lithuanian case, the Constitutional Court acts in a relatively isolated environment, so 
the opportunities and constraints are contained in the text of the Constitution, while the 
motivations and preferences of the authors can be gleaned from the deliberations and 
justifications presented in the rulings. The text of the Constitution was analyzed in Chapter 
2, and the texts of the rulings are analyzed below in section 4.2.  
4.1.1.3. Process tracing of the role of ideas. In my quest to identify the influence 
of norms, I follow the process tracing approach and look for expressions in the discourse 
that would be expected if certain conditions were met. Process tracing is especially relevant 
to the inquiry into the Lithuanian case, since the decision to curtail dual citizenship goes 
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against the predictions of citizenship studies discussed in Chapter 1 and is an unlikely 
outcome, therefore, the analysis should concentrate on identifying the conditions of 
possibility of such a paradox.  
Four types of evidence can be utilized in process tracing: pattern (the outcome one 
would predict), sequence (hypothesized cause happened before the effect), trace (mere 
existence of certain pieces of evidence is proof of existence of a causal mechanism) and 
account (the content of the empirical material, in our case texts) (Beach and Pedersen 2013: 
99-100). In the Lithuanian dual citizenship case, the pattern is represented by the 
expectation that if nondiscriminatory norms play a role, the Constitutional Court ruling will 
conform to the imperative of nondiscrimination; the sequence is represented by the EU 
normative pressure and conditionality existing before the ruling was made; the trace is 
represented by the fact that there was a challenge based on the norm of nondiscrimination 
to which the Court was obligated to respond; and the account is represented by the actual 
contents of the Constitutional Court rulings. On a more concentrated level, within the texts 
of the rulings themselves, we would trace the invocations of international norms vs. of 
values associated with stateness, and evaluate their relative frequency and positive vs. 
negative salience. 
Since process tracing is based not on probability, but on the principle of necessary 
and sufficient conditions of possibility, the types of empirical tests of the parts of causal 
mechanism are based on the dimensions of uniqueness (sufficient condition) and of 
certainty (necessary condition) which produce four types of empirical tests (Beach and 
Pedersen 2013: 101-105; Collier 2011; Rohlfing 2012: 182-183). These tests are not 
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substitutes, but rather complements, and the strongest argument can be made in case where 
all of them are satisfied.  
The weakest test is called “straw in the wind”, which is neither sufficiently unique 
nor certain, such as contextual description, which is usually too vague or multifaceted to 
be considered as proper evidence. However, if there are many clues, and if they challenge 
alternative explanations, they add to the strength of one’s explanation. In the Lithuanian 
case, the preceding two chapters presented such contextual clues which established that the 
new restrictions on dual citizenship challenge the liberalization/convergence hypothesis 
and do not serve state interests of maintaining ties with co-ethnics, lending initial support 
to my proposition that such an unlikely result must be an unintended consequence of the 
combination of the hegemony of international norms of nondiscrimination which preclude 
preferential treatment of Lithuanian diaspora and of continual relevance of stateness 
concerns which preclude the liberalization of access to citizenship.  
A certain but not unique test is known as a “hoop” and is usually used to reject 
alternative explanations: if we fail to find a certain kind of evidence, that hypothesis is 
clearly rejected, but if we do find that evidence, it is not yet sufficient for accepting the 
explanation. Failure to find references to either international norms or to stateness in the 
Lithuanian Constitutional Court rulings would result in rejecting that factor as an 
explanation of the paradoxical outcome, but if we find them both, we could not say which 
one of them is the correct explanation, and if we find only one of them, that in itself would 
not be sufficient to prove causality. We would need to employ hoops that are increasingly 
harder to jump through – in this case, I aim to evaluate not just the existence of the 
explanations, but also their relative prominence and normative salience. 
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A test that is unique but has low certainty is known as a “smoking gun” – a piece 
of unlikely but very strong evidence. If we find it, our explanation gains great support, but 
if we fail to find it, that does not mean rejecting the hypothesis. In the Lithuanian 
Constitutional Court rulings, an equivalent of a “smoking gun” would be explicit rejection 
of either international norms or stateness values, or explicit affirmation of the precedence 
of one of them over the other, neither of which is very likely in a carefully worded legal 
text.  
The strongest possible test is known as “doubly decisive” – finding this type of 
evidence would at once confirm our hypothesis and reject alternative explanations. This 
type of evidence is even less likely than a “smoking gun” and should not be relied upon in 
most research. In the Lithuanian case, a “doubly decisive” piece of evidence would be 
statements from the judges who passed the ruling on dual citizenship where they would 
explain how exactly the court came up with the arguments laid out in the ruling and to what 
they gave precedence in their deliberations – to international norms or to stateness 
concerns. Unfortunately, the judges are bound by the requirement of secrecy of the 
deliberations that take place behind closed doors, so it is not possible to get such 
information. However, if we triangulate the justifications provided in the text of the ruling 
itself, the questions and comments made by the judges in the public part of deliberations, 
and snippets of reasoning revealed by the judges in public interviews, it is possible to gauge 
the motivation behind the ruling, so I incorporate such elements into the discussion of the 
data.  
Beach and Pedersen (2013: 104-105) suggest that the bulk of evidence should come 
from “hoop” tests, because “smoking guns” and “doubly decisive” tests are too unlikely to 
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be relied upon. Therefore, the main focus of the empirical research performed in the second 
half of this chapter is on the relative frequency and positive vs. negative salience of 
references to international norms vs. to values of stateness. In the next two subsections I 
delve deeper into what each of these alternative explanations entails. 
4.1.2. Human rights and European conditionality 
The first part of the two-pronged approach to explaining trends in citizenship 
regulation that I advocate concerns the tensions between the hegemony of international 
norms of non-discrimination that translates into the limits of a country’s ability to favor its 
co-ethnics in designations of citizenship on the one hand, and the reinforcing of identitarian 
concerns that is produced by the feedback loops of postnationalist developments, on the 
other. In Chapter 1, I talked about how European integration is supposed to bring forth 
postnational sensibilities and prompt postcommunist countries to abandon ethnonationalist 
orientations, and argued that the decoupling of rights and citizenship ends up by reinforcing 
the identitarian dimensions of citizenship, and in Chapter 3 I demonstrated that this 
reinforcement is actually observable in Lithuanian public discourse on citizenship. In this 
section, I discuss the international norms which delegitimize identitarian elements in 
citizenship regulation, and later I explore whether they actually play a role in the rulings of 
the Constitutional Court. The mechanisms through which such international norms are 
supposed to operate can be horizontal (socialization of elites, emulation and diffusion of 
acceptable practices), vertical top-down (normative pressure and conditionality applied by 
international organizations whose membership a country is seeking), and vertical bottom-
up (normative pressure exerted by domestic civil society organizations) (Grittersová 2013: 
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3). Due to the relative isolation of judicial review from societal pressures, we can bracket 
the third type of normative influence and concentrate on the first two mechanisms. 
4.1.2.1. Central and Eastern Europe as the target of international norms. One of 
the key early concerns prompted by the fall of communist regimes was the threat of 
ethnonationalist conflics. The country boundaries in Central and Eastern Europe have 
changed enough over the past couple centuries to ensure that the dictum of nationalism 
which requires the state and the nation to overlap (as identified by Gellner (1998) could 
not be achieved, thus opening a space for continuous relevance of nationalist orientations 
of some members of the polity. Very early on in their independence, CEE countries 
declared their desire to “return to Europe”, expressed as integration into Western European 
political structures, epitomized by the European Economic Community (now the EU), but 
also including others like the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe and 
the Council of Europe, which were perceived as precursors or correlates to EU 
membership. These structures, in turn, put forth the conditions of such integration, chief 
among them certain standards of human rights and, more specifically, minority rights. 
The international hegemony of the norms of non-discrimination, where the 
requirement of respect for minority rights was a prerequisite for acknowledging a country’s 
independence, can be traced from the post-Westphalian concern with religious group 
rights, through the concern with political instability and violence related to 19th – 20th 
century nationalist movements, to the human rights imperatives prompted by the 
experiences of the World War II, although during the Cold War its implementation was 
subservient to superpower interests (see Jackson Preece 1997, or Galbreath and McEvoy 
2011, Ch.4, for an overview).  
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Wilmer (2004) suggests that minority rights have an inevitably international 
dimension due to the fact that the very stateness of any country is dependent on 
international (more specifically, European) norms of a state’s attributes and inter-state 
relations. What Galbreath and McEvoy (2011) note, however, is the fact that the 
obligations towards minority rights instituted by the League of Nations were only applied 
to Central and Eastern European states. After the fall of communist regimes we saw a 
similar pattern: organizations and policies geared towards minority protection were 
revitalized, but their main focus remained on postcommunist countries (Kymlicka 2007a, 
2007b). This attention was prompted by two-fold concerns: first, the perceived threat of 
instability in states engendered by minorities that strive for either regional autonomy, 
outright independence, or ratachist intentions to leave one state and join another where the 
titular nation is their ethnic kin; and, second, the fear of certain state behaviour, such as 
violence towards separatist minorities within the country or irredentist claims on portions 
of other countries where kin-minorities are located (Galbreath and McEvoy 2011). The 
nesting-doll quality of the ethnic composition of Central and Eastern Europe has lent itself 
to such concerns in more ways than any other location, in large part due to the peculiarities 
of the Soviet Union and its satellite regimes. 
4.1.2.2. Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. The first step in 
revitalizing the concern with human rights in Europe was the 1975 Helsinki Conference on 
Security and Cooperation (CSCE) in Europe which founded the Organization for Security 
and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE). Although the Soviet Union was formally composed 
of fifteen republics with their own titular nationalities, the actual authoritarian character of 
the state and its confluence with Russian imperialism allowed the representatives of non-
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Russian ethnicities to take up the claim of being a minority and to make demands for the 
rights covered under the Helsinki Final Act of 1975.  
The Helsinki groups that sprang up in communist countries became the focal point 
for dissident mobilization, which in turn helped bring forth democratization movements 
and the fall of communist regimes (Galbreath and McEvoy 2011; Thomas 2001). Thus 
from early on human rights concerns served as a way to highlight the contrast between 
democratic Western and lacking Eastern states. The CEE promoters of such attitudes found 
themselves in a peculiar position when their countries gained independence and could no 
longer claim the mantle of the victim, instead gaining the responsibility to ensure human 
rights within their borders against the perceived ethnonationalist impulses. In fact, the 
Helsinki Group played an active role in formulating legislation regarding minority rights 
in, for example, Poland (Schwellnus 2005). Faced with the disintegration of communist 
regimes and consequently the loss of the position of Soviet Union/ Russia as the perverse 
guarantor of regional stability, international organizations hastened to hone the human 
rights imperatives and to spell out the particular emphasis on minority rights.  
The first such spelling out of minority rights occurred during the second meeting 
of the Conference for Security and Co-operation in Europe in Paris in November, 1990, 
when the heads of state signed The Charter of Paris for a New Europe, reaffirming an anti-
discriminatory stance and protection of minority rights as “the bedrock on which we will 
seek to construct the new Europe” (CSCE 1990: 4). As Galbreath and McEvoy (2011: 70) 
note, this charter established the main parameters of the European minority rights regime: 
awareness of inter-state interests in minority issues due to the phenomenon of ethnic kin-
states abundant in Europe; an emphasis on the minority’s belonging to the state where they 
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live as an attempt to warn the political establishment of the state against casting minorities 
as their “others” and to discourage minorities from separatist and irredentist actions; and a 
direct linkage between minority rights and human rights, and between minority rights and 
democratic institutions, establishing minority rights as the litmus test of the quality of 
democratic transition of postcommunist states.  
The idea of institutionalizing minority rights monitoring was banded about in the 
OSCE since the fall of the Iron Curtain, culminating in the 1992 Helsinki Summit creation 
of the office of the High Commissioner on National Minorities. The Commissioner was 
charged with monitoring and providing “early warning” and “early action” whenever 
tension regarding minorities threatened to escalate into instability and violence without 
falling on the side of either of the conflicting parties (CSCE 1992).  
The Commissioner traveled to locations of tensions, conducted “fieldwork” and 
produced recommendations. One of the key concerns for the Commissioner was legislative 
proposals, the majority of which concerned citizenship and language laws (Galbreath and 
McEvoy 2011: 73-74), thus it is relevant to inquire whether an effect of such pressures can 
be seen in citizenship regulation in the region, and in Lithuania in particular. It is important 
to note that the European Commission (the executive body of the European Union) 
explicitly referenced adherence to the High Commissioner’s recommendations as part of 
its evaluation of the progress of candidate countries in their quest for EU membership (see 
e.g. European Commission 1998: 8), highlighting the symbiotic relationship between 
various organizations forming the hegemonic regime of anti-discriminatory norms that 
CEE countries were expected to adopt.  
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
173 
 
4.1.2.3. The Council of Europe. Another organization that exists in a symbiotic 
relationship with the European Union is the Council of Europe. This organization was 
founded in 1949 as an early attempt at European integration, and although this function 
was taken up by the European Economic Community instead, the Council of Europe made 
a crucial contribution by adopting a binding Convention for the Protection of Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms, better known as The European Convention on Human Rights 
(Council of Europe 2010). The convention established the European Court of Human 
Rights that can be addressed by either individuals or states. Membership in the Council of 
Europe is a prerequisite for membership in the EU, and its Conventions are considered to 
be a part of the acquis communautaire. Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Council of 
Europe has reimagined itself as the main watchdog of postcommunist countries’ adherence 
to democracy, rule of law, and the protection of human rights, especially minority rights. 
With such focus, in 1995 it adopted the Framework Convention for the Protection of 
National Minorities (Council of Europe 1995). The text references UN and CSCE 
documents, reinforcing the symbiotic nature of the hegemony of international human rights 
norms.  
Convention pronouncements like Section II, Article 4, Subsection 1 statement that 
“any discrimination based on belonging to a national minority shall be prohibited” (Council 
of Europe 1995: 3), with the Council of Europe serving as a gateway to European Union, 
were very relevant to CEE countries. When Estonia and Latvia, postcommunist countries 
with the thorniest issues related to citizenship regulation, signed the Framework 
Convention, they explained who are to be considered national minorities in a way which 
excluded the Russian minority. For example, Latvia declared that only “citizens of Latvia 
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<…> who have traditionally lived in Latvia for generations and consider themselves to 
belong to the State and society of Latvia” can be considered as belonging to national 
minorities (see Council of Europe 2015) [italics are my emphasis – E.V.]. This should be 
interpreted as a political statement that only autochtonous minorities are worthy of 
protection, while Russians should be perceived as colonizers and thus undeserving of the 
same rights, first and foremost of access to citizenship, the main bone of contention 
between these Baltic states and their Russian minorities. These were not the only 
addendums: not only CEE countries like Poland, but also Western European countries like 
Austria, Germany, Luxembourg and Switzerland also added a statement that only citizens 
with long-lasting ties are to be considered under the title of national minorities (which 
should be interpreted as an attempt to distinguish migrant communities from autochtonous 
national minorities), Macedonia (FYROM) added a list of minorities which did not include 
Greeks, Malta declared that there are no national minorities in Malta and that they are 
signing only due to solidarity with other countries, while Azerbaijan and Bulgaria explicitly 
declared that signing this Convention does not give anyone a right to threaten the country’s 
territorial integrity or internal and external security (Council of Europe 2015). Although 
even more extreme behaviour could be found in Western Europe, where France refused to 
ratify the Framework Convention due to the claim that there are no national minorities in 
France (Galbreath and McEvoy 2011: 77), it is important to note that postcommunist 
countries felt enough pressure to at least pay lip service to the hegemonic international 
norms of nondiscrimination, and yet searched for ways to prevent such norms from 
legitimizing colonizers or opening opportunities for challenges by potentially subversive 
minorities.  
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4.1.2.4. The European Union. The prospect of joining the European Union, which 
included fulfilling the expectations of the aforementioned two organizations, was from the 
start the key motivator of state behaviour in Central and Eastern Europe, and was expected 
to prompt convergence with EU policies and practices, including greater inclusiveness and 
nondiscrimination (e.g. Csergő and Goldgeier 2005; Henderson 1999; Maresceau 1997; 
Sadursky, Czarnota and Krygier 2006; Schimmelfennig and Sedelmeier 2005; Tasch 2010; 
Weidenfeld 1995). The key to these expectations was EU conditionality – tying 
membership prospects with fulfilling certain prerequisites. These prerequisites were 
formalized as Copenhagen conditions, named after the meeting of the European Council 
(heads of EU states) in Copenhagen in 1993:  
Membership requires that the candidate country has achieved 
stability of institutions guaranteeing democracy, the rule of law, human 
rights and respect for and protection of minorities, the existence of a 
functioning market economy as well as the capacity to cope with 
competitive pressure and market forces within the Union. Membership 
presupposes the candidate's ability to take on the obligations of 
membership including adherence to the aims of political, economic and 
monetary union (European Commission 1993). 
The European Commission was tasked with monitoring and evaluating the progress 
of the candidate countries in pursuing these goals. Although all of these conditions required 
a lot of effort from the countries undergoing a double (political and economic) or even 
triple (stateness) transition, minority rights were the most contentious element from the 
point of view of the candidates (for a detailed overview of the accession process see 
Vassiliou (2007) or Sajdik and Schwarzinger (2008)). Yet in this area the EU essentially 
turned to the aforementioned two organizations for information and recommendations by 
relying on reports of the High Commissioner for National Minorities and meetings between 
EU commissioners and the High Commissioner for Human Rights of the Council of Europe 
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(de Beco 2012). The EU documents themselves do not refer to minorities. Maybe such 
references would have been seen as superfluous since they were already covered by the 
sister organizations, or perhaps such reticence was due to the Western European countries’ 
long-standing issues with their own minorities, like Basques and Catalons in Spain or the 
irredentist Irish in the UK. Whatever the reason, the result is that the imperative of respect 
for minority rights is confined to accession requirements and thus applicable only to 
prospective members. Many scholars have questioned such imbalance and the lack of 
recourse for disciplining postcommunist countries once they become members (Cirtautas 
and Schimmelfennig 2010; Jutila 2009). Therefore, based on the principles of ideational 
analysis, if we want to argue that the Lithuanian case has been affected by the international 
norms of nondiscrimination, we need to find references to them made after the country has 
become a member. 
The evaluation of minority rights situation in candidate countries in the European 
Commission progress reports appeared to matter, as evidenced by the refusal to include 
Latvia or Slovakia in the first wave of applicants who could begin official negotiations. 
However, even if we can accept that candidate countries had to follow the prescriptions of 
nondiscrimination due to membership conditionality, it is legitimate to question whether 
one could expect CEE countries to follow these prescriptions once this carrot/stick was 
removed. On the other hand, it would not be correct to say that there are no 
nondiscrimination norms in the EU itself. Despite a slow start, norms of nondiscrimination 
have been gaining traction in EU legislation, starting with the 1993 Stability Pact and 1997 
Amsterdam Treaty, which in turn prompted the 2000 Racial Equality Directive 
(2000/43/EC) establishing nondiscrimination on the basis of characteristics like ethnic 
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origin as a mandatory norm for the EU countries. These developments were partly 
prompted by the prospects of enlargement and the fear of Eastern European xenophobia, 
but also aimed at supporting the free movement of persons, often stressed as the most 
fundamental freedom in the EU (Schiek 2002). Even in such assimilationist countries like 
France, the European imperative of nondiscrimination was explicitly invoked in the 
debates regarding the citizenship of the children of postcolonial migrants (Bertossi 2004). 
However, the main focus fell onto CEE countries. 
Some authors are skeptical towards the notion that the “civic” West is leading the 
“ethnonationalist” East away from discriminatory impulses and highlight the inconsistent 
application of the minority rights standards to Eastern vs. Western Europe and even to 
different CEE countries, as well as question whether norms are relevant only insomuch as 
they were acceptable to domestic actors (Hughes et al. 2004; Jutila 2009; Kochenov 2008). 
Kochenov (2008) goes so far as to suggest that the EU completely ignored the treatment of 
the Russian minority in the Baltic states and supported assimilationist positions of Estonia 
and Latvia by funding state language courses.  
Grabbe (2006: 202) notes that the effect of eurointegration on CEE policies “was 
great, but it was blunt rather than precise”. The disentanglement of domestic factors and 
EU conditionality is particularly difficult. Grittersová (2013) points out that, when Slovakia 
was excluded from the first wave of EU (and NATO) applicants due to Mečiar‘s policies, 
he placed the blame on the domestic opposition for blackening their country internationally 
instead of acknowledging his policies as unacceptable, while Croatia, which had 
experienced an even stronger nationalist leadership under Tudjman, wavered in its 
commitment to pursue EU membership due to EU‘s ambivalence during the Yugoslav wars 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
178 
 
and did not even make it into the second wave of applicants. The more subtle analysis has 
suggested that international norms do matter, but that conditionality has a stronger effect 
than normative pressure, and that domestic factors moderate the effects of the latter much 
more than of the former (Kelley 2006). However, I propose that, once membership is 
gained and conditionality is no longer an effective motivator, it is possible to isolate the 
ideational effects of EU norms into which the elites have been socialized to the point where 
they keep following EU prescriptions even without enforcement mechanisms (which are 
few and far in between in the EU and apply only to mandatory legislation like directives, 
which could not be applied to citizenship regulation as one of the last bastions not breached 
by supranationalism). As Ram (2012: 1193) points out, if EU norms would have been 
accepted due to purely rationalist incentive of EU membership, then we would expect 
countries to renege once membership has been achieved, and if that does not happen, we 
can hypothesize that the effect of norms at this point is ideational rather than interest-based. 
Based on the process tracing logic, this means that if we can find references to 
international norms of nondiscrimination in the Lithuanian case despite the lack of 
enforceability that used to be available under candidacy conditions and under the 
conditions of extremely widespread domestic opposition, then we can conclude that norms 
do actually play a role in the outcome. Even if they are only a part of “EU-speak” and not 
fully internalized (Uysal 2013: 12), the very existence of such a phenomenon shows that 
EU prescriptions are considered legitimate and carry normative weight.  
4.1.3. Ideational research of constitutionalism and judicial review. 
The Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania serves the function of 
constitutional judicial review, i.e. it judges how well legislative acts conform to the 
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principles laid out in the Constitution. Therefore, from the perspective of discursive 
institutionalism, the text of the Constitution is the locus of institutionalized norms which 
form the environment of the Court, and the rulings can be understood as the interactive 
locus where the discourse takes place. Both the text of the Constitution and of the rulings 
are subject to empirical analysis in this thesis.  
4.1.3.1. Constitutional judicial review. Constitutionalism appears to be tailor-made 
for ideational research: indeed, norms do not get much more explicit than a written 
Constitution – a higher standard against which all other norms get judged. Judicial review 
is, at bottom, pure decision making based on norms, which makes it a stellar object of 
ideational analysis (cf. Berman 1998: 29, 32). Furthermore, Constitutions are especially 
conducive to inquiries related to issues of ethnic discrimination and identity, as they offer 
a way to achieve better analytical clarity and specification of such nebulous topics as 
collective identity (see Berman 2001: 238-239; Deets 2006; Rosenfeld 2010). However, 
the reach of scientifically sophisticated research on Constitutionalism does not go far 
beyond the establishment, spread, and empowerment of judicial review (see Ginsburg 
2008; Graber 2005; Hilbink 2009; Hirschl 2006; 2008; 2009). In that sense, my research, 
which is more concerned with the specific ways ideas play in the actual workings of judicial 
review, contributes a building block to filling what Ginsburg (2008: 93) sees as an 
important gap in Constitutional research by providing a microstudy of judicial review that 
moves beyond speculative positing of transnational influences on Constitutional politics of 
identity and offers a concrete investigation of empirical evidence. 
The body of ideational research on the workings of Constitutionalism that does 
exist does not offer a coherent set of hypotheses and is permeated by discordance between 
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those who claim to themselves the mantle of realists, and another side, labeled by the 
former as idealists. The importance of ideas and norms in Constitutionalism is emphasized 
in what Ginsburg (2008) terms the “demand-side” “rights hypothesis,” which views 
judicial review as a result of societal pressures for better enforcement of rights. This 
approach is criticized for being underspecified and is counteracted by institutionalist 
accounts of judicial review as an attempt to resolve competition among different parts of 
government, turning it into judicial policy-making.  
The type of Constitutional Courts that have been institutionalized throughout the 
postcommunist region appear to be about as isolated from external pressures as a political 
institution can be, but the aforementioned institutionalist accounts reveal a different story 
in the underlying logic of the operations of Constitutional judicial review. Graber (2005: 
427-428, 443) suggests that the current research on judicial review is converging on a new 
paradigm which asserts that “judicial review does not serve to thwart or legitimate popular 
majorities; rather that practice alters the balance of power between the numerous political 
movements that struggle for power in a pluralist democracy,” and that “justices have tended 
to support liberal results that limit state action or favor a secular elite, but they have 
abandoned lines of liberal activism that called for more state intervention on behalf of the 
powerless”. He connects legislative deference to judiciary with disagreements within the 
ranks of elites (Graber 1993). In a similar vein, Epstein, Knight and Shvetsova (2001) 
discuss the Courts’ potential to challenge the political leaders, but present an 
unproblematized view of its legitimacy in the eyes of a larger public. 
Weiler (1995) claims that constitutionalization of values means taking them out of 
political bargaining. In contrast, Hirschl (2006) suggests such fundamental political issues 
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as the questions of collective identity get transposed into the judicial realm when there is a 
disonance between the values entrenched in the Constitution and those prevalent in the 
country‘s populace. I believe the Lithuanian case of dual citizenship allows us to take into 
account both approaches. The Constitution reflects the transposition of the conflict between 
civic and ethnic values, as it contains norms related both to the principle of 
nondiscrimination and undesirability of dual citizenship, and to the special relationship 
between the Lithuanian state and people of Lithuanian ethnic descent. However, the fact 
that both approaches are entrenched in the Constitution takes away the possibility to solve 
the dilemma through political means. Thus the level of judicial review becomes even more 
important for analyzing the ideational vicissitudes of dual citizenship.  
Hirschl (2000) is sceptical of the analytical potential of the “rights doctrine” and, 
in a manner characteristic of anti-ideationalist skeptics, claims that ideational explanation 
can only be valid if it can demonstrate a self-defeating effect that is contrary to interests of 
pertinent stakeholders (Hirschl 2009: 825-830). Ignoring for now the anti-ideational bias 
of such claims, it suffices to say that my research can also be seen as a test of Hirschl‘s 
statements via exploring the actualization of such ideational disonance that produces a 
gridlock without tangible winners.  
On a similarly skeptical note, Kelley (2006) argues that, when it comes to ethnic 
policy, transnationally informed socializing does not work if faced with strong domestic 
opposition, and membership conditionality matters much more. If we look at the research 
on Constitutional Courts in the postcommunist realm, we find authors such as Bugaric 
(2001) who argues that Constitutional Courts in postcommunist Europe are not active 
enough in the protection of human rights, but does the staunchly antidiscriminatory ruling 
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of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court provide evidence to the contrary? To bring it closer 
to home, Pettai (2003) discusses the ethnopolitical cases that the Constitutional Courts of 
Estonia and Latvia have had to face, and it becomes apparent that in all of them the Courts 
have been acutely aware of the tension between the raison d’être of newly independent 
states and the rights of nondiscrimination of ethnic minorities (both collectively and 
individually), and in most cases the rulings served the former while trying to placate the 
latter.  
These Courts attempted to toe a narrow line, following the letter of the Constitution 
and emphasizing judicial technicalities, rather than questioning the fundamentally 
ethnonationalist orientation of these states. The question that logically follows is whether 
the Lithuanian ruling that allows dual citizenship “for no one rather than for everyone” is 
basically serving similar statist logic while paying lip service to the rights of minorities. 
Advancing an interests-based explanation becomes tricky in a situation where there appears 
to be no winners, but the stateness-based line of reasoning offers a way to zone in on those 
interests, thus providing an opening for the second prong of the dual approach to explaining 
citizenship regulation that I seek to flesh out in this dissertation. 
4.1.3.2. Intra-constitutional contradictions. The importance of constitutionally 
institutionalized international human rights norms has been repeatedly invoked in cases of 
judicial review from Israel (Woods 2009) to Central and Eastern Europe (Scheppele 2000; 
2003). However, as Leoussi (2007: 162 passim) points out, entrenchment of internationally 
recognized human rights in the body of a Constitution is only part of the story: attention 
should also be paid to the preambles of Constitutions, which in the postcommunist case 
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make the ethnonationalist underpinnings of these states very explicit.56 Thus the 
Constitution itself includes contradictory norms, and the real issue centers around the 
choices that the Constitutional Court judges make to prioritize one set of norms above the 
other.  
On the surface, we can observe Euro-integrational imperatives trumping the 
ethnonationalist statist concerns throughout the postcommunist region – even if an explicit 
constitutional norm that charges the state with taking responsibility for co-nationals living 
abroad is entrenched in the Constitution, it is often bypassed by state actors in fear of a 
Western backlash (see Deets 2006; Williams 2002). However, when we look at them more 
closely, such developments reveal the paradoxical dynamics induced by the interaction of 
conflicting ideational paradigms, part of which is a redefinition and adjustment of interests. 
As Kostakopoulou (2005: 236-237) observes in her study of European judicial review, 
“agents have the capacity to capitalise on the normative surplus of meaning and the 
progressive possibilities already present in accepted logics and existing conceptual 
resources nested within institutions in order to develop new conceptions, to construct and 
extend norms and to act in complex environments.” My research uncovers precisely this 
kind of usage of the surplus of meaning brought about by the tensions that are wrought into 
Constitutions as über-norms, demonstrating the ubiquity of ideational struggles over a 
Constitution caught between a rock and a hard place, i.e. between the Euro-integrationist 
and ethnonationalist paradigms of political membership. 
                                                 
56 The French judicial review experience abundantly demonstrates the enforceability of preambles; see e.g. 
Stone Sweet 2000. Also, see Deets 2006 and Přibaň 2004 for discussions on the inner tensions of 
postcommunist constitutions. 
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The case of recent politicization of citizenship in Lithuania, which has often been 
neglected in studies of citizenship, is interesting precisely because it offers insights into the 
vicissitudes of the normative and institutional overlap between “East” and “West.” The 
role of EU membership conditionality in the politics of postcommunist countries has been 
extensively discussed, but the bulk of the research fails to analytically disentangle 
“genuine” normative socialization on the one hand, and strategic reasoning and action that 
breeds “constitutional cheerleading” and Janus-faced structures and discourses on the other 
(see Jacoby 1999). Is the Lithuanian case a case of what Laitin (2012: 56) calls “a greater 
motivation of those on the far periphery to assimilate into the norms of the centre”? Or is 
it a case of ethnonationalism in yet another disguise? More generally, is it an exception that 
only confirms the stereotypes about postcommunist Europe, or is it a harbinger of the fruit 
of the unprecedented marriage between the East and the West? I probe these questions via 
the exploration of the reasoning that led the same state elites who twenty years ago fought 
for and built Lithuanian independence to now become ‘backstabbing traitors’ in the eyes 
of a significant part of its population. The ideational research on the Euro-orientation of 
the postcommunist world has mostly focused on the role of neoliberal economic ideas (see 
Appel 2004; Darden 2009; Dawisha and Ganev 2005; Ganev 2005; Horowitz 2007). 
Meanwhile, as Dawisha and Ganev (2005) lament, scholars who focus on such ideationally 
centered topics as nationalism and other identitarian phenomena often fail to produce 
analytically adequate work. Process tracing of the reasoning exibited by the Constitutional 
Court helps avoid the trap of normativity and essentialism and investigate concrete ways 
in which ideas play a role in producing an outcome that flies in the face of both scientific 
predictions and lay expectations pertaining to the relationship between citizenship and 
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ethnonationalism. In that sense, this research speaks directly both to the contention that 
ideational research is ad hoc and merely correlational, and to the question of the actual 
effect of European integration on the domestic politics of postcommunist countries. In 
addition to measuring references to international norms, I test the prediction that 
conditionality should move the country in a more civic than ethnic direction by tracing 
whether one could observe a decline of the relevance of ethnonationalist values and an 
increase of the valence of civic values over time across the different rulings that touch upon 
the issues related to citizenship. 
My research is based on the premise that the issue of the supposed beneficial 
normative effect of Euro-integration on postcommunist countries is more complex than a 
juxtaposition of international “norm-makers” and domestic “norm-takers” (Checkel 1999: 
84). In the next part of this chapter, I hone in on how those dynamics are realized in a 
situation where the Constitution contains both the imperative of nondiscrimination and the 
underpinnings of national identity, and the key question concerns the conditions of 
possibility of intraconstitutional choices when both paradigms are made partially available, 
yet cannot reach an optimal equilibrium.  
4.2. The textual evidence in the Lithuanian case. 
In this part of the chapter, I recap the key characteristics of the textual background 
against which we can analyze the 2006 ruling of the Constitutional Court and which was 
discussed in more detail in Chapter 2 and proceed to conduct content analysis of the 
Constitutional Court rulings. The evidence on the motives and reasoning pertaining to dual 
citizenship and its relationship to ethnicity and to international norms was gathered by 
examining the records of the work of the drafters of the Constitution, the court proceedings 
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and the rulings pertaining to citizenship and ethnic minorities, and by interviewing the 
relevant actors and analyzing their written commentary in Lithuanian media and scholarly 
publications.57  
4.2.1. The ideational context of the 2006 Constitutional Court ruling. 
In Chapter 2 I presented the broader demographical and historical background of 
the questions of dual citizenship in Lithuania, pointing out its expected ethnic connotations. 
The Constitutional Court is supposed to be quite isolated from any such influences and 
only make decisions based on the letter and spirit of the Constitution and on the body of its 
own jurisprudence. Let us review both of these elements of the discursive context of the 
November 2006 ruling. 
4.2.1.1. Constitutional ambiguities. In section 2.2.3., I analyzed the proceedings of 
the 1990-1992 parliamentary commission which drafted the Constitution adopted in 
October 1992. I demonstrated that the intimate relationship between citizenship and 
identity is evident in the proceedings of the Lithuanian Parliament related to both the 
Constitution and the Law on Citizenship, despite the apparent civic credentials of the initial 
1989 Lithuanian Citizenship Law. For now let us recap the main characteristics of the 
Constitution which pertain to the matters of citizenship, such as the relative presence of 
international norms of nondiscrimination vs. particular conceptions of statehood. 
                                                 
57 The documents of the drafting of the Constitution were accessed at the archives of the Parliament of the 
Republic of Lithuania and the documents of the proceedings of the Constitutional Court were accessed at 
the archives of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania in August-September 2009 thanks to 
The Johns Hopkins University Leonard and Helen R. Stulman Jewish Studies Award for Pre-dissertation 
Research. The texts of rulings can be found on the website of the Constitutional Court of the Republic of 
Lithuania. I used the official English translations for quoting the rulings in this chapter, but conducted 
content analysis using the original texts of the rulings in Lithuanian, found at http://www.lrkt.lt/lt/teismo-
aktai/nutarimai-isvados-ir-sprendimai/138/y2010, in order to capture all nuances of meaning that can be 
lost in translation. However, the supporting case materials and protocols of public deliberations can only be 
found in the archives. 
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The protocols of the drafters of the Constitution demonstrated a keen awareness of 
the possible alternative conceptions of Lithuania as a more ethnic or a more civic state, 
expressed by the question of how to define the nation (see e.g. the protocol of the meeting 
of the commission on February 3rd, 1992). Some proposals suggested a more ethnic term 
“Lithuanian nation” (such as the ones produced by diaspora representatives), while others, 
such as the left-wing opposition, argued in favour of a more civic notion of “the nation of 
Lithuania” and defined it as including representatives of traditional ethnic minorities (see 
section 2.2.3.1. for more details). The choice of the definition of the nation was said to 
matter mostly due to how it would be perceived by Western observers and national 
minorities whose loyalty to the Lithuanian state was not a given. Most of the members of 
the Commission subscribed to a more ethnonationalist conception of the nation. Even a 
staunch social democrat Vytenis Andriukaitis expressed concern with “ecological 
existence and continuity of the nation” (January 27, 1992) and stated that the nation is 
composed of “all people of ethnic Lithuanian origin” plus territorially relevant ethnic 
minorities (February 12, 1992). Those who called for a non-ethnic conception of the nation, 
like Egidijus Jarašiūnas or Kazimieras Motieka, also suggested to include not only citizens, 
but also “those who consider Lithuania to be their Homeland” (February 12, 1992), echoing 
the imperative to exclude disloyal colonizers similarly to the other Baltic states and to 
include the diaspora. In March 1992 the Commission was considering a civic definition of 
“the nation of Lithuania”, and the Constitutional Court chose this fact as an argument 
supporting its 2006 ruling. However, the civic definition was ultimately not used in the 
final draft. The final preamble of the Constitution choses to use the ethnic term for the 
nation, but refrains from explicitly defining who exactly belongs to that nation: 
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The Lithuanian Nation 
 
– having created the State of Lithuania many centuries ago, 
– having based its legal foundations on the Lithuanian Statutes and the 
Constitutions of the Republic of Lithuania, 
– having for centuries staunchly defended its freedom and 
independence, 
– having preserved its spirit, native language, writing, and customs, 
– embodying the innate right of the human being and the Nation to live 
and create freely in the land of their fathers and forefathers—in the 
independent State of Lithuania, 
– fostering national concord in the land of Lithuania, 
– striving for an open, just, and harmonious civil society and State 
under the rule of law, 
by the will of the citizens of the reborn State of Lithuania, adopts and 
proclaims this 
Constitution.58 
It is evident from this preamble that the orientation towards statehood is clearly 
informed by ethnic sensibilities and a strong concern with historical claims of nationhood. 
The privileged position of Lithuanians in Lithuania is further affirmed by Articles 2 and 3 
asserting the ultimate sovereignty of the Nation (in the protocol of the Constitutional 
Commission meeting on February 12, 1992, MP Jonas Liaučius proclaimed that “if we do 
not use the concept of the ethnic Lithuanian nation, we will have to give up the sovereignty 
of the nation”), Article 14 instituting Lithuanian as the state language, and Article 32 giving 
the right to any ethnic Lithuanian to come and settle in Lithuania. At the same time, Article 
29 clearly instituted the norm of nondiscrimination, expressly forbidding both restrictions 
and privileges on discriminatory grounds. Thus the Constitution contains both norms that 
allow for an ethnic and a civic interpretation of the relationship between the Lithuanian 
state and its people. 
                                                 
58 The English translation of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania can be found at 
http://www3.lrs.lt/home/Konstitucija/Constitution.htm. 
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As we saw in the analysis of the public discourse in Chapter 3, in the eyes of the 
Lithuanian public and politicians, the ruling of the Constitutional Court effectively 
amounted to what Stone Sweet (2007: 916) has called “a judicial coup d’état” in that it 
challenged the intentions of the “founders” by denying the privileged position of 
Lithuanians in Lithuania. The documents of the Constitution drafting indeed suggest that 
some of the “founders” had ethnonational aspirations. It is possible that the choices made 
by the Constitutional Court have something to do with the fact that the member of the 
Constitutional Commission who proposed to use the civic notion of the “nation of 
Lithuania”, Egidijus Jarašiūnas, was serving as an advisor to the Constitutional Court at 
the time of the deliberations on the 2006 ruling. It is important to keep in mind that 
Jarašiūnas held a minority position regarding parts of the draft of the Constitution as late 
as September 1992 (see Žilys 2013 for references to his repeated submission of alternative 
proposals of the draft distinct from the main body of the Constitutional Commission) – 
although the bulk of contention centered around the executive-legislative division of 
powers, a statement of the conception of the nation was part and parcel of any draft of the 
Constitution). Unfortunately, he refused to give an interview. In this case, we have to go 
looking for the “fingerprints” and see to what extent the text of the ruling explicitly appeals 
to the civic intentions of the founders vs. to what extent international norms or concerns 
with stateness are mentioned. 
As Graber (2005: 429) notes, “legal hope for neutrality is a phantasm. Judicial 
decisions require contested value choices that cannot be logically deduced from purely 
legal standards.” The crux of the question is precisely why the Constitutional Court, an 
institution as sheltered from external pressures as it is possible in politics, would choose to 
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emphasize the phrases that call for equal treatment of ethnicities rather than the ones that 
assert the ‘Lithuanianness’ of Lithuania. This question serves as the opening for claims of 
the role of the international human rights paradigm and of the “European” view of ethnicity 
as an unacceptably discriminatory criterion for citizenship. However, the close analysis of 
the textual evidence reveals there are more sides to the story.  
4.2.1.2. Citizenship and ethnicity in the rulings of the Constitutional Court. There 
are five main rulings passed by the Constitutional Court in which the issues pertaining to 
citizenship and/or ethnic discrimination are at the center of attention. They include the 
April 1994 ruling regarding citizenship of Red Army officers, the November 1998 ruling 
on prohibition of multiple citizenship for political candidates standing in elections, the 
December 2003 ruling on the Presidential power to grant citizenship by decree, the May 
2006 ruling on the use of state language on referendum ballots, and the November 2006 
ruling on Lithuanian dual citizenship legislation, which is the main object of interest in this 
thesis and which was informed by the contents of the preceding four rulings.  
Most of these rulings were initiated by petitions from members of the Parliament 
(MPs), harkening back to what we discussed in the preceding sections on the conflicts 
among the political elites which are deferred to judicial review due to the impossibility of 
reaching a compromise politically. Furthermore, most of them explicitly touch upon the 
issue of dual citizenship, lending support to my suggestion that citizenship is in essence a 
boundary maintenance regime, and that a large part of that maintenance take place at the 
site of dual citizenship (another site being naturalization requirements). Let us review these 
rulings that, taken together, present the Constitutional doctrine on citizenship in Lithuania, 
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and see whether it is possible to trace changes in the relative prioritizing of international 
norms and nondiscrimination vs. stateness concerns over time.  
4.2.1.2.1. Ruling on the eligibility of Red Army officers for Lithuanian citizenship, 
April 13, 1994.59 The first formulation of the position of the Constitutional Court on the 
question of citizenship was the April 13, 1994, ruling “On the compliance of the Resolution 
of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania “On Amending Item 5 of the Resolution of the 
Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Procedure for Implementing the 
Republic of Lithuania’s Law on Citizenship’” of 22 December 1993 with the Constitution 
of the Republic of Lithuania”. The case was initiated by a group of mostly opposition MPs 
represented by a right-wing politician Vilija Aleknaitė-Abramikienė and a former member 
of the Constitutional Commission Egidijus Jarašiūnas. The plaintiffs questioned the 
resolution of the Parliament to accept that those officers of the Red Army who resigned 
from Soviet service and who gained Lithuanian identification documents can be accepted 
to be Lithuanian citizens. The petitioners (mostly MPs elected under the banner of the 
independence movement Sąjūdis) argued that the zero option of Lithuanian citizenship is 
dependent on the person’s repudiation of any other citizenship, whereas Soviet officers 
certainly carried Soviet citizenship and thus should be considered ineligible for Lithuanian 
citizenship unless proven otherwise. They also pointed out that Red Army officers had no 
choice in deciding their place of residence and went where the Soviet Union sent them, so 
they could not be considered to really have chosen allegiance to Lithuania. 
                                                 
59 All quotes in this section are from Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 1994. Ruling “On 
the Compliance of the Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution “On Amending Item 5 of the 
Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Procedure for Implementing the 
Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship’, adopted on 22 December 1993, with the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania.” Case No. 7/94. Vilnius, 13 April 1994, unless indicated otherwise. 
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The Constitutional Court agreed with the petitioners and responded by emphasizing 
that those who came to Lithuania from the territories of the USSR during the occupation 
were “immigrants (settlers)” who in essence became foreigners after the declaration of 
independence and thus should go through the process of naturalization accordingly. This 
was the first strong pronouncement of the primacy of stateness concerns in Lithuanian 
citizenship regulation and the designation of the part of the Russian minority who came to 
Lithuania under official capacity of serving the Soviet Union as colonizers who do not 
belong there. The Court postulated a restrictive understanding of citizenship: 
Citizenship is a permanent political-legal relationship of a 
person with a specific state, based on mutual rights and duties as well 
as trust, loyalty and protection. Laws on citizenship adopted by states 
precisely regulate conditions and procedure for acquiring citizenship, 
providing for the oath to the state and pledge of loyalty (with exception 
of cases when citizenship is acquired by birth), forbidding or strictly 
limiting dual citizenship. 
The Court pointed out that Article 12 entails a general prohibition of dual 
citizenship except in individual cases provided by law, and that the only people who are 
allowed to hold dual citizenship are those who were citizens of Lithuania before June 15, 
1940 (before Soviet occupation), and their descendants, which certainly excludes recent 
immigrants from Russia or other parts of the USSR. Keeping in mind the contents of the 
2006 ruling, it is interesting to note that in 1994 the Court explicitly stated that the existence 
of different groups of persons in citizenship regulation is “obvious” and consequently 
requires different procedures of granting citizenship. The only group that was guaranteed 
Lithuanian citizenship consisted of interwar Lithuanian permanent residents and their 
descendants. The next hierarchical level was occupied by those who were born in Lithuania 
– they automatically gained Lithuanian citizenship if they did not hold citizenship of 
another state, then came those who have a permanent residence and legal means of income 
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(both of which do not cover service in the Red Army) – they had to declare their choice in 
the “zero option”, and on the lowest hierarchical level we find those who gain citizenship 
through naturalization or by way of exception. In an interesting twist of perspective, the 
only area in which the Constitutional Court invoked antidiscrimination norms was 
privileges granted to Soviet army officers by the USSR, such as their exemption from 
mandatory registration which restricted freedom of movement within Soviet Union and 
which incidentally served as the basis of determining permanent residence for the purposes 
of determining eligibility for Lithuanian citizenship. Ultimately, only those Soviet army 
officers who could claim pre-war Lithuanian roots were allowed to gain Lithuanian 
citizenship. 
Overall, stateness concerns occupy a central place in the April 1994 ruling, 
Meanwhile, there are only a few references to anything international in this ruling, among 
them the aforementioned quote on general strictness of dual citizenship availability and the 
statement that “it should be noted that the fact of the 1940 annexation and occupation of 
Lithuania was recognised by many states of the world”, invoked in support of treating the 
presence of Red Army officers as “illegal stationing of the occupation army on the territory 
of another state”. Another interesting twist on invoking international norms can be seen in 
the way the Constitutional Court interprets the implications of the 1949 Geneva 
Convention: 
The provisions of Item 5 of the Republic of Lithuania’s Law on 
Citizenship of 10 December 1991 are in compliance with the main 
principles of international law. In Article 49 of the 12 August 1949 
Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in 
Time of War it is promulgated (declared) that deportations of protected 
persons from occupied territory to the territory of the Occupying Power 
or to that of any other country, occupied or not, are prohibited. 
Therefore, if such limitations are imposed with regard to civil residents 
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(civilians), it is inappropriate even to talk about the right of servicemen 
of the occupation army and officials of other repressive structures to 
citizenship of the occupied state. 
In conclusion, the concern with stateness rooted in interwar Lithuanian republic is 
very strongly pronounced throughout this ruling, whereas international norms are relevant 
only insofar as they serve the interests of stateness. 
4.2.1.2.2. Ruling on multiple citizenship of election candidates, November 11, 
1998.60 The next ruling in which questions of citizenship played a central role was the 
November 11, 1998, ruling “On the compliance of Part 4 of Article 38 of the Republic of 
Lithuania Law on Elections to the Seimas and Part 4 of Article 36 of the Republic of 
Lithuania Law on Elections to Local Government Councils with the Constitution of the 
Republic of Lithuania.” The Law on Elections requires those candidates who hold dual 
citizenship to provide written proof of repudiation of any oath given as a citizen to another 
state. The case was initiated due to the fact that a prominent Lithuanian-American public 
figure Liucija Baškauskaitė was denied a possibility to stand as a candidate in elections 
due to the fact that she held both a citizenship of Lithuania and of the United States of 
America, unless she forsake American citizenship – a condition unlikely to be fulfilled. 
Thus this ruling is especially interesting, because it was initiated by a member of the 
Lithuanian diaspora rather than of a national minority. Formally the petition was filed by a 
group of the members of the Parliament, but the eclectic list of signatures from a rainbow 
of political parties, as well as the designation of a private lawyer as the representative of 
the plaintiffs, indicates that this was a personal quest by the jilted candidate to address what 
                                                 
60 All quotes in this subsection are from Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 1998. Ruling 
“On the compliance of Part 4 of Article 38 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Elections to the Seimas 
and Part 4 of Article 36 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Elections to Local Government Councils with 
the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case No. 17/97. Vilnius, 11 November 1998, unless 
indicated otherwise. 
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she claimed to be an instance of discrimination which prevented her from fully exercising 
her political rights. The petition claimed that a holistic interpretation of the Constitution 
should allow dual citizens to stand for elections and invoked the European Convention of 
Human Rights to support the charges of discrimination.  
The Constitutional Court responded by affirming the requirement to repudiate any 
oath to another country if one wants to compete in elections and reiterating its restrictive 
stance on citizenship: 
 Citizenship is a permanent political and legal link with a 
concrete state, which is based on mutual rights and obligations, and, as 
the result of the latter, on mutual confidence, protection and individual's 
loyalty to the respective state. <…>. In the institution of citizenship an 
oath is most often used when citizenship is granted by way of 
naturalisation: a person applying for citizenship pledges solemnly to 
observe the Constitution and laws of the respective state, to protect that 
state in case of need and perform other civil duties, to respect the 
customs and culture of that state etc. Thus, doubtless to say, an oath of 
a citizen is a political obligation of a particular person to the state which 
grants its citizenship to the person in the first place. <> only the persons 
who are loyal to that state and regarding their loyalty or credibility no 
doubts arise may work in its institutions. 
It is interesting to note how the contents of citizenship identified by the 
Constitutional Court includes not only upholding the Constitution and other laws of one’s 
state and performing necessary civil duties, but also mention respect for the customs and 
culture of that state. Combined with the political nature of these obligations and a strict 
emphasis on loyalty to the state, such enumeration could lead us to interpret that the 
Constitutional Court upholds a more thick and identity-related conception of citizenship. 
The ruling explicitly states that the very fact of possession of another state’s citizenship is 
equivalent to political duty and loyalty to that state, which in the case of Lithuania dovetails 
with the historically informed distrust of the members of national minorities whose kin-
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states have at some point in history threatened Lithuania, which makes dual loyalties a 
zero-sum game. 
International references in this ruling also are invoked to cater to the restrictive 
approach to citizenship: 
 <…> the legal doctrine also emphasises general 
tendencies of regulation of some relations of citizenship: universal 
recognition of acquisition of citizenship in cases when an individual is 
born in a family of citizens; establishment of special conditions for 
acquisition of citizenship by naturalisation; restriction of double 
citizenship in greater or smaller extent. In addition, it is underlined that 
all issues connected with citizenship, especially those of acquisition and 
loss of citizenship, are regulated by the laws of every particular state. 
The influence of international law on the institution of citizenship 
becomes evident only when bilateral international agreements are 
concluded concerning citizenship issues or corresponding international 
conventions are joined. Most often by bilateral international agreements 
one attempts to solve the problems which arise due to double 
citizenship. 
As we can see, the Court reiterates its position that dual citizenship is to be avoided 
and that domestic stateness concerns take precedence over international norms when it 
comes to citizenship regulation, yet at the same time refers to the international dimension 
in its attempts to portray restrictiveness as the norm. Such subversive use of international 
norms for the purposes of stateness continues into the November 2006 ruling and helps 
explain its outcome. 
It is important to note that the 1998 ruling is the first time when European Union is 
explicitly mentioned by the Constitutional Court in relation to citizenship: 
 By the way, European Union directives urge that the 
other member states should not hinder the citizens of other states 
belonging to the European Union and who reside in other states to 
participate in local government elections. Thus, the practice of local 
elections is varied, however they are ultimately regulated by domestic 
laws. 
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It is symptomatic that this mentioning of the EU is greeted with the reaffirmation 
of the primacy of domestic legislation. The Court firmly concludes that the requirement to 
repudiate any other citizenship if one wants to run for elections in Lithuania does not 
violate any constitutional or even international norms. 
This ruling also contains the most clear statement of the position of the 
Constitutional Court on the issue of discrimination and the meaning of Article 29 of the 
Constitution which prohibits discriminating or granting privileges: 
 The principle of equality of persons which is established 
by Article 29 of the Constitution means, in essence, prohibition of 
discrimination. Discrimination is most often understood as restriction of 
the rights of an individual or granting certain privileges according to his 
or her sex, race, nationality, language, origin, social status, religion, 
convictions, or opinions. However, differentiated legal regulation when 
it is applied to certain groups of persons which are distinguished by the 
same signs, and in case one strives for positive and socially meaningful 
goals, is not regarded as discrimination. Special requirements or certain 
conditions when their establishment is linked with peculiarities of the 
regulated relations are not attributed to discriminatory restrictions 
either. For example, laws provide for certain requirements of education, 
qualifications, health or work experience as regards citizens who enter 
the civil service. Taking account of the peculiarities of performance and 
responsibility in state institutions, such requirements are considered 
natural and indispensable and they are applied in all states, therefore in 
such cases there never arise questions as for the violation or restriction 
of the right of citizens to participate in the government of their country. 
It appears that in 1998 the Court did not yet have any issues with differential 
treatment of different groups of persons when it comes to citizenship regulation and did 
not treat it as discrimination. This stands in contrast with the November 2006 where dual 
citizenship for ethnic Lithuanians was judged to be discriminatory. 
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4.2.1.2.3. The ruling on granting citizenship by way of exception, December 30, 
2003.61 The December 30, 2003, ruling “On the Compliance of President of the Republic 
of Lithuania Decree No. 40 "On Granting Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania by Way 
of Exception" of 11 April 2003 to the Extent that it Provides that Citizenship of the 
Republic Lithuania Is Granted to Jurij Borisov by Way of Exception with the Constitution 
of the Republic of Lithuania and Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Republic of Lithuania 
Law on Citizenship” is especially controversial. Although this ruling nominally addresses 
the abuse of presidential power of granting citizenship by way of exception which should 
be based on that person’s merits to Lithuania, as established in Article 16 of the 2003 Law 
on Citizenship, the petition was filed by Lithuanian political elites looking for a way to 
legally oust Rolandas Paksas, then President of Lithuania, who was perceived as weak and 
compromised by Russian interests. The Constitutional Court agreed with the petitioners 
and ruled that Paksas did breach the oath “to be faithful to the Republic of Lithuania and 
the Constitution, to conscientiously fulfill the duties of his office, and to be equally just to 
all” which he had given at inauguration by way of granting citizenship to his Russian 
supporter Jurij Borisov who had previously lost his Lithuanian citizenship (gained under 
dubious circumstances in the first place, as he was a Red Army officer) due to gaining 
Russian citizenship. After the presidential decree Borisov effectively had both a Lithuanian 
and a Russian citizenship – the anathema of the routine Lithuanian citizenship policy. 
There are some people who hold this combination of citizenships due to their contributions 
                                                 
61 All quotes in this subsection are from Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2003. Ruling 
“On the Compliance of President of the Republic of Lithuania Decree No. 40 “On Granting Citizenship of 
the Republic Lithuania by Way of Exception” of 11 April 2003 to the Extent that it Provides that 
Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania Is Granted to Jurij Borisov by Way of Exception with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Republic of Lithuania Law 
on Citizenship.” Case No. 40/03. Vilnius, 30 December 2003, unless indicated otherwise. 
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to Lithuanian culture, arts, etc., but Borisov’s contributions were material and considered 
dubious – as the Constitutional Court pointed out, “in the sense of the Law on Citizenship, 
the person must be with merits not to any subject but the State of Lithuania itself”, which 
could not be demonstrated in Borisov’s case. A large part of the accusations also related to 
not following the appropriate procedures to the letter at various point in time during the 
Borisov saga, etc., making this ruling the longest by far among all those analyzed in this 
thesis. 
Ultimately, Paksas was accused of granting Lithuanian citizenship by way of 
exception only because of his support in the electoral campaign instead of upholding 
Lithuania’s interests. The hearings of a parliamentary commission were televised and 
basically took the form of a public trial, where the standing President was prosecuted by 
MPs from the whole partisan spectrum and defended by the most notorious and expensive 
lawyers. The Constitutional Court ruling was used as a basis for his impeachment by the 
Parliament, the first such instance in the postcommunist world which highlighted the 
division between the “winners” and “losers” of the postcommunist transition and elevated 
Paksas into martyrdom in the eyes of a part of the population disillusioned by the 
Lithuanian political establishment (see Clark and Verseckaite 2005 for more detailed 
analysis). He was not only removed as a president, but also forbidden to take up any office 
that would require giving an oath to the Lithuanian state. Paksas is still fighting this 
prohibition and has found a political niche as a member of the European Parliament, since 
that position does not require an oath to Lithuania.  
However, it is possible to bracket the political exigencies while analyzing this 
ruling and to distill its most important points related to citizenship doctrine. A lot of the 
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text is devoted to the discussion of what can be considered merits to Lithuania. Since 
granting citizenship by way of exception is usually confined to prominent artists and 
athletes and does not affect the rules of citizenship loss or acquisition for the general public, 
I focus on what the 2003 ruling says in terms of the more general constitutional citizenship 
doctrine. However, it is quite illuminating that the Constitutional Court denies the merit of 
material contributions and claims that the label of merit is applicable only to a person who 
“very significantly contributes to strengthening of Lithuanian statehood, to the increase of 
the power of Lithuania and its authority in the international community, when it is evident 
that the person has already integrated into the Lithuanian society”.  
In this ruling, the Constitutional Court reiterated the restrictive conception of 
citizenship set out in the 1994 ruling and emphasized that “citizenship expresses legal 
membership of the person in the state, reflects legal belongingness of the person to the 
nation as a community organised into a state (state community)”. It also repeated the 
pattern of appealing to the international norms on citizenship regulation, this time 
expanding more on them by stating that “citizenship legal regulation established by laws 
and concluded international treaties must ensure the implementation of the human right to 
citizenship, must be in line with international covenants, international customary law and 
generally recognised legal principles related with citizenship”, but ultimately emphasizing 
the internationally recognized norm of the primacy and discretion of a state in regulating 
citizenship. The Court also reiterated its emphasis on the general prohibition of dual 
citizenship; however, it went much further in making that statement than in earlier rulings: 
 It should be underlined that the provision of Article 12 
of the Constitution that a person may be a citizen of the Republic of 
Lithuania and, at the same time, a citizen of another state only in 
individual cases established by law, means that such cases established 
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by law can be very rare (individual), that cases of double citizenship 
must be extraordinarily rare, exceptional, that under the Constitution it 
is not permitted to establish any such legal regulation under which cases 
of double citizenship would be not extraordinarily rare exceptions, but 
a widespread phenomenon. Under the Constitution, expansive 
construction of the provisions of the Law on Citizenship consolidating 
an opportunity to be a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania and a citizen 
of another state at the same time is impermissible, under which double 
citizenship would be not individual, extraordinarily rare exceptions, but 
a widespread phenomenon. 
Such a forceful statement was an admonition to the legislators who had just passed 
the new 2003 Citizenship Law which had expanded the possibilities for new generation 
emigrants to gain Lithuanian citizenship, as noted by the then-chairman of the 
Constitutional Court (cited in Maksimaitytė 2007). Basically, in this ruling, the 
Constitutional Court set the stage for the November 2006 ruling by reinforcing the 
previously established restrictive imperatives in its Constitutional doctrine.  
The 2003 ruling also starts bringing in additional elements that heretofore had not 
been prominent in the Constitutional doctrine on citizenship. First of all, it appeared to 
supplement the political conception of citizenship evident in the 1994 and 1998 rulings 
with a reinforced legalistic dimension:  
 Citizenship is not any permanent link between the person 
and the state, but it is a legal link. Citizenship relations are always legal 
ones, and their presence is always stated in a legal form. Only state 
institutions can decide citizenship issues, and, when doing so, they can 
perform only such actions that are provided for in the Constitution, laws 
and other legal acts. The state of citizenship could be changed only in 
case there exist grounds established in legal acts and only after the 
parties, the citizen and the state, have performed certain legal actions 
and upon adoption of a corresponding legal decision by the state 
institution. 
Such emphasis on the legality of everything related to citizenship makes sense in 
the context of the 2003 ruling where the challenge lay in the subtleties of application of 
various legal provisions and the interpretation of every facet of many actions by the 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
202 
 
President and his officials. However, the result of such strong statement of a legalistic 
doctrine of citizenship had a long lasting impact in foreclosing the space of interpretation 
available for the November 2006 ruling analyzed in this dissertation. Furthermore, the 
Court devoted an entire section to complain about how the power to grant citizenship by 
way of exception has been employed “in a legally deficient manner, without taking into 
account of the essence and nature of citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania enshrined in 
the Constitution”. The Court finished the section of complaints by stating that: 
The Constitutional Court emphasises that such conception of 
Article 16 of the Law on Citizenship, which had been in practice until 
now, distorts the institute of citizenship of the Republic of Lithuania 
established in the Constitution and virtually devalues citizenship of the 
Republic of Lithuania, denies its nature and meaning. 
The Court had to spend a large amount of time justifying its right to pass judgment 
on the President’s behaviour as it pertains to his oath in this case, which helps understand 
the unusually activist stance that the Court adopts in this ruling. This kind of going beyond 
the letter of the petition to which the ruling is supposed to respond set the precedent for the 
judicial activism witnessed in the November 2006 ruling and its aftermath. 
Another new development in the 2003 ruling is the first instance where the 
Constitutional Court explicitly claims that the concept of the Nation which is sovereign in 
the Lithuanian state actually refers to a civic (poorly translated in the English version as 
“civil”) nation – a body of citizens, a state community. Again, perhaps one could venture 
to say that such a statement has something to do with the presence of Egidijus Jarašiūnas, 
the member of the Constitutional Commission who championed the notion of the Nation 
of Lithuania, who now was a judge of the Constitutional Court, but since it is impossible 
to get that kind of a “smoking gun” confirmation, we are forced to rely on what the text 
indicates. Despite the subscription to the term of the civic nation, the Constitutional Court 
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seems to continue the emphasis on a thick and historically rooted content of what it means 
to be a citizen, as evidenced in its recounting of what naturalization entails: 
It is possible to acquire citizenship by way of naturalisation, i.e. 
citizenship is granted to a person who meets the conditions established 
in the law. As a rule, such conditions are requirements of permanent 
residence in the state for a certain time period established in the law, and 
of knowledge of the state language. These requirements are based on 
the provision that the person wishing to acquire citizenship and the state 
must be connected by a permanent factual link before citizenship is 
granted, that permanent residence in the state during a certain time 
period established in the law and knowledge of the state language are 
necessary pre-conditions for a foreigner or a stateless person to integrate 
himself into the society, to perceive the mentality of the Nation and its 
strivings, the Constitutional order of the state, to get acquainted with the 
history, culture, customs and traditions of the Nation and the state, to be 
prepared to take responsibility for the present and the future of the state. 
It is due to this that it is not sufficient for a citizen of a foreign state or 
a stateless person who wishes to acquire citizenship merely to settle in 
this country — for this reason one has to reside permanently in the state 
for a longer time period, which is established in the law, and to know 
the state language. 
A strong emphasis on mastery of the state language foreshadows the next ruling 
which touched upon the questions of ethnonationalist character of the Lithuanian state – 
the May 2006 ruling on the use of state language in voting ballots. In rounding up the 
analysis of the December 2003 ruling, we are forced to conclude that it was the most 
comprehensive statement of the Lithuanian constitutional citizenship doctrine, which 
perhaps got overshadowed by the focus on the scandal of the impeachment of the President, 
which is part of the reason why the November 2006 ruling was such a shock to the public 
and politicians alike. However, before me move on to the analysis of the key ruling on dual 
citizenship, we need to explore one last ruling which set its discursive context – the ruling 
on the use of state language. 
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4.2.1.2.4. Ruling on the use of state language in voting ballots, May 10, 2006.62 The 
May 10, 2006, ruling “On the Compliance of Paragraph 6 (Wording of 10 April 2003) of 
Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on the Central Electoral Commission with the 
Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania” was another instance of one part of political 
elites challenging another, although it was less similar to the 2003 interinstitutional 
challenge and more in line with the setup of the 1994 ruling where right-wing politicians 
sought to enlist the authority of the Constitutional Court in their quest to prevent the left’s 
attempts at relaxation of restrictive measures. 30 right-wing MPs, an interesting mix of 
conservatives, liberals and populists, addressed the Constitutional Court with a request to 
strike down the provision that referendum voting ballots can be printed not only in 
Lithuanian, but also in the language of a concentrated national minority in its region, which 
was instituted by the left-wing government in preparation for the referendum on EU 
membership. The plaintiffs argued that such provision contradicts two articles of the 
Constitution: Article 14 establishing Lithuanian as the state language, and, surprisingly, 
Article 29 establishing the norm of nondiscrimination. They claimed that the clause of 
geographical concentration of minority is discriminatory in that it gives extra privileges to 
Russians and Poles living in more concentrated communities, but discriminates against 
representatives of more dispersed national minorities.  
This ruling is not about citizenship per se, but it helps us gauge whether the 
Constitutional Court sides with the more civic or more ethnic conception of the nation. 
Language is an especially interesting element of the civic-ethnic divide. On the one hand, 
                                                 
62 All quoting in this section is from Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On 
the Compliance of Paragraph 6 (Wording of 10 April 2003) of Article 3 of the Republic of Lithuania Law 
on the Central Electoral Commission with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case No. 25/03. 
Vilnius, 10 May 2006, unless indicated otherwise. 
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both scholars and practitioners argue that mandating a state language is not ethnic, but 
rather civic policy, since it is geared towards enabling deliberative democracy and does not 
require one to give up other languages. However, others point out that the very requirement 
of a certain level of proficiency in the official state language already puts members of 
national minorities at a disadvantage, from symbolic underrepresentation in the public 
sphere to limited employment opportunities exacerbated by the need to invest additional 
resources into learning the state language. When people in countries like the USA, which 
one would be hard pressed to deem ethnonationalist, rally around the English language as 
a marker of national identity and the boundary that demarcates “us” and “others” (in their 
case Spanish) (Zollberg and Long 1999), the civic status of a state language becomes a 
question rather than an axiom. What the Lithuanian Constitutional Court says about 
language bears reflecting upon: 
<…> the Lithuanian language, as the state language, is the 
means of public expression and internal communication of state and 
municipal institutions as well as communication with members of the 
community. It is an important element of the statehood, a factor uniting 
all citizens of the Republic of Lithuania, integrating the state 
community—the civil Nation—because it ensures equal opportunities 
for all citizens of the state to participate in the governance of their 
country, to make decisions of national importance, also the right to enter 
on equal terms in the state service. The knowledge of the state language 
is a prerequisite and a necessary condition for full-fledged participation 
of the citizens in the governance of the state. <…> It is impossible to 
deny the fact that a citizen of the Republic of Lithuania who does not 
know the state language has not fully integrated into the society of 
Lithuania. 
Here we again see that the Constitutional Court adopts a civic stance by appealing 
to the notion of the civic nation and attributing the state language with an integrative power 
for the purpose of deliberative democracy. However, proclaiming that Lithuanian language 
is an important element of statehood inevitably points out that the state is created on the 
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basis of ethnic Lithuanians, and the claim that it is both a prerequisite and a necessary 
condition for full political participation designates those who have not mastered the state 
language as a type of second class citizens. In fact, the Court explicitly states that those 
who do not learn the language without being objectively unable to do so “lack public spirit” 
and should not be artificially prompted to participate in governance of the state community 
that s/he does not fully belong to and make nationally significant decisions. It goes so far 
as to say that if a person does not know enough state language to grasp a simple formulation 
of a referendum question that requires only a yes/no answer, then it is highly doubtful that 
this person “is capable of understanding the goals of the Nation and is ready to undertake 
the responsibility for the presence and future of the State of Lithuania”. 
The majority of such people are precisely the Polish and Russians living in 
geographically concentrated communities. Due to mandatory Russian language instruction 
during the Soviet occupation and to the fact that Polish language media was the closest 
available material that underwent less censorship than what was available in the USSR 
itself, most Lithuanians, especially in those regions where the minorities are concentrated, 
can understand these languages. Conversely, the Slavic minorities can understand some 
Lithuanian even if they do not speak it, so in social situations like shopping or going to a 
doctor’s office the representatives of minorities can get by without speaking Lithuanian. 
However, politically these people are extremely isolated and routinely vote for the same 
handful of co-ethnic politicians who hold a virtual monopoly over the governance in 
municipalities where there is a greater concentration of minorities, so the Court’s appeal to 
the integrative power of the state language is not without grounds. This isolationism, 
perceived by the general Lithuanian public as former colonizers’ refusal to learn the state 
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language inseparable from a refusal to accept the end of colonization, serves to maintain 
an undercurrent of ethnic tension, exacerbated by the attempts of the minorities to affix 
place names and street signs in the bastardized mix of Polish-Russian-Belorussian that they 
appear to speak, and by the disparity between Polish minority rights in Lithuania and 
Lithuanian minority rights in Poland. The Court may be actively promoting a civic state, 
but its conception still requires certain sacrifices from the perspective of national 
minorities, as it claims that those who are not sufficiently integrated (meaning do not have 
sufficient knowledge of the Lithuanian language) are not full members of the Nation. 
The Constitutional Court is very explicit about its active stance on the side of the 
civic rather than ethnic conception of the nation. It quotes its own December 30, 2003, 
ruling, and adds that “the Lithuanian civil Nation includes all citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania, regardless of the fact whether they belong to the nominal Nation (they are 
Lithuanians), or to national minorities”. However, it also insists that using more than just 
the state language in official capacity would deviate from the concept of the state 
community as a civic nation and says that only those who are fully integrated (i.e. have 
learned the state language) can be considered to be full members of the state community – 
the civic Nation. Furthermore, the Court points out that state support for minority cultures 
and languages does not mean that they can oppose the common interests of the state and 
Nation of Lithuania.  
The court also pays lip service to the issue of international norms, once again 
affirming that the requirement to only use the state language in voting ballots does not 
violate international treaties and respects “universally accepted principles of international 
law”. However, having relatively forcefully established the imperative of the monopoly of 
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the state language in the public sphere, the Court refused to even consider the second part 
of the petition – the discrimination charge. Therefore, the interpretation of the May 2006 
ruling as either civic or ethnic cannot be unequivocal. The language of this ruling suggests 
that we do indeed see a movement from a more ethnic to a more civic stance in the 
Constitutional Court rulings, but it is important to measure the tendencies more precisely, 
which I execute in section 4.2.3. Let us recap the key points of the Lithuanian 
Constitutional doctrine on citizenship and proceed to analyze the November 2006 ruling in 
that context. 
4.2.1.2.5. Interim conclusions: Constitutional doctrine on Lithuanian citizenship. 
Having overviewed the rulings pertaining to citizenship, we have to conclude that the 
Constitutional Court has been explicit in invoking the imperatives of independent statehood 
and connecting them with the historical record of restrictiveness in all rulings that touched 
upon the issue of citizenship. This historically informed stance is what gave basis for the 
Constitutional Court to strike down the possibility for Soviet army officers serving in the 
Red Army, which was seen as a foreign aggressor, stationed in Lithuania, to gain 
Lithuanian citizenship63, as well as for its negative evaluation of the practices of granting 
dual citizenship through Presidential decrees, epitomized in the 2003 case relating to the 
President charged with ties to Russia64. In the latter ruling, the Constitutional Court 
presents a condensed version of its understanding of citizenship: 
                                                 
63 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 1994. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Seimas of the 
Republic of Lithuania Resolution “On Amending Item 5 of the Resolution of the Supreme Council of the 
Republic of Lithuania ‘On the Procedure for Implementing the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship’, 
adopted on 22 December 1993, with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case No. 7/94. Vilnius, 
13 April 1994. 
64 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2003. Ruling “On the Compliance of President of the 
Republic of Lithuania Decree No. 40 "On Granting Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania by Way of 
Exception" of 11 April 2003 to the Extent that it Provides that Citizenship of the Republic Lithuania Is 
Granted to Jurij Borisov by Way of Exception with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania and 
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“Without its citizens, the state cannot exist. Citizenship is an attribute of the 
state. Citizenship is not a mere formal legal category, it is inseparably linked with 
the issues of sovereignty of the nation and the state, of national identity and rights 
and freedoms of the person. As a rule, citizenship is perceived as a permanent legal 
link between the person and the state.  
In its ruling of 13 April 1994, the Constitutional Court defined citizenship 
as follows: citizenship is a person's permanent political legal relation to a certain 
state, grounded on mutual rights and obligations as well as mutual trust, loyalty and 
protection therefrom. 
It needs to be noted that the conception of citizenship as a legal link between 
the person and the state is also consolidated in the 1997 European Convention on 
Nationality (Article 2).”65 
These paragraphs allow us to discern certain cornerstones of the constitutional 
doctrine of citizenship, namely, the primacy of the state in the relationship of citizenship 
(“citizenship is an attribute of the state”), the imbrications of the issue of citizenship and 
national sovereignty and identity, and the inseparability of rights and obligations of a 
citizen with a premium on trust and loyalty. The reference to international norms is there, 
but comes as an afterthought. Overall, the body of jurisprudence on the issues of citizenship 
seems to be much more concerned with the nation-state than with international norms. How 
then did the 2006 ruling end up repudiating a large part of said nation by cutting off dual 
citizenship availability for Lithuanian emigrants? 
4.2.2. The 2006 ruling on dual citizenship. 
In the previous chapter (section 3.1) I presented the key elements of the November 
13, 2006, ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of Legal Acts Regulating the 
Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania”66 and discussed 
                                                 
Paragraph 1 of Article 16 of the Republic of Lithuania Law on Citizenship.” Case No. 40/03. Vilnius, 30 
December 2003. 
65 2003 December 30 ruling “On a decree of the President of the Republic”. 
66 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2006. Ruling “On the Compliance of the Provisions of 
Legal Acts Regulating the Citizenship Relations with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” Case 
No. 45/03-36/04. Vilnius, 13 November 2006. 
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its repercussions in the public discourse. In this subsection I take a look at the ruling in 
light of the “intentions of the founders” and the development of the Lithuanian 
Constitutional doctrine on citizenship presented in the preceding section (4.2.1.). Then I 
proceed to conduct content analysis of all five rulings in order to measure the temporal 
trends in civic vs. ethnic orientation and international norms vs. stateness concerns. Taking 
into account all the “hoops” we have jumped through and “smoking guns” we have 
gathered, I attempt to explicate the puzzling decision to cut off dual citizenship possibilities 
for Lithuanian emigrants. 
4.2.2.1. The key features of the November 2006 ruling. The main object of the 
petition which initiated the November 2006 ruling was a charge that the repatriation clause 
prohibiting dual citizenship for members of ethnic minorities who had emigrated to their 
kin-states required inquiry into a person’s ethnicity and thus was noncompliant with Article 
29 of the Constitution which prohibited discrimination or privileges based on descent. The 
Court ruled that the repatriation clause was indeed discriminatory, thus disappointing the 
politicians wanting to employ ethnic differentiation as a part of the stateness boundary 
maintenance mechanism and prevent access to Lithuanian citizenship by potentially 
disloyal Russians or Poles. However, by declaring the widespread availability of dual 
citizenship to be unconstitutional and undesirable, it also disappointed the petitioners, a 
mixed group of left-wing, liberal and minority MPS, who had expected a liberalization of 
access to dual citizenship, not to mention the hundreds of thousands of Lithuanian 
emigrants who now were faced with the requirement to give up Lithuanian citizenship if 
they wanted to get citizenship of their host country.  
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The response to this charge in the November 2006 ruling is the most concentrated 
expression of the constitutional doctrine on Lithuanian citizenship and its relation to 
ethnicity. In this text, the Constitutional Court reiterated that citizenship regulation is a tool 
of strengthening of statehood and went over the preceding regulation of citizenship in great 
detail, focusing on its continuity, restrictiveness, and the corresponding shortcomings of 
the latest citizenship laws. The Court again reasserted the civic-minded conception of the 
Nation as the state community, however, in the next sentence it reminded the readers that 
the state of Lithuania came into being on the basis of the ethnic Lithuanian nation, and that 
the full-fledged life of the latter would be very difficult or even impossible without the 
former. Several sections of the text are devoted to enumerating the link between the ethnic 
nation and the state, including the importance of the Lithuanian diaspora. Interestingly, the 
Court still affirms that it should be easier for ethnic Lithuanian migrants to gain/retain 
Lithuanian citizenship than to any other type of migrants. However, then it proceeds to 
present its own version of Lithuanian history of mutual tolerance between the titular 
Lithuanian nation and traditional minorities (again excluding Soviet-era colonizer 
immigrants), claiming that inter-ethnic discord was only present when Lithuania was 
occupied by some foreign power, and that all citizens are members of the civic nation 
irrespective of their ethnic origin, as long as they are integrated into the society by knowing 
the language, etc.  
The Constitutional Court emphasizes that “the notions of “Lithuanian Nation” and 
“Nation” used in the Constitution may not be opposed”, citing the ethnic Lithuanian nation 
as the basis and the necessary precondition of the state as the civic nation. The history 
lesson continued with an overview of the development of citizenship regulation since the 
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declaration of independence in 1918, geared to establish its continuity and restrictiveness. 
Even the denial of the Red Army officer’s eligibility to gain Lithuanian citizenship 
apparently echoes a similar provision in the 1919 Law on Citizenship to exclude from 
Lithuanian citizenship those who have been serving the Russian state. The ruling forcefully 
reiterated the doctrine already established in 2003 – the imperative to ensure that any 
possibilities to get dual citizenship should be extremely rare. The Constitutional Court 
emphasized that the general prohibition of dual citizenship was due to the concern with 
loyalty to the Lithuanian state, while an exception made for emigrants to the Americas was 
due to the desire to maintain ties with large diaspora communities. It treated the return of 
the Vilnius region from Polish occupation to Lithuania as an instance of affirming the basis 
of Lithuanian citizenry in residence rather than ethnicity. Crossing off the Soviet period as 
illegitimate, the Court emphasized the importance of the 1989 Law on Citizenship and its 
“zero option”. The bulk of the text was occupied by detailed overview of the development 
of the subsequent Laws on Citizenship and their amendments, interspersed with 
admonitions and self-references to the previous rulings, especially the 2003 one. 
One the notable characteristics of the November 2006 ruling is a comparatively 
more extensive referral to international norms, such as explicit appeals to organizations 
like the UN, Council of Europe and the EU, and documents like the 1930 Convention on 
conflict of nationality laws, the Universal Declaration of the Human Rights, even the 1963 
Council of Europe convention for prevention of multiple nationality and 1997 European 
Convention on Citizenship not yet signed by Lithuania. However, the Constitutional Court 
chose to highlight the points which supported a restrictive and statist stand, for example, it 
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stated that, despite all the changes and increased possibilities for dual citizenship, the 
general principle that each person should only hold one citizenship remains valid. 
The tension between judicial review’s aim for atemporal pronouncements ex 
cathedra and the judges’ practice of invoking the intentions of the “founders” (e.g. see the 
interview with Kūris in Digrytė 2008) helps appreciate the changes in the discourse over 
time. For over a decade the Constitutional Court did not question the Constitutionality of 
the provision that gave the right to dual citizenship to anyone whose lineage held the 
citizenship of interwar Lithuanian Republic, except to expatriates of other ethnicities. Now, 
it took away the possibility to have dual citizenship from everyone, disregarding their 
ethnicity. As mentioned earlier, the November 2006 ruling effectively instituted a new 
explicit Constitutional doctrine aimed against ethnic discrimination67 – in other words, 
against a privileged position of Lithuanians in Lithuania. Seen from a temporally sensitive 
perspective, the 2006 ruling represents a seismic shift in the ideational landscape of 
Lithuanian constitutional jurisprudence: although the Constitutional Court has consistently 
upheld the imperatives of stateness in relation to citizenship, this was the first time when it 
was forced to reconcile them with the transnationally diffused imperative of ethnic non-
discrimination/non-privileging. What could be the reasoning behind this particular ruling 
beyond the arguments laid out in its text? 
4.2.2.2. Gleaning the judges’ reasoning. In essence, it is impossible to learn exactly 
what motivated the Constitutional Court judges to make one or another decision due to the 
mandate of secrecy of deliberations in the chamber. Indeed, a direct statement by the actor 
regarding his/her motivations and preferences would be the only “smoking gun” that could 
                                                 
67 Chairman of the Constitutional Court Egidijus Kūris, interview in Kweder 2007. 
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validate our hypotheses, and even then we would be operating on a risky assumption of 
their truthfulness. Stone Sweet (2000) suggests that the unavailability of such information 
preempts ideational analysis of judicial review in favor of strategic-interest based 
approaches. However, the process tracing approach and such tools like discourse analysis 
and content analysis allow us to glean at least a part of the reasoning used by the judges, 
which can be treated as “hoop” tests of the “fingerprints” of the causal factors operating in 
this case. Therefore, I look for explicit mentioning of ideational vs. interest-based motives, 
preferences and concerns. The judges’ preferences and concerns can be gleaned from the 
part of the proceedings of the hearing of the case that was available for public access, as 
well as from their publications and interviews. 
4.2.2.2.1. International and stateness concerns. The protocol of the hearing that 
took place on October 11th, 2006, indicates the judges’ concern with the clarity and 
impartiality of the regulation of citizenship, and since the repatriation clause was the object 
of the petition, its arbitrariness, inconsistency and problematic implications gained the most 
attention. For example, judges Vytautas Sinkevičius and Egidijus Kūris repeatedly 
questioned the representatives of the Parliament about the paradoxical situation of 
members of ethnic minorities who emigrate to a country other than their homeland, for 
example, Lithuanian Jews who emigrated to Canada would have had no problem gaining 
dual citizenship, while their counterparts who went to reside in Israel would not have a 
similar opportunity. The representatives of the Parliament replied by claiming that what 
matters is the combination of the person’s ethnicity and the ethnic makeup of the 
destination state – if they align, the dual citizen is privileged, which results in a potential 
for the dual citizen’s loyalty for that country to supersede his/her loyalty to Lithuania, 
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whereas an ethnic Lithuanian person will never have an opportunity to find another country 
where s/he would be privileged. Then the judges questioning turned to the problematic 
nature of determining a person’s ethnic belonging, especially if they lead migrant or 
cosmopolitan lives, and highlighted the amount of discretion required to judge each 
person’s belonging to some homeland and the fact of their repatriation.  
Overall, the judges formulated questions to the representatives of the Parliament 
and to migration officers by referring to international legal norms, the freedom of 
movement in the European Union, the cosmopolitan nature of the globalized world, etc., 
thus lending support to the hypothesis of the importance of the international dimension as 
a reference point for the Constitutional judges. However, some questions demonstrated 
concerns with Lithuanian diaspora, for example, judge Toma Birmontienė repeatedly 
inquired whether the Parliament had thought about facilitating the reclamation of 
Lithuanian citizenship by those emigrants who had lost it before the 2003 law came into 
effect. 
The direct pronouncements of opinions of various judges as to what motivates the 
decisions pertaining to citizenship vary greatly. In a September 2009 interview 
(unrecorded), the future constitutional judge Egidijus Šileikis expressed an opinion that the 
Constitutional Court (before his membership) chose to follow a narrow interpretation of 
the letter of the Constitution rather than geopolitical considerations. The former Chairman 
of the Constitutional Court Egidijus Kūris, who has repeatedly presented the image of a 
constitutional judge as an idealist, emphasized that the only motivation the judges have is 
to follow the letter and spirit of the law and protect their reputation in the eyes of their 
fellow judges, and denied the possible influence of considerations of property restitution 
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on the one hand or “patriotism” on the other (see numerous interviews in the Lithuanian 
media (e.g. Digrytė 2008; Liaučius 2007); position confirmed by personal interviews in 
September 2009 and July 2013). On the other hand, one of the key judges in the case of 
dual citizenship, Vytautas Sinkevičius68 (2002), has emphasized that the interests of the 
state have always been the basis for developments in regulation of citizenship in Lithuania 
and acknowledged the explicit geopolitical considerations of the decision makers who 
drafted relevant legislation. Overall, it appears reasonable to say that the evidence points 
to a fundamental mutual imbrication of the “European” norms that denounce the 
relationship between ethnicity and citizenship and the interests of shielding the newly 
independent state from potential venues of influence of historical adversaries, both of 
which played a part in producing the unexpected ruling. 
4.2.2.2.2. The specter of restitution. It is important to consider the possibility that 
the ideational-identitarian arguments that stem from historical distrust of neighboring 
countries do not exhaust potential explanations for restrictive regulation of citizenship in 
Lithuania. An interest-based approach would bring up the issue of restitution of property 
that we touched upon in the previous chapter.69 
Teitel (2000: 130) points out that in a transitional situation, such as the one 
postcommunist countries have found themselves in, the balance of interests is ever-
changing, but the question of property restitution appears to offer a relatively clear matrix 
                                                 
68 Sinkevičius refused to discuss it on the grounds of the duty of the judges of the CC to keep the 
discussions that led to the final text of any ruling secret, but his argumentation pertaining to the issue of 
dual citizenship could be discerned in his public pronouncements, scholarly writings, and in the transcript 
of the hearing of the case before the Constitutional Court; also, he served as the secretary of the group that 
drafted the text of the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania. 
69 Significantly, this apparently materialist topic cannot be disentangled from the question of rights in the 
reactions to the ruling. In the very beginning, the then chairman of Human Rights Monitoring Institute 
(later a member of the Parliament) Kęstutis Čilinskas discussed implications of the November 2006 ruling 
of the Constitutional Court in relation to property restitutions, quoted in Praninskas 2006. 
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of straightforwardly material interests. However, the possibility to satisfy them all is a 
different story, which is why countries institute conditions like citizenship status and 
limited periods for applications. In Lithuania, as in numerous other postcommunist 
countries, restitution of property took place during a limited period of time and was (and 
remains) connected to citizenship status, which is a source of friction above all with the 
world Jewish community (Barkan 2000, Eizenstat 1997, Geleževičius 2003). 
Consequently, the repatriation clause in the Law of Citizenship had effectively precluded 
Jewish, Polish, Russian and German expatriates from claiming pre-Soviet property rights, 
which was the main motivator behind the petition which started the dual citizenship case. 
In fact, the lawyer of the Israeli citizen whose quest for property restitution was the initial 
impulse behind the petition, Faina Kukliansky, suggested that the repatriation clause was 
directly related to the desire to circumscribe restitution of Jewish property located in the 
most prestigious districts of Lithuanian towns (unrecorded interview, September 16, 2009). 
She proposed that the Constitutional Court judges chose to interpret the nondiscrimination 
charge in a restrictive rather than liberalizing way in large part because they did not want 
to open this Pandora’s box.  
The records of the proceedings of the hearing of the case in the Constitutional Court 
reveal that the judges actually did raise the question whether the legislature intentionally 
changed dual citizenship availability in relation to restitution prospects. The 
representatives of the Parliament, denied the existence of a direct relationship between 
citizenship regulation and restitution concerns in front of the Court, but the fact that this 
question was raised indicates that the judges were aware of the implications of citizenship 
regulation for the policy on restitution of property. In fact, Arminas Lydeka, one of the 
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principle authors of the 2003 Law of Citizenship, highlighted that it came into effect long 
after the end of the application period for property restitution (2001), which entailed 
intentionally distancing citizenship regulation from restitution issues. 
The direct relation between the issues of citizenship and the issues of property 
restitution is evident in the public discussions of the ruling mentioned in the previous 
chapters, and in the fact that a new case questioning this relationship was consequently 
brought to the Constitutional Court by the same courts whose appeal to a Vilnius court on 
behalf of the Israeli citizen trying to regain her property in Šiauliai resulted in the challenge 
to the discriminatory nature of the repatriation clause. Egidijus Šileikis (a current 
Constitutional judge who was charged with preparing the materials for this case), before 
he became a member of the Constitutional Court, emphasized the sea change that the 
antidiscriminatory ruling on citizenship regulation could bring about in the developments 
pertaining to property restitution, to the point where the recognition of the unConstitutional 
nature of ethnically-conscious citizenship regulation could have retroactive effects by 
reanimating restitution, which up till then appeared to be essentially over (Šileikis 2007; 
reiterated in the unrecorded interview conducted in September 2009).  
The Constitutional Court passed the ruling on the conn ection between citizenship 
and restitution of property on December 22, 2010.70 This ruling in essence reiterated the 
constitutional doctrine that supports limiting restitution of property to citizens who hold 
permanent residence in Lithuania, and a limited restitution at that, which was established 
by the June 20, 1995, ruling71 and fleshed out in subsequent rulings, such as March 4, 2003, 
                                                 
70 2010 December 22 ruling “On restoration of the rights of ownership only to citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania”.  
71 1995 June 20 ruling “On the restoration of citizen’s rights of ownership to the existing real property”.  
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August 23, 2005, July 5, 2007, May 20, 2008, July 4, 2008, and March 9, 2010, which are 
mentioned in the December 2010 ruling text72 in the self-referential manner characteristic 
of Constitutional review. 
In conjunction with the November 2006 ruling against dual citizenship, this 
restrictive approach to restitution did not provide additional venues of pursuit of property 
restoration for those former inhabitants of Lithuania who had, according to the earlier 
clause of the Citizenship Law, “repatriated to an ethnic homeland”. Even the possibility of 
the highly unlikely course of action that these claimants would in theory be able to pursue, 
namely, renounce their current citizenship, become citizens of Lithuania and move to 
Lithuania, was preempted by the court’s emphasis on the limited timeframe of restitution 
which had expired several years ago and was not, in the courts view, auspicious to an 
extension aimed at the persons who did not hold Lithuanian citizenship within the time 
limits of the general process of restitution carried out in Lithuania.  
It is important to note in the context of this dissertation that the Constitutional Court 
sided with the representatives of the Parliament of Lithuania against the plaintiffs and 
supported their argumentation that the question of restitution regulation should not be 
considered part and parcel of citizenship regulation, but is to be interpreted separately from 
citizenship regulation, pointing out that the laws on restitution are not and have never been 
designed to regulate citizenship and its acquisition, despite the fact that citizenship is the 
sine qua non condition of restitution. Such a reiteration was targeted against the reasoning 
of the district courts who addressed the Constitutional Court precisely because of the 
November 2006 ruling against ethnic discrimination in attribution of dual citizenship. The 
                                                 
72 2010 December 22 ruling “On restoration of the rights of ownership only to citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania”.  
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district courts had raised the possibility that such persons may be able to apply for 
restitution of their property despite the fact that the term for submitting such requests had 
passed, because they had not been able to pursue restitution in the provided timeframe due 
to discriminatory and thus unConstitutional laws like the repatriation clause, and therefore 
may be granted an extension for the term of submitting applications for restitution of their 
property. However, the Constitutional Court foreclosed this possibility by reaffirming the 
legal, geographical and temporal limits of eligibility for restitution. 
The Constitutional Court also agreed with the arguments of the representatives of 
the Parliament who pointed out that the European Court of Human Rights in its ruling on 
the case Boruch Shub v. Lithuania ((dec.), No. 17064/06, June 30, 2009, mentioned in the 
December 2010 ruling73) has confirmed the prerogative of states to determine the rules of 
citizenship acquisition and their limited responsibility for restitution of property 
confiscated before signing the Convention. In this way, we again witness how arguments 
pertaining to international norms are employed to shore up the imperatives of stateness and 
the interests of the state. This ruling on restitution is not included in the content analysis of 
the rulings pertaining to the Constitutional doctrine of citizenship due to the explicit 
statement of the Constitution Court against similar attribution. However, it does provide 
additional support for the argument presented in this dissertation, namely, the mutual 
imbrication of the international human rights norms and stateness concerns in the 
constellations of citizenship regulations.  
Hall (1989: 390) observes: “If the Keynesian case demonstrates that ideas have a 
real power in the political world, it also confirms that they do not acquire political force 
                                                 
73 2010 December 22 ruling “On restoration of the rights of ownership only to citizens of the Republic of 
Lithuania”.  
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independently of the constellation of institutions and interests already present there.” An 
inquiry into the reasoning behind the crucial Lithuanian Constitutional Court ruling 
testifies to profound difficulty, if not futility, of disentangling the mutual imbrication of 
ideas and interests, as well as to the key weakness of actor-centered ideational research – 
the ultimate impossibility of knowing their “real” motives., I have strived to show the 
enduring value of ideational research in making sense of a paradoxical situation that goes 
against the predictions of mainstream theories. In the next part of this chapter, I shore it up 
by triangulating with content analysis of the rulings of the Constitutional Court pertaining 
to the question of Lithuanian citizenship. 
4.2.3. Content analysis of the rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
I have analyzed the development of the Lithuanian Constitutional doctrine on 
citizenship and ethnic discrimination by exploring the changing emphasis on different 
elements and suggested that there is an identifiable shift from a more ethnic to a more civic 
conception of the nation-state, but did not discern similar directional patterns in the 
invocations of international norms nor concerns with stateness. However, it is important to 
conduct a more thorough empirical analysis, which is the object of this subsection. Content 
analysis, defined as a “systematic reduction of a flow of text (or other symbols) to a 
standard set of statistically manipulable symbols representing the presence, the intensity, 
or the frequency of some characteristics relevant to social sciences” (Shapiro and Markoff 
1998: 18), provides a possibility to operationalize underlying dimensions of the 
conceptualization of citizenship in the doctrine of Constitutional interpretation. In the face 
of unavailability of direct access to the reasoning of the judges, I follow Holsti (1969) in 
the attempt to employ content analysis in making inferences about antecedents of the 
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counterintuitive outcomes of judicial review, which dovetails with the heretofore usage of 
discourse analysis as a method also oriented towards discovering the underlying ideational 
patterns relevant to the reasoning behind the case at hand. Content analysis, understood as 
“the determination of characteristics of a source from the natural-language utterances it 
emits” (Hays 1967: 16), is a fitting instrument for the inquiry into where the Constitutional 
Court is coming from.  
I set out to discover patterns of references to international norms and ethnic vs. 
civic basis for citizenship as a proxy for the influence of international norms brought about 
by EU normative pressures, and of references to stateness in the rulings of the 
Constitutional Court, and to track their changes over time, in order to discern whether there 
is a trajectory that would provide support for or negate the proposition developed in this 
dissertation: namely, that a state that has a starting point as an ethnonationalist postcolonial 
emigration state is eventually boxed in by the international norms which delegitimize 
preferential treatment of co-ethnics, so that its only recourse is to resort to universal 
restrictiveness as a stateness boundary maintenance regime. I use content analysis to 
explore whether it is possible to establish a parallel between the ideational developments 
of the Constitutional doctrine on citizenship and the process of European integration as 
seen from the postcommunist Central and Eastern Europe, and whether it is employed in 
favour of or against the state interests.  
4.2.3.1. Operationalization and measurement. After preliminary research on the 
five relevant rulings, I coded them on three separate conceptual dimensions: the frequency, 
intensity and positivity vs. negativity of references to ethnic vs. civic elements, the 
frequency of references to the international realm, and the frequency of references stateness 
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concerns. After reviewing each of them, I check if there is a correlation between the trends 
in the different conceptual dimensions. 
4.2.3.1.1. Coding the international and stateness dimensions. References to the 
international realm, which is a “conceptual domain” (Carney 1972: 270) that includes such 
words as “international”, “universal”, “European”, “Union”, does not lend itself to 
evaluative coding, since references to it are never negative. Therefore, I only calculated the 
frequency of such utterances to see if their amount changes over time. The same can be 
said about the keywords associated with stateness – it is extremely unlikely that they would 
carry negative valence. Therefore, to measure the dimension of stateness, I counted only 
the frequencies of words like “independence”, “loyalty”, “statehood” and “occupation” 
(see Appendix A for more detailed instructions of coding the relevance of the word “state”). 
4.2.3.1.2. Coding the civic-ethnic dimension. The bulk of the decision making went 
into coding the texts on two-dimensional indices of a combination of a categorical variable 
“ethnic vs. civic” and an interval scale of “intense vs. neutral” combined with evaluative 
directionality “positive-negative”. For the purposes of my hypothesis I conceptualize the 
distinction between “ethnic” and “civic” dimensions as they have been actualized in the 
common European space: it is the difference between emphasizing descent vs. territory in 
defining criteria for citizenship. In the codebook I constructed (see Appendix A) before 
close analysis of the texts, the category “ethnic” included word forms of “ethnic”, “origin”, 
“descent”, “culture”, “language”, “tradition”, “customs”, “identity”, “repatriation”74 and 
the like, and the category “civic” included word forms of “tolerance”, “equality”, 
                                                 
74 “Repatriation” is defined in the documents pertaining to Lithuanian citizenship as “departure for one's 
ethnic homeland and settlement there.” 
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“discrimination”, “civic Nation”, “national concord”, “rule of law”, and anything referring 
to “residence” and “territory”. 
After conducting the first round of coding, I had to revisit my codebook and make 
corrections in the way I coded “language”: although in general “language” would appear 
to be more attributable to the ethnic side, a specific phrase “state language” was used in 
these rulings in conjunction with “civic Nation”, demonstrating an explicit attempt to co-
opt the arguments pertaining to language to the civic side of the arguments. Hence I recoded 
the texts, coding instances of “state language” as civic and freestanding words “language” 
as ethnic. However, one should not think of this issue as easily resolved, because it may be 
argued that even civic rhetoric serves ethnic purposes when it is used in conjunction with 
language. In order to evaluate whether state language can be ascribed to the civic rather 
than the ethnic side of the divide, I conducted a perfunctory analysis of other rulings of the 
Constitutional Court that explicitly deal with the issues of state language, i.e. the 1999 
ruling and 2009 decision pertaining to one of the main grievances of ethnic minorities, first 
and foremost the Polish, – the transcription of their names in passports in Lithuanian rather 
than in the original language.75 These documents demonstrate the unwavering stance 
adopted by the Constitutional Court in relation to the monopoly of Lithuanian language. A 
strict refusal to include non-Lithuanian letters like “w”, “q” or “ł”, and the requirement to 
spell names out according to their pronunciation, results in either forcible changes of names 
                                                 
75 Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 1999. Ruling “On the compliance of the 31 January 
1991 Supreme Council of the Republic of Lithuania Resolution "On Writing of Names and Family Names 
in Passports of Citizens of the Republic of Lithuania" with the Constitution of the Republic of Lithuania.” 
Case No.14/98. Vilnius, 21 October 1999.; Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania. 2009. 
Decision “On the Construction of the Provisions of Items 4 and 7 of the Reasoning part of the Ruling of the 
Constitutional Court of the Republic of Lithuania of 21 October 1999.” Case No.14/98. Vilnius, 6 
November 2009. 
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or an inability to obtain a passport76. The government and the Constitutional Court continue 
to uphold this requirement, in effect continuing the policy of Lithuanization of family 
names in a bizarre mirror image of the Polonisation of Lithuanian names conducted by 
Poland during the times when it dominated parts of Lithuania77. Taking into account such 
effects of the enforcement of the monopoly of the state language in the public sphere, I 
maintain that we should remain skeptical when faced with claims that unequivocally 
ascribe state language to the civic dimension. 
Other than the question of language, the designation of ethnic vs. civic keywords 
in the codebook is quite mainstream and thus helps avoid too fine of a tuning to match the 
peculiarities of the case and provide a broader analytical purchase. Laborious coding and 
re-checking was conducted three times at different dates to ensure consistency of coding 
across cases, which was equal to 1 (identical coding every time). 
4.2.3.1.3. Coding intensity and valence. Intensity, a popular category in content 
analysis research (see Berelson 1971 [1952]: 160, Gottschalk, Winget and Gleser 1969, 
Neuendorf 2002: 97), is measured by counting verbs in context: “must”, “need”, “have to”, 
“emphasize” vs. “may”, “could”, “mention”, “note”, as well as looking for adjective or 
adverb modifiers, such as “deviant”, “unacceptable” and the like (see Appendix A for the 
full dictionary of coding). In my research, I combine the measurement of intensity with the 
measurement of negative or positive evaluation in order to be able to give weights to ethnic 
and civic utterances. Depending on the intensity and the direction of evaluation of each 
                                                 
76 For example, my husband‘s family name, Grzeskowiak, which happens to be Polish-American, could be 
spelled „Gžeškoviak“ in Lithuanian based on pronunciation, or at the very least would have the letter „w“ 
replaced with a „v“ and would effectively differ from the rest of the family. 
77 My last name, Verseckaitė, contains a letter „c“, which was not there originally, due to the Polonisation 
of its spelling. 
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unit under measurement, it is assigned a score, where -2 means intense negative, -1 means 
moderate negative, 1 means moderate positive, and 2 means intense positive. A 0 on this 
scale allows us to single out paragraphs where there is no mention of dimensions in 
question. Certain scholars (see Krippendorf 1980; North et al. 1963) suggest that the value 
“0” in scales of evaluation and intensity should be assigned not to the absence, but to the 
statistical mode of the studied dimension. However, in the case of the rulings of a 
Constitutional Court a contrary choice is justified in that, first, it serves the purpose of 
measuring the presence of dimensions of interest together with their valence and intensity, 
and, second, it helps to control subjectivity by allowing the coding to be more automatized 
and less dependent on individual perception bias. Whatever shortcomings the coding 
scheme may have, it serves the basic purpose of the research, as it is consistent across cases, 
thus allowing for comparisons of trends in increase or decrease of the presence and valence 
of dimensions under scrutiny. 
4.2.3.1.4. Unit of measurement. My initial plan was to use a clause (a unit of 
meaning that can serve as a stand-alone statement containing a subject and a term) as a unit 
of measurement, which is recommended as the single most basic unit of meaning that can 
be discerned in the flow of communication by Gottschalk and his collaborators (e.g. see 
Gottschalk, Winget and Gleser 1969; Gottschalk 1995). But after initial scanning of the 
texts of rulings such a recommendation proved unfeasible to follow – Gottschalk’s 
methodological recommendations are mostly formulated for psychological research, 
directed at measurements of a person’s natural speech, while the language of the rulings of 
a Constitutional Court is far more verbose and is not easily broken down into single-
meaning clauses. Consequently, I decided to use the unit of measurement that is a popular 
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unit in research of political communication – a paragraph. This may seem like a mechanic 
approach, but it is, first, conducive to quantitative measurements of the text, enabling 
relatively straightforward comparison of the presence, frequency and intensity of 
dimensions under consideration, and, second, paragraphs in a legal document do constitute 
an actual unit of meaning. Berelson (1971 [1952]: 135-136) provides a useful clarification: 
the keywords are the recording unit, and the paragraph is the context unit, enabling to 
assign valence to the utterance. 
The rulings were first divided according to their standard structure – introduction, 
the first part where the arguments of the institutions or persons addressing the Court are 
laid out, the second part where the Court lays out its argumentations, and the conclusion. 
Only the second part, where one finds the actual thoughts of the Constitutional Court, is 
coded and measured as a relevant source of information about the opinions of the 
Constitutional Court, because the first part does not represent the reasoning of the judges, 
but rather is a summary of the arguments presented by the petitioners and other parties to 
the case, and the introduction and conclusion summarize the relevant legislation instead of 
presenting arguments. If a paragraph contains both sides of the continuum, each of them is 
coded. Finally, since the rulings are of quite varying sizes (from 8 to 76 pages), I calculate 
relative frequencies in order to achieve comparability. 
4.2.3.2. Findings of the content analysis of the rulings of the Constitutional Court. 
The results of pattern analysis (North et al. 1963: Ch.7) of the five rulings can be 
summarized in Tables 1-3 and Figures 1-6 (see Appendix B). 
Two conclusions are readily observable. First, there indeed is a tendency of increase 
in relative and absolute negativity towards the “ethnic” dimension. Only the deviant case 
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of the ruling of November 11, 1998, is marked by the spike in the intensity and valence of 
paragraphs with “ethnic” keywords, explanation of which goes beyond quantitative textual 
analysis and has to do with one of the targets of this ruling – local politicians in regions 
traditionally populated by ethnic minorities which settled there during times when those 
regions were occupied by one or another neighboring country. In fact, this precise 1998 
ruling was instrumental in the early stages of my research in drawing the attention to the 
dimension that is not subsumable under ethnic nor under civic headings and that required 
an addition to the coding scheme – the issue of stateness. In that sense, this dissertation is 
a theory-building exercise, as its main theoretical contribution was derived based on the 
cues in the empirical data.  
Overall, content analysis appears for the most part to confirm the tendencies in 
change of valence and intensity of the “ethnic” vs. the “civic” dimension over time that are 
consistent with the hypothesis of anti-ethnic influence of the process of integration into the 
West. On the other hand, we should note that the more directly operationalized 
“international” dimension does not exhibit any clear directional tendency. Also, 
“international” keywords are usually mentioned in different paragraphs than either the 
“ethnic” or the “civic” ones, so it is not possible to establish a clear picture of correlations 
on a paragraph level, although the few paragraphs that do contain both dimensions under 
scrutiny suggest that there is indeed a correlation between negative valence of “ethnic” and 
positive valence of “civic” in instances where the Constitutional Court calls upon 
international norms to justify its argument. 
The drop in references to the “international” dimension in the rulings of November 
11, 1998, and of December 30, 2003 that counteracts the expected longitudinal increase in 
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the positive reference to the “international” dimension can be understood in conjunction 
with their topic – a sharply defined issue of politicians’ loyalty to the state. In fact, the 
references to independence and statehood allow us to go beyond the straightjacket of the 
“ethnic” vs. “civic” stereotypes and remind us that there is more to the situation of the 
postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe, bringing us back to the key 
proposal of this dissertation – the fundamental role of stateness concerns in citizenship 
regulation.  
The difference in the frequency of keywords associated with stateness and those 
associated with the international dimension does not exhibit a clear tendency in either 
direction and is more dependent on the specific subject of the rulings under investigation 
and the relative degree to which they lend themselves to invoking international norms as 
opposed to being inherent to the definition of statehood. Granted, Constitutional Courts 
can be expected to be dominated by a vision informed by the concerns of stateness rather 
than international norms, as demonstrated by the notorious case of the German 
Constitutional Court which saw itself as a legitimate challenger to the EU on behalf of the 
German people (see Eriksen and Fossum 2011, Komárek 2013, Miller 2014, Wendel 
2011). Yet the difference in intensity and valence of the “ethnic” dimension, despite similar 
topics and targets, is evident between the rulings of the Constitutional Court that were 
passed before and after Lithuania’s EU accession process officially began, providing 
support to the hypothesis of the influence of Euro-integration. The fact that the trend 
continued after achieving EU membership lends support to the supposition of sufficient 
socialization into the EU norms of non-discrimination which were being observed even 
without external incentives. 
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Content analysis’ “capacity to render narratives into a countable form” (Shapiro 
and Markoff 1998: 23) has served its purpose of triangulation, and this exercise has helped 
to establish with further confidence the decline of valence of the ethnic dimension of 
citizenship and the increase of valence of the civic dimension of citizenship in the rulings 
of the Lithuanian Constitutional Court in conjunction with the process of Euro-integration. 
In addition, it has helped to elucidate the centrality of stateness concerns to citizenship 
regulation that I advocate. The dimension of stateness has a much more pronounced 
presence in the rulings of the Constitutional Court than any other of the dimensions that 
were measured. The relative frequency of the keywords pertaining to the dimension of 
statehood and of the international dimension cannot be said to reveal any stable directional 
pattern, thus providing additional support to the criticism of postnationalist theories that 
proclaim the decline of the relevance of the nation-state.  
The prominence of stateness in the rulings of the Constitutional Court serves to 
highlight the fact that stateness concerns are so crucial to citizenship regulation that they 
can even cause deviation from the mainstream assumptions of what constitutes an 
emigration country’s interests. The widely accepted idea that an emigration state seeks 
diasporic dual citizenship in order to exert political control and encourage remittances is 
fundamentally challenged by the outcome of the Lithuanian case. Furthermore, attention 
to the dimension of statehood suggests that the focus on security which characterizes the 
newest wave of citizenship studies is too narrow to capture the logic behind a restrictive 
backlash against dual citizenship and would benefit from paying attention to the more 
fundamental questions of stateness and national identity that underlie what may 
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superficially be termed security concerns. Instead, I propose conceptualizing these 
symptoms as the stateness maintenance regime. 
The close analysis of textual evidence conducted in this chapter helps elucidate the 
way in which the imperative of independent statehood can start devouring its own children, 
which is a fitting title for what is happening in the Lithuanian case. With their hands tied 
by the international norms of non-discrimination, which in this case turned into non-
privileging of co-ethnics, the elites are ready to pay the price of losing a large part of the 
nation in their pursuit to stave off potential encroachments by historical enemies. 
Juxtaposing the curious case of dual citizenship with the emigrational demographics of 
Lithuania in the previous chapters highlighted the theoretical puzzle that this case presents; 
and the discussion of identitarian implications of European integration and the process-
tracing of the debates surrounding the 2006 ruling on citizenship regulation in this chapter 
allowed us to deconstruct this puzzle into potential ideas- and interests-based lines of 
reasoning, if only to demonstrate the shortsightedness of an either/or logic when it comes 
to adjudicating between them. I would be inclined to agree with Blyth (2007: 776), who 
suggests that an attempt to disentangle ideas and interests, which are a compound, may 
obscure more than it may explain. Ultimately, my research lends additional support to the 
relevance of what McCann (2009: 835) refers to as relational rather than linear causality, 
and, instead of confirming the charge of “ideational sugarcoating” (Hirschl 2009: 828) of 
interests, demonstrates that constitutional judges are indeed faced with “tragic choices” 
(Graber 2005: 448) and boxed into a corner by institutionalized, but far from harmonized, 
ideas. The Lithuanian case demonstrates how the conjunction of norms that prohibit 
privileging a particular ethnicity on the one hand, and the imperatives of stateness on the 
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other hand, prompted the elites to pay the price of losing a considerable part of the nation 
in their pursuit to stave off encroachments by historical enemies projected onto ethnic 
minorities. It thus provides a corrective to claims like Checkel’s (1999: 108) that in a clash 
between international and domestic norms the latter matter more, and presents a more 
poignant understanding of agency in ideational struggles. 
However, the question remains whether such a paradoxical mutual impact of the 
hegemony of international norms of nondiscrimination and stateness concerns is unique to 
the Lithuanian case, or whether it has broader comparative purchase. In order to address 
this question, in the next chapter I overview dual citizenship regulation trends in various 
regions of the world, paying special attention to Lithuania’s most obvious counterparts – 
European countries, – but also conducting a more in-depth analysis of South Korea – a case 
that is sufficiently far removed from Lithuania to be a formidable test of how well my 
theory travels across regions. 
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Chapter 5. Comparative implications 
 
This dissertation started with a puzzle of a country whose citizenship policies have 
become contrary to what the mainstream citizenship theories would predict for a country 
of its attributes. Thus an in-depth analysis of the context and content of the Lithuanian 
citizenship discourse and regulation became a testing grounds for unpacking the claims of 
those theories and their implications. Having conducted the empirical data analysis, it is 
time to revisit the theoretical background and inquire into the broader applicability of the 
propositions developed in this dissertation – namely, that the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship is at the same time delegitimized, but also increasingly emphasized as an 
unintended consequence of the decoupling of rights and citizenship, and that we should 
approach citizenship as a boundary maintenance regime employed by countries facing 
challenges to stateness, which in the age of globalization pretty much includes everyone. 
To establish the extent of comparative purchase of these suggestions, in this chapter 
I review the trends in citizenship regulation around the world, paying special attention to 
dual citizenship and naturalization requirements. I also conduct an in-depth comparison 
with the case of dual citizenship in South Korea, another ethnonationalist postocolonial 
state with a large diaspora, and test the fit of the main categories of my explanation: 
hegemony of international norms, the reinforcement of the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship, and stateness concerns exacerbated by postcolonialism and migration on the 
other. I conclude that the increasing availability of dual citizenship should not be 
uncritically accepted as an indicator of postnationalism, and that a more complex outlook, 
which takes into account naturalization requirements and the discourse associated with dual 
citizenship, points towards a retrenchment of the identitarian dimension of citizenship and 
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the role of citizenship as a boundary maintenance regime in response to the challenges that 
both postcolonial experiences and globalization pose for stateness. 
5.1. Revisiting the theoretical background 
Facing an empirical puzzle that needed solving, I turned to the dominant theories 
in the field of citizenship studies. One of the major theories developed in the past several 
decades is the so called liberalization/ convergence hypothesis. It claims that there is a 
trend of convergence among different countries’ citizenship policies due to their shared 
realities and mutual learning, and that the convergence is moving into the direction of 
liberalization, epitomized by increasing availability of dual citizenship and decreasing 
relevance of identitarian characteristics in citizenship ascription. These theories are more 
like clusters of a mix of both descriptions and prescriptions, but ultimately they stem from 
the reality of increased diversity that is caused by migration and the need to accommodate 
that diversity and are either based on postnationalist or multiculturalist approaches.  
The postnationalist ideas are based on European integration, where the freedom of 
movement in the common market has brought about the decoupling of people, state and 
territory. According to this line of reasoning, citizenship is becoming less relevant due to 
the international human rights regime and the availability of more rights to people without 
citizenship (Jacobson 1996, Soysal 1994). Another approach that can serve as a foundation 
of the liberalization/ convergence hypothesis is multiculturalism. It also accentuates that 
ascriptive identities are less relevant due to increased diversity in states, but here 
citizenship remains relevant as the main tool of incorporation and participation in the 
polity. However, both of these approaches converge on the idea that citizenship is less 
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associated with national identity that the models of citizenship that are based on the 
conception of nationhood as discussed by Brubaker (1992).  
Most of these theories were developed with a view of the Western immigration 
states. However, when it comes to dual citizenship, the hypothesis of 
liberalization/convergence is readily ascribed to emigration states as well. They are 
expected to expand dual citizenship to ensure the links with their diaspora, even if the 
liberalization is asymmetrical and only applied to co-ethnics. Therefore, Lithuania’s 
restrictive turn provided an especially interesting case in the foreground of these theories.  
I proposed to think of the phenomenon of the decoupling of rights and citizenship 
from another angle: once citizenship is stripped of its rights dimension, what is left is the 
identitarian dimension, which thus gets inadvertently emphasized. The analysis of the 
Lithuanian discourse on dual citizenship demonstrated how this dynamic works in relation 
to the diaspora who claim that they already have all the rights that they need, but what they 
really want is to feel that they belong and to be able to identify with their ethnic homeland.  
I hypothesized that a similar logic operates on the side of the immigration state. 
Rights are attributed to migrants to a large extent via the status of denizenship. (Hamar 
1990). However, the only fully secure status (or at least mostly secure from deportation) is 
full citizenship. When we look at the process of naturalization, the policies and debates 
related to citizenship acquisition, we can see that the relevance of identity from the 
perspective of the host state has not only not disappeared, but in many cases has been 
reinforced both by the aforementioned disaggregation of the rights and belonging 
dimensions of the conception of citizenship, and by the desire to maintain the dominant 
local culture and to varying degrees assimilate the immigrants.  
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The fact that the Lithuanian dual citizenship discourse consistently shows a very 
strong inclination towards dual citizenship for co-ethnic emigrants, and yet such a 
possibility was cut off by the Constitutional Court, which heretofore had not shied away 
from acknowledging the legitimacy of treating the descendants of interwar Lithuanian 
citizens differently than any other claimants to citizenship, prompted me to look for an 
additional variable which would help explain the unexpectedly restrictive outcome. The 
hegemony of international norms which delegitimize discrimination on the basis of identity 
in citizenship regulation is not a sufficient explanation in itself, because it could either lead 
to the availability of dual citizenship for everyone, or for no one. I argued that a full 
explanation requires taking into account Lithuanian experience as a postcolonial state that 
has experienced foreign domination and is conditioned to be concerned about its stateness. 
Perceiving a threat of co-optation of dual citizenship by the agents of foreign aggression, 
and yet unable to differentiate between potential foreign aggressors and co-ethnic migrants, 
Lithuania chooses to give up the latter as a price for containing the former.  
Such a political constellation where the possibility to privilege the titular nation in 
its postcolonial state is again imperiled, although in a roundabout way, by foreign 
domination, be it the West or the East, is met with a continuous undercurrent of the 
perception of unfairness and a search for ways to circumvent it. The feedback loop in which 
Lithuania has been stuck since the Novemebr 2006 Constitutional Court ruling highlights 
the intermeshing of the identitarian and stateness dimensions. In this chapter I also want to 
test whether this proposition can be applied beyond the realm of postcolonial experiences. 
I base my hunch on the idea that it is possible to interpret immigration as a threat to 
stateness due to the constant pressure on citizenship. If citizenship is the interface between 
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immigration control and societal integration (Brochman 2002), then it is possible to apply 
the condition of the intermeshed concerns with stateness and identity to the countries of 
immigration as well.  
In sum, I proposed that, instead of accepting the postnational thesis of decreasing 
importance of citizenship, we need to pay attention to the unintended consequences of 
decoupling of rights and citizenship in that its identitarian dimension gets re-emphasized, 
and hinted that the imperative to continuously police the boundaries of stateness using 
citizenship regulation may be relevant to more than just postcolonial countries. In the 
following sections, I test how well these propositions resonate with the situation in various 
parts of the world. 
5.2. Dual citizenship around the world 
Dual citizenship regulation is commonly used as an indicator of liberalization or 
restrictiveness of a country’s citizenship regime. One of the main arguments of the 
liberalization/convergence thesis is the increased availability of dual citizenship across the 
world. In this section, I try to answer the question whether such a tendency can be 
established, and whether it should be a synonym of liberalization. In this part, I use 
secondary data and rely on the research conducted by other scholars, therefore the 
conclusions should be taken with caution due to the plurality of approaches and 
methodologies which make systematic comparison harder. However, it is possible to still 
discern broader tendencies in the development of dual citizenship.  
I begin with a brief overview of citizenship regulation trends in the region on which 
the postnational liberalization/convergence thesis is essentially based – Western 
immigration states – in an attempt to discern whether it still lends support to postnationalist 
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proclamations. Then I look at Central and Eastern Europe and post-Soviet states as the 
closest reference point for contextualizing the Lithuanian case and tentatively testing the 
applicability of its insights. Afterwards I turn to broader brushstrokes and briefly review 
the development of dual citizenship in other parts of the world. Since the ideas of the 
liberalization/convergence thesis and the political contentiousness of citizenship and 
migration make sense mostly in a democratic environment, I bracket those areas where 
democratic effectiveness could be questioned. I finish my world tour with a look at Asia, 
and take a more in-depth look at the case of South Korea, whose dual citizenship 
experiences are especially conducive for the evaluation of the comparative purchase of the 
conditions of possibility distilled by the Lithuanian case. 
5.2.1. The Western world. 
The liberalization/ convergence thesis, as much of citizenship studies in general, 
was formulated based on the experience of Western immigration states. In this subsection, 
I overview comparative research on citizenship regulation in these countries, paying 
special attention to the argument of convergence and to the main litmus tests of the 
liberalization postulate, namely, access to dual citizenship and the character of 
naturalization requirements.  
5.2.1.1. Western European states. The foundational pronouncements of the 
liberalization/ convergence hypothesis appeared in the early 1990s. Its proponents 
analyzed the experience of European integration and the position of migrants, and claimed 
to identify a trend whereby more and more rights were awarded to a person on the basis of 
domicile rather than citizenship (Soysal 1994, Jacobson 1995). Another part of this 
hypothesis stemmed from either the outlook on European integration and the impact of 
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internal border abolishment and establishment of common external borders on the 
harmonization of migration policies (Faist and Ette 2007, Vink 2005), or attribute the trend 
towards convergence to similar experiences of migration pressures (Weil 2001), which are 
intimately related to citizenship policies and therefore should have an impact towards 
greater convergence even if citizenship firmly remains in the domestic domain of 
competence. 
As a classical example of testing the liberalization/ convergence hypothesis, 
Howard (2005, 2009) conducted a comparative study of the trends in restrictiveness of 
citizenship policies in the EU countries from 1980s until 2008 by comparing them based 
on a citizenship policy index (CPI) composed of the availability of ius soli and dual 
citizenship for immigrants, as well as the relative difficulty of naturalization requirements 
such as the length of residence – all classical elements of the liberalization/convergence 
thesis. He found that, on a scale from 0 to 6, Western European countries in 2008 ranged 
from a very liberal Belgium (score 5.50) to a very restrictive Austria (score 0.00), with 5 
countries considered restrictive, 2 moderate and 8 liberal. The range of the scores was 
ultimately the same as in the 1980s, but Howard (2009) definitely identified a trend towards 
liberalization in that two countries had moved from restrictiveness into the medium range, 
and all four countries that occupied the medium range in the 1980s had moved to the liberal 
category. Thus Howard (2009) concluded that we can indeed witness both a trend of 
liberalization and relative convergence, although he expressed caution on both accounts 
due to the increasing use of civic integration tests and the remaining gap between the most 
restrictive and the most liberal countries. 
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The liberalization/convergence hypothesis has been increasingly challenged by 
scholars who put a greater emphasis on either a lack of convergence or a move towards 
increased restrictiveness. Those who criticize the notion of convergence mostly focus on 
the persistence of national models of citizenship. Since Brubaker’s (1992a) seminal book, 
the notion of different models of citizenship and nationhood became an accepted part of 
the discourse on citizenship regulation in Europe. He distinguished a more ethnic German 
model and a more civic French model. For now let us bracket the fact that the civic model 
appeared more assimilationist than the ethnic one. Other authors have engaged in similar 
pursuits to categorize the types of citizenship regimes, but most of them fall into a similar 
discourse of the civic-ethnic elements and are mostly derived based on the relation of 
citizenship regulation to identity and diversity.  
A representative example can be found in Koopmans et al. (2005) who construct 
four ideal-typical conceptions of citizenship based on two dimensions: first, whether access 
to citizenship is connected to ethnic criteria or not, and, second, whether cultural pluralism 
is acknowledged or, conversely, cultural monism prevails. Countries that grant cultural 
rights to various groups but do not connect access to citizenship with ethnic criteria are 
labeled as multiculturalist, for example, the UK and the Netherlands at the time. Those 
which do not acknowledge ethnic criteria either on the individual or a group level are 
considered universalist, approximated by France. These two types of citizenship 
conception are more characteristic of former colonial powers that have had to accept 
diversity from the outset. If a country does not recognize cultural plurality and institutes 
ethnic criteria for citizenship, it is considered assimilationist, for example, Germany. 
Finally, a country which would acknowledge cultural group rights, but would use ethnic 
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criteria for access to citizenship, would be labeled as segregationist, epitomized in the 
“guestworker” philosophy. Koopmans et al. (2005) acknowledged that these models are 
not static, but rather move within the conceptual space in response to political pressures. 
This study argued that the general trend in the dimension of ethnic vs. civic individual 
criteria for citizenship is movement towards the civic pole, lending support to the 
liberalization/convergence hypothesis, while at the same there is a divergence in societal 
immigrant integration in terms of cultural group rights brought about by the post-9/11 
atmosphere and examples of the failures of migrant integration in the Netherlands in the 
1990s. Thus, when it comes to dual citizenship, etc., Koopmans et al. (2005) could be 
considered among the supporters of liberal/ convergence hypothesis. However, the shift 
towards the civic-universalist model comes with integration pressures that shade into 
assimilationism with their language and civic integration, or even cultural knowledge, 
requirements for naturalization. Therefore, Koopmans et al. (2005) can be considered a 
good example of a trend towards more subtle scholarly approach that qualifies the 
liberalization/ convergence thesis.  
An especially large study of citizenship policies in the EU countries was conducted 
by IMISCOE, a team of researchers funded by the EU that produced several volumes of 
analysis in the late 2000s (e.g. Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and Waldrauch, 2006a, 
2006b). They suggest that the liberalization/ convergence thesis should be qualified both 
due to increasing application of “thicker” requirements for naturalization and to nonlinear 
development of dual citizenship acceptance which fluctuates with the changes in a 
country’s politics and government. These scholars also point towards a continuing trend of 
national variety in citizenship policies. In an empirical study of immigrant citizenship 
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requirement trends from 1980s until 2008 in 10 European countries, Koopmans et al. 
(2012) drew a similar conclusion and stated that immigrant rights have stagnated since the 
early 2000s, and that there remains large variation among states’ scores. 
However, a large part of criticism for the liberalization/convergence hypothesis 
comes from those scholars who posit a reverse trend: they claim that there indeed is a trend 
of convergence, only it is moving in the direction of restrictiveness rather than 
liberalization (Joppke 2007a, 2008; Joppke and Morawska 2003). This argument is focused 
on the hardening of naturalization requirements, mostly expressed in civic integration tests 
that immigrants are required to take. When such requirements are present, access to dual 
citizenship does not mean that there are fewer identitarian requirements placed upon a 
person – to the contrary, the person is facing double identitarian pressures from both 
countries.  
Some scholars argue that migrant integration policies are tentatively converging 
towards multiculturalism (Schain 2010), while others posit a backlash against 
multiculturalism (Alexander 2013). However, there is a growing body of comparative 
research on the trend towards increasing “thickness” of the naturalization requirements 
across countries as a counterpart to immigration control (Carrera 2009, Joppke 2007a, van 
Oers 2013; van Oers, Ersbøll and Kostakopoulou 2010). While basic language 
requirements have been more common (in his comparison of 25 countries’ citizenship 
regulations, Weil (2001) found 17 which had a language requirement and only 4 which had 
a history test, 2 of them being the entrenched ethnonationalists Estonia and Latvia), there 
is an increase in both the level of required linguistic proficiency and the additional 
requirement of knowledge about a country’s history and culture. Goodman (2010) develops 
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a civic integration index (CIVIX) to measure the degree to which achievement of desired 
status is made conditional on language proficiency, knowledge about the country and 
liberal values, a trend that was started by the Dutch in 1998 and quickly caught on. She 
argues that a linear additive approach to naturalization requirements employed by some 
scholars leads to overstatement of their restrictiveness and suggests confining the label of 
restrictiveness to the dimension of access (availability of ius soli, dual citizenship), while 
treating the knowledge requirements as a measure of the degree of difficulty, depending on 
where they are applied on the immigration and integration timeline – the gate of entry, of 
settlement or of naturalization. Goodman (2010) compares the amount and strength of civic 
integration requirements in 1997 vs. in 2009 and shows a definite increase in 6 EU 
countries (Denmark, Germany first and foremost, followed by Austria, the Netherlands, 
the UK, and France), while 4 show no change and 4 others exhibit minimal change. As 
Goodman (2010) suggests, countries with liberal policies either do not consider 
immigration to be relevant to their policy making, or consider mandatory requirements for 
integration to be counterproductive. Countries like the Netherlands, France and the UK, 
which in Koopmans’ et al. (2005) study were considered to not have cultural requirements 
for an individual to access citizenship, are now among the most demanding countries, 
which could be interpreted as a symptom of the purported “failure” of both 
multiculturalism and universalism. Such tendencies lend support to the argument that there 
is a trend towards treating citizenship as a reward for assimilation, again related to 
reinforcing the identitarian dimension of citizenship.  
In my view, these developments in the citizenship policies of the Western European 
states challenge the liberalization/ convergence thesis, and lend support to my argument 
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about the increasingly identitarian conception of citizenship. Scholars increasingly agree 
that citizenship policies in Western European states are affected by multidirectional factors 
that range from liberalizing trends like ius soli provisions for second or third generation 
immigrants to restrictive tendencies like “thicker” integration tests (Vink 2013). 
Skepticism toward the pronouncements of postnationalism is further supported by the 
persistence of the differentiated treatment based on origin, such as the preferential 
naturalization conditions for people from Spanish-speaking Latin American countries in 
Spain, which in other aspects is considered a quite restrictive citizenship regime (Fitonella 
and La Barbera 2013). Is it possible to find support for the liberalization/ convergence 
thesis in another immigration environment with purportedly less exclusionary identities? 
Let us turn to the traditional immigration/ settler states with that question. 
5.2.1.2. Immigration/settler states. The immigration/ settler countries, like Canada, 
Australia, and the United States, have always been considered to hold civic conceptions of 
nationhood. Their citizenship regimes are similar enough to consider the liberalization/ 
convergence hypothesis to be at least partially true in that it suggests that the similarity in 
policies is shaped by similar experiences of immigration pressures (Martin 2000). These 
countries are contrasted to Western Europe as much more accepting of immigration as part 
and parcel of national identity (van Reekum, Duyvendak, and Bertossi 2012). While it may 
not be wise to be overly optimistic about these countries’ acceptance of migrants, there are 
indeed qualitative differences from the reluctant European countries of immigration. 
One of the key differences between Western Europe and the settler states is that the 
latter actively encourage immigrants to naturalize (Bauböck, Ersbøll, Groenendijk and 
Waldrauch, 2006a, 2006b). Naturalization requirements are similar and relatively 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
245 
 
manageable, provided you can get access to a status that puts you on the citizenship path, 
installing the legality of one’s migration status as a core component of citizenship discourse 
and regulation (Aleinikoff 2000; Martin 2000). While it would be naïve to accept the 
official image of the settler states as fully neutral, considering the dominance of Anglo-
Saxon language and culture, racism issues, and selectivity of migration, ethnic immigration 
has become a thing of the past (Joppke 2005). Canada is considered to be the closest there 
is to a true multicultural approach to citizenship. Australia has made a sharp turn since the 
1970s by discarding the “White Australia” migration policy and introducing multicultural 
measures. Despite the symbolic content of the citizen’s oath, the USA does not in reality 
mandate a naturalizing citizen to give up on their homeland citizenship, supported by a 
Supreme Court ruling that facilitated opening the way for dual citizenship (Aleinikoff 
2000; Martin 2000).  
However, contrary to postnationalist belief in the declining importance of 
citizenship due to the decoupling of rights and citizenship, the way the traditional 
immigration states challenge the liberalization/convergence approach is by reaffirmations 
of the primacy of citizenship. One of the classic signals was the 1996 Welfare Act in the 
USA which went against the postnationalist predictions and excluded permanent residents 
from certain social benefits, resulting in a heightened sense of vulnerability and a flurry of 
naturalization (Correa 2002; Martin 2002). Immigration has become one of the most 
contentious issues in the United States, thus reinforcing migrants’ feelings of insecurity 
and prompting their pursuit of citizenship as the ultimate guarantee against deportation and 
a channel of participation in making such political decisions like the retrenchment of the 
relationship between rights and citizenship.  
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
246 
 
As far as identitarian concerns, the increased emphasis by certain societal groups 
on the primacy of the English language could be seen as a symptomatic development 
(Zollberg and Long 1999). The debates on citizenship, especially those that refer to the 
availability of dual citizenship as a facilitator of naturalization, often focus on questioning 
the loyalty of these dual citizens and lament the instrumental nature of their approach to 
host country citizenship (Martin 2000). A lot of scholarship on dual citizenship has been 
concentrated on the situation of various groups in the immigration countries, inquiring 
whether dual citizenship helps or hinders participation, and in which country (), and 
highlighting the acknowledgement of multiple identities by the transnational migrants. The 
perspective of the immigration states is not always benevolent in this regard, especially if 
the other culture is perceived as so different that true loyalty and identification with both 
of them is a zero sum game. This kind of logic is behind much of the movement towards 
the “thickening” civic integration requirements due to Europe’s concern with third country 
migrants, particularly Muslim immigration. A potential for a similar reaction is evident in 
the settler countries as well, as evidenced by the introduction of the Australian citizenship 
test. The government introduced this test in an attempt to reassert the type of Australian 
identity promoted under the “White Australia” policy and portrayed it as a response to the 
combined factors of necessary labour immigration, global terrorism and the perceived 
failure of multiculturalism (Fozdar and Spittles 2009). The perception of the failure of 
multiculturalism seems to be a characteristic common to right-wing politicians both in 
Europe and in Australia, while a left-wing government would reassert its value and 
application (Tavan 2012). This harkens back to the scholars who suggested that 
partisanship should not be ignored in favour of national traditions when it comes to 
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explaining approaches to migration and citizenship, but for the purposes of this paper we 
need to note that multiculturalism does not remain unchallenged in immigration countries. 
The traditional immigration/ settler countries are the classic locus of treating dual 
citizenship as a tool for immigrant incorporation and should in theory be the most neutral 
towards the identitarian dimension, however, the scholarship and the high-strung public 
debates help underline the fact that migrants’ loyalty and identification with the host 
country is a major concern in dual citizenship (see e.g. Renshon 2005). By highlighting the 
close link between migration, citizenship, and national identity of the host state, even the 
traditional immigration countries suggest that we should treat the 
liberalization/convergence thesis with caution. 
5.2.2. Postcommunist states. 
If Western states have been seen as the epitome of postnationalist developments, 
then postcommunist states have been portrayed as their conceptual opposites. Central and 
Eastern Europe has been perceived as the “other” of the Western Europe, as the wildness 
which needs to be tamed (see papers in Korek 2007), and the first and foremost area of 
concern was the fear of ethnonationalism in the region. The conditionality of EU 
membership and the monitoring of various international organizations were aimed at 
ensuring minority rights in the region, with the hope that the West will have a positive 
effect and nudge CEE countries towards more civic policies. Taken as a whole, are 
citizenship policies in postcommunist countries indeed ethnonationalist, has there been a 
trend towards greater inclusion, and is there a difference between the postcommunist 
countries with a different degree of experiencing EU conditionality and concomitant 
normative pressure? 
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5.2.2.1. Central and Eastern Europe. Systematic comparison of dual citizenship 
policies in the region is hampered by a relative lack of large scale comparative studies. 
Instead, the bulk of the scholarship on this region has been in the form of singular case 
studies based on the expertise of the author on the history and politics of a particular 
country. A common trend in the study of citizenship in CEE is the attention to kin-state 
politics (Bauböck 2007). The attention received by different countries is disproportionate. 
By far the most popular object of study is Hungary and its minorities in the neighbouring 
countries, but similar kin-state politics have been observed between Romania and Moldova 
and between various Balkan states. The Baltic states of Estonia and Latvia have gotten a 
certain amount of attention due to their problems with the Russian minorities.  
Even the larger volumes on CEE countries, like Bauböck, Perchinig, and Sievers 
(2009), tend to be mostly parallel studies of different countries. However, it is possible to 
glean the scholar’s evaluation of the citizenship policy trends in the region. One the most 
influential sources of the evaluation of relative restrictiveness or inclusiveness of 
citizenship policy is Howard’s (2006; 2009) study which found 8 new EU members to be 
restrictive and only 2 could be considered on the lower end of moderate (Bulgaria and 
Slovakia). Howard (2009) concludes that citizenship regulation in this region is restrictive, 
certainly more than in Western Europe. Howard’s citizenship policy index is especially 
relevant for our purposes because it gives significant weight to the regulation of dual 
citizenship, more specifically, its availability for immigrants. Dumbravă (2007) extended 
the application of Howard’s citizenship policy index to 16 postcommunist countries in the 
period of 1990s-2000s and found that, according to this model, 4 countries remained 
restrictive, 12 were at the lower end of the moderate, and only Moldova experienced a 
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move from restrictiveness to a medium regime, while Romania got even more restrictive 
in terms of dual citizenship. Overall there was little liberalization in the region except for 
some rules regarding citizenship of children. Based on these studies, Lithuania has always 
been the most restrictive CEE country along with Slovenia, but it cannot be considered an 
exception in the region, merely an end of the spectrum.  
The scholars have tried to explain the restrictiveness of citizenship policies in this 
region by referring to the specifics of their historical circumstances, such as the changes in 
borders that do not match ethnic group locations, the struggles for independence, etc. 
(Howard 2009; Liebich 2000, 2009). In that sense, my research is not a radical departure 
from the previous scholarship, however, my contribution is to propose a unified 
understanding of these circumstances by conceptualizing them as concerns with stateness. 
Furthermore, I also contribute to the part of scholarship on CEE citizenship which 
emphasizes the way these countries can take advantage of EU integration for their own 
agenda. For the most part, this line of reasoning can be found in the well-developed inquiry 
into the relationship between ethnic minorities and their kin-states (Batory 2010; Csergő 
and Goldgeier 2004; Csergő and Goldgeier 2005; Fowler 2002; Iordachi 2004; Kemp 2006; 
Sievers 2009; Tóth 2003; Udrea 2014; Waterbury 2008). The Lithuanian case demonstrates 
that EU integration may be used subversively instead of expansively: faced with the 
impossibility of continuing the ethnonationalist citizenship regime due to the hegemony of 
the norm of nondiscrimination, this norm was dovetailed with stateness concerns rather 
than expansion of inclusivity. Perhaps Lithuania is more afraid of Russia than most other 
CEE countries which maintained their formal independence under their own communist 
regimes; nevertheless, it warns us against uncritical acceptance of the idea that the West 
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has a liberalizing effect on the East. Let us turn to the other concentric circle to which our 
case belongs – the former republics of the Soviet Union – for another set of examples of 
the importance of stateness for countries that have experienced Russian domination. 
5.2.2.2. Former Soviet Union. The postcommunist region can be further split into 
those countries that belonged to the Soviet Union vs. those CEE countries that enjoyed at 
least nominal independence (discussed in the preceding section). Although the Baltic states 
are also ex-USSR countries, they are substantially different in that they are the only ones 
that enjoyed some independence during the 20th century. Therefore, since stateness is my 
central conceptual tool, it would seem to make sense to bracket the Baltic countries when 
talking about the former Soviet Union countries, due to the peculiar constellation of 
stateness in most countries which had experienced Russian colonization, but did not have 
previous stateness experience against which to contrast their postcolonial predicament. It 
is even more legitimate to treat the rest of the ex-USSR countries as postcolonial due to the 
role of Russian settlement as colonial elites during the times of Tsarist Russia and later as 
the main source of highly skilled labour during the Soviet times, especially in the Central 
Asian republics. Consequently, one of the main features of their post-independence 
situation was “accidental diasporas” (Brubaker 2000) of variously sized Russian 
minorities. In addition, the policy of Russification resulted in a situation where even a part 
of the country’s titular nationals spoke Russian instead of their ethnic native language. It 
is not surprising that regulation of citizenship in this region became inexorably intertwined 
with the countries’ relationship with Russia.  
As only Russia became a Soviet Union successor state, the rest of the republics 
were not obligated to grant citizenship to all former USSR nationals living in their territory 
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(UNHCR 1993). The way states took advantage of this relative freedom of choice was 
directly related to the degree of stateness legacy they could claim. The Baltic states that 
had been independent in the interwar period were adamant to institute a qualitative 
difference between the descendants of interwar citizens and those who arrived as part of 
the foreign occupation (Barrington 1995, Gelazis 2003, Ziemele 2005). Lithuania opted for 
the same zero option as the rest of the republics (with the exception regarding Red Army 
officers discussed in Chapter 4) thanks to a relatively manageable size of the ethnic 
minority population. However, the much more demographically challenged Estonia and 
Latvia instituted highly ethnonationalist citizenship regimes, denying Russian settlers a 
chance at automatic citizenship (which Lithuania could afford to offer due to the relatively 
small size of the ethnic minorities) and requiring them to pass language and civic 
knowledge tests. Furthermore, additional restrictions were instituted to weed out Russian 
loyalists. For example, the Latvian 1994 Law on Citizenship listed the types of persons 
who would not be eligible for citizenship even if they fulfil the naturalization requirements, 
which included those who arrived to Latvia as Soviet Army officers (similar to the rule in 
Lithuania discussed in the previous chapter), those who had been working with KGB, those 
who have propagated communist totalitarian ideas and those who have “turned against the 
Republic of Latvia’s independence, its democratic parliamentary state system or the 
existing state authority in Latvia, if such has been established by a court decree” (Gelazis 
2003: 51-52). This is an archetypal example of how concerns with stateness affect 
citizenship regulation. Gelazis (2003: 53) also notes how Estonia adopted multiple 
provisions for the rights of non-citizens as a counterpart to the intention to maintain a 
restrictive ethnonationalist citizenship regime. This is an example of the decoupling of 
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rights and identity going in tandem with the reinforcement of the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship. 
Mutual resentment between the titular Baltic populations who felt they were 
engaging in affirmative action, and the Russians who overnight fell from the position of a 
hegemon to a minority, has been somewhat mollified due to the pressure of the European 
institutions monitoring the progress and compliance with conditionality on the road of 
eurointegration, and although the citizenship regime retains its ethnonationalist 
characteristics, a large part of the Russian population has eventually gotten incorporated 
into the polity. Such direct incentive like membership conditionality was not available to 
the rest of the ex-USSR states. Therefore, despite the initial common starting point of 
granting citizenship to all permanent residents at the time of independence, the further 
development of citizenship regulation was to a large extent determined by the balance of 
the relationship between each state and Russia on the one hand, and the existence of a co-
ethnic diaspora on the other hand. This dynamic is especially relevant to the question of 
dual citizenship conditions, as they directly applied to such disparate groups of people.  
Makaryan (2006) analyzed the changes in citizenship laws of all 15 ex-USSR states 
and determined that they started out as relatively liberal and got more restrictive over time 
in terms of naturalization, especially since mid-1990s once the process of instituting 
independent lives of states was well established. He observed trends in increasing residency 
requirements and stricter demands in language tests, more countries took up testing the 
knowledge of the Constitution, and a minority even adopted history knowledge 
requirements. As he included the Baltic states in his analysis, we can see that the approach 
to citizenship regulation was not radically different among all the countries carrying the 
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legacy of Soviet rule and its main ingredient – experience of forcible suppression of 
ethnonationalism in favour of Russian hegemony. After independence, the majority of the 
postcommunist region could be characterized by a combination of mutually exacerbating 
nationalisms experienced by states engaged in internal nationalizing vs. states pursuing 
protective relationships with kin minorities in other states (Brubaker 2000).  
Shevel (2009) offers a different perspective and argues in favour of recognizing 
variety in the citizenship regulation among the former Soviet republics. She evaluated the 
laws in the 15 countries and found 7 of them to be of the civic and 8 of an ethnic variety, 
the latter ranging from the indefinite preservation of a right to citizenship for descendants 
of ethnic Lithuanians who would choose to come settle in their ancestral homeland, to a 
waiver of some naturalization requirements, such as income in Belarus or residency and 
even language in Kyrgyzstan. Shevel (2009) explained the differences among countries by 
the degree of contestation over national identity rather than by international influence, 
lending support to my proposal of treating citizenship laws as the nationhood boundary 
maintenance regime. In this region, the boundary has been drawn mostly depending on the 
degree of threat perceived from the Russians, whether it be a threat to the nationhood or to 
the personal power of dictators, and, as Shevel (2009) suggests, more civic laws arise from 
the inability of some countries to subdue their Russian populations and assert a titular 
ethnonational identity.  
 A characteristic example of the vicissitudes of post-USSR dual citizenship 
issues and their power relationship with the factor of Russia can be found in Turkmenistan. 
In 2003, Turkmenistan announced the end of the dual citizenship treaty it had signed with 
Russia in 1993 and ordered all Russian dual citizens to make a choice of their citizenship 
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within a couple months or automatically become only Turkmen citizens (Durdiyeva 2003). 
This bold move followed the presidents Niyazov and Putin signing a lucrative deal on 
providing Turkmen gas to Russia and provoked resentment among Russian politicians for 
selling out their compatriots aboard in exchange for gas (Torbakov 2003). The Russian 
parliament Duma defied Putin’s alleged agreement to the end of dual citizenship (he signed 
an agreement to stop granting it for new applicants (Eurasianet.org 2003)) and refused to 
ratify the cancellation of the 1993 treaty (Pannier 2003; Rejepova 2010; RFE/RL 2003; 
Torbakov 2003). Although the crackdown on dual passport holders subsided in 2004 with 
the retreat from exit visas (RFE/RL 2004), the ban on dual citizenship was enshrined in the 
Constitution, last updated in 2008, and, in 2010, the Turkmenistan president 
Berdimuhamedov picked up the efforts to finalize the enforcement of the ban on dual 
citizenship, preventing dual citizens from traveling abroad until they make a choice, using 
the introduction of biometric passports mandatory for international travel as the tool to 
ensure no one slips through the cracks (Fitzpatrick 2011; Rejepova 2010). 
 Critics consider the reasons behind this backlash against dual citizenship to 
be rooted in the desire to close off and control the society, both by preventing Turkmens 
from escaping abroad and by cracking down on the potentially influential Russian minority 
(IRIN 2003). The reported position of some of the high Turkmenistan officials that “Russia 
has already ceased to be a factor in Turkmen foreign policy” (Fitzpatrick 2011) can be seen 
as an echo of the notion behind my conceptualization of the role of stateness concerns in 
citizenship politics, namely, that dual citizenship regulations are strongly influenced by the 
relative inter-state vulnerability of countries in question.  
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 A more thorough investigation of dual citizenship regulations and 
discourses in postcommunist countries would certainly be interesting, however, for the 
purposes of this paper we can make some interim conclusions. Looking at the region of 
which Lithuania is part, whether it be Central and Eastern European members of the EU or 
former Soviet Union states, we can state that the restrictiveness of the Lithuanian case of 
dual citizenship cannot be considered to be such an outlier as it appears to be when looking 
only at the citizenship theories. This conclusion points to the limited nature of citizenship 
theories that are derived solely relying on the experience of Western immigration countries. 
Some scholars may counteract my claim by saying that it is perfectly understandable that 
different citizenship theories would fit immigration vs. emigration countries. However, my 
overview of Western European trends shows that identitarian concerns are valid for both 
of these types, thus calling into question the stereotypical dichotomy between a civic West 
and an ethnonationalist East. 
5.2.3. East vs. West ≠ ethnic vs. civic? 
The ideas of EU conditionality and normative pressure have been predicated on the 
conception of a contrast between the more ethnic-oriented East and the more civic West. 
However, scholars have been increasingly challenging this distinctions and pointing out 
the preferential treatment of co-ethnics by countries like Germany, Italy, Spain, etc., and 
the double standards applied to postcommunist countries which the old EU members do 
not uphold themselves (Bauböck 2007, Jutila 2009). On the other hand, comparative 
studies have concluded that there indeed is a difference in the degree of restrictiveness 
between these two regions (Howard 2009, Ariely 2013). However, the prediction that EU 
conditionality would help liberalize postcommunist countries has not been fulfilled, as 
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most of them retain preferential policies towards their co-ethnics. Furthermore, Western 
states themselves are increasingly instituting “thicker” integration requirements for their 
migrants, thus finding ways to assert the mutuality of citizenship and national identity. In 
fact, scholars find evidence that the original conception of the ethnic-civic divide between 
the European countries themselves (keeping in mind that Germany was then relegated by 
Kohn (1945) to the “East”) is still valid, and that Central and Eastern European countries 
like Poland and Czech Republic fall close to the middle of the possible ethnic-civic range, 
as opposed to the more civic countries like Belgium, Ireland, and Sweden, and more ethnic 
countries like Austria, Denmark and Greece (Koning 2011). Having reviewed the trends in 
citizenship policies in these two regions, we can conclude that the liberalization/ 
convergence thesis was premature, and that the strengthening of the identitarian dimension 
of citizenship is a more universal trend than one would expect based on the predictions of 
postnationalists. Let us expand the effort to establish the applicability of my theoretical 
proposals by looking beyond Europe. One of the reasons why it is legitimate to expect such 
applicability is precisely the fact that most of the non-European countries have in some 
form been affected by colonialism, therefore, the concerns with stateness that I identified 
as the key determinant of citizenship regulation should be even more relevant here. 
Although the limits of this thesis permit only a cursory overview, it is possible to establish 
certain tendencies. 
5.2.4. Latin America. 
Latin America78 and postcommunist countries have been compared copiously in 
light of the waves of democratization, especially under the somewhat compromised 
                                                 
78 I limit my analysis to Spanish and Portuguese speaking countries in Latin America and the Carribbean. 
According to Brøndsted Sejersen (2008), 80 percent of countries in the Caribbean allow dual citizenship. 
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heading of transitology. The classical study by Linz and Stepan (1996) posited that, due to 
the crystallization of national units in the 19th century, Latin American countries were not 
subject to stateness concerns which plagued the postcommunist countries. However, I 
suggest that we should not write off the role of citizenship as the stateness boundary 
maintenance mechanism in this region.  
5.2.4.1. A note on studying citizenship in this region. When it comes to citizenship 
regulation, the comparability of CEE and Latin America becomes less straightforward, and 
citizenship studies of these two regions have scarcely been mutually engaged. Whereas 
Eastern European countries have mostly been studied with the eye on historical changes of 
regimes and borders and treatment of ethnic kin-minorities (see above), a large part of the 
studies of Latin American citizenship deals with questions of substantial citizenship rights 
and practices (as Yashar (2005: 32) put it, “the content rather than boundaries of citizenship 
in multiethnic settings”), indigenous minorities, and issues pertaining to emigration, 
especially the question of emigrant incorporation in host countries and the question of 
remittances (Albro 2010; Jones-Correa 1998, 2001a, 2001b, 2003; Escobar 2004, 2007; 
Fitzgerald 2009; Hooker 2005; Isotalo 2009; Portes, Escobar, and Radford 2007; Oboler 
2006; Tulchin and Ruthenberg 2007; Yashar 2005). Part of it is unavoidable in the 
academia clustered along regional studies lines, but part of the different substantive 
orientation of regional scholars may be explained by the fact that legislation in most Latin 
American countries distinguishes between the legal status of nationality as belonging to a 
state in the eyes of the international community and that of citizenship as the exercise of 
                                                 
Most of these countries have permitted dual citizenship since independence (Jones-Correa 2001a). The 
confluence of the factors of colonial legacies, geography and migration patterns produces an especially 
conducive environment for dual citizenship, but lack of recent changes makes this region less relevant for 
the purposes of this dissertation. 
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political rights, whereas in the postcommunist world the concept of nationality has strong 
ethnic connotations and thus citizenship is the preferred term when speaking about the legal 
status.  
In this dissertation I have used the term ‘citizenship’ to refer to the legal status of 
membership in a state, but in the analysis of Latin American countries, the terms 
‘citizenship’ and ‘nationality’ are used interchangeably and refer to the more narrow 
conception of legal status as belonging to a state. Also, as a side note, for the purposes of 
this study, the status of Latin American countries as emigrant sending countries is more 
relevant than the questions of domestic citizenship regulations aimed directly at indigenous 
diversity. Although we can observe an interesting parallel between postcommunist 
countries’ preoccupation with who has oppressed who at various points in history in 
formulating citizenship policies’ and the tensions in the relationships between indigenous 
peoples, descendants of African slaves and of European immigrants in Latin America, the 
current salience of former oppressors’ access to citizenship is arguably not the same in 
these two regions. In light of economic differences, the possibility to migrate to the former 
metropolis for better opportunities is widely appreciated in numerous Latin American 
countries and ads to the attractiveness of the availability of dual citizenship. 
It is important to appreciate the specificity of the background which has shaped 
their citizenship regulations, considering the profound changes in terms of migration flows 
that Latin American countries have experienced throughout the history of their statehood. 
While the foundations of many of these countries’ self-image are inseparable from large-
scale European immigration (admittedly, this is more salient in the countries of the 
Southern cone), it is reasonable to say that today’s concerns are oriented toward large scale 
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emigration. Depending on the time-horizon assumed by a researcher, it is possible to over- 
or under-estimate the effects of one of these phenomena and the crucial role they both play 
in the constellations of the conception of nationhood and citizenship. In this study I 
established the importance of taking into account the prolonged time-horizon of relations 
with other countries and nations when interpreting developments in citizenship regulation. 
Therefore, comparing the findings of this study, which question the hypothesis of 
convergence towards liberalization, with the situation in Latin America, which has a 
reputation for liberal policies of citizenship, can be especially illuminating.  
5.2.4.2. Dual citizenship trends in Latin America. A majority of Latin America 
forms the largest block of countries in the world that follow ius soli policies in citizenship 
attribution (Feere 2010), opening up greater likelihood for dual citizenship gained by birth. 
According to various cross-national studies, all countries in Latin America allow some 
form of dual citizenship, except for Cuba.79 The latter’s lack of democratic credentials and 
a contentious relationship with major emigration destinations render the premises of the 
mainstream liberalization/convergence hypothesis inapplicable, whereas Latin America 
and the Caribbean, on average, has held a higher score in the EUI democracy index than 
Central and Eastern Europe, so we should expect it to be even closer to the predictions of 
the liberalization/convergence hypothesis. However, as I have argued throughout this 
study, it is important to deconstruct the notion of availability of dual citizenship and take a 
closer look at its constituent parts, instead of presuming this permissiveness to be an overall 
indicator of convergence towards liberalization. Earlier I discussed the insistence of 
Howard (2009) that dual citizenship for immigrants is the true litmus test of liberalization 
                                                 
79 http://www.centrorisorse.org/nationality-in-american-constitutions.html, Boll 2007, Escobar 2007: 51, 
Jones-Correa 2001a.  
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and pointed out that, even if a country allows dual citizenship for immigrants, it can still 
express a rationale that is very much oriented towards assimilation of immigrants rather 
than an intentional liberal approach to migrant integration, as evidenced by the thickening 
naturalization requirements in Europe, as the contents of what an immigrant is expected to 
assimilate into is inseparable from the dominant conception of the nationhood.  
The notion of liberalization is inseparable from the imperative of nondiscrimination 
based on descent. The findings of the analysis of the Lithuanian case show that even the 
apparent symmetry between dual citizenship availability for emigrants and for immigrants 
does not necessarily indicate liberalization, as this symmetry is not sustained in the wider 
context of citizenship regulation, from the difference in residence requirements to the 
expressive guarantee of the right of every Lithuanian to retain the right to regain citizenship 
and settle in Lithuania enshrined in the Constitution. There is no directly comparable 
counterpart to Lithuania in the Latin American region, since there has been no instance of 
a similar backlash against previously available dual citizenship. However, it is possible to 
take an overarching comparative look at the regulation of dual citizenship broken down 
into its constituent parts relating to emigrants and immigrants and thus evaluate whether 
Latin America can provide support or, to the contrary, question the 
liberalization/convergence hypothesis, and help illuminate the findings of the Lithuanian 
case. 
5.2.4.3. Identitarian dimensions of dual citizenship in Latin America. Having 
reviewed the citizenship regulation in Latin American countries80, I suggest that their 
                                                 
80 Information compiled by triangulating several sources:  Jones-Correa 2001a; Boll 2007; Brøndsted 
Sejersen 2008, Escobar 2007; United States Office of Personnel Management Investigative Services. 
Citizenship Laws of the World. March 2001 <http://www.opm.gov/extra/investigate/IS-01.pdf> [last 
accessed April 22, 2012]; and translations of pertinent country legislation available on the websites of 
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liberal reputation may be deserved overall, but needs to be qualified, just as we have to do 
in the analysis of European countries. Although all of these countries afford a certain 
degree of the possibility of dual citizenship, the regulations are not equally liberal. The 
strongest mandate for dual citizenship comes from acquiring it by birth, while voluntary 
acquisition of another nationality is considered normatively lower. It is true that the 
majority of these countries allow dual citizenship both for emigrants and immigrants, 
however, none of them provide a fully symmetrical treatment to emigrants and to 
naturalizing immigrants.  
First of all, in most of these countries a citizen by birth cannot be deprived of his 
or her nationality, but naturalized citizens can be deprived of their citizenship for various 
reasons, from domicile abroad for a prolonged time (El Salvador), to presenting claims to 
the status of a foreigner (Mexico), to acquiring another nationality through naturalization 
(Paraguay), to crimes against existence and security of the state (Columbia) (see country 
laws and Constitutions in Boll 2007). Second, dual nationals are often prevented from 
occupying various political or public service posts. Third, in a number of countries only 
some of the naturalizing immigrants can retain their nationality of origin, a provision that 
is based on the principle of reciprocity between countries and in practice equals a 
preferential treatment of persons from culturally similar countries.  
One of the most manifest characteristics common to the citizenship regulations in 
the countries of this region is a special treatment of the common Iberian cultural pool which 
can be traced in the naturalization requirements for more than a century and buttresses my 
                                                 
Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada <http://www.irb-cisr.gc.ca:8080/Publications/index_e.aspx>  
[last accessed April 22, 2012], the Article Directory http://www.centrorisorse.org/nationality-in-american-
constitutions.html [last accessed April 22, 2012], and country government websites. 
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argument of the fundamentality of the identitarian dimension of citizenship. While we can 
find a similar logic of cultural affinity playing a role in European examples of citizenship 
acquisition rules, the mutual preferential treatment of Latin citizens is of unprecedented 
proportions. All the countries in Latin America (as well as Spain and Portugal) provide 
facilitated naturalization or even a possibility to acquire citizenship by declaration to 
citizens of either some or all of the other countries of Iberian pedigree. The central role of 
Spanish/Portuguese heritage is also evident in the naturalization requirements that 
prescribe a test of language and knowledge of culture and history (Panama, Costa Rica, 
Mexico since 1993). However, the proclaimed equality and fraternity of Latin American 
peoples does not translate to practice, as is evident, for example, in the discrimination 
against Central Americans in Mexico, which also is one of the countries, along with 
Panama and Nicaragua, that require naturalizing foreigners from non-treaty countries to 
renounce their nationality of origin (Base de Datos Políticos de las Américas 1998). 
5.2.4.4. Citizenship and stateness. The citizenship legislation reforms that brought 
about the often symmetrical availability of dual citizenship have often taken place in the 
context of larger Constitutional reforms and should be seen as both a part of a broader 
attempt to improve the institutional underpinnings of the state, fight exclusion and increase 
an appreciation for ethnic diversity, and the incorporation of international agreements on 
human rights and an effort to increase democratic legitimacy of post-authoritarian 
governments (see Hooker 2005; Hunt 2006; Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003). In that sense, 
the developments in Latin America support my notion of the continuing relevance of the 
relationship between citizenship and stateness. As Albro (2010: 74) proclaims, “successive 
expansions of citizenship rights being a principal feature of consecutive national projects 
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dedicated to the reinvention of the country”, although not all Latin American countries 
stated is as boldly as the preamble of the Bolivian 2009 Constitution that claimed to have 
“left behind our colonial, republican, and neoliberal past” and “refound Bolivia” (Figueroa 
2011). It is interesting to note in this context that, for example, Article 96 of the 1991 
Constitution of Columbia provides for dual nationality for indigenous peoples who share 
the border (Article 96), or that the carving up of electoral legislation puts Colombians 
abroad in the same category as ethnoracial and political minorities (Escobar 2007: 66; see 
Van Cott 2000 on the normatively charged Constitutional reform in Columbia). Overall, 
the concerns with stateness in this region are related more with their internal challenges 
than with some major external threat like in postcommunist countries; however, Latin 
America shows that colonial experiences can be expressed through various channels, but 
my proposition of the importance of postcolonial status for the approach to citizenship 
remains valid, even if on a more removed level. 
5.2.3.5. Dual citizenship and migration. Even if the extension of dual citizenship is 
often associated with wider democratization, such as the inclusion of commitment to dual 
citizenship in the Dominican Republic’s 1994 “Pact for Democracy” (Levitt and de la 
Dehesa 2003: 596), one cannot overlook the fact that the discourse that surrounds the 
discussions pertaining to dual nationality overwhelmingly centers around emigration. The 
legislation itself does not shy away from acknowledging the reasoning behind it, such as 
the paragraph in the Constitution of the Dominican Republic, Article 20, which states that 
“The public authorities apply special policies to preserve and strengthen the bonds of the 
Dominican nation to its own nationals abroad, with the ultimate aim of achieving greater 
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integration.”81 And although the legislation of the Dominican Republic appears to be liberal 
with its permission of dual citizenship and ius soli, it has to be interpreted by taking into 
account the 2004 reforms which expanded the definition of persons “in transit,” whose 
children are not eligible for birthright citizenship, to include anyone who is not a legal 
resident. Since 2007 the administrative practices have been to apply this law retroactively 
to the numerous population of Haitian descent in the Dominican Republic (Fieser 2011). 
Representatives of the Dominican government react defiantly to international concerns 
about rendering Haitians stateless, point out that the ius sanguinis laws of Haiti ensure their 
entitlement to a nationality, are backed up by their Supreme Court, and proclaim that the 
selective denial of birthright citizenship is necessary to fight illegal migration. Another 
case that could have potential for the exploration of the interaction between migration and 
citizenship policies could be Colombia, in that the country which was a pioneer in liberal 
symmetrical citizenship regulations in the region with its 1991 Constitution is one of the 
few Latin American countries that do not follow ius soli policies. 
The bulk of the comparative studies on dual citizenship in Latin American cases 
are mostly concerned with the effect it has on immigrant incorporation in the USA and the 
transnational practices and contributions to the country of origin by the emigrants (Barry 
2006; Graham 2001; Guarnizo 1998; Guarnizo and Roach 1999; Jones-Correa 2001a, 
2001b; Leblang 2013). In fact, a part of the support for the mainstream hypothesis that 
posits the beneficial effect on immigrant incorporation, such as a statistically significant 
increase in naturalization rates when dual citizenship is available, comes from research on 
                                                 
81 The Constitution of the Dominican Republic can be found at 
http://www.jmarcano.com/mipais/politicos/title1.html.  
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Latin American migrants (e.g. Jones-Correa 2001a, 2001b). For the purposes of this study, 
we are primarily concerned with the antecedents of dual citizenship legislation.  
A brief overview of the research reveals that the question of the country’s 
relationship with its emigrants is indeed the major determinant in deciding the policies of 
dual citizenship, although different authors emphasize different factors that shape this 
causal relationship. The story of dual citizenship in Latin American countries follows 
roughly along the lines of the mainstream reasoning pertaining to sending countries, 
attributing its spread to the processes of democratization that, on the one hand, prompt 
states to shore up their democratic credentials in the eyes of their population and the 
international scene, and on the other hand, actualize the need to recruit voters and campaign 
contributors from the point of view of political elites and the desire to pressure for an 
availability of such influence from the point of view of emigrants.  
The other side of the often-told story is the socioeconomic salience of emigration, 
both the demographic imperatives of a large number of co-nationals leaving and the desire 
to harness their economic potential to benefit the development of the state of origin through 
a stabile flow of remittances and investments, or, as Leblang (2013) put it, “harnessing the 
diaspora”. Different authors attribute different weight to these constituent parts in different 
and sometimes in the same cases, which is a reminded of the importance of process tracing 
that we discussed in the introduction for fleshing out a grounded understanding of the 
complex combinations of factors that produce the causal relationship in any specific case.  
5.2.3.6. Mexico: a case note. The case of Mexico is probably the most researched 
and the most illuminating to address in the confines of this chapter. In one of the key 
reference studies on Latin American dual citizenship, Jones-Correa (2001b: 1000) 
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distinguishes institutionalization of dual citizenship “from above” and “from below”, 
claiming that the earliest reforms were initiated by the states’ governments, but later 
instances of dual citizenship recognition could come either from the emigrant campaigning 
and pressure or from the state. Escobar (2007) adds the importance of the changes in the 
migrant community situation in the receiving countries and of the rapid diffusion and 
emulation among the countries in this region. According to Escobar (2007: 44), the 
variations in the timing, sequence and form of dual citizenship legislation result from the 
combination of the demographic and socioeconomic characteristics of migration and the 
political system of the country seen both in a broader historical context and within the 
timeframe of contemporary domestic political competition. Smith (2003a, 2003b) concurs 
that the initial impetus in the Mexican case came from the state, but argues that the migrants 
were able to carve out their own diasporic space at subsequent stages of developments in 
citizenship regulation based on the relative weight of changes in the global system, 
domestic politics, and migrant actions, which varies over time.  
The approach of the Mexican state could be considered to have been expressed by, 
for example, its diplomat Gutiérrez (1999), who noted the role of the anti-immigrant 
developments, such as the California Proposition 187 and the welfare reform, in prompting 
the state to take a stance of solidarity with its co-nationals abroad by providing the 
possibility to have dual citizenship and thus reducing the costs of their naturalizing in the 
USA. We have to acknowledge the importance of the international, or, rather, the inter-
state dimension in shaping dual citizenship regulations. Escobar (2007: 54, 69) points out 
that the concern with anti-immigrant tendencies in the USA and concomitant migrant 
mobilization prompted not only Mexico, but also Brazil, Peru, Guatemala in the 1990s, and 
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Honduras, Bolivia and Chile in the 2000s to allow dual citizenship, thus acting as a 
homogenizing factor across a variety of historical nationhood traditions. This once again 
demonstrates the close relationship between the case of Latin America and the mainstream 
theories that posit the sending countries’ policies as reactions to the behavior of immigrant-
receiving countries. As Axtell (2009: 17) notes, “a less utopian view of dual citizenship 
has begun to form, characterized in equal parts by shades of laissez faire tolerance within 
the U.S., realpolitik rule changes at home and abroad, moments of private creativity and 
constraint, and stammers of nativism.” 
An interesting argument can be made based on the findings of the analysis of the 
Lithuanian case that neither purely instrumental calculations nor purely identitarian 
concerns with nationhood and its historical and contemporary context in relation to 
migration are sufficient determinants of citizenship policy; rather, the crucial factor to look 
at is how one state relates to others. This is what Fitzgerald (2005) does in his study of 
Mexico’s nationality law, claiming it to be “a case where policy-makers’ primary goal is 
not to redraw borders or call home a ‘diaspora’, but rather to use nationality law as a tool 
to moderate the political and economic asymmetry in relationships with migrants’ countries 
of origin and destination,” informed by both emigration and a smaller but politically 
significant immigration (Fitzgerald 2005: 173). He demonstrates how certain politically 
charged experiences of immigration can color dual citizenship debates to the point where 
they become more salient than the overwhelming demographic weight of emigration, 
similar to what we have seen happening in the Baltic states in relation to ethnic descendants 
of former aggressors, and attributes it to Mexico’s geopolitical vulnerability. He also 
recounts the deliberate usage of references to international law, emphasizing the strategic 
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selectivity of the Mexican government when choosing which international lessons to 
incorporate into their national regulations, and points out that the lack of possibility to 
claim common ethnic descent that is characteristic of all historical immigration countries 
does not equal shying away from claims about nationhood which still manage to distinguish 
citizens by descent from naturalized citizens (Fitzgerald 2005: 181-182, 186). In this view, 
the case of Mexico offers support for the argument that posits the importance of 
international law impact on dual nationality policy.  
Arguments presented by Fitzgerald (2005) parallel my findings in the Lithuanian 
case of the state concerns that are not as emphasized in the public discourse as the 
identitarian questions, but nevertheless play an important role in shaping the end result of 
citizenship regulation. The Mexican case is illuminating in the context of this dissertation, 
as its citizenship regulations are consciously shaped by both experiences of immigration 
and emigration. It speaks to the Lithuanian case in that, though emigration in both cases is 
more substantial than immigration and thus the discourse on the role and impact of dual 
citizenship is shaped mostly in reference to emigrants, the historical concerns relating to 
representatives of potentially hostile nations and geopolitical considerations have not been 
purged from citizenship legislation. The difference is that in the Mexican case the 
asymmetry between dual citizenship for emigrants and immigrants has not been blocked 
by judicial developments like it was in Lithuania. One can also appreciate the historical 
parallels in the development of migration dynamics between the Mexican-U.S.A. and 
Lithuanian-E.U. migration systems and the long-term popularity of nationalist ideologies. 
The divergence occurs with Lithuania’s entry into the European Union, which enables the 
free migratory movements and delegitimizes preferential treatment of co-ethnics. Without 
Egle Verseckaite:      Citizenship as a Stateness Boundary Maintenance Regime 
269 
 
a comparable process tracing of the Mexican case it is not possible to make definitive 
statements, but the cursory comparison suggests that the emphasis on the normative 
constraints placed on the Lithuanian state’s abilities to manipulate its citizenship which 
were not imposed on Mexico does have weight as a plausible causal explanation of the 
counterintuitive outcome of the Lithuanian case, considering that both states experienced 
the processes that deterritorialize the nation, but not the normative constraints on 
dovetailing this deterritorialization with dual citizenship provisions.  
Compared to the attitude towards dual citizenship that was prevalent until the end 
of the twentieth century, international relations are still a very important dimension of 
problematizing dual citizenship, but on a more collective level rather than the question of 
a given individual’s conflicting allegiance and law applicability. When dual nationals 
become a number to be reckoned with, they can become en masse symbols of relations 
between states, such as Lithuania’s preoccupation with former occupiers or Latin American 
countries’ concern about the possibility to influence U.S. politics. However, the majority 
of cases of politicization of dual citizenship in Latin America has occurred in the context 
of elections, pointing towards domestic political developments as the main axis of 
politicization of dual nationality. Besides numerous cases of electoral contestation of 
Mexican-Americans, an example can be found in the resonance caused in Nicaragua by the 
case of the presidential candidate who was prevented from running in the election due to 
having acquired Italian citizenship through marriage and thus considered to have lost his 
Nicaraguan citizenship. The Supreme Court backed him, yet the administrative authorities 
insisted on following the letter of the law which forbade dual citizenship.82 The public 
                                                 
82 Alvaro José González Robelo v. Nicaragua, Case 12.144, Report No. 25/01, OEA/Ser.L/V/II.111 Doc. 
20 rev. at 443 (2000). [REPORT Nº 25/01, CASE 12.144, ALVARO JOSÉ ROBELO GONZÁLEZ, 
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debate was interlaced with nationalistic commentary about a descent-based conception of 
nationhood (Esquivel 2000). The legislation was changed by the 2000 Constitutional 
amendment which stipulated that Nicaraguans by birth will not lose their nationality in case 
of acquiring another one.  
In sum, an overview of Latin American nationality regulations confirms the 
importance of taking into account the long time-horizon view of the relationship between 
a country’s history, statehood, migration profile, and access to citizenship. Such closer 
examination reveals cracks in the apparent symmetry of immigrant and emigrant treatment 
that echo the conclusions of the previous section pertaining to the persisting relationship 
between citizenship and nationhood refracted through the issue of migration, producing its 
own brand of identity politics. 
5.2.5. Asia. 
In contrast to Latin America where all but one country exhibit a more or less 
permissive attitude towards dual citizenship, Asia is the region with the least 
permissiveness towards dual citizenship according to Brøndsted Sejersen (2008). 
Arguably, she did not include Africa in her analysis, but at least in comparison to Europe 
and the Americas, Asia presents a different context and thus can help elucidate the factors 
relating to a less favorable attitude towards migration in general and dual citizenship in 
particular (Asia hosts the largest percentage of the world’s stateless persons (IRIN 2011)). 
In fact, this region presents some of the rare examples of actual backlash against previously 
allowed dual citizenship, such as the 1955 declaration by China that it will no longer 
recognize dual citizenship, or the institution of an explicit prohibition of dual citizenship 
                                                 
NICARAGUA, March 5, 2001]. University of Minnesota Human Rights Library. Retrieved April 20, 2012 
(http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/cases/25-01.html). 
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in 1985 in Japanese citizenship legislation, or the breakdown of the Mongolia-Soviet Union 
agreement on dual citizenship after the fall of communist regimes. An additional factor, 
the relatively small ratio of migrant population vs. native citizens in the East Asian 
countries (Akaha and Vassilieva 2005) presents a situation comparable to our case study, 
where issues of emigration and nationalism are much more pronounced than those of 
immigrant integration and incorporation, although the latter questions are carving their way 
into the public discourse in light of the fact that most Asian countries are both migrant-
sending and receiving countries (Asis and Piper 2008: 425-426). Developments in 
citizenship regulation in this region cannot be understood without taking into account the 
wider historical context, namely, the initiation into the West-dominated international 
system, the legacies of colonialism and postcolonial struggles, and the Cold-War 
constellations, as well as their aftermath. In that sense, Asia is an unexpectedly fitting 
counterpoint for the inquiry of the comparative implications of the findings of the 
Lithuanian case, especially in terms of how the legacies of domination and ideological 
juxtapositions color subsequent articulations of nationhood and of state interests. 
I overview the main characteristics of citizenship regulation in Asia and proceed to 
conduct a more in-depth case study of South Korea in order to ascertain the comparative 
purchase of the theoretical propositions that I have formulated – the reinforcement of the 
identitarian dimension when rights get decoupled from citizenship and the role of 
postcolonial legacies as underlying the concerns with stateness. I limit the analysis in this 
section by excluding island countries in the Oceania for reasons similar to excluding the 
Caribbean in the previous section, and by focusing on the countries in East, South, 
Northeast and Southeast Asia. The Central Asian countries of ex-USSR comprise a 
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separate cluster for the purpose of our grouping, and the Middle Eastern countries do not 
lend themselves to the liberalization/convergence hypothesis, because the only democracy 
in the region is Israel. The latter’s citizenship policies reflect the complexities of Jewish 
experiences and cannot be adequately treated within the confines of this study. The political 
regime variety in Asia is especially great, ranging from full democracies South Korea and 
Japan, to “flawed democracies” like India, Indonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, and Taiwan, 
to “hybrid regimes” like Singapore and Sri Lanka, to autocratic states (EUI 2012). 
Discussions of liberalization/ convergence hypothesis are mostly relevant in the context of 
democracies, however, examples from a varied spectrum of countries helps illustrate the 
main features of citizenship discourse in Asia. 
5.2.5.1. The key characteristics of citizenship politics in Asia. If we continue to 
subscribe to the notion that citizenship policies are inseparable from migration issues, the 
characteristics of migration in Asia help highlight the specificity of this region. As Hugo 
(2006) emphasizes, the main factors can be summarized as the three D’s: demographics, 
development, and democracy. More specifically, the more developed Asian countries 
experience the need for immigration due to the aging society and a need for labour, which 
stands in tension with mononationalist conceptions of nationhood and statehood (see e.g. 
He 1998 on the assimilationist stance of states towards minorities in East Asia). The ability 
to deal with the latter is inversely proportionate to the degree of democracy in a regime due 
to human rights concerns. Last, but not least, countries across the political regime spectrum 
can be characterized as “developmental states” which emphasize the role of the state in 
pursuing economic development under elite leadership and call upon their populations to 
make whatever sacrifices necessary in order to promote this vision, including certain 
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aspects of democracy and human rights (Evans 1995; Johnson 1982; Vu 2007; White 
1988). Let us attempt to map the Asian experience onto the conceptual propositions 
developed so far in this paper. 
5.2.5.1.1. Instrumental vs. identitarian dimensions of citizenship. Taking into 
consideration the variety of political regimes in Asia, the primacy of the state interests and 
the precariousness of migrant status, one difference becomes evident: a relative lack of the 
decoupling of rights and citizenship based on human rights that served as the basis for the 
liberalization/ convergence thesis in Europe. Therefore, the applicability of the proposition 
that the identitarian dimension becomes the primary content of citizenship once it is 
decoupled from rights is questionable. However, this difference allows us to revisit the 
tensions between the instrumental and identitarian dimensions of citizenship that are 
flanked by international pressures. In Asian states, this tension is refracted through the 
developmentalist orientation of the states, where the question of access to citizenship and, 
crucially, the availability of dual citizenship, is caught between the need to attract the most 
economically desirable migrants and the need to deal with co-ethnic diaspora on the one 
hand and national minorities within the state’s borders on the other hand. In the context of 
globalization, a developmentalist state adopts an especially aggressive stance in the pursuit 
of the global talent, while facing contradictory challenges of human rights norms from both 
international pressures and domestic activist organizations (Ball and Piper 2002). Thus, it 
is still possible to tentatively map the vector of the liberalization/convergence hypothesis 
onto a developmentalist orientation, but we should not expect the same results. 
Authoritarian countries like Brunei have no qualms about asking “to protect the supremacy 
of the Bruneian identity and accept the Malay concept of the Sultanate” (Shahminan 2012) 
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and “sacrifice, commitment and a high spirit of patriotism in presenting their undivided 
loyalty to king, race and country” (Ubaidillah and Bandar 2010) of their citizens, and yet 
want to give special consideration to those who have economically valuable professional 
skills (Finaz, Han, and Bandar 2008; Rosli and Bandar 2008). For countries that at least 
somewhat aspire to be considered democratic, it is not so simple. 
At first glance, the utilitarian dimension seems to dominate the citizenship 
regulations in this region. In order to get a competitive edge, states are willing to open the 
access to citizenship for those migrants who are perceived as economically beneficial. 
Tadai (2009) hypothesizes that state demand for financial and human capital is a strong 
predictor of permissiveness towards dual citizenship, but is qualified by political factors 
such as regime type. However, the need for financial and human capital is almost universal, 
although there is great variety in the actual constellations of citizenship rules both among 
the authoritarian and the democratic states.  
Sri Lanka, one of the few countries that treat dual citizenship symmetrically (a key 
indicator of the liberalization thesis), was a pioneer introducing the legislation in 1987. 
However, that does not mean we can interpret this symmetry as liberalization in a 
straightforward sense, since the eligibility for dual citizenship and engagement with 
diaspora in general was explicitly tied to material considerations. Dual citizenship has been 
consistently approached from a utilitarian perspective, from Bandaranaike’s attempt to tax 
Sri Lankan expatriates in the 1970s (Tilak, n.d.) to the Central Bank’s explicit reliance on 
diaspora for foreign reserves in the aftermath of the world financial crisis in 2009 
(Samaraweera 2009). Applicants are subjected to high fees and strict screening and can be 
deprived of the nationality at any time if officials deem their continuing possession of 
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citizenship to not be of benefit to Sri Lanka.83 In 2011, the dependence on the 
administration’s judgment of whether the person in question “may contribute to the socio-
economic development of Sri Lanka” (Embassy of Sri Lanka in Netherlands, n.d.) 
culminated in a suspension of dual citizenship application processing and a threat of 
revision of existing dual citizens due to the policy not producing desired results and 
benefits to the country (Berenger 2011, David 2011).  
The interplay between utilitarian and identitarian dimensions is evident in the 
legislative changes in two of the largest emigrant sending countries, namely, those in 
Philippines in 2003 and India in 2005. Philippines have recently become the top labor 
sending country in the world (Asis and Piper 2008) and have become somewhat of the 
model of remittances-seeking emigration country in migration research. Furthermore, it 
can be seen as a model for the success in ensuring the less tangible but still coveted 
identification with the country of origin, as evident in the outstanding growth of the 
percentage of Filipinos who claim their nationality has become more important to them 
(Inoguchi and Blondel 2008: 83-86). 
 In 2003, India passed legislation establishing the status of a Overseas 
Citizens of India, which ultimately did not provide a full-fledged citizenship status and 
formulated the OCI regulations more in line with the aforementioned Turkish “pink cards” 
or Polish card. Although the status of an Overseas Citizen of India does not provide 
political rights, it solves the practical issues of transborder life, such as travel and property 
rights, serving, as some overseas Indians acknowledge, as a “life-long visa” (Kulkarni 
                                                 
83 Sri Lankan Government. 1987 and 1993. “CITIZENSHIP.” www.lawnet.lk //     
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2008). We can juxtapose the low levels of foreign direct investment by non-resident 
Indians until 2003 (Chaturvedi 2005: 147-148) and the fact that India is now the country 
that receives the largest amount of remittances in the world84. Perhaps this shows that both 
the motivation of increasing remittances as the underlying motive for seeking out a 
relationship between the state and its diaspora, and the reasoning that the push for dual 
citizenship places a premium not on political rights but on greater convenience of 
transnational life, are substantiated.  
Overall, there is a clear tendency in Asian states to include preferential provisions 
for economically beneficial citizens. The global race for talent extends beyond the borders 
of Asia, however, the unabashed developmentalist orientation of many of these states 
allows us to apprieciate the ongoing relevance of citizenship status if it goes with some 
other desirable characteristic. Economic potential has come to stand next to co-ethnicity as 
one of the key determinants of access to citizenship. Yet, utilitarian considerations are in 
constant tension with demography and identity. 
5.2.5.1.2. Demography and nationhood. The utilitarian approach marks a 
divergence between a continuously essentialist and homogenizing discourse on national 
identity and nationhood on the one hand and an increasingly instrumental citizenship-
migration policy nexus on the other (Aguilar 1999: 329-330). Questions of loyalty to the 
nation-state and emphasis on preserving an ethnically defined national identity and culture 
play a large role in the discourse on dual citizenship in countries where it is explicitly 
forbidden, from Malaysia to Mongolia to Indonesia. One of the main reasons why the 
question is approached at all is demographic pressures. Although different Asian countries 
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experience very different birth rates, both in the cases where international marriages are 
supported by the state to compensate for a low birth rate, and in countries that have rapidly 
growing populations, the main pressure on citizenship regulation comes from international 
marriages and concerns foreign spouses and children born in mixed-citizenship families, 
prompting NGO pressure to ensure human rights of abused spouses and state efforts to 
integrate and accommodate multicultural families (Chung and Kim 2012; Jones 2008; Kim 
and Oh 2011; Yeoh, Leng and Dung 2013). The migration flows in this region and 
especially their genderization have become one of the most important factors in citizenship 
regulation development. Later in this chapter I discuss in more detail the case of South 
Korea to analyze the particular effects of these factors, but they are relevant in other 
countries of the region as well.  
Aligning citizenship regulation with gender rights has been a large part of any 
changes seen in this region, even if it starts from a low baseline. The 2006 change in 
legislation that instituted the possibility for Indonesian children who gain dual citizenship 
by birth to keep both citizenships until they have to choose at a certain age was touted as 
revolutionary and a huge step forward (Winarnita 2008). In contrast, that kind of policy is 
considered relatively restrictive in numerous countries on the other side of the globe, and 
even among some of the participants of the public discourse in the two Asian democracies 
– Japan and South Korea. However, the steps towards greater gender equality in citizenship 
legislation were taken in Japan only in 2008 after the Supreme Court ruled the different 
citizenship attribution based on parents’ marriage status to be unConstitutional, two years 
later than in Indonesia. In other words, a conservative outlook on citizenship is not 
automatically counteracted by the degree of democracy. On the other hand, being able to 
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claim the title of democracy renders a state more vulnerable to charges related to human 
rights, one of the main sources of increasing attention to gender equality in citizenship 
legislation. However, while a democratic government may be more sensitive to human 
rights claims, it is also more sensitive to the popular opinion, a more immediate indicator 
of the prevalent conceptions of nationhood and priorities related to citizenship. The public 
discourse on dual citizenship in Japan can be an example of the Scylla and Charybdis of 
international human rights, and increasing internationalization of society through channels 
like international marriages, vs. restrictive public opinion and ethnonationalist identity of 
the nation-state. 
Following the 2008 gender-related amendments to the Nationality law and the 
reaction to a Nobel-prize winner who had renounced his Japanese citizenship in favor of 
USA, a member of parliament proposed to allow dual citizenship with countries that permit 
it for most people (except public officials), as long as the dual citizens report it. He argued 
for its usefulness for “securing necessary human resources” and bringing legislation closer 
to reality, seeing as in practice a majority of Japanese who are supposed to choose one of 
two citizenships at majority85 did not comply, and the government did not enforce this 
requirement, resulting in a relative loss for an honest minority (Matsutani 2009). This 
proposal caused heated debates (see e.g. Assogba 2009; Kamiya 2009; Matsutani 2009). 
Some wanted to allow dual citizenship as a way to deal with the realities of globalization 
and its effects on Japanese society, first and foremost international families. Opponents 
cast it as a threat to national unity (or, more boldly stated, ethnic homogeneity) and raised 
the specter of bogus family claims and European-style immigrant integration failures. 
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Events of European scale are unlikely, since the proportion of migrants in Japanese 
population is relatively small, but the perception of their threat to national identity is very 
acute, and looms large in the policy discourse.  
The objective demographical need for immigration is acknowledged by state 
officials within the developmentalist framework. The various editions of the “Basic Plan 
for Immigration Control” periodically updated by the Ministry of Justice (2005a) reiterates 
those needs: “from the viewpoint of enhancing the international competitiveness of Japan, 
there is special need to welcome those foreign nationals who are vital to Japanese society 
such as highly-skilled workers who have world-class specialized knowledge or technical 
skills”. However, as a frequent critic Arudou (2009) remarks, “the prospect of Japan's 
decimation was no match for the fear of the foreign element”. Japanese politicians 
continuously struggle to limit potential settlement immigration and exhibit a preference for 
employing local underemployed population, such as women and elderly, and foreigners of 
Japanese origin (Arudou 2007). In fact, the subsequent renewals of the official statement 
on migration policy by the Ministry of Justice (2005b) explicitly acknowledge the 
immutability of the main objectives set in 1992 – “the promotion of smooth exchanges of 
personnel” and “measures against illegal foreign workers” – and denounces large scale 
immigration as unrealistic, “if you trace back the history of Japanese society and give 
thought to the Japanese people's perception of society, culture and their sensitivity.” In the 
2010 edition of the immigration policy, the Ministry of Justice acknowledged:  
Today, against the backdrop of a serious decline in the population as a 
result of the declining birthrate and the aging of our society, we are 
faced with the challenge of maintaining the vitality of Japanese society 
and, in the midst of the dramatic economic growth of the countries in 
the Asian region, in terms of incorporating the vitality of the region into 
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Japan, it is required that the acceptance of foreign nationals who are 
needed by Japanese society is carried out even more proactively. 
However, this does not equal unconditional acceptance of even beneficial 
foreigners, and the negativity towards dual citizenship is one of the best indicators of this 
weary attitude. In fact, the relationship between Japanese citizenship regulation and 
international norms has been used in favour of restrictiveness. For example, dual 
citizenship was expressly prohibited in the 1985 Law on Nationality in tandem with 
preparations for signing the U.N. Convention on Elimination of All Forms of 
Discrimination Against Women, specifically to counteract its potential effects on 
expansion of dual citizenship (Murazumi 2000; Gurowitz 2006: 318). Thus, until today, 
the legislative and administrative changes to regulation of migration in Japan centers on 
being able to track, police, control migrants (Burgess 2009). In the end the availability of 
dual citizenship was not expanded, due to the combination of a popular backlash stemming 
from the prevalent understanding of Japan as a homogenous nation-state (see Chung 2010 
on the struggles of second-generation Koreans in Japan) and of migrants as a threat to the 
public, and the official position of the government that dual citizenship presents a risk when 
the two state’s interests are at odds (Arudou 2003; Burgess 2007; Burgess 2009; Ito 2011; 
The Ministry of Justice 2005a). The same Supreme Court whose ruling led to the expansion 
of gender equality has ruled that public authority can only be exercised by Japanese 
nationals (The Japan Times 2005). Japan is still very much the state of the Japanese nation, 
and the actions committed by the government in relation to colonialism, such as the 
unilateral revoking of citizenship rights of Korean immigrants in Japan following the end 
of the colonial era, still haunt the current discourse on migration and citizenship (Moriss-
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Suzuki 2008). The latter concern leads us to the next element of my theoretical framework 
– concerns with stateness. 
5.2.5.1.3. Stateness issues. Paradoxically, even if citizenship becomes relegated to 
instrumental status and thus loses some of its normative value, the identitarian dimension 
of citizenship does not lose its relevance, but instead becomes intertwined with the issues 
related to stateness, revolving around loyalty to the state that conceives itself 
ethnonationally. The extremely negative attitude towards dual citizenship in some of these 
countries needs to be interpreted as the intersection of both contentious inter-state relations, 
including actual and potentially feared border disputes, and internal relations in these 
multiethnic states. 
Looking at debates surrounding dual citizenship, this pattern becomes apparent in 
many Asian countries. For example, it is possible to discern elements of concern with 
stateness in aforementioned Sri Lanka which pioneered symmetrical dual citizenship in 
1987 and has been consistently approaching it from a utilitarian perspective. Although the 
interest in dual citizenship increased after the defeat of the Tamil forces (Manjula 2011), 
the possibility of Tamil emigrants supporting the Tamil Tigers (Kapur and McHale 2003: 
55; The Economist Blog Banyan 2011) adds to the atmosphere of distrust between the 
government and dual citizens, as evident in the government representatives’ claims that 
dual citizenship should only be available to those who do not have hidden agendas and who 
are loyal and committed to Sri Lanka (Berenger 2011).  
The intersection of ethnic minority and external state, so common in the 
postcommunist countries, is especially evident in the attitude towards the Chinese minority 
in places such as Malaysia and Indonesia (eerily parallel to the historical economic 
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ghetoization and subsequent stereotyping of Jews in Europe). They are exacerbated by the 
explicit gearing of state policies towards preferential treatment of the native majority, 
which in turn could not be understood without taking into account colonial legacies (see 
Aguilar 1999 for an account of the relationship between colonial practices and subsequent 
delineations of citizenship in the region, and Swan Sik 1990: 164 passim for an account of 
the role of concerns regarding Chinese minorities in the developments of citizenship 
regulations throughout Asia).  
In the context of Indonesian Chinese issues, the arguments of both proponents and 
opponents of citizenship liberalization are interlaced with emphasis on economic 
considerations and issues of discrimination and human rights. The 1998 legislation changes 
which removed discriminatory rules towards the Chinese minority in Indonesia should be 
seen more as a move to prevent an exodus of capital and not an ideological commitment to 
liberalization and multiculturalism (Aguilar 1999: 319-320), especially if one takes into 
account the anti-Chinese actions during the 1998 riots. Even though the explicit 
discrimination against the Chinese was ended by the revision of the definition of 
indigenous people to include all Indonesian-born citizens who never assumed a foreign 
citizenship, touted as revolutionary (The Jakarta Post 2006a, 2006b), nativism is deeply 
entrenched in the Southeast Asian discourse (The Jakarta Post 2012). In fact, even the 
wives from international marriages who spearheaded the push for the 2006 changes in 
Indonesian citizenship law and the 2011 changes in its immigration law (Rachman and 
Oktofani 2011; Sijabat 2011), whose combined effect was to combat gender inequality and 
ease the possibility for family members to live and work in Indonesia, have acknowledged 
that a full-blown allowance for dual citizenship would not be beneficial for the natives of 
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the country because of the competition in the labor market (Winarnita 2008: 311). When 
the 2011 immigration bill was passed, the press reported the minister for law and human 
rights pronouncing that “the new law contains changes on par with the “actual 
developments” brought by “increased mobility” of people due to globalization and efforts 
to keep the administration in line with ratified international conventions Indonesia has 
signed” (Grazella 2011). On the other hand we have the increasing calls by Indonesian 
diaspora for dual citizenship (Bev 2012). However, proposals for expansion of dual 
citizenship to adults based on arguments about globalization and the need to attract human 
and financial capital are counteracted by fears of exploitation of Indonesian resources by 
neighboring countries and neo-colonialist managerial trends (Lienau 2010; Prameswara 
2010), despite the evidence of the approach by the Indonesian government that 
naturalization of foreign talents is a fast track to success, even if it is in a somewhat 
frivolous field such as sports (Teguh 2010). Overall, the changes in Indonesian regulation 
of the citizenship-migration nexus could be interpreted as a gradual opening and thus 
liberalization (Hamzah 2011), but such an evaluation would be akin to application of 
double standards with hope for a future liberalization trend.  
As the situation on the Malaysia-Thailand border illustrates, in addition to the 
elements of the threat of an internal ethnic minority and external foreign power in the 
concerns with stateness, another key element of the discourse on dual citizenship are those 
of control of populations and cross-border movements. This issue is exemplified by the 
situation where thousands of people who live in Thai territory, but are of Malay descent, 
hold dual citizenship, although Malaysia forbids it. The dual citizens are perceived as 
disloyal by both sides – by Thailand due to separatism and by Malaysia due to political 
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differences between the government and the locally dominant political forces (Funston 
2010). This in turn encourages mutual distrust between the countries and the talks between 
the two governments about exchanging personal data to identify the dual citizens solving 
the problem have been taking place for over a decade. The government officials claim such 
efforts to be limited to identifying criminals and perpetrators of violence in the troubled 
border region, but the ultimate goal is to eliminate dual citizenship (The Nation 2009). A 
similar discourse can be observed in Mongolia’s pronouncements of cooperation with 
Kazakhstan in order to “solve the dual citizenship problem” (M.A.D. Investment Solutions 
2011), despite periodic proposals of introducing the possibility of dual citizenship. Thus, 
inter-state vulnerability due to population constellations endows dual citizenship with the 
label of potential danger to stateness and therefore a problem that needs solving. 
Even Japan, which has been the colonizer rather than the other way around like 
most other Asian states, feels threats, which become evident in the discourse on dual 
citizenship. Japan may succumb to China’s political pressuring when it comes to questions 
like harboring North Korean defectors (The Yomiuri Shinbun 2011), but it is not willing 
to succumb to a potential “fifth column” by allowing dual citizenship, as mirrored by the 
occasional attempts to scare the public about Chinese people who would settle on 
underpopulated islands and then vote for their secession from Japan and accession to China 
(Arudou 2011).  
Although the Singaporean discussion on the topic of citizenship also centers on 
attracting the desirable type of immigration (“immigrants have to be young, can contribute 
economically and can adapt to Singapore culture” (Yee 2011), it does not relent from the 
single citizenship principle except for those who are born into a dual citizenship situation 
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and are mandated to choose one of them by 21 (TR Emeritus 2011). In fact, Singapore is 
one of the countries that require documentary proof of renunciation of another citizenship 
for naturalization (Rubenstein 2003). Despite a “clinical” approach to migration via an 
economic lens (Yeoh and Lin 2012). Singapore exhibits squeamishness towards the 
propositions of dual citizenship and insistence that citizenship has to be about identity and 
belonging and putting down roots as a Singaporean. My conceptualization of citizenship 
as a stateness boundary maintenance regime would suggest that this is related to 
Singapore’s vulnerability as a nation, considering that the public discourse continuously 
refers to the experience of both British and Japanese colonialism, the relatively recent 
independence from Malaysia, a multiethnic population composed mostly through 
immigration, the culture of transit, and an uneasy relationship with the kin-states of its main 
ethnic groups (Yee 2011). 
Both a pursuit of remittances and concerns with historical animosities played a 
significant role in the Indian discourse on dual citizenship. The official inquiry into the 
situation of Indian diaspora acknowledged that the provision of the loss of Indian 
citizenship in cases of naturalization abroad was formulated in the Constitutional Assembly 
of India with an eye to the question of partition and the overwhelming need to delineate 
the citizenry of India vs. the citizenry of Pakistan, rather than with an intention of a blanket 
decision on dual citizenship (Report of the High Level Committee on the Indian Diaspora 
2002: 514-517). As Chaturvedi (2005: 148) notes, the report which paved way for the 
special status of Indians abroad was virtually silent on Indians in the surrounding countries 
of South Asia, witnessing to the lingering effects of postcolonial legacies and border shifts 
throughout this region. 
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The already tumultuous issues of loyalty are further complicated by the legacies of 
the Cold War and ideological juxtapositions. For example, the question of loyalty is 
paramount in the dual citizenship discourse in the two Chinese countries, both of which 
highly mistrust each other. For example, Chinese lawmakers and the public discourse are 
overwhelmingly opposed to the practice of dual citizenship, which is illegal in China, and 
call for stricter control, including finding a way to crack down on “birth tourism” (Zhao 
2012). In our scenario, China serves a role that is slightly similar to the role Russia plays 
for the postcommunist countries. 
In Taiwan, the issue of dual citizenship is hotly debated every time a change in 
citizenship legislation is proposed (1990, 1995, 1999, 2006) and has actually moved in a 
more restrictive direction, even if in certain other aspects the law became more inclusive, 
first and foremost in the sense of gender equality (Shen 1995). The central concept in the 
discourse on dual citizenship has been that of loyalty. The movement of Chinese between 
the island and the mainland could be considered to be an issue of national security, thus 
their migration is regulated under a special law and they are not allowed to hold public 
posts ten years after naturalization (Wang 2012). However, the focus of the public debate 
has been on questioning the loyalty of public figures, especially those who have ties with 
USA (or other Western countries) or Japan, as exemplified by the concern with the 
citizenship of the president’s daughter-in-law and her unborn child (Lin 2006). 
The long-available dual citizenship for lay people was questioned but not restricted 
in light of concern with the overseas Chinese. However, it is still asymmetrical and requires 
naturalizing citizens to renounce their original citizenship, prompting occasional 
statements of potential benefits in attracting foreign talents and wealth. These argument are 
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interlaced with pointing out that 90 percent of naturalizing citizens in recent years have 
been from Southeast Asia, because their citizenship is of lesser comparative value than 
Taiwan, but for Westerners their original citizenship is more valuable than Taiwanese 
(Crook 2010). The same cannot be said for public officials, who were forbidden to hold 
dual citizenship after the incident of a legislator of overseas Chinese pedigree who held 
dual Taiwanese-Australian citizenship and in the late 1980s was found to be “a frequent 
visitor to Beijing” (Baum 1995: 28). In fact, Taiwanese politics have been characterized 
by the frequent outcry about not only dual citizenship, but even a permanent residency held 
in a foreign country by any public figure.86 They get blamed both for disloyalty and for 
having “a life-jacket” when most of the population of the island does not have that luxury 
(Engbarth and Yeh 2008; Shih 2008). This subject has been fanned by both sides of the 
political spectrum against each other.  
Constant debates have prompted the ruling KMT party to propose that officials 
cannot hold either a foreign citizenship or permanent residency, representing a backlash 
against the 1979 decree which specified that there was no law which would prevent a public 
official from holding permanent residency elsewhere (Mo and Shih 2008). However, while 
the government is willing to pursue the exclusionary model of loyalty in politics, it is 
moving in the direction of liberalization of citizenship acquisition. Presenting the 2014 
proposal of amendments that ensure the availability of dual citizenship or permanent 
residency for the desirable foreign talents in science and research, they also liberalize 
citizenship attribution based on marriage to harmonize it with the International Covenant 
                                                 
86 The case of Diane Lee, a legislator and a dual citizen of Taiwan and USA, was dragged out from 2008 
till 2010 and ended with her imprisonment for corruption, spawning dozens of articles in the Taiwanese 
press. For residency as an issue, see Editorial 2009e; Mo 2008; Wang and Shih 2008. 
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on Civil and Political Rights and International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (Taiwan Today 2014). The balance between economic and normative concerns 
shifts based on the orientation of a given current government, but both the goal of attracting 
“high quality people” and the special treatment of ethnic Chinese are present in the official 
policy at the same time (Wang 2012).  
 
Having reviewed the main elements of the dual citizenship discourse in Asian 
states, it is possible to discern the elements discussed elsewhere in the text – an interplay 
between the instrumental and identitarian aspects of citizenship prompted by the need to 
deal with demographic pressures, and the concerns with stateness. However, for a more 
definite test of the theoretical purchase of these elements, I turn to an in-depth comparative 
case of a country which allows us to draw surprising parallels with the Lithuanian case, 
despite seldom being compared with countries outside of Asia in social sciences. For the 
purposes of this dissertation, South Korea is an unexpectedly fitting point of comparison 
for the Lithuanian case due both to its experiences vis-à-vis colonialism and Cold War and 
to its express concern with fitting in the international community in terms of economic 
development and human rights considerations, all of which I discuss in the following 
subsection. 
5.2.5.2. Testing the theoretical purchase: the case of South Korea. In contrast to 
the stunted attempt to introduce dual citizenship in Japan, the South Korean government 
did produce relevant changes in legislation and instituted conditional dual citizenship in 
2010, although both countries are some of the fastest aging societies in the world with 
record low birth rates and thus experience similar demographic pressures for openness 
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(Kim A.E. 2009). An appreciation of the development of Korean nationalism in the past 
century in relation to Japanese colonialism and later in relation to the Cold War division of 
the nation (see Shin 2006; Kim 2008; Kim 2009) makes expansion of access to citizenship 
and removal the requirement to choose one citizenship at majority even more remarkable. 
As I established in the preceding subsection, understanding this case requires taking into 
account the combination of developmentalist, demographical and stateness imperatives. 
5.2.5.2.1. International marriages and human rights. Gender equality, which is 
credited with a large role in the increase of dual citizenship in the mainstream accounts, 
has been one of the key features of the legislative changes in the 2000s throughout this 
region. In fact, the transition from temporary to permanent migration of women through 
the shading between labor and marriage migration has served as the major impetus for 
reconsideration of citizenship policies in relation to migrants (see Piper and Roces 2003) 
and for promotion of multiculturalism on governmental level, starting with the declaration 
of President Roh Moo-hyun that the trend towards multiculturalism was irresistible, which 
underlies the concern with integrating marriage migrants into Korean society (Doucette 
and Prey 2010).  
According to some analysts, the difference in the result of the dual citizenship 
debates between Japan and Korea in essence stems from the combination of a greater 
increase in international marriages and the ability to build a societal-governmental 
consensus in South Korea (Aizawa 2011). In light of the ability of human rights activists 
to link the discourses on internationalization, citizenship and migration in both Japan 
(Gurowitz 1999; Gurowitz 2006; Shipper 2011) and South Korea (Kim 2009; Nam 2010), 
it is important to also take into account the relatively more immediate memories of 
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experiences of the Korean democratization movement at the end of the Cold War and the 
overall more radical and active orientation of Korean NGOs towards promotion of human 
rights (Yamanaka and Piper 2005: 25, 27).  
Korean NGOs have been able to assume a de facto leadership of the public opinion 
on migration and have been more successful in producing the image of the international 
community as a “external positive other” and subsequently framing mistreatment of 
internal others as a national disgrace reminiscent of suffering that Korea experienced under 
the oppression of the “negative external other” (Japanese colonialism and USA militarism) 
(Kim 2009: 683, 679, 687-688). Furthermore, human right activists have been self-aware 
of their actions’ impact on the position of ethnic Korean minorities in other countries (Lee 
2011), especially Japan (Lee 2002: 123-124). This has translated into greater empathy 
towards and more beneficial developments for migrants. It is also interesting to note that 
the Overseas Koreans Act was instituted under President Kim Dae-jung, a former dissident 
who was eager to please the diaspora (Lee 2010: 237). Although in general human rights 
have not played such a prominent role in the citizenship discourse in Asia as they have in 
Latin America, South Korea could be considered to be one of the most prone to a human 
rights discourse among the countries in this region. I suggest that this openness is related 
to one of the key factors determining Korea’s ability to accept dual citizenship – the 
pervasive prevalence of the developmental discourse, which has been the focal point 
shaping the politics of both the authoritarian and democratic regimes in this country (Chang 
2012: 188-190 passim). The legitimacy of this orientation among Koreans has enabled a 
greater acceptance of globalization which was proactively embraced by the government as 
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a tool to further national development (Chang 2012; Shin 2006), and of migration and 
multiculturalism as its inseparable element. 
South Korea has experienced some of the most marked changes towards greater 
gender equality in its legislation within the past two decades (Hunt and Weldon 2011: 162), 
in large part due to the ability of civil society to coalesce around a notion of citizen that 
initially indicated an anti-authoritarian stance and after the regime change came to be 
deployed in the activists’ attempts to move from an exclusionary ethnonationalist towards 
a more inclusive civic conception of collectivity (Nam 2010: 80), as well as the 
aforementioned deployment of the desire to avoid embarrassment in the international 
community’s evaluation of Korean performance in terms of human rights (Cheng 2011: 
477-478). However, immigration officers’ self-appointed role as promoters of 
multiculturalism and human rights of asylum seekers and marriage migrants goes hand in 
hand with efforts to tighten border controls and crack down on fake marriage claims (Park 
2009b). The general stance is to enforce the distinction between those who move here and 
need to be integrated into Korean society to the point where they are expected to perform 
as Koreans do, vs. those who are temporary sojourners and thus do not merit a permanent 
place in society and similar efforts at integration (Lim 2009; Doucette and Prey 2010; Kim 
2012). Ethnic Koreans and their families are considered to be the first hurdle that needs to 
be dealt with properly before one can even hope to deal with migrants’ human rights (see 
Lee 2002: 119-120). Let us take a closer look at the mutual imbrications of 
developmentalism and ethnonationalism as mediated by stateness. 
5.2.5.2.2. The mutual imbrications of developmentalism and ethnonationalism. 
Despite the prominence of abuse of immigrant wives and the concern with the plight of 
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children of international marriages in Korean public discourse, it is important to pay close 
attention to the role of economic considerations in the Korean discourse on diaspora and 
citizenship, which is considerably more pronounced than in Lithuanian discussions of 
diaspora’s citizenship due to the hegemony of the developmentalist discourse. Actual 
developments in Korean legislation demonstrate how the strongly proclaimed 
ethnonationalist orientation towards the unity of the Korean ethnic nation was refracted 
through economic considerations.  
The end of the Cold War increased opportunities for mobility and diaspora 
members, no longer held back by an iron curtain, started to trickle and then poor into South 
Korea. At first the government, true to the official policy of Koreans as one nation, 
welcomed co-ethnics from the other side of the Cold War divide, but when the numbers 
grew, and when China expressed its discontent with what it perceived as an affront to its 
sovereignty over its citizens (Seol and Skrentny 2009: 153; Lee 2002: 110; see Kim 2009 
on how the historical developments in inter-state relations impinge on the transborder 
national membership politics), it turned cautious and kept adjusting its ethnic migration 
policies to curb the influx of low skilled laborers and mask it as more morally palatable 
family reunification or industrial training (Lee 2010). Even North Korean defectors became 
ideologically downgraded when they started to be perceived as a socioeconomic burden 
(Yoon 2012: 220). Similar to Japan’s efforts to curb the ethnocultural impact of migration 
by recruiting the descendents of Japanese from Latin America which turned sour in the 
times of economic downturn and led to officials offering cash incentives for those 
immigrants to leave and be relegated to the end of line if they wanted to return to Japan 
(McNeill, Minoru, Martin, Setsuko and Jun 2009), the Korean preference for ethnic 
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Koreans from abroad has been qualified by the need to manage the economy, especially 
evident by the tightening of migration policy after both the 1998 and 2008 crises.  
The revision of the Nationality Act in 1997 which effectively categorized ethnic 
Koreans from surrounding states as foreigners, and the timing and formulation of Overseas 
Koreans Act (OKA, introduced instead of a failed attempt at dual citizenship expansion 
(Lee 2002: 109)) which effectively split them into more highly skilled Koreans coming 
from the USA and low-skilled workers coming from China and introduced a differential 
regime of entry and freedom for each group, and the fact that when the OKA act was 
challenged for lack of parity, the discriminate treatment was removed from the law and 
shifted to the administrative realm of the visa regimes, shows the inextricability of 
economic and identitarian considerations (Kim 2008: 588; Seol and Skrentny 2009, Lee 
2010, Lee 2002). As Seol and Skrentny (2009: 157) argue, the paramount role of economic 
considerations has shaped a hierarchical order of South Korean citizenship by placing 
ethnic Koreans in the West slightly lower than local Koreans, but higher than ethnic 
Koreans from East Asian countries, who were still above immigrants of other ethnicities, 
but not equal to “full Koreans” (see also Lee 2002). 
When the expansion of dual citizenship beyond the age of majority was proposed, 
representatives of the government proclaimed that it is designed with the explicit goals to 
prevent brain drain, attract global talent and fight the low birth rate (Kim 2010). An 
exponential growth of immigration has brought about some vocal expressions of anti-
foreigner sentiment, which was partly responsible for an aborted bill meant to tackle racial 
discrimination in 2009, but in sociological polls over two thirds of the population has 
expressed their support for anti-discrimination legislation in general and more than a half 
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of those surveyed supported non-discrimination of foreigners more specifically, with 
tolerance decreasing with age (Lee 2010). However, from the point of view of the state, 
the promotion of multiculturalism could be seen as an extension of population policy (Kim 
2012: 209), a tool to enable globalization and soften its societal impact, rather than as an 
end in itself (Lee 2011). In the eyes of government officials who spearheaded the 
citizenship legislation changes, dual citizenship is necessary in the context of globalization, 
which was proclaimed as official governmental orientation by President Lee Myung-bak 
(Kang 2008). It is noteworthy that the officials expressed hope that the proposal of dual 
citizenship “will help attract competent individuals, especially second and third generation 
ethnic Koreans overseas” (Park 2009a), demonstrating the confluence of identitarian and 
economic considerations. As the head of the immigration service put it during the time of 
the proposal to expand dual citizenship, “population has already become a key factor 
deciding national power and competitiveness,” and dual citizenship should be “should be 
comprehensively allowed to cope with the lowering birth rate as well as to accommodate 
talented foreigners as Korean citizens” (Park 2009b). The state exhibits an overwhelming 
desire to be able to use dual citizenship as a flexible tool rooted in economic considerations. 
However, it still produces a somewhat colorful list of eligibility criteria (like working as a 
manager in a Forbes Fortune List company or a researcher in a renowned laboratory), and 
has to deal with demographic concerns. In fact, the push for dual citizenship was conceived 
as part of a concerted campaign to fight record low birthrates called “Increase Koreans”, 
next to such measures as an anti-abortion campaign (Byun 2011). 
The state cannot be expected to be completely neutral in terms of identity, as 
numerous critics of the administrative set-up for evaluating dual citizenship eligibility have 
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noted (Park 2011). In this context, it is interesting that critics have noted that easier rules 
for permanent residency (which was also promoted by deploying both appeals to human 
rights international norms and goals of economic development (Lee 2010: 244)) would be 
more consequential and beneficial for economic attractiveness (Editorial 2011). Although 
intellectual proponents of dual citizenship have emphasized the myth of Korea as a 
homogeneous society, from the point of view of the state the main arguments for its 
availability have centered on, as some critics put it, “economic instrumentalism” and 
“ability profiling” (Editorial 2011). In fact, the original proposal of expanding dual 
citizenship was only aimed at Korean adoptees and foreign talents, and later expanded to 
include Koreans who, when forced to choose one nationality, overwhelmingly choose not 
the Korean one (Editorial 2011), and, as officials themselves have acknowledged, did not 
sufficiently address the predicament of weaker members of society (Lee 2009), once again 
pointing towards the key role of economic developmentalist imperatives in the Korean 
discourse of citizenship in general (Chang 2012: 193) in the push for citizenship legislation 
changes in particular. 
5.2.5.2.3. Reinforcing stateness. The opponents of liberalization of citizenship 
legislation have emphasized the questions of loyalty to the nation, bringing up arguments 
that reach back to the 1948 debates on whether Koreans who collaborated with the Japanese 
imperialists should be citizens (Nam 2010: 84). The strongest expression of the opposition 
to dual citizenship is channeled through the issue of military conscription. The public and 
legislative opposition pushed the government to revise the dual citizenship bill in order to 
prevent “military draft dodgers,” “tax evaders” and “anchor babies” from being able to take 
advantage of dual citizenship, strengthening the emphasis on loyalty to Korea, instituting 
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an oath against using foreign national rights while in Korea, and expanding the space for 
administrative arbitrariness (Editorial 2007; Editorial 2009a; Editorial 2009d; Kang 2008; 
Kim 2011a; KST 2011; Lee T. 2009a; Lee T. 2010c; Park 2009c). Young men’s eligibility 
for dual citizenship will hinge on their fulfillment of military service, and initially the 
government was discussing applying a similar requirement of volunteer service for women 
(Kang 2008; Kim 2010). However, the government deemphasized the fact that this 
requirement will apply only to ethnic Koreans (but, note, not defectors from North Korea 
(Yoon 2012: 236)), which could reinforce the already negative sentiment towards what the 
public perceives as unfairness of dual citizenship (Editorial 2009d; Lee T. 2009a; Lee T. 
2010a; Lee T. 2011a). In Korea, dual citizenship is definitely not symmetrical in its 
application to a much greater degree than merely the question of purported equality of its 
availability to immigrants vs. emigrants – this is one of the main differences from the 
Lithuanian case. 
 Some of the overseas Koreans have not been happy with the automatic extension 
of dual citizenship to them precisely because it limits their possibility to take advantage of 
opportunities available for foreigners in Korea, such as being able to come to study without 
having to serve in the military of the country they have not been living in (Chung 2012). 
Most of the foreign spouses, whose predicament enabled to sway the public opinion in 
favor of dual citizenship, will not in practice be able to benefit from the new legislation, 
since most of them come from other Asian countries which do not allow dual citizenship, 
prompting some disgruntled citizens to accuse the government of using the issue of 
multicultural marriage as a promotional tool in order to mask the fact that the majority of 
benefits of dual citizenship will still accrue to the better-off families, which has long been 
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at the root of the negative public opinion on dual citizenship (Editorial 2009a; Lee 2011b). 
The government has been so concerned with closing all the loopholes which could lead to 
potential abuse of dual citizenship that they instituted the possibility to order a person to 
choose one citizenship and divest them of dual citizenship if they “act against the national 
interest with regard to the economy, national security and diplomatic relations, or seriously 
disturb public order” (Kim 2010). Due to concerns with loyalty and state interests Korean 
law bars dual citizens from holding certain public offices, a trend that is in line with 
numerous other countries’ approach to dual citizenship regulations. For example, dual 
citizens are obliged to perform military service, but are forbidden from pursuing a military 
career (Lee 2011a). Officials openly state that “it is improper for multiple citizenship 
holders to take part in investigations related to national security or state secrets, because in 
such cases Korea’s interest sometimes clashes with other countries,” that “people with a 
nationality other than Korean may make decisions that prefer the other country’s interests 
to Korea’s” and that “if a judge in cases about state secrets has dual citizenship, the public 
may not trust the judge’s ruling” (Kim 2011b). The different emphasis on potential 
disloyalty of officials vs. lay citizens is reflective of the general concern with dual 
citizenship. Note that when they say that “it is inappropriate for foreign nationals to take 
part in cases or investigations that involve national interest, classified materials and 
security issues” (Arirang News 2011), dual citizenship holders are considered to be more 
foreigners than Koreans.  
When the question revolves around economy, supporters of expansion of dual 
citizenship acknowledge that fixation on nationality hinders international competition, and, 
to be competitive, human capital is especially important for a resource-poor country like 
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Korea (Editorial 2009c). However, when it matters politically, true loyalty can ultimately 
only be single. On the other hand, although the ministry who drafted the bill had intended 
to restrict dual citizens’ suffrage for a time period after naturalization and a majority of the 
population supported the idea of making dual citizens’ voting rights conditional on having 
resided in Korea for a varying number of years, such a possibility was not even discussed 
by the legislators (Lee 2009b; Lee 2010d). Thus we see certain ambivalence towards ethnic 
Korean diaspora and their role from the perspective of stateness. 
5.2.5.2.4. Comparative purchase: South Korea via Lithuania. After reviewing the 
characteristcs of the South Korean case, it can be claimed that South Korea and Lithuania 
share a certain number of parallel developments that impinge on citizenship regulation. 
The modern ethnonationalist self-consciousness emerged in light of the experiences of 
being oppressed by a colonizing power, Japan and Russia, respectively. Later, the national 
identification of each country was strongly shaped by the opposition to communist regime, 
North Korea for ROK and the same Russia in a different disguise for Lithuania. The 
conception of the state-nation nexus is marked by a strong current of stateness concerns 
that focus on security and loyalty and are challenged by both ethnonationalists and human 
rights activists on both sides.  
The strands of debates directed against former colonizers closely mirror the 
arguments presented in the Lithuanian citizenship discourse, whose exclusionary impulses 
were explicitly aimed at representatives of nations whose states had at some point 
colonized all or part of Lithuania. Nationalism as a hegemonic way of conceiving of 
national identity (Shin 2006; Kim 2009), and the contradictory desire to have a place in the 
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globalized world and yet remain ethnocentric (Kim 2012: 205) is characteristic of both of 
these countries.  
On the other hand, appeals to international human rights norms of 
nondiscrimination have played a large part in both South Korean and Lithuanian changes 
in citizenship legislation, and the Constitutional/Supreme Court has been an active player 
in the dynamics of relations with diaspora, migrants and citizenship regulation (Lee 2010: 
241-242, Seol and Skrentny 2009: 158; Kim 2009: 155-156, Lee 2002: 116 passim), 
shifting its position from renouncing citizens right to vote abroad as prohibitively 
expensive to defending them as rights that are not dependent on obligations and prompting 
the government to pass necessary legislation (Chae and Moon 2012; Choi 2009).  
The historical experiences of colonialism and Cold War communism cannot be 
completely left in the past by either of these countries, as long as Korea remains divided 
and as long as Lithuania remains within Russia’s desired sphere of influence. What, then, 
could explain the leaning towards greater restrictiveness in Lithuania and towards 
relatively greater openness in South Korea? A more detailed analysis of the Korean 
political developments would require conducting a process tracing inquiry which goes 
beyond the scope of this chapter. However, based on the preliminary investigation, I 
suggest that the key factors that influence the divergence in outcomes can be sought in the 
greater embrace of globalization as a way of national development in Korea and a more 
restrictive international environment in the case of Lithuania, where using European norms 
as the referential point has forced the policy makers to retract the nonsymmetrical rules of 
dual citizenship availability instead of expand them. The continuing presence of the threat 
of Russia and fear of political and material interests of ethnic minorities which would be 
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at odds with the interests of the state conceived as a political vehicle of the Lithuanian 
nation has pushed the installment of symmetry in the more restrictive, rather than a more 
liberalizing, direction. At the same time, the fact that the debate about dual citizenship in 
South Korea appears to put a greater emphasis on pragmatic concerns than the discourse 
analysis shows in Lithuania’s case may lend tentative support to the claim that the context 
of the euro-integration leads to a greater emphasis of the identitarian dimension of 
citizenship, presuming that the practical matters have been taken care of courtesy of the 
common European space regulations. Lack of a buffer against the normative power of 
international norms (Gurowitz 2006) has been a factor in both countries, but Lithuania’s 
embeddedness in the institutional context which delegitimizes differential treatment based 
on identity has been more profoundly reflected in the critical juncture of its legislation on 
dual citizenship.  
 However, the importance of the identitarian dimension of Korean 
citizenship cannot be overlooked, even if it is not as explicitly discussed in the public 
debates about dual citizenship. There still are naturalization tests and classes that teach 
Korean language and try to instill an understanding of Korean culture and society (KST 
2009a). Even the international families that could have been the first seeds of 
multiculturalism have been subject to this nationalizing impulse, as evident by the 
introduction of Korean language tests for prospective brides in other countries (AFP 2014). 
Despite the emphasis on dual citizenship as a tool to attract global talent, we have to 
remember that some of the primary targets of dual citizenship policy is the ethnic Korean 
abroad, including adoptees (explicitly arguing for the need to enable them to self-identify 
as “biologically Korean”) (Park 2009c) and retirees who want to permanently settle in 
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Korea, and people who marry Koreans, thus becoming a part of the Korean nation. Both 
of these groups do not have to demonstrate possession of extraordinary talents required of 
those naturalizing for economic considerations. Furthermore, immigration officials have 
noted that those who want to naturalize and apply for dual citizenship due to their skills or 
talents still need to demonstrate their attachment and loyalty to Korea, even though they 
are exempt from length of residency requirements and naturalization tests, and their 
naturalization has to be deemed to be in the national interest (Kim 2010; KST 2009b; Lee 
2009b; Lee 2010b). Finally, all those applying for dual citizenship have to sign an oath of 
loyalty to Korea and vow not to use their status as foreign nationals while in Korea. Taking 
into account these aspects, dual citizenship legislation serves as a tool to confirm the ethnic 
tilt in citizenship legislation and to sharpen the delineation of the Korean nation, or, as Lee 
(2010) claims, readjusting the nation-state nexus, instead of diluting it, as the 
postnationalists might like to claim. The intention to make military service obligatory only 
for those dual citizens who are ethnic Koreans (Lee 2011a) may be one of the most 
egregious indications of the subordination of dual citizenship to the ethnonationalist 
conception of the nation-state, but it is far from the only one. Therefore, as a supercharged 
mix of historical and contemporary inter-state vulnerabilities, both geopolitical and 
normative, and of economic and identitarian concerns, the story of South Korean dual 
citizenship is an especially illuminating counterpoint to the curious Lithuanian case. 
5.2.5.3. South Korea and comparative implications. Having overviewed citizenship 
politics in Asia and conducted more in-depth analysis of the South Korean case, two key 
elements come into focus. First, surprisingly, it is possible to identify a pattern that is 
similar to the European the tension between instrumental and identitarian dimensions of 
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citizenship and the pressure of international human rights. The peculiarity of Asia comes 
through in the specific expressions of those dimensions. The instrumental dimension is 
centered around developmentalist ideologies and meets international norms in the need to 
deal with migration and international marriages, while the identitarian dimension is 
strongly expressed in the discourse on citizenship. The relatively strict regulations of dual 
citizenship in Asia help appreciate the role of the international human rights factors pointed 
out by the worldwide account of the spread of dual citizenship discussed in Chapter 1, such 
as concern with gender equality in citizenship attribution and international marriage, which 
stands in tension with the overwhelmingly ethnonationalist conception of stateness. Is it 
legitimate to say, as Brøndsted Sejersen 2008 and Aguilar 1999 suggest, that we can expect 
that dual citizenship will spread and be appropriated by Asian countries similarly to the 
way the concept of citizenship and of nation-state came from the West and was 
appropriated for local political contestations? The discussion in this subchapter appears to 
dampen such expectations. Concern with migration control is explicit in this region even 
if it comes at the expense of vulnerable inner populations, and speaks directly to my 
discussion of the concern with stateness in countries that have themselves been vulnerable 
to another nation/empire in the past. Thus, the second element that lends additional 
theoretical purchase to my propositions developed from the Lithuanian case is the role of 
postcolonial legacies in citizenship discourse. Although the instrumental dimension may 
be more pronounced due to the specificity of developmentalist states, the enduring 
relevance of citizenship as a nationhood and stateness boundary maintenance regime is 
even more pronounced. Since my analysis focused on the notion of conditions of possibility 
rather than probability, I can legitimately conclude that the building block of my theory do 
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appear to travel not only outside of postcommunist countries and Europe, but also outside 
the usual comparative counterparts and to the far reaches of the globe.  
5.3. Concluding remarks. 
After overviewing certain trends in citizenship regulation across various regions of 
the world, I can restate the theoretical purchase of the insights gleaned from the Lithuanian 
case. A look at the Western countries of immigration has called into question the 
liberalization/ convergence hypothesis, and the analysis of the countries beyond Europe87 
offers a valuable addition to Howard’s (2005, 2009) argument about the importance of 
colonial legacy for dual citizenship regulations. While his research was focused on the 
immigrant-receiving countries, the analysis performed in this dissertation and the 
comparative insights of this chapter help appreciate the importance of the legacy of 
colonialism and negative inter-state relations experiences when it comes to the countries 
of emigration, as well as providing a more balanced view of the question of securitization 
of citizenship-migration nexus. Both the cases of Mexico and South Korea [and Africa] 
                                                 
87 The global reach of my analysis can be considered limited by a lack of attention to dual citizenship not 
only in the island states of the Carribbean and the Pacific, but first and foremost in Africa. Since not a lot of 
comparative studies have been conducted on these questions, it did not seem efficient to have a separate 
section to recap mostly the work of one author, Brownen Manby (2009, 2009), who gathered and analyzed 
the information about citizenship regulation in African countries. She calculartes that approximately half of 
the countries in Africa tolerate dual citizenship at least to a certain degree and shows how the tendency 
developed from the initial exclusiveness aimed against former colonizers, to greater permissiveness born of 
the desire to harness the economic potential of diaspora for developmentalist needs, to a tightening of 
naturalization laws due to the negative attitude towards immigration. Dual citizenship in African states is 
characterized by asymmetrical treatment of emigrants vs. immigrants and by enduring legacies of 
postcolonialism, such as the mismatch between country borders and ethnic groups, and the preoccupation 
with being autochtonous, which often leads to contesting claims of who is the most indigenous. There is a 
certain amount of grappling with the issue of giving citizenship to colonizer settlers, where oponents use 
arguments like their privileged position under colonialism, access to dual citizenship, and questionable 
loyalty (Young 2012: 299). Thus, a cursory glance at the dual citizenship discourse in Africa suggests that 
my suggestion to take into account postcolonial legacies and the position of entitlement claimed by 
previously oppressed people is applicable to this region, but more in-depth analysis is needed to flesh out 
such suggestions, which goes beyond the limits of my research. 
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testify to the lasting impact of historical vulnerabilities on the availability of dual 
citizenship and the question of symmetrical treatment of immigrants and emigrants. 
The premise that extension of dual citizenship is directly linked to the lessening of 
conflict between states needs to be qualified by taking into account a certain “chronic low-
grade fever” that characterizes the relationship between those who have dominated and 
those who have been dominated at some point in history. The analysis of the Lithuanian 
case helps appreciate the persistence of the anticolonial sentiment and its embedding in the 
very scaffolding of statehood and nationhood, and the comparative look at countries in 
other parts of the globe through the lens informed by the findings of the Lithuanian case 
reveals the cross-regional prevalence of this phenomenon.  
Taking into account the data reviewed in this chapter, it is possible to finalize the 
conceptualization of stateness as the “missing ingredient” which helped us unpuzzle the 
Lithuanian case that was rendered unintelligible under the parameters laid out by the 
prevalend theories of citizenship studies. The term of stateness was coined in relation to 
the specific situation of postcommunist countries undergoing triple transition and has not 
been routinely applied to already established states. My contention and theoretical 
contribution to citizenship studies is to extend both temporal and geographical relevance 
of stateness. I showed that even after an independent state has been established and 
recognized by others, it does not loose the broader historical perspective, thus the state is 
permeated with awareness of its vulnerability, and continually maintains suspicion and/or 
resentment towards its former oppressors. I also demonstrated that it is possible to find 
concerns with stateness beyond the postcommunist region. First of all, the discourse of the 
need to maintain stateness and the suspicion and resentment towards others as past or 
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potential future oppressors, is essentially valid for all postcolonial countries. Second, if we 
keep in mind that the main constituent elements of stateness are territory and citizenry, it 
becomes evident that Western immigration states also experience pressures which can be 
perceived as challenges to stateness. Thus the concept of stateness offers a bridge between 
usually very remote domains of theories pertaining to emigration vs. immigration 
countries. I conceptualize citizenship as the main tool of boundary maintenance in a 
country whose dimensions of stateness are challenged, which in today’s world include 
virtually every country. 
 
  





My research project started with a genuine puzzle of a case which exhibits 
developments in citizenship regulations that fly against the predictions of mainstream 
theories on several levels, and used the empirical puzzle to revisit those theories. I analyzed 
the historical context and development of Lithuanian citizenship regulation, the critical 
juncture in 2006 in which the Constitutional Court ruled both against an ethnonational 
character and the very fact of dual citizenship, the reaction by the public, the diaspora and 
the politicians, and investigated the evolving constitutional doctrine on citizenship in an 
attempt to understand why Lithuania, a quintessential emigration country, would institute 
a backlash against dual citizenship for emigrants. Through my work, I touched upon several 
clusters of social scientific research, such as European studies; postcommunist studies; 
studies in citizenship, migration, and nationalism; constitutionalism; and ideational 
inquiry. 
The curious case of Lithuanian dual citizenship served as the grounds to reconsider 
three major assumptions of citizenship studies, namely, the hypothesis of convergence 
towards liberalization of citizenship regulation which sees dual citizenship as one of the 
main indicators of such liberalization; the treatment of European Union as the laboratory 
for postnationalism and liberal convergence and a catalyst of liberalization in 
postcommunist countries of Central and Eastern Europe; and the premise of emigrant-
sending countries’ interest in dual citizenship.  
I produced four main arguments in relation to these assumptions, the first two 
primarily related to the liberalization/convergence hypothesis and the role of the EU, and 
the other two concerning dual citizenship. First, the liberal convergence thesis and the 
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purported lessening of the importance of national identity considerations are significantly 
challenged when migration issues are taken into account, which I demonstrate by 
discussing the developments in the European Union. Second, instead of mitigating the 
ethnonationalist proclivities of Central and Eastern European countries and guiding them 
down the postnationalist path, European integration exacerbates the tensions in the 
citizenship discourse due to the combination of norms that delegitimize identitarian 
discrimination in citizenship regulation on the one hand, and the paradoxical strengthening 
of the identitarian dimension of citizenship engendered by the postnationalist decoupling 
of rights and citizenship on the other. Third, dual citizenship should not be considered an 
indicator of liberalization and postnationalism if it is conceptualized in terms of state 
concerns with loyalty and identity. Fourth, emigration countries’ approach to dual 
citizenship is much more nuanced and disaggregated than the mainstream predictions 
would suggest. However, taken together, these arguments still do not fully explain the 
curious case of Lithuanian dual citizenship. Therefore, this thesis is a theory-building 
endeavor, investigating the question of what conditions of possibility can account for the 
unexpected combination of restrictiveness of dual citizenship and adherence to 
international norms of nondiscrimination. 
I proposed to focus on the notion of stateness which was formulated within the 
studies of democratic transition and consolidation, defined by Linz and Stepan (1996) as a 
security of a state’s territorial and demographic boundaries. The empirical analysis of the 
Lithuanian case showed the pervasiveness of stateness concerns throughout the citizenship 
discourse, and I concluded that the unexpected restrictiveness of Lithuanian dual 
citizenship regulation is a result of a paradoxical gridlock produced by a combination of 
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the hegemony of international norms which delegitimize ethnic discrimination, and the 
continuous concerns with stateness which are intermeshed with identitarian imperatives. 
The fact that both of these limiting conditions of possibility are continuously pitted against 
the imperative to maintain ties with a significant diaspora means that the dual citizenship 
discourse is stuck in a feedback loop, rehashing the same arguments and the same attempts 
at legislative solutions since 2006, thus demonstrating the fundamental role of all three of 
these elements in understanding the dual citizenship discourse. 
Having distilled the main theoretical propositions from the Lithuanian case, I 
proceeded to test their comparative applicability. I overviewed the discourse and regulation 
of citizenship in other postcommunist countries, in Western Europe and the settler 
immigration states, in Latin America and in Asia. I concluded that all three elements are 
relevant more broadly in citizenship discourse, but their combinations may differ. Similarly 
to Lithuania, the citizenship of ex-USSR countries is to a large extent shaped by the 
relationship with Russia, as well as by their co-ethnic diaspora situation. The conditions in 
Central and Eastern European states are similar to Lithuania due to their participation in 
the common European space, having gone through same conditionality pressures, and 
going through the experience of the simultaneous delegitimization and re-iteration of 
ethnonationalist discourse on citizenship. In Western European states, we saw the re-
emphasis on the identitarian dimension in reaction to migrant pressures which should be 
interpreted as the West’s own brand of threats against which they want to maintain the 
stateness boundaries. Even the traditional immigration/ settler states exhibited symptoms 
of the reinforcement of the identitarian dimension of citizenship. Although Latin America, 
a region most often compared to postcommunist Europe under the rubric of transitology, 
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is considered to have relatively liberal dual citizenship policies, a closer analysis revealed 
the pervasiveness of the identitarian dimension and of postcolonial legacies, in addition to 
the struggles for participatory citizenship rights which can be construed as challenges to 
stateness. 
In order to stretch the test of comparative theoretical purchase to its limits, I chose 
to conduct closer investigation of the dual citizenship discourse in Asia, which is arguably 
the farthest removed from Central and Eastern European politics and society. However, I 
found a fascinating amount of comparability. Studying South Korea as a shadow case, I 
found evidence of the relevance of all three explanatory elements gleaned from the 
Lithuanian case: the pressure of international norms, the pervasiveness of ethnonational 
identity, and the concerns with stateness stemming from the legacy of colonialism and from 
new pressures of globalization.  
There exist certain differences, such as the continuation of relative importance of 
the instrumental dimension of citizenship due to the developmentalist approach in Asia and 
due to the precarious position of migrants without citizenship, and a more bottom-up rather 
than top-down or horizontal influence of international norms compared to Lithuania, but 
the essential elements of the story are remarkably similar. These findings give me 
confidence in offering my insights for further use. It would have certainly be better if I 
could have analyzed dual citizenship everywhere rather than only in select regions, but that 
is a task for the future, as the groundwork has been laid out. In sum, if we want to 
understand citizenship regulation in a particular country, we should look at the 
constellation of the conditions of possibility, where, on the one hand we have the tension 
between the ethnonationalist conception of the nation vs. the international human rights 
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regime and its imperative of non-discrimination, and on the other hand we have the tension 
between the interests of the state shaped by historical legacies of postcolonialism that work 
against openness vs. current migratory pressures for openness. Citizenship operates within 
these parameters and is employed as a mechanism for continuous stateness boundary 
maintenance in a world that challenges states and highlights the tensions between rights 
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Content Analysis Keyword Dictionary 
 
Dimension: ETHNIC 
Keywords: culture, customs, descendants, descent, ethnic, ethnical homeland, 
ethnical nation, ethnicity, forefathers, identity, (native) language, Lithuanian nation, 
Lithuanians, mentality, national minorities, nationalities, nominal nation, non-Lithuanian, 
origin, repatriate(d), repatriation, traditions. 
 
Dimension: CIVIC 
Keywords: civic Nation, civil Nation, discriminate(d), discrimination, equal, 
equality, human right(s), national concord, reside(d)(ing), residence, resident, rule of law, 
settle(d), settlement, state language, territory, tolerance. 
 
Dimension: INTENSITY 
Keywords: crucial, emphasize(d), important, must, need(s), obvious(ly), only, 
particularly, pay attention, precisely. 
 
DIRECTIONAL keywords: 
NEGATIVE: deficient, deviate(s), groundless, impossible, in conflict with … 
Article, unacceptable. 




Keywords: Convention, Europe, European, EU, international, treaty(-ies), 
United Nations, UNO, universal, world. 
 
Dimension: STATENESS 
Keywords: independence, independent, loyalty, (give an) oath, occupation, state 
[except in conjunction with “department”, when it indicates the name of a government 
institution, or with “news”, when it indicates the name of the official periodical publication 
of the government, and thus does not directly invoke the more fundamental notion of the 
state of Lithuania], statehood. 
  












































Figure B1. Ratio of means (Ethnic : Civic)




























Figure B2. Difference in means (Ethnic - Civic)
Difference in 
means (μE–μC)






















Figure B3. Frequency of paragraphs with "Ethnic" 













Figure B4. Frequency of paragraphs with "Civic" 
keywords of negative valence
NegC-Freqnc
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Figure B6. Trends in paragraphs with "International" 
keywords of the "Ethnic vs. Civic" dimension
Negative valence of E
Negative valence of C
Intense positive E
Intense positive C
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N of § 
N of § 
with E 
N of § 
with C 
N of § 
with I 
N of § 
with S 
ƒ of § 
with E 
ƒ of § 
with C 
ƒ of § 
with I 
ƒ of § 
with S 
1994-04 20 4 10 4 12 0.200 0.500 0.200 0.600 
1998-11 29 3 8 2 23 0.103 0.276 0.069 0.793 
2003-12 290 9 91 15 126 0.031 0.314 0.052 0.434 
2006-05 20 10 15 5 16 0.500 0.750 0.250 0.800 
2006-11 313 114 109 25 205 0.364 0.348 0.079 0.655 
 
Notations: § – paragraphs, E – “ethnic” keywords, C – “civic” keywords, I – “international” keywords, S – “stateness” keywords, 
N – number, ƒ – frequency, μ – arithmetic mean. 
 
 


























1994-04 0.400 0.333 0.200 -0.400 1.000 0.700 1.429 0.729 
1998-11 0.373 0.087 0.304 -0.724 1.660 1.000 1.660 0.660 
2003-12 0.099 0.119 0.047 -0.382 1.222 1.088 1.121 0.033 
2006-05 0.667 0.313 0.427 -0.550 1.100 1.400 0.786 -0.614 
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1994-04 1 1 1 1 0.000 0.100 NA -0.100 0.000 0.050 NA 0.050 
1998-11 2 1 2 1 0.000 0.034 NA -0.034 0.069 0.069 NA 0.000 
2003-12 1 1 1 1 0.000 0.010 NA -0.010 0.007 0.048 0.146 0.041 
2006-05 1 1 1 1 0.050 0.000 NA 0.050 0.150 0.300 0.500 0.150 
2006-11 1 1 1 1 0.150 0.000 NA 0.150 0.029 0.089 0.326 0.060 
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